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July 21, 2004

China, Taiwan and Sea Power

The Chinese have launched a new type of submarine, one probably designed to attack U.S. aircraft carriers. Thank you to Mud & PHuD for finding it first.

The new boat, which appears to be a combination of indigenous Chinese hardware and Russian weapons, suggests that China is building up its submarine forces in preparation for a conflict over Taiwan, defense analysts say.

"China has decided submarines are its first-line warships now, their best shot at beating carriers," said Sid Trevethan, an Alaska-based specialist on the Chinese military. "And China is right."

"One has to marvel at the enormity of the investment by the People's Liberation Army in submarines," said Richard Fisher, a specialist on the Chinese military.
The submarine is powered by diesel-electric engines. As such, it is less expensive and easier to operate than its nuclear counterparts. Diesel-electrics are ideal for coastal defense and short-range missions. It is tempting to dismiss them as "old" technology, but this would be a mistake. These submarines can be very sophisticated, and when running on electric engines are quieter than nuclear-powered subs of similar design. Further, sensors and weapons are not dependent on powerplant.

StrategyPage says that it appears to be an improved version of the Soviet Kilo class. Supporting the theory that the Chinese have decided to use submarines as their main strike force is the fact that the new commander of the Chinese Navy is a submariner. StrategyPage also dismisses the notion that the US was "surprised" by the new sub.

So...who cares?

You should care because China regards the island nation of Taiwan(or Republic of China, as they call themselves) as a breakaway province and is determined to bring it under Peking's rule. Make no mistake about it, they are deadly serious about doing this.

Word is that they intend to "resolve" the issue one way or another by the end of this decade. Because the Olympics are going to be held in Peking in 2008, they'll probably wait until after they are over before they make their move. They don't want a repeat of the 1980-84 boycotts.

Bill Gertz has an excellent book called The China Threat that discusses this possibility. Other people have written about this too, see here and here.

And by "resolve" they mean a shooting war if necessarily. One that we will certainly be drawn into. The US has pledged to protect Taiwan by force if necessary. We have pledged to do so through the Taiwan Relations Act.

The Chinese have probably decided to base their fleet on submarines for a few basic reasons.

First, they cannot hope to meet our carriers head-on. Operating an aircraft carrier is probably the most difficult challenge a navy can undertake. Given that they have absolutely no experience in this field, it would take years for them to become proficient.

Second, it is simply not the Chinese way to meet a confrontation head-on. During the Cold War it was said that the difference in strategy between the US and the USSR was that we played poker while they played chess. The Chinese, on the other hand, are better understood through an ancient author that is still considered a classic of military. Sun Tsu's Art of War preaches victory through deception and maneuver. Rather than meeting the enemy directly, Sun-Tsu preaches that one should adopt a more subtle strategy.

Appear at places to which he must hasten; move swiftly where he does not expect you. (Chap VI, 5)

Third, China is in the position of requiring a sea-denial strategy, while the United States and Taiwan must engage in sea-control.

Sea-denial means denying the enemy the use of a portion of the ocean without necessarily giving you control of it either. Sea denial is saying that "you may not safely sail your ships on this portion of the ocean." The definition of "safe" varies depending on the countries involved, the time in history, and the political stakes involved. Further, it refers to sailing surface ships, both military and civilian. At one time and place a nation may decide that high losses are worth it, while in another a nation may decide that any loss at all is unacceptable. The point is to know at what point your opponent will cry "uncle." But just because you deny the enemy the use of the ocean does not necessarily mean that you control it either. The enemy may be able to destroy an unacceptable number of your surface ships should you attempt to sail in the part of the ocean in question.

To have sea-control means that you can safely sail your ships on the particular part of the ocean in question. Sea-control means that you can safely navigate the ocean with acceptable losses. Again, "safe" is a relative term, and what constitutes "acceptable" losses will vary from conflict to conflict.

Submarines and shore-based maritime aircraft are both sea-denial weapons. The former cannot protect civilian merchant ships at all, and the latter, while immensely useful, cannot do it alone.

Aircraft carriers are sea-control weapons. Married to cruisers and destroyers, they can protect vast portions of the worlds oceans. They can also project power across the seas. Cruisers and destroyers cannot do this, let alone submarines.

In both world wars Germany needed to do was to cut off merchant shipping to Great Britain in order to win. The British depended on commerce for their lifeblood, and if Germany could sink enough ships they would be forced to seek an "accomodation" with Hitler. In other words, surrender. Germny built a vast submarine fleet in an attempt to achieve this goal. The Allies, on the other hand, needed to actually control the oceans, as they were the ones who needed to ship men and material from the US to the UK.

A similar situation existed in the Cold War. In the event of war, the US and our allies would need to ship men and armaments to Europe. We would have needed to control the Atlantic in order to do this. The Soviets, in order to conquer western Europe, only needed to deny us this transit. They could have achieved their goals through the use of land power. They would not need to control Atlantic shipping lanes themselves, but merely deny their use to us. They, too, build up a large submarine force, and never built anything but a few small aircraft carriers.

The point is that China does not need to control the ocean around Taiwan in order to win. All they need to do is do deny the use of that ocean to others, specifically the Taiwanese Navy, the US Navy, and the merchant ships of countries that trade with Taiwan. If they can achieve two or more of these goals they will bring Taiwan to it's knees in short order. Once Taiwan has acquiesced to the communist giant's demands, the fighting will end. It will be France, 1940, all over again.

There has been much speculation on the subject of Chinese plans for an aircraft carrier, but little is known for certain. What is known is that over the past twenty years they purchased one old Australian carrier "as scrap", and three Soviet-era carriers. None were put into actual operation, and apparently they used the hulks for study only. Rumor has it that they plan to launch a small carrier by 2010, but this is unconfirmed.

Unfortunately the response to this new Chinese submarine, as suggested by an analyst in the Washington Times article, is one that I think makes no sense:

The Navy should consider building its own diesel attack submarine to be able to "effectively duke it out with the new tidal wave of Chinese subs, that if left unchecked, may soon dominate the Asian littoral regions," Mr. Fisher said

Hmm, this sounds familiar. Alaska-class battlecruisers, anyone? In the first half of the twentieth century, navies thought that each type of ship would, in wartime, square off with it's counterpart. The dogma was that battleships would fight battleships, and cruisers would fight cruisers, and so on down the line. Each navy therefore built it's ships on this basis, that "our battleships must be bigger and better than your battleships, and our cruisers must be bigger and better than your cruisers."

Of course, things did not turn out this way. Ships only rarely fought against their exact counterparts. As a result, entire classes of ships became "white elephants." The Alaska-class is only the most obvious example of a ship that was built to counter a scenario that never materialized.

A more effective strategy is an exercise that the US Navy is in fact carrying out in coming weeks. It is called "Summer Pulse '04"

In the coming weeks, the USS Kitty Hawk and six other Navy aircraft carriers will be deployed around the globe to demonstrate America's ability to deal with a decidedly post-September 11 scenario: the outbreak of violence just about everywhere at once.

For security reasons, Adm. Kelly won't discuss specifics of the Kitty Hawk's role in the "Summer Pulse '04" exercises, which will include maneuvers with allies from every part of the world. But he can say one thing: It reflects a major change in the way the U.S. military is looking at the world these days

This makes sense for a number of reasons.

First, it takes into account how the Chinese will fight. They will be anything but predictable. We must adapt to this by being able to bring overwhelming force to the scene very quickly.

Second it is in tune with our required strategy of sea-control, which I discussed earlier.

Third, aircraft carriers provide enormous visual power. Submarines may be militarily very useful, but they do not have the psychological impact of showing footage of a Carrier Battle Group on the evening news. A few of these battle groups in the seas around Taiwan will give the Chinese leadership pause.

And lastly let's not forget that the US Navy has over sixty years worth of experience in sinking submarines. We got pretty good at it in World War II. We then spent the entire cold war getting ready to fight a Soviet submarine fleet that was larger than what China has now by several orders of magnitude.

This is an issue that is in the background now, but has the potential to explode within the next ten years.

Posted by Tom at July 21, 2004 4:25 PM

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