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November 30, 2004
Where are We? II
In the light of more research, it would appear that the pessimistic tone of the post I made immediately after the fall of Fallujah was not entirely warranted.
Jack Kelly puts the battle in the perspective of the history of insurgencies:
The rule of thumb for the last century or so has been that for a guerrilla force to remain viable, it must inflict seven casualties on the forces of the government it is fighting for each casualty it sustains, says former Canadian army officer John Thompson, managing director of the Mackenzie Institute, a think tank that studies global conflicts.By that measure, the resistance in Iraq has had a bad week. American and Iraqi government troops have killed at least 1,200 fighters in Fallujah, and captured 1,100 more. Those numbers will grow as mop-up operations continue.
These casualties were inflicted at a cost (so far) of 56 Coalition dead (51 Americans), and just over 300 wounded, of whom about a quarter have returned to duty.
"That kill ratio would be phenomenal in any [kind of] battle, but in an urban environment, it's revolutionary," said retired Army Lt. Col. Ralph Peters, perhaps America's most respected writer on military strategy. "The rule has been that [in urban combat] the attacking force would suffer between a quarter and a third of its strength in casualties."
One key to victory, then, may be within our grasp; killing them faster than they can replenish their ranks. Victor Davis Hanson points out that the al Qaeda terrorist in Iraq seem not to "...know the requisite numbers of dead or wounded Americans necessary to break the resolve of the United States...." They lack any military sophistication. Such an ignorance is quite in contrast to that of Mao Tse Tung or Ho Chi Mihn, for example, who were well versed in military theory.
There are other reasons for optimism also. Looking back on various revolutionary movements, especially that of Vietnam, Eqbal Ahmad wrote in 1970 that
An outstanding feature of guerrila training is the stress on scrupulously "correct and just" behavior toward civilians.... Guerrillas' use of terror, therefore, is sociologically and psychologically selective.
They must do this in order to be successful, that is. The insurgent terrorists in Iraq are anything but selective in their methods. Their infamous bombs, roadside or otherwise, kill indiscriminately. This is bound to turn the population away from them sooner or later.
And, indeed, there is much evidence to support that most of the Iraqi people are quite grateful to us for our efforts to rid their country of these terrorists. Recently, Rich Lowry received an email from a father who's son fought in Fallujah. He said that his son had related to him that
Many residents of that besieged town left bedding for the Marines and soldiers, along with notes thanking them for liberating their town from the terrorists and inviting them to sleep in their homes if necessary.
Not going to read stories about things like that in the MSM anytime soon. Much better to concentrate on one Marine who shoots a terrorist who may have been playing dead.
Ahmad identifies other factors that a revolutionary movement must possess in order to win, and it is instructive to note that the insurgents in Iraq have few of them on their side. These are the things that a revolutionary movement must possess;
- A coherent, consistant, ideology appropriate to the society involved
- A new vision of society that is in congruence with the old culture
- The symbols of revolution must derive from the local culture
- A program that promotes shared goals common to a broad base of people
- Functioning revolutionary institutions which are accountable to the population
- Leaders with integrity, who promote and practice the ideals of the revolution
- Sanctuaries are important, although not vital, to success
- External help is vital
From what I can tell, the insurgents are a mixed bag of leftover Ba'athists, common criminals, Iraqi Islamic fundamentalists, Sunni sectarians (by which I mean they regard Shi'is as the main enemy), and foreign al Qaeda troops. There is no unifying philosoply. We would be blind, however, not to recognize that a fundamentalist al Qaeda style of Islam motivates most of them. Although they have a leader who is on our "most wanted" list, he hardly seems in the mold of a Ho Chi Minh or Fidel Castro. They are getting help from Syria and Iran, but even that is infinately less than what North Vietnam got from the Soviet Union and China.
Lt. Gen Tom McInerney (ret) pointed out on Fox News last week that in ten years Iraq could be a showcase for the entire region. The insurgents know this, and that is why they are fighting so hard. They must prevent a popular government from taking shape. "As Iraq goes, so goes the Middle East."
In a separate article than the one cited above, Hanson has identified four things that we need to look at to determine if we are winning.
- Is the United States winning it's engagements on the ground? Answer; Yes, and we are doing so in overwhelming fashion. We re far more successful in basic combat now than we were in Vietnam
- Are the terrorists winning widespread Iraqi support? Answer; so far no. Any "help" they are providing to Zarqawi and company come from fear, not sympathy.
- Does fighting the terrorists lead to a political resolution that offers manifest advantages to the majority of Iraqis, and is it recognized as such? Answer; yes, because there are scheduled elections, and because the Iraqis are taking more and more responsibility for their own defense.
- Is there a mechanism for the U.S. to ease out of Iraq? Answer; yes again, says Hanson, and "More so than we think."
And, as Hanson points out in the editorial cited above, this is precisely how they think they can defeat us. As the press was once obsessed with Abu Ghriab, now they are fixated on the so-called "scandal" of a Marine shooting a terrorist who was likely playing dead.
We are not out of the woods yet, not by a long shot. But we are on the road to victory.
Posted by Tom at November 30, 2004 2:01 PM
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