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December 15, 2004
Humvee Armor and the Secretary
As it turns out, the Homespun Blogger's weekly symposium question is about Secretary Rumsfeld and the Humvee armor question. I addressed the issue in this post:
It's been pretty well established that the incident the other day when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld got some by tough questions from soldiers over Humvee armor was a setup. The reporter's behavior was completely out of line (and something of a braggart too). And Senators such as McCain and Biden, both of whom have been quite critical lately, are simply positioning themselves to run for president in '08. Further, we live in an age of style over substance, one in which the way a question is answered gets greater attention than the substance of the question at hand. But lapsing into despair over these things will not make them go away.
Ultimately, the question about the armor is valid. And it is inexcusable for Rumsfeld to have appeared startled by the question. After all, the issue of armor on Humvees and other vehicles has occupied the Pentagon for some time.
And unfortunately for Rumsfeld, it might get worse before it get's better. William Kristol, one of the most influential neoconservatives around, has declared in a Washington Post editorial that he no longer supports the Secretary. It seems to me that Kristol is entirely too hard on Rumsfeld, and seems unaware that the issue is actually fairly complicated.
And, before we write off our Defense Secretary over armor on Humvees, let's site back and take a deep breath. For the plain fact is that far from being the "arrogant, buck-passing" Secretary that Bill Kristol seems to think he is, Rummy is actually quite iconoclastic. He's trying to shake things up at the Pentagon far more than I think is generally realized.
Consequences
If there is any blame, it is in not anticipating that there would be an insurgency. We need to remember that we thought that what we were worried about was fighting a conventional battle against the Iraqi army. As such, our Army and Marine Corps was configured to fight just such a war. Armor on Humvees was simply not important in a traditional invasion, where armored vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank and Bradley M2/M3 fighting vehicle would lead the way.
But then, almost no one anticipated the insurgency. Recall that those who opposed the war warned of many dire consequences, but few if any mentioned a long insurgency. Most were focused on a conventional fight with the Iraqi army, or chemical attacks on our troops. Others told us that a civil war would almost certainly erupt, or that massive famine would ensue. Still others were certain that the "Arab street" thoughout the Middle East would erupt and chaos would ensue throughout the region, perhaps even toppling governments. But then if you're anti-war you are always forgiven.
That none of these things have happened seems not to matter to some of these critics. For the plain fact is that the requirements of an invading column and those of an anti-insurgent force are quite different. And it's not so simple to revamp overnight.
Armor on a Humvee has disadvantages, as has been pointed out elsewhere. One of them is slower speed, which can be a tactical disadvantage. Another is increased fuel consumption. In an insurgency, when you are operating from bases close to the scene of the action, this is not a big deal. But go back to the original invasion of Iraq (or of another country). This additional weight on the vehicles could very well have slowed down the invasion columns to the point where the Iraqis were able to put up a better defense. And this would have resulted in a longer conventional phase to the conflict. Which would have resulted in criticism from the usual suspects.
Some Marines in Fallujah have pointed out the pros and cons of armor to reporters who told them about the dustup with Rumsfeld
Asked whether he would prefer a closed Humvee with bulletproof windows, Munns said "it's a yes-and-no answer."
"An enclosed vehicle reduces your visibility and if you are not able to see an attack you might as well have no armor at all," he said. "It needs to be a fine balance between visibility and protection."
Munns said he prefers mobility over the weight of extra body armor.
The three Marines agree that the most exposed person is their gunner in the turret.
"He has to think about the bigger stuff, he is up there, more exposed than any of us," Munns noted.
History and More History
Here is where things get difficult. For me as a writer, that is. . Certainly it looks like up-armored Humvees are necessary in fighting the insurgency. Certainly also many soldiers are angry that they don't have enough armor. And maybe the Pentagon should have anticipated the need and got them out to the field faster. But, and I don't at all mean to sound callus here folks, but in the scheme of history this is not a huge screw-up. It is important and deserves our attention. Woe be the day when we shrug off what our troops tell us that they need.
And from most of what I read the Pentagon is and has been trying to get armor on the Humvees and trucks. Have their been mistakes, and should the job have been done faster and better? Perhaps so.
However, we need to put all this in the perspective of history. And if we take a little trip back through time, here are some things that we discover
- We entered World War II with 80% of our torpedoes being defective. That's right, folks, up to 80% of the torpedoes that we fired didn't work for one or more of three reasons: they dove too deep, they failed to explode on contact, or they detonated en route to the enemy ship, the magnetic detector being the culprit (ideally a torpedo goes under the enemy ship and detonates to achieve maximum damage, thus a magnetic detector is required to detect the steel of the ship).
- Not only did we enter the war with inferior and outright lousy tanks, we never did achieve parity with the Germanys. The reasons why we stuck with the venerable Sherman are many (and some quite valid), but that does not excuse the fact that we entered the war with inferior tanks. (Note to techies; yes I know this issue, like all others concerning military hardware, is very complex. See posts here, for example)
- The Shermans that we did finally build couldn't deal with the hedgerow country in Normandy in the days and weeks after the D-Day invasion. The tanks became stuck in the hedgerows that were all over the area and became bogged down. Finally a US sergeant came up with the idea of welding a fork-like scoop to the front of the tanks. When they came to a hedgerow they were able to plow the hedges up and keep moving. None of this was anticipated, as arguably it should have.
- However one comes down on the debate about US tanks, no one can dispute that our aircraft were almost universally inferior, especially to those the Japanese had. Our F4F Wildcat couldn't match the famous Mitsubishi Zero, the F2A Buffalo was a joke, the and TBD Devastator obsolete . At least theSBD Dauntless was a good aircraft.
- We went into Vietnam with F-4 Phantom fighter aircraft that didn't have guns. In our infinite wisdom we had thought that the days of gunbattles in the sky were over and everything would be decided by missiles. Wrong. Pilots quickly discovered that while missiles were preferred, there were many cases where only a gun would do. To rectify the situation we strapped a gun onto the center hard-point of the Phantoms (or some of them anyway), and only later reincorporated a gun into the aircraft.
Rumsfeld the Rebel
Take this story that appeared in the Wall Street Journal recently. The Army was quite convinced that it had discovered the way to winning future wars. Speed, overwhelming firepower, and ever-better C4I capabilities would surely devastate future enemies. What we found out was that yes, we could win this way - as long as the enemy cooperated. As Clausewitz reminded us
In war the will is directed at an animate object that reacts
Rumsfeld understands all this perfectly and it working to change how the Army fights.
"We're realizing strategic victory is about a lot more than annihilating the enemy," says one senior defense official in Mr. Rumsfeld's office. Victory also requires winning the support of locals and tracking down insurgents, who can easily elude advanced surveillance technology and precision strikes. In some cases, a slower, more methodical attack, one that allows U.S. troops to stabilize one area and hold it up as an example of what is possible for the rest of the country, could produce better results, according to emerging Army thinking.
Mr. Rumsfeld acknowledges that the military, which is still organized "to fight big armies, navies and air forces on a conventional basis," must change in order to deal with guerrilla fighters and terrorists. "The department simply has to be much more facile and agile," he says in an interview. "We have got to focus more on the post-combat phase."
and further
A recent directive, prepared by Mr. Rumsfeld's office and still in draft form, now yields to that view. It mandates that in the future, units' readiness for war should be judged not only by traditional standards, such as how well they fire their tanks, but by the number of foreign speakers in their ranks, their awareness of the local culture where they will fight, and their ability to train and equip local security forces. It orders the military's four-star regional commanders to "develop and maintain" new plans for battle, hoping to prevent the sort of postwar chaos that engulfed Iraq.But does it Matter?
Despite all of the good he has done in his position, Secretary Rumsfeld is under attack as never before. Regardless of what one thinks of Senators McCain and Hagel, when they call for his resignation we must pay attention. And when Bill Kristol adds his voice to the chorus, it's really time to sit up straight.
Perhaps the Humvee armor story is overblown. But if that is so it is more a case of the straw that broke the camel's back. Our inability thus far to put a lid on insurgency in Iraq has frustrated supporters of the war. That they should call for changes at the top should not surprise us.
Update
The editors of National Review, as usual, put some perspective on the issue of armor
Remember: When Rumsfeld showed up at the Pentagon for
his second stint as secretary of Defense, the army was hell-bent on building the Crusader, a "mobile" artillery system that couldn't even fit into a C-130 transport plane. It wanted to build the Comanche helicopter, an aircraft conceived in 1983 with our Soviet adversary in mind. The army was caught in a bad Cold War flashback. As the Wall Street Journal reported earlier this year, "Even as the armored Humvee proved itself in small conflicts around the globe, the Army failed to buy more because it was focused on preparing for major wars with other large armies — rather than low-end guerrilla conflicts."
It would be ironic if Rumsfeld lost his job over the issue of armor, when it was he who has been trying to revamp the military just so it could fight these "low-end guerrilla conflicts.
At this point, of course, everyone agrees on the need for more armored Humvees, which weren't originally conceived as combat vehicles. But in considering today's conventional wisdom, it is always useful to remember yesterday's. Before the roadside bombs really took hold as the Iraqi insurgents' weapon of choice, commentators were praising the British in Iraq for their unthreatening approach that emphasized soft vehicles and foot patrols. The Pentagon was criticized for its attachment to armor, not for having too little of it.
But hindsight is always 20/20 and if you're an anti-war commentator you are never held to account for what you said in the past.
Meanwhile, Republicans McCain and Hagel call for Rumsfeld's head. Once again, the editors of National Review
The get-Rumsfeld crowd — mostly Democrats, joined by the McCain-Hagel caucus and a few stray hawks — takes great umbrage at Rumsfeld's answer to a National Guardsman's question about an insufficient number of up-armored Humvees. Hagel intoned, “those men and women deserved a far better answer from their secretary of Defense than a flippant comment.” But Rumsfeld wasn't being flip. One wonders whether Hagel has even taken the time to read the full transcript of the secretary's remarks. The troops gave Rumsfeld a standing ovation at the end. Is it the position of the secretary’s critics that the troops were too stupid to realize they had just been belittled?
Further, Rumsfeld was certainly right when he said that you go to war with the army/military that you have. Long gone are the days when one had time to hold off the enemy with whatever was at hand while you built up your forces. Today we are almost required to see into the future. Unfortunately, noone has yet invented the necessary crystal ball.
Update IICourtesy of the Greg Pierce at the Washington Times
The truth is trickling out on the true state of affairs concerning the armoring of U.S. vehicles in Iraq, the Media Research Center reports.
" 'It now appears that the premise of the question that caused an uproar around Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was, so to speak, off base,' [Fox New Channel's] Brit Hume noted Tuesday night in reminding viewers how two weeks ago National Guardsman 'Thomas Wilson said to Rumsfeld, quote, "our vehicles are not armored, we do not have proper armament vehicles to carry with us north," into Iraq.'
"But, Hume relayed, 'according to senior Army officers, about 800 of the 830 vehicles in Wilson's Army regiment, the 278th Calvary, had already been up-armored' at the time of his widely publicized question.
Posted by Tom at December 15, 2004 11:15 AM
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