The Redhunter

This week's question was submitted by Arthur Chrenkoff:

The war on terror and the war in Iraq have caused deep fissures through the international political landscape, but arguably not simply and predictably "left" versus "right"; after all, President Bush is allied with a social democrat Tony Blair and ex-communists of Eastern Europe, while the anti-war coalition is also a motley crew of American and British paleo-conservatives, European right (France) and left (Germany) and many others.

So what does it all mean? What is the new divide in international politics? And will it last?

Arthur is correct in that the new division is not primarily traditional concepts of "right" vs. "left". They still exist, and the far-left is arguably more unified than the right, but that is a subject for another day.

During the Cold War, the most powerful alliances were among ideologically compatible leaders. Thus Reagan, Thatcher, and Kohl could lead the rest of NATO towards common goals, such as installing our own intermediate-range missiles to counter the Soviet SS-20s.

With the Cold War over these alliances have or are breaking apart. NATO has outlived it's original usefulness and now seems to serve primarily as a means of integrating eastern European countries into the West. Without a common enemy, the traditional NATO allies see little reason for unity. For example, six NATO countries have refused to send their military officers into Iraq to train Iraqi forces.

It was assumed by many that democracies would naturally band together to encourage the spread of their form of government throughout the world. The first Gulf War seemed to confirm this theory, with the nations of western Europe and the United States coming together against a traditional dictator. Ditto with Yugoslavia, when, after much hesitation and hand-wringing, NATO intervened to keep the slaughter to a minimum.

It was the aftermath to the Gulf War that saw the start of fissures. We were able to ignore them, however, and put them down to the traditional obstructionism we've come to expect from France and Russia. It was the run-up to the invasion of Iraq that saw the divisions widen to a point where recognition of a new reality became inperative.

The New Divide

Perhaps in the future I will come up with a single term to label each side, but no single one seems to apply just now. This may be because each side is not unified, but is itself made up of factions with disparate interests.

In One Corner

George Bush and Tony Blair lead a coalition that can be described as consisting of elements of the following; neo-Wilsonians, idealists, moralists, and those concerned about national security, and who wish to preserve their national sovereignty.

To this group, security threats are paramount. The threat will be addressed multilaterally if possible, unilaterally if necessary. Their short-term tactic is aggressive use of military force, and the long-term strategy is encouragement of the spread of democracy. They are skeptical of "international law". International institutions are useful insofar as they serve these goals.

Not all members of this group are in unity over all matters. The individual's right to self-defense is not at all viewed similarly in the US and UK; see horrifying example here.

Readers of this blog will be in no doubt that I am firmly in this group's corner.

In the Other Corner

Opposition to the first group is made up disparate elements also. The can be described as consisting of the following: freedom-skeptics who are advocates of a realpolitik-style of foreign policy, traditionalists whose only philosoply is that of retaining cold-war alliances and who's motto is "stability uber alles" (see Brent Scrowcroft), world government-types, and nationalists such as those in France or Russia who have no ideology or principles save what benefits their respective countries. Oh yes, we also have the re-emergence of the New Left, so ably documented by David Horowitz.

This description of the two sides seems unsatisfying. It was so much easier during the Cold War, when we had the "first world" of democratic states, "second world" consisting of the communist-bloc nations, and the "third world", into which we could lump everyone else. However, I am not sure that we can be so neat in our descriptions this time.

What Does it Mean?

Three things immediately come to mind:

One, simple recognition of new realities. Traditional Cold War alliances are dead, and continuing to pretend otherwise is folly. Thus John Kerry talk about "rebuilding alliances" was at best just so much useless twaddle, at worst dangerous as it refused to recognize basic facts that have become clear in the post-Cold War world.

Second, that we need to look towards building new alliances. I have no answers here yet, but explored this concept towards the end of my answer to last week's symposium question last week.

Third, we need to disengage ourselves from institutions such as the UN. This should occur simultaneously as our development of new alliances proceeds.

Will it Last?

Yes, and the fissures will widen further. War with China is a real possibility before the decade is out. I wrote about this a few months ago in a post, and interested readers can find details there. The point here is that such a war over Taiwan will exacerbate these divisions. Our prime ally will be Japan, and most western Europeans will be outraged by any military resistance to the PRC.

If we are successful in Iraq, as I think we will be, the spread of democracy in the Middle East will further inflame tensions. This will seem odd to traditionalists. They fail to realize that the French and Germans, for example, couldn't care less about the spread of democracy. They are safe and secure in their continent (or so they think, can you say "Iranian ICBM"?) and see their mission as developing a counterweight to the "hyperpower" that is the United States.