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February 14, 2005
Just War Series - Probability of Success
Summary and Outline:
Introduction to Just War Theory
I. Recourse to War - jus ad bellum
- Just Cause
- Competent Authority
- Comparative Justice
- Right Intention
- Last Resort
- Probability of Success
- Proportionality
1. Discrimination
2. Proportionality
There must be a reasonable probability of success (victory) before a way may be considered just. This does not mean that victory must be certain, only that one must not start a war unless there is a reasonable probability of success. Offensive wars fought in vain are traditionally considered unjust.
The Meaning of Victory
First we must define victory. It has been my observation that all too often people see warfare and victory in terms of World War II; invasion of a country, total defeat of it's armed forces, capture of it's capital and leaders, and occupation of the country until a new government is installed. As an accident of history would have it, we live in a time in which we are involved in another such total war in Iraq. It would be a mistake, however, to view all war as if it occurred this way.
The reality is that most wars are fought using limited means for limited goals. "Total War" is the exception, not the rule. Rarely does victory involve the total destruction of the enemy and occupation of his homeland. Nineteenth century Prussian general turned military and political philosopher Carl von Clausewitz wrote that
In war many roads lead to success, and...they do not all involve the oponent's outright defeat. They range from the destruction of the enemy's forces, the conquest of his territory, to a temporary occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate political purpose, and finally to passively awaiting the enemy's attacks....The point, of course, is that the definition of what constitutes victory depends on one's objectives, and the objective need not be total war. It need not even involve actual fighting. Clausewitz explains:Bear in mind how wide a range of political interests can lead to war, or ...think for a moment of the gulf that separates a war of annihilation, a struggle for political existence, from a war reluctantly declared in consequence of political pressure or of an alliance that no longer seems to reflect the state's true interests. Between these two extremes lie numerous gradations. If we reject a single one of them on theoretical grounds, we may as well reject all of them, and lose contact with the real world.
Combat is the only effective force in war; it's aim is to destroy the enemy's forces as a means to a further end. That holds good even if no actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed.(emphasis added) In other words, if we can achieve our goal with a credible threat of force, then so much the better.
Therefore, to determine the probability of success, one must ask, "Success in achieving what objective(s)?"
Pyrrhic Victory?
In the past many or most nations were generally not so concerned with the amount of damage that they caused to an enemy, as long as the objectives were met. There are many reasons for this, not least among them is the advent of television which brings the horrors of war to your living room in living color. It is not our purpose here to examine this, but to examine the concept of victory in our modern age.
World War II was perhaps the last war in which major democracies could wantonly and deliberately kill huge amounts of "enemy" civilians, and cause tremendous damage to the enemy's homeland without domestic repercussions.
Even with precision weapons and careful targeting, civilians will be killed and property will be damaged. We do try and limit this, but it will occur (Note; we will discuss this in detail in Part II of this series, Conduct in War: Discrimination and Proportionality). Success in war is to a large extent dependant on how it is reported, and opinion counts, not just at home but abroad. Now, it is equally true that no matter what we do, many will believe the worst about us, encouraged by news outlets such as Al-Jazeera. The point is that we must be cognizant of domestic and world opinion as never before, and therefore must take as many precautions as possible against unnecessary damage (again, this will be discussed in detail in future posts)
So today we do not simply ask "victory at what cost to us?" but "victory at what cost to us and to the enemy?"
Better Dead than Red?
One question that theorists used to struggle with is whether it is just to put up a defense if defeat is all but certain. Back when few if any countries were representative democracies one could reasonably ask if "defeat was all so bad" when compared to the amount of death and destruction that would occur in a war. One could do a utilitarian analysis and come up with an answer in mathematical terms.
During the Cold War, many debated over whether victory had any meaning in an age in which nuclear weapons could kill most or perhaps all of the citizens of the warring nations. Since this scenario is largely behind us, and would take much space anyway, so we will not consider it here.
However, we may well go to war with a nuclear armed China, North Korea, or Iran. Would we be justified in going to war over Taiwan, for example, when there was a chance (however small) that we might lose Los Angeles (as a Chinese general once threatened)? I will try and answer this and more questions in future posts.
War on Terror
As we saw in a prior post, a war declared only to exact retribution is unjust. With regards to terrorism, war may be declared to prevent future terrorist acts. Al Qaeda operated from Afghanistan, and had a declared intent to do as much damage to the United States and our interests as possible. They also had a history of staging attacks against us ( ex: possibly the first World Trade Center bombing, our Embassy in Kenya, the USS Cole) we were justified in going to war to destroy them and their Taliban protectors. By doing so we reduced their ability to conduct future operations.
It is also just to take even preemptive action to destroy terrorist bases and those who harbor them. If we determine that other nations are harboring terrorists who wish to harm us or our allies, we would be just in destroying them (as long as all other criteria of Just War are met).
The Iraqi War
One can only make decisions using information available at the time. One cannot make decisions based on information that only becomes available later. I realize this sounds obvious, but as some seem not to understand these concepts they need to be said.
The relevant question, therefore is: Did the war advocates have reasonable cause to believe that a war would be successful?
In light of the criterion outlined above, my answer is "yes." Given the information that we had available at the time, we had a reasonable expectation of success. We had reasonable expectation that we could find and destroy Saddam's WMD (which we had good cause to believe existed), destroy his armed forces, and set up a representative government.
Like all wars in history, the Iraq War has not turned out exactly like the planners had hoped. Then again, it hasn't turned out totally differently, either. The planners got some things exactly right, like the ability of the U.S. military to destroy the Iraqi military (this contrary to some critics; remember the "Battle of Baghdad" that never took place?).
However, the size and scope of the terrorist insurgency was not anticipated. Further, it has been harder to get a representative government in place than we anticipated (and success is still not assured). Few anticipated that the Iraqi strategy would be to go over to guerilla/terrorist warfare, and even if they had, it wouldn't have mattered, for I believe that we are indeed on the way to defeating them anyway.
It is impossible to fight a war and totally avoid civilian casualties and destruction of property.
However, we have made vast strides since Vietnam, let alone the Second World War. Our forces to go great lengths to avoid unnecessary death and destruction, as is evidenced from a perusal of honest sources about the war.
Further, although it is not clear that war advocates were too optimistic with regard to support from the Iraqi people, the recent elections demonstrate clearly that they are on the road to success.
All in all, therefore I believe the war in Iraq meets the Just War requirement of Probabililty of Success
Update
Blogger Mark O asks
How about the American Revolutionary War? Given the size and strength of the British Empire at the time, we had no reason to expect success unless the English were sufficiently distracted by foreign powers, i.e., the French. However one could argue that at the outset we had little cause for believing in a probability of success in that war. Was it Just?
Excellent question. I believe the answer lies in whether the Founding Fathers had reasonable cause to believe that they would be successful.
According to the article on the American Revolution in Wikopedia, in 1775 the British had a standing army of about 50,000 men. During the course of the war, they were able to hire 30,000 Hessian mercenaries. However, the total British strength in America never exceeded 32,000 at any one time.
As for the Americans, Perhaps 250,000 Americans served as regulars or militia men during the war. The maximum serving at any one time, however, was never more than 90,000. Washington himself never commmanded more than 17,000 in his Continental Army at any one time.
We never had much of a navy, only sending forth small ships and frigates, whereas the British had the most powerful navy on earth. The advantage to the British was twofold; they could move troops up and down the coast at will, and they could wreck trade and imports of arms from Europe.
According to another article, here are the advantages each side enjoyed: --British advantages
*Stronger navy
*Better trained army though officer corps not at same level of expertise as naval officers. Army officers were promoted not on merit, but by purchasing their ranks.
*Financial structure
*25%-33% of Thirteen Colonies= population, called Loyalists or Tories, probably supported the British (plus another third of population who would waver until they saw which way things are going-thus if Britain achieved battlefield victories, these undecideds would stick with the crown). Probably 30-50,000 Loyalists fought with the British.
*Motivation: questionable, had to hire German mercenaries (Hessians) to fight.
--American advantages
*Conditions of victory more easily achievable-- British must achieve outright victory, Americans must merely avoid losing.
*No center of gravity exposed to British
*Militia availability
*Britain had to utilize navigable rivers in order to supply troops.
*Britain had world responsibilities to cover at the same time.
*Motivation: fighting for their lives and for a cause
*Selected foreign officers came to support the patriot cause (Lafayette, von Steuben, de Kalb)
* Leadership of George Washington
We should not play a desperate game for it or put it upon the issue of a single cast of the die. The loss of one general engagement may effectively ruin us, and it would certainly be folly to hazard it, unless our resources for keeping up an army were to end, and some decisive blow was absolutely necessary; or unless our strength was so great as to give certainty of success. Neither is the case: America can in all probability maintain its army for years, and our numbers though such as would give a reasonable hope of success are not such as should make us intirely [sic] sanguine. A third consideration did it exist might make it expedient to risk such an event-the prospect of very great reinforcements to the enemy; but every appearance contradicts this, and affords all reason to believe, they will get very inconsiderable accessions of strength this campaign. All the European maritime powers, are interested for the defeat of the British arms in America, and will never assist them.Certainly the war could have gone either way. I'm no expert and don't have time to do a thorough analysis. Many Founders were quite nervous about war with Britain and I'm sure someone can unearth letters to that effect. My brief research and knowledge of the subject says that the Founders had reasonable cause to believe that they would be successful.
...
On whatever side it is considered, no great reinforcements are to be expected to the British army in America.
...
On our part: we are continually strengthening our political springs in Europe, and may everyday look for more effectual aids than we have yet received. Our own army is continually growing stronger in men arms and discipline. We shall soon have an important addition of Artillery, now in its way to join us. We can maintain our present numbers good at least by inlistments [sic], while the enemy must dwindle away; and at the end of summer the disparity between us will be infinitely great, and facilitate any exertions that may be make to settle the business with them.
Posted by Tom at February 14, 2005 9:00 PM
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