The Redhunter

It's worth hoping over to read the entire article, but here are a few of Dr Raphaeli's observations:

There were two parliamentary elections in Iraq in 2005- the first on January 30 and the second on December 15. There were, however, significant differences between the two:

1. Participation - The first election was boycotted by the Sunnis. Although self-imposed, the boycott reflected somewhat negatively on the legitimacy of the election and its outcome. In the second election, there was overwhelming Sunni participation with a view of playing a significant role in the country's political process. In the AnbarProvince, the heartland of the Sunni-led insurgency, 88 percent of the eligible voters exercised their right to vote. Contrary to previous Sunni position, Dr. Adnan al-Duleimi, a key leader in the Sunni community, stated that his group will enter into alliance with anyone who is committed to the integrity of Iraq.

2. Security - In the first election, people voted under the cloud of the threat that "blood would flow in the streets." In the second election, the Sunni insurgents held their fire. Security was maintained through curfews, restrictions on the movement of non-authorized vehicles, closure of borders with neighboring states and an effective cordon sanitaire around the polling stations established by the Iraqi security forces, aided unobtrusively by the U.S. military.

3. Methodology - In the January election, Iraq was treated as a single constituency with the votes cast distributed among the different slates on a strictly proportional representation method. In the December elections, there was a more complex system with the 275 contested seats divided into two categories. The largest category of 230 seats were divided among the 18 governorates with Baghdad receiving the largest share of 59 seats and al-Muthana Province, in the south, with the smallest share of 5 seats.

The remaining 45 seats, known as the compensatory seats, will be divided according to a complicated mathematical formula. [4] The compensatory seats would help small parties or even individual candidates who may not receive enough votes to qualify for a seat in one governorate to be elected with the help of votes cast in for them in the other governorates or overseas.

4. Duration of Parliament - The parliament elected in January was a transitional one entrusted with the responsibility of promulgating a new constitution with its provisions for a general election. The December election has elected a parliament for a term of four years operating in a fully sovereign Iraq.

5. Scope of Voting - In the first election, the voters cast two ballots, one for the parliament and one of the Council of the Governorate where they live. In the Kurdish region there was a third ballot for the Kurdish parliament. In the December election there was one ballot for electing a new parliament.

The Key Concerns of the Iraqi Voters

Most commentators agree on a number of key concerns for the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi voters. These include:

(a) the restoration of security;

(b) the building of the foundations of a modern state with functioning services-electricity, water, health and petrol;

(c) the ending of corruption;

(d) the creation of employment opportunities; and

(e) the exiting of the multinational forces.

...

Political configuration after the Election

Even when the results are made public, it is a safe assumption that four or five key political groups in the new parliament will negotiate extensively over the future government's agenda and the distribution of its portfolios, particularly those commonly referred to as the sovereign ministries, among the winners. After the previous election in January, it took the two leading coalition partners three months to form the current government and that only after the U.S. president called on the party leaders to conclude their bargaining.

The Sunnis will enter the new parliament with renewed political vigor and with determination to seek far-reaching constitutional and political concessions. The willingness of the other partners to make the concessions will be inextricably tied to the capacity of the Sunnis to deliver on the issue of the cessation of the insurgency.

There is a common agreement, however, that unless the Sunnis join the political process the stability of the country and indeed the future of democracy will be in jeopardy. The United States will no doubt use its good offices to insure that concessions are made by everyone to bring the Sunnis in full force into the next Government of Iraq as part of an exit strategy of the multi-national forces.