The Redhunter

The Insurgency's Best Hope
The Mudville Gazette has an excellent, if long, review of the the War in Iraq throughout 2005. In the end, Greyhawk concludes that while the insurgency can still kill large numbers of people, "their political effectiveness is virtually nil", as was proven by three successful elections. Their only chance of success lies with allies in the west who "who won't abandon their cause." Be sure to check out the very interesting graphs in the post.

The Good Half
Speaking of graphs Gateway Pundit posts some in his 2005 Iraq War piece. His take is that the media got half the story right last year - the wrong half. What they missed was the good news. His graphs show 1) that Iraqi civilian and insurgent casualties have gone down each year from 2003 to 2005, 2) that daily fatalities trend downwards since 2003, and 3) that now matter what stats you belive about the current situation, Saddam killed far more Iraqis than are dying today. Our liberal pundit know-it-alls seem determined to miss this last one.

It's All About the Shia, Stupid!
StrategyPage (a daily must-read) reminds us that "It's All About the Shia, Stupid!" in a Dec 22 post. The Arab world, and Islam worldwide, is overwhelmingly Sunni. Iran has been the only Shia-dominated and run country, historically. Sunnis and Shia have fought throughout the centuries, much as Roman Catholics and Protestants did. Saddam may have been a hated tyrant, but he was "our' tyrant, the Sunnis thought, against the hated Shia. "The Shia angle" is key, the editors say, because it is this fear that keeps the insurgency and al Qaeda alive. However, they conclude that fears of an Iran-domiated Iraq are unfounded, because Iraqi Shia are Arabs first and Shia second. Also, the United States is simply not going to let it happen.

Wanted: Law and Order
James Dunnigan, editor-in-chief of StrategyPage, discusses trends in the war in another article and condludes that "Looking at the Iraq operation as a process, and brushing aside the sensationalism and rhetoric, the trends are pretty clear." He sees a trend towards defeating the insurgency, as most Iraqis are determined to defeat it, but also one among Iraqis towards "irrational and self-destructive behavior". Basic law and order, Dunnigan says is "the main thing missing from about a third of Iraq." This is so because unlike in the west, where the government takes care of law and order, it is a local matter in places like Iraq. It is more of a "family affair", he says, something that tribal and clan leaders were responsible for. Divided loyalties are a big problem in the new Iraqi Army and Police. In the end, though, most Iraqi simply want an end to the violence. As such, Dunnigan hints (but maddeninly won't say directly) that the new government will likely crack down in harsh fashion.

Metrics to Judge By
Last November Victor Davis Hanson provided some metrics by which we can judge whether we're winning the War on Terror in general and in Iraq in particular:

Are the Iraqi security forces growing or shrinking? Are elections postponed or on schedule? Are Europe, Jordan, Lebanon, and others more or less sympathetic to a war against Islamic terrorism in Iraq? Are bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Zarqawi more or less popular or secure after we removed Saddam? Is al Qaeda in a strengthened or weakened position? Is the Arab world more or less receptive to democracy in the Gulf, Egypt, Lebanon, and the West Bank? And is the United States more or less vulnerable to a terrorist attack as we go into our fifth year since September 11?

Elections are on schedule, the countries are sympathetic to our cause if not our methods, al Qaeda is losing popularity and has been weakened, there has at least been moves toward democracy in the Middle East, and while we are always vulnerable that there has been no terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11 has to count as a success.

All That Has Gone Right
In another recent article, Hanson reminds us of how much has gone right in Iraq by relating how much the naysayers told us would go wrong:

Before we went in, analysts and opponents forecasted burning oil wells, millions of refugees streaming into Jordan and the Gulf kingdoms, with thousands of Americans killed just taking Baghdad alone. Middle Eastern potentates warned us of chemical rockets that would shower our troops in Kuwait. On the eve of the war, had anyone predicted that Saddam would be toppled in three weeks, and two-and-a-half-years later, 11 million Iraqis would turn out to vote in their third election — at a cost of some 2100 war dead — he would have been dismissed as unhinged

Indeed. Remember the "Battle of Baghdad" that was sure to take place? The one where the "elite" Republican Guard would turn the city into another Stalingrad (or Leningrad, depending on the talking head), that would keep American troops at bay for months? But the critics seem never to be held accountable for their bad predictions.

Conclusions

So the situation in Iraq is difficult, and much could still go wrong. However, it is important to note that the insurgency, while dangerous, is not in and of itself the main threat. They cannot take over the country, and people who think otherwise do not know what they are talking about. The dangers are more in the political realm, here in the United States and in Iraq. The wildcard is a nuclear Iran. So 2006 brings new hopes and new challenges.