The Redhunter

Both are anonymous, but I don't think that really matters, as they both ring true.

In the first one, the author says that not keeping (or recalling) Saddam's army was "a grave error" but that

...this also does not mean that a reconstituted Iraqi Army would have been performing at the level we are seeing now in the fall of '03 or even in the summer of '04. The most capable units, the Republican Guards and the more notorious Special Republican Guards, were either decimated in the fighting or filled with the types of thugs and regime supporters we were not about to keep around in significant numbers. The vast majority of Iraqi units were poorly trained, ineptly led and indifferently equipped. Their officers were largely ineffective and a professional NCO corps virtually non-existent. Even if the majority of the troops remained with their units, it would still take a great deal of time to train a new officer and NCO corps, provide them with new or refurbished equipment and train them in sufficient numbers.

Go and read the whole thing. The author is quite critical of the military and Bremer, and I suppose by implication the Administration.

In the second the author is also critical of Bremer, saying that the original plan was to keep elements of the Iraqi army. The decision not to do that was "... made at the last minute and that decision contradicted the original plan...."

That said, he points out that had we kept the old army, "Bremer is correct in saying the Shia and Kurds were not going to tolerate a reconstituted Sunni dominated Army."

Moving to the difficulties of creating a new army

The next time someone glibly says “We can take some kid off a tractor in Iowa and another one off the block in Baltimore and turn them into infantrymen in 16 weeks. Why is it taking 2 years to train the Iraqi’s?” Please slap them for me. First of all the 16 weeks number is just for basic training/bootcamp. Most service members then go to some specialist training. For some specialties this might last an additional year. Even infantrymen, artillerymen and tankers usually get another 10 weeks or so depending on service, branch, specialty etc. And that is just the privates.

In some posts last year, the invaluable Bill Roggio discussed "readyness" and how it is so often musunderstood by the media and war critics who like to claim that the new Iraqi army suffers low readyness. It's a complicated issue, and too much for me to summarize here now. Go to Roggio's post, read it, and follow his links.