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April 02, 2006
Iraqi Perspectives Project - Part V
In this part, we see that Saddam never viewed the Coalition as his greatest threat, being much more concerned with internal revolts and his regional enemy, Iran. In addition, Saddam's interference in military matters made a bad situation worse for his generals.
The Iraqi Perspectives Project is "an unclassified historical report in book form on the Iraqi view of coalition military operations conducted in Iraq." Published in book form by the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Center for Operational Analysis, the project examines "the perspectives of the Iraqi civilian and military leadership involved in major combat operations gathered through interviews conducted during the fall and winter of 2003/2004, and an extensive review of Iraqi historical documents done in the months since then."
You can download the report here. It is 230 pages and about 7.5Mb.
This series will summarize the report chapter by chapter. I will provide commentary at the end of each part.
Previous Posts
Iraqi Perspectives Project Summary from the Washington Times
Iraqi Perspectives Project - Part II - Introduction and Chapter I: The Nature of the Regime
Iraqi Perspectives Project - Part III: - Chapter II: Skewed Strategy
Iraqi Perspectives Project - Part IV - Chapter III Military Effectiveness
CHAPTER IV CRIPPLED OPERATIONAL PLANNING
• Although the highest levels of the Iraqi Army were incompetent at conducting military operations, there were many competent mid and lower-level officers.
• Many of these competent officers were as high as corps and divisional level commanders.
• After the Gulf War, these officers and their staffs “worked hard to make the best of a bad political situation” and “worked hard towards identifying their own shortcomings, and attempted to predict the course of a future war.” Their plans were realistic and made the best use of what they had available to them. Their attitude was one of “pessimistic pragmatism.”
• The plan they developed held until December 18, 2002, when Saddam unilaterally discarded it and enforced the use of his own plan, which resulted in disaster for the Iraqi military.
• During the 1991 – 2002 period, Saddam constantly interfered in the planning process. His primary goal was to prevent internal revolts and coups, and the doctrines he proposed were designed to meet this internal threat. Military efficiency was not his goal, political control from the top was.
• Iraqi planners faced a dilemma; if they dispersed their forces they could better survive air attacks, but to do so would leave them vulnerable to ground assault.
• Saddam’s priorities were 1) internal revolt and coups, 2) regional threats like Iran, and 3) external threats like the United States. However, his military planners took #3 more seriously.
• Some of the more serious effects of Saddam’s late 2002 reorganization were to reduce “the quality of battlefield reporting and leadership situational awareness.”
• Saddam’s December 18 2002 plan centered on the defense of Baghdad as a last-ditch redoubt. Qusay Hussein presented it to his senior officers, and no input or changes to it were permitted. His commanders immediately recognized the plan as ridiculous. For example, it did not take geography into account, “in Saddam’s eyes, the rivers, swamps, and canals simply did not exist.” who nevertheless were forced to carry it out to the letter.
• No guidance was provided to military leaders on how to impliment this plan. Although they met several times, commanders could not agree on an implementation scheme
My Take
One can feel the frustration of Iraqi Army officers as you read this chapter. It is not hard to feel sympathetic towards them. They are already hampered with inferior equipment (relative to the West), the sanctions made it difficult to obtain up-to-date technology, and to top it off their national leader imposes the most insane requirements on them.
It all sort of reminds me of reading about Hitler and his generals. Hitler's "no retreat" strategy at times defied military logic, but the generals had to carry it out anyway or face death themselves.
Like the Germans, the Iraqis were in the service of an evil regime. In a perfect world they would all recognized the immorality of fighting for such a government, and would have refused to fight and sacrificed themselves for truth and justice. Some of the Iraqi officers, no doubt, were true believers in Ba'athism, just as were some of the German officers. But many probably just rationalized what they were doing as "fighting for their country."
To be sure, even under perfect conditions, the Iraqi Army would have been defeated in short order to Coalition forces. Saddam made a bad situation worse. Paradoxically, this was probably to the benefit of his countrymen, for the quick defeat undoubtably saved Iraq from even greater death and destruction.
Next Up: Chapter V - The Regime Prepares for War
Posted by Tom at April 2, 2006 08:49 PM
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