The Redhunter

I remember all the angst when the Iraqi constitution was first announced. Many Americans were very disappointed that it incorporated Islam, and did not include many protections that we would consider vital, such as a Western-type bill of rights.

But before we despair we need to consider a few things. One, our own constution initially allowed for slavery and did not give the vote to women. Yet we have been able to rid ourselves of the first and enable the latter while keeping the originial document. Further, the only democratic example in the Islamic world is in Turkey, and the "Mustafa Kemal model" is much despised by Arabs. Further, it depended too much on the force of will of a a single powerful person.

The simple fact of the matter is that any Arab constitution is going to incorporate Islam and we might as well get used to it. Better, I think, to work towards long-term reform of Islam than try and marginalize it, which didn't work for the Shah and won't work in Iraq. Perhaps we can reform it if we can install some sort of democratic government.

The Consequences of Defeat

There is a certain type on the left, and even some on the paleo-right, who almost laugh at the idea that there will be dire consequences if we are defeated in Iraq. They point to Vietnam and say "See! You tried to scare us with your domino theory and nothing happened!"

But Iraq is not Vietnam, for a million reasons. The Islamists will use Iraq as a springboard to overthrow the regimes in surrounding countries. They will ally with Iran. They will come after us in Europe and America.

Given these stakes, even partially successful democracy promotion in the Islamic world and the creation of a modestly pro-American and strongly anti-jihadist government in the heart of the Middle East would be a stunning strategic defeat for al-Qaeda and its allies. It would be a brilliant geopolitical stroke, fusing American idealism with the imperatives of realpolitik. Conversely, the consequences of a U.S. loss in Iraq would be manifold and dire. Most obviously, the fates of Baghdad and Kabul are inextricably intertwined. This is because the Taliban and Qaeda elements in Afghanistan would surely be emboldened by a U.S. defeat in Iraq, while the pro-Karzai forces would be demoralized. A defeat in Iraq would also make it difficult to retain support, both in the U.S. and internationally, for Western efforts in Afghanistan.

More fundamentally, those who claim that the current Hobbesian chaos in Iraq can be neatly separated from other Middle East trouble spots, and that it does not affect America’s influence in the region, are utterly wrong. The war of all against all, with nationalism and Islamic extremism thrown in as the major motivating forces, is not limited to Iraq; it occurs frequently throughout the region, appearing in places where American troops have never set foot.

Certainly at this point the goal of a democratic, anti-jihadist Iraq looks difficult to achieve. We should consider, however, that in most past wars there were points at which the eventual victor faced severe setbacks if not outright defeat. But sticking to the point, I concur that Rivkin's essential point that a defeat in Iraq would have devastating consequences across the region if not the globe. Those who see everything through the lens of Vietnam ought to consider what happened in the 1970s after our defeat in Vietnam.

We also know that Islamist forces have perceived a long series of American retreats — in places ranging from Vietnam to Beirut to Mogadishu — as a sign that, in bin Laden’s charming words, the U.S. is a “weak horse.” His sentiment is not uncommon; Islamists are constantly searching for evidence of their foes’ weakness.

One of Reagan's biggest mistakes was pulling the Marines out of Beirut after the bombing of their barracks. At the time we did not see that we were setting a pattern, one that would be repeated in our pullout of Mogadishu, and the non-response to the bombing of the USS Cole.

The U.S. retreated from Vietnam after being engaged there politically and militarily for nearly a decade and suffering almost 60,000 war deaths and 150,000 casualties. It paid a huge geopolitical price in the form of emboldened Soviet foreign policy in the 1970s and ’80s and a precipitous decline in U.S. credibility worldwide.

Those who claim that "the domino's didn't fall" after our withdrawal from Vietnam ought to study the history of the 1970s more carefully. Carterism led to an agressive Soviet Union. The result was the invasion of Afghanistan, increased Soviet influence in Africa, and insurgencies in Central America. If anything, the Islamists will be worse. At least the communists didn't seek to directly attack our homeland; the Islamic terrorists will.

A U.S. loss in Iraq would be taken as a sign that the time had come to launch ever bolder attacks on American soil and against American interests overseas, and to push for the creation of a global caliphate. Thus, an America that fails to stop suicide bombings on the streets of Baghdad, Fallujah, and Ramadi is likely to face them on the streets of New York, Washington, and Los Angeles.

The bottom line is that, with our ability to project power against the Islamist forces dramatically diminished, we would have to fight a largely reactive war, focusing mainly on homeland defense against an emboldened enemy. History’s lessons concerning such warfare are not encouraging. To take but one example, the Roman Empire in the 4th century ceased strategic offensive operations and, ultimately, was overwhelmed by the barbarians.

Eating Soup With A Knife

It is possible that we will lose in Iraq. I do not discount this.

It is also quite possible that we can win. Countries have pulled themselves out of seemingly impossible situations before and gone on to victory.

Insurgencies can be defeated. However, unlike fighting a conventional army, defeating an insurgency is difficult, messy, and takes a lot of time. In the words of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence, better known as "Lawrence of Arabia", it's like being like eating soup with a knife. Back in March of this year I wrote a post on this very subject, taking Lt. Col. John Nagl's recent book Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife as a guide.

In his conclusion, Rivkin says much the same thing

There are no easy shortcuts to victory. Counterinsurgency campaigns are won by staying in the fight and grinding down the insurgents. Defeating the insurgencies in Malaysia and Algeria took years of hard fighting, with high civilian and military casualties.

Once again, whether it was right for us to have invaded Iraq is beside the point. The simple fact is that it is part of our war against Islamic terorrism, and those who say otherwise are dead wrong. The consequences of defeat would reverberate for decades, and it is not clear to me that we could recover. As Mark Steyn points out, we can lose this war; not the one in Iraq, but the entire one against the Islamists. Losing Iraq would only be the beginning of the end.