The Redhunter

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The Keane-Kagan plan is not revolutionary. Rather, it is an application of a counterinsurgency approach that has proved to be effective elsewhere, notably in Vietnam. There, Gen. Creighton Abrams cleared out the Viet Cong so successfully that the South Vietnamese government took control of the country. Only when Congress cut off funds to South Vietnam in 1974 were the North Vietnamese able to win.

Some people may be shocked to learn that yes, we did destroy the VC and most NVA troops in the south. Indeed, Linebacker II (December of 1972) put the fear of god into the communists to the point where they returned to the negotiating table as we wanted them to. As Barnes indicates, had not congress cut off funds the ARVN troops would have stood a fighting chance of holding off the NVA in 1974-75. But I digress.

On to the actual plan. I have not read the whole thing, as I just don't have time right now. Here's the important part of the executive summary on the AEI site

We must act now to restore security and stability to Baghdad. We and the enemy have identified it as the decisive point.

There is a way to do this.

o We must change our focus from training Iraqi soldiers to securing the Iraqi population and containing the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now it must become the first priority.
o We must send more American combat forces into Iraq and especially into Baghdad to support this operation. A surge of seven Army brigades and Marine regiments to support clear-and-hold operations starting in the Spring of 2007 is necessary, possible, and will be sufficient.
o These forces, partnered with Iraqi units, will clear critical Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shi’a neighborhoods, primarily on the west side of the city.
o After the neighborhoods have been cleared, U.S. soldiers and marines, again partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to maintain security.
o As security is established, reconstruction aid will help to reestablish normal life and, working through Iraqi officials, will strengthen Iraqi local government

This approach requires a national commitment to victory in Iraq:

o The ground forces must accept longer tours for several years. National Guard units will have to accept increased deployments during this period.
o Equipment shortages must be overcome by transferring equipment from non-deploying active duty, National Guard, and reserve units to those about to deploy. Military industry must be mobilized to provide replacement equipment sets urgently.
o The president must request a dramatic increase in reconstruction aid for Iraq. Responsibility and accountability for reconstruction must be assigned to established agencies. The president must insist upon the completion of reconstruction projects. The president should also request a dramatic increase in CERP funds.
o The president must request a substantial increase in ground forces end strength. This increase is vital to sustaining the morale of the combat forces by ensuring that relief is on the way. The president must issue a personal call for young Americans to volunteer to fight in the decisive conflict of this age.

Failure in Iraq today will require far greater sacrifices tomorrow in far more desperate circumstances.

It would seem to me that the key here is in the 3rd recommendation at top: "After the neighborhoods have been cleared, U.S. soldiers and marines, again partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to maintain security." I base this on our attempt to secure Baghdad in October and why it didn't work; see my posts Baghdad Security Plan and Baghdad Security Plan II.

If adopted, will it work? Beats me. Opinions are a dime a dozen, and I'm sure there'll be a million of them soon, some undoubtably in the comments section of this post, too. Just on NRO's The Corner blog alone, opinions on increasing troop strength vary. Mario Loyola says that " if we send 60,000 more troops to Iraq, the effect on the violence could easily prove to be negligible-to-zero", and compares the situation to the insurgency that Algeria went through in the 1990s, which "arose volcanically in the very teeth of an enormous army that was fully in control of the security situation everywhere." On the other hand, Rich Lowry and others there have consistenly argued for more troops. Anecdotal evidence (sorry, no links) from a variety of other sources seems to indicate that we can clear, but we can't hold, because the troops are always needed elsewhere and the Iraqis can't or won't themselves.

General Keane discussed the plan on This Week with George Stephanopoulos (quotes from The Corner)

GENERAL KEANE: In terms of the strategy itself, it's a fundamental change in the mission. The mission, people are focusing on the surge of the troops, but the essence of it is we changed the mission to the security of the people in Baghdad. We've never taken that on as a military mission before. Our mission has been transition to the Iraqi security forces and we made some inadequate attempts to secure Baghdad twice in the past.

We cleared out the insurgents and the Shia death squads from the areas but never committed ourselves to phase two of the operation, which is significant, and that is to put a 24/7 force in the neighborhoods to protect the people and they do not go back to their bases at night. It is a security of the people that's the key to success.

Baghdad would probably take . . . well into the fall of the year. And then we would turn to al-Anbar with a different mission. . . . And that would take another six to seven months, and that would probably go into '08, as well.

The economic package to this is very important. It has two phases to it. The first one would be basic services while we're protecting the people. And then another economic package for enhanced quality of life services that would be tied to an incentive package in terms of their cooperation and their willingness to help us in turning over who the death squad members are and who the insurgents are.

And that takes time for the people to realize that this really is a secure situation. And bring the economic packages in and they begin to isolate the insurgents who are trying to sneak back in. Our problem in the past in Fallujah, in Samara, twice in Baghdad, has always been the same problem, we ran the insurgents out and we never put the protection force in to secure the people.

So Keane and Kagan are not just agitating for "more troops" without any real idea as to what they'd do. That's a good thing, too, because Ralph Peters has some very hard questions for anyone who would do so

What would the specific tasks be? "Restore security" is too vague - we need to identify no-nonsense objectives. And which new tactics would be authorized? Would the rules of engagement change?

How would we handle prisoners, given that a crackdown would generate tens of thousands (and the Iraqi system releases the worst offenders)? What if the Maliki government rejects our plan?

At that point, the think-tank boys give you a deer-in-the-headlights look and spurt empty generalities. Our military is supposed to figure out the pesky details.

But it's the details that make the difference between succeeding and failing.

Read the whole thing. Peters has often been very critical of the way we've been fighting in Iraq, but it's only because he wants us to win.

BTW, there is an existing plan, and it's on the White House website.

And I know I've said this many times, but it bears repeating what Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence, better known as "Lawrence of Arabia", said about defeating insurgencies, that it's like "eating soup with a knife". In other words, you can do it, but it's messy and takes a long time. (see my post on this here) This said, citizens of a democracy want to see progress. I think that the American people can be patient and can accept casualties, as long as they see the goal as worthwhile and that progress is being made. Fortunately we've got a president who doesn't give up easily.