The Redhunter

But much of this was prompted by al Qaeda in Iraq, and their constant attempts over the past several years to prompt a civil war between the Sunnis and Shias.

The point is that the situation does not seem to be getting better. We are apparently in a sort of stalemate, which I would think in the long run favors those who want an Islamic dictatorship.

No doubt there is much we could and should have done differently. But even if we had not made the mistakes that, say, Thomas Ricks says we made, there is no guarantee that things would have turned out differently. As Charles Krauthammer said, "We have given the Iraqis a republic and they do not appear able to keep it". There is only so much that we can do. Either the Iraqis will pick up the ball and run with it or they won't. As StrategyPage reminds us, corruption and military incompetence is endemic in that part of the world, and awefully hard to overcome. To be fair, the Iraqis are just coming out of 30 years of vicious dictatorship. One wonders how we would have faired if, rather than George III, our colonies had been ruled by Louis XVI. Perhaps it's not a wonder the French Revolution turned out the way it did.

We also shouldn't blame the American people too much. There is a temptation on the right, I think, to become frustrated that American's won't tolerate a long war, even one that by historical standards isn't very costly (see chart). I think Mara Liasson has it right when she commented on Fox News that "I don't think the American people are rising up against casualties. I think that they're looking at Iraq and they don't see success. They see Iraqis killing each other, they don't see the government coming together, and that's the problem. I don't think it's the casualty level."

Here's the chart I referred to above, click on it to enlarge

It's also not that our troops aren't killing the enemy in droves. They are. But Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki has proven ineffectual, and can not or will not deal with either the insurgents or private armies such as the Badr Organization (armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)) or the Mahdi Army (controlled by firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr).

Consequences

The consequences of failure could be horrific. Independent journalist Michael Yon is in Cambodia, and visited one of the museums dedicated to "The Killing Fields" of the 1970s. It's a post well worth reading, for the horrors inflicted by the Khymer Rouge rival anything the Nazis did. If we leave Iraq, it's quite possible the country could descend into Cambodia or Rwanda-levels of violence.

Retired General Barry McCaffrey spells out what withdrawal could look like:

We could immediately and totally withdraw. In less than six months, our 150,000 troops could fight their way along strategic withdrawal corridors back to the sea and the safety provided by the Navy. Several million terrified refugees would follow, the route of our columns marked by the burning pyres of abandoned military supplies demolished by our rear guard. The resulting civil warfare would probably turn Iraq into a humanitarian disaster and might well draw in the Iranians and Syrians. It would also deeply threaten the safety and stability of our allies in neighboring countries.

And this doesn't even speak to the general loss of US prestige and power that would no doubt result from a precipitous pull out. It would mean a return to Carterism, to the 1970s. Just as the Soviet Union was newly ascendant then, the Islamic Fascists would gain much strength if we lose in Iraq.

A Coming Change of Strategy?

Many of us wondered what President Bush would do about the report by the Iraq Study Group ("The Baker Commission"). Fortunately, he seems to have rejected most of it's conclusions, especially the ones that suggested that we essentially plead with Syria and Iran to help us stabilize Iraq. The question is, what comes next?

I think that the President is on the verge of a major announcement. I know you're also probably read that elsewhere, so I'm not claiming any special insight. Charles Krauthammer is one, for example. Fred Barnes also suggested as much on the Fox News Special Report with Brit Hume last Thursday night.

The President won't want to interrupt the holidays, so he will probably make it sometime in early January. He will, I predict, announce a fairly significant change in strategy. It will consist of two parts; a temporary "surge" of troops, and various leadership changes.

Many on the right, at least, have been advocating more troops as of late. The Washington Times and National Review(and here) have each advocated sending in more soldiers and marines. According to this story in the Los Angeles Times, it's what the Pentagon wants, and has recommended to the President be done.

To be sure, simply sending in more troops won't by itself do it. As Michael Ledeen points out, we ought to loosten up the rules of engagement as well. This is not without risk, because it will result in additional damage and casualties it will likely alienate some Iraqis (see this undated video of a firefight in Fallujah for a taste of realism).

I also think it likely that General Abizaid and General Casey will be replaced as well. They're both good men, but they've had their chance. Lincoln changed generals quite often when they weren't getting the job done. Unfortunately, President Bush has not. It is possible that he or Rumsfeld General Sanchez over Abu Ghraib, but there is no hard evidence to support this. Bush tends to appoint someone, and then stay with them until the bitter end. He stayed with Rumsfeld for years, and when he finally did fire him it was at the worst possible time, just after the GOP had lost the November elections so as to make a defeat look worse. Nevertheless, it's time for new blood at CENTCOM. We've got many talented generals, and it's time to give some of them the top slots.

Another benefit to doing these things is that it would show the Iraqi government, the militias, and the terrorists that yes we do mean business and no we're not going to quit the fight as you hope we will. Amir Taheri raised the point in an op-ed a few weeks ago that it's not just that we doubt the Iraqis; they doubt us, too; "uncertainty about the United States' policies is also the No. 1 issue of Iraqi politics", he reminds us. They can read history too, and know that from Vietnam to Beruit to Somalia, we've bugged out before victory was secured.

Additional Plans

I would be remiss to suggest that "more troops" or "new people" were all that was needed. The situation is more complicated than that.

First, we ought to beef up the size of our military as a whole. Now, as I pointed out even this is not so simple.

The LA Times story linked to above points out that

The problem with any sort of surge is that it would require an eventual drop-off in 2008, unless the president was willing to take the politically unpopular move of remobilizing the National Guard and sending reserve combat units back to Iraq.

But military officials are taking a close look at a proposal advanced by Frederick W. Kagan, a former West Point Military Academy historian, to combine a surge with a quick buildup of the Marines and the Army. That could allow new units to take the place of the brigades sent to Iraq to augment the current force.

I would think that all of this would require additional monies, which only Congress can provide. It is, of course, now controlled by the Democrats, many of whom want just the opposite of a troop buildup, especially in Iraq. At best, they will want presidential concessions in other policy areas. While some negotiating will be necessary, the president can stem the damage by playing the "Truman Card". President Truman, after suffering a loss of congress to the GOP in 1950, said something to the effect that "the heck with them, I'm just going to do what I well please for the next two years."

Clifford May, writing at National Review, provides six steps we might take:

We might start by stabilizing Baghdad — as we said we would. When the United States says it’s going to do something that should not mean trying for a while, then giving up. If stabilizing Baghdad requires more troops — or different commanders — send them. A victory in the Battle of Baghdad, the most diverse area of Iraq with more than a quarter of the country’s population, would have major and beneficial consequences.

Second, we are at war with al Qaeda and al Qaeda’s most lethal forces are in Iraq. So we must stay and fight them in Iraq. We don’t flee the battleground.

Third, when we chased Saddam Hussein from his palaces, we thought we had broken his regime. Big error. Baathist insurgents still need to be hunted down.

Fourth, we have to deal with the regimes in Iran and Syria. That means finally demonstrating that we can and will hurt them if they to continue to conspire to kill Americans and Iraqis who work with us. Once that is done, once they understand we have the power and the will to take them on, sitting down to talk may make sense.

Fifth, we intensify and accelerate the training of Iraqi forces so that sooner, rather than later, they can stand up to the bad guys on their own.

Sixth, we act as an honest broker between Iraq’s Sunni and Shia communities. Who else can play that role? It may be that these populations need fences to be good neighbors — a process of separation is already underway. We can make that process less painful and perilous. We ought to consider what Brookings scholar Michael O’Hanlon calls the Bosnian model: Each of Iraq’s ethno-religious groups would establish autonomy within a unitary Iraqi state. Oil wealth would be shared by all cooperating and stabilized areas of the country.

All of these things make sense, although with most it's not a question of what but how.

Charles Krauthammer boils it all down to two things we must do

First, as I’ve been agitating, establish a new governing coalition in Baghdad that excludes Moqtada al-Sadr, a cancer that undermines the Maliki government’s ability to work with us. It is encouraging that the president has already begun such a maneuver by meeting with rival Shiite and Sunni parliamentary leaders. If we help produce a cross-sectarian government that would be an ally rather than a paralyzed semi-adversary of coalition forces, we should then undertake part two: “double down” our military effort. This means a surge in American troops with a specific mission: to secure Baghdad and (together with the support of the Baghdad government — a sine qua non) suppress Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

A little better and more succinct than what May offered, I believe, although he is essentially on the right track.

Lastly, we'll go back to Barry McCaffrey, in the Washington Post editorial cited above, for his ideas on how to win:

First, we must commit publicly to provide $10 billion a year in economic support to the Iraqis over the next five years. In the military arena, it would be feasible to equip and increase the Iraqi armed forces on a crash basis over the next 24 months (but not the police or the Facilities Protection Service). The goal would be 250,000 troops, provided with the material and training necessary to maintain internal order.

Within the first 12 months we should draw down the U.S. military presence from 15 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), of 5,000 troops each, to 10. Within the next 12 months, Centcom forces should further draw down to seven BCTs and withdraw from urban areas to isolated U.S. operating bases -- where we could continue to provide oversight and intervention when required to rescue our embedded U.S. training teams, protect the population from violence or save the legal government.

Finally, we have to design and empower a regional diplomatic peace dialogue in which the Iraqis can take the lead, engaging their regional neighbors as well as their own alienated and fractured internal population.

Hmm. I agree with the investment, doubt that it's a good idea to advertise a drawdown schedule, and wonder what in the world he's talking about with regard to a "regional peace dialogue"? Sounds too much like Baker-Hamilton to me.

Conclusion: Krauthammer gets an A, Mays a B, and McCaffrey a D+. Surge troops, replace the generals, and increase the overall size of the military. Dare the Democrats to oppose you, Mr Bush. It's crunch time, we're playing catch-up football, and it's not just your place in history that matters, but whether we're going to win a victory in this war on Islamic Fascism or go back to the days of Carterism and malaise.