The Redhunter

The violence has, of course, risen during the year, which is a very bad thing, even if relatively few of the deaths were Americans.

From what I can tell, the Sunnis started or promoted the insurgency in it's early days as a way of getting the US out of Iraq and themselves back into power. The Shi'ites reacted by forming or building up their militias and going after the Sunnis. The Kurds (Sunni but not Arabs) did their own thing up north, the one part of the country that pretty much works. The Sunni supported al Qaeda-in-Iraq bombed the Golden Dome of the Al-Askaria Mosque in Samarra, and the whole thing escallated. My understanding is that because of Shi'ite retribution many of the Sunnis now regret their earlier actions, and are trying to make peace, but it might be too late. The Shi'ites are not going to give up their militias voluntarily, at least in the short term. What is going on now is little short of Shi'ite ethnic cleansing. Only the presence of US forces prevents it from escallating into a Rwanda or Kosovo-style slaughter.

The Iraqi government doesn't want to go after the Shi'ite militias because many of the ministers, not the least of which is that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki depends on Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army for his own position. The Iraqi Army is getting stronger, but some individual units will not fight against their own sect or clan. The Iraqi Police are riddled with death squad activity and are part of the problem.

A hanging is a terrible thing, but it was right that Saddam was executed, however the method. It won't win the war, but it does deny the die-hard Ba'athists the hope that he may someday return to power.

The reporting on Iraq is often seemingly contradictory. Read one story and you think all is lost. Read another and you believe that no, there is much progress. Christopher Hitchens talks about this phenomenon and concludes that "It isn't so much a matter of deciding who or what to believe, because both (the good and bad) may be simultaneously correct." One wonders if Americans had this problem deciphering the news during the Civil War or World War II.

Our plan to stabilize Baghdad in October (more here) failed, and now President Bush is considering a plan by academic Frederick Kagan and retired general Jack Keane, which is considerably different from what what we've tried over the past few years. With the Democrats now in charge of Congress, Bush's time to win is limited, and whatever he does next may be our last chance.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is arguably the number two front in the war. The defeat of al Qaeda and their Taliban allies dealt a huge blow to the Islamist movement, and they are determined to take the country back. As such, 2006 saw large Taliban-al Qaeda offensives. Unfortunately for them, they also saw large numbers of Taliban and al Qaeda killed. Bill Roggio estimates that 3,500 of 4,000 Taliban fighters have been killed in these offensives. The paradox they face is that if they remain dispersed, it is harder for us to find and kill them, yet if they mass for the attack, we can find and kill them easily.

The Taliban and al Qaeda are using their bases in Pakistan to attack in Afghanistan. Until we find a way to neutralize these bases, these attacks will continue. Our paradox is that if we go after these bases, we neutralize the Taliban/al Qaeda, but run a serious risk of destabilizing Pakistan with potentially disasterous consequences.

Although several NATO countries have sent troops, they have not sent nearly as many as they could have, this despite that Afghanistan is supposed to be the war that everyone agreed was the good one. Further, some NATO governments that have sent troops have placed such serious restrictions on them as to practically remove them from the fight altogether. Some are fighting quite honorably, so this is not meant to tar all Europeans.

As with Iraq, reports are contradictory. Michael Yon is worried and thinks we might lose the country, but other stuff I read makes me think that no, the Taliban and al Qaeda may stage offensives but we're handling them without too much difficulty.

In the end, I think we're winning in Afghanistan but have the potentiol to lose. 2007 will be a violent and possibly decisive year.

Pakistan

2006 saw us experience a serious setback in the war in Pakistan. The Taliban and al Qaeda forced the government to abandon the region called North Waziristan and sign the Waziristan Accord. In this accord the government officially ceded control of the aformentioned territory to the Taliban.

Although this development went largely unmentioned in the media, it was one of the worst setbacks we have suffered in this war. According to Roggio, al Qaeda operates at least 22 camps in this area, and the Taliban have set up their headquarters there. Although not as good as having Afghanistan, it does provide them with a safe-haven, vital for any terrorist group.

The US did nothing when this accord was announced, and from what I can tell have not done anything since. As mentioned earlier, it would be extremely risky for us to attack these bases. Not to do so, though, means that we will face continued attacks into Afghanistan and elsewhere. It is not an easy dilemna to solve, but most disturbing of all is our apparenty unwillingness to want to face the problem at all.

Somalia

Until a few weeks ago this would have gone down as a huge setback in the war. Now we can cautiously put it in the "win" column.

Last summer the Islamic Court Union had taken over the country, or at least the southern part of it. Ethiopia sent in troops to bolster their allies. The ICU, or a part of it, declared a jihad against Ethiopia. After a 5 month standoff, in December Ethiopian forces launched a major offensive, which included air and ground forces. They drove the ICU from the capital, Mogadishu, who have fled to the south. As of this writing Ethiopian forces stand poised to move south in pursuit, and may already be doing so.

2007 will undoubtably see more fighting, as the ICU will likely turn to insurgent warfare.

It is highly probable that the US and our European allies have been deeply engaged in this conflice, albeit at the clandestine-diplomatic level. I would not be surprised if a few aid bills for Ethiopia and Somalia flew threw congress in the next few months.

Iran

Iran remains a problem for three reasons: 1) They are continuing to supply, train, and influence the insurgency and Shi'ite militias in Iraq, the cause of much of the violence, and 2) They are continuing their pursuit of nuclear weapons without much interference from the US or Europe, and lastly, 3) They are the biggest state-sponsor of terrorism in the world, for example being the main supplier to Hezbollah.

As such, we have to put Iran in the "loss" column.

It is unimaginable that we do not have a good idea where Iranian terrorist training and supply depots are. Further, the ones supplying the Iraqi militias etc are likely close to their border with Iraq. No doubt it would be risky to attack them for a variety of reasons. Yet as long as they remain operational it will be difficult to stabilize Iraq.

The administration seems to believe that the situation with regard to Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons will resolve itself, because I cannot imagine that they actually think that their pursuit of Security Council resolutions and never-ending diplomacy will produce results. It is possible that they are right. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did suffer a setback in their recent elections, and other reports have it that Iran could run out of oil in as little as a decade, which would deprive them of the funds necessary to produce nuclear weapons.

It seems to me that while it is possible that the nuclear situation will resolve itself, it is not very likely that this will be the case. As such, Iran remains our greatest long-term threat in the region.

The war between Hezbollah and Israel was inconslusive, and the Bush Administration mishandled the situation badly, urging Israel to accept a toothless Security Council resolution that has proved worthless in disarming Hezbollah. 2007 will likely see a revival of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah.

Lebanon

The promise of the Cedar Revolution of 2005/6 has been squandered. Bret Stephens, in the Opinion Journal piece cited above, points out that the Bush Administration followed up the revolution "with nothing". We apparently thought that presto, with Syria gone everyting would work out fine.

Lebanon is a mess, with Wikipedia describing it as "highly fragile." The country is a safe haven for Hezbollah, one of the most dangerous Islamic terrorist organizations on the planet. No doubt they are currently being resupplied by Iran through Syria, and in 2007 we can look forward to more attacks by them on Israel, with the possibility of a full-scale war likely.

Lebanon obviously goes in the "loss" side of the ledger.

Syria

Syria was not part of Bush's original "Axis of Evil" but should have been. A state sponsor of terror, Syria has been behind much of the insurgency in Iraq and terrorism perpetrated against Israel.

We have been unable or unwilling to stem either. As with Iran, it is almost certain that we know where the supply and training bases are in Syria. There are rumors that Rumsfeld wanted to attack some of them but was vetoed by Bush. Attacking them would be far less risky than going after similar bases in Iran, and would serve to warn Iran as well. As long as we defer from doing so we will face a continued problem from Syria, as from their perspective supporting terrorism has become largely cost-free.

That Syria is still supplying the insurgency in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon means that we have to put this in the "loss" column. The status quo is not acceptable.

Saudi Arabia

Bill Roggio maintains that wealthy Saudis continue to fund terrorism, and I am certain that he is correct. In addition, it is well known that much jihadist hate is preached from Saudi Arabian mosques. The government is willing to tolerate this behavior in a "deal with the devil"; we'll let you preach as long as you don't touch us. One day these chickens may come home to roost.

In addition, funding for many mosques built in the West comes from Saudi sources. Wahhabism as currently practiced is part of the Islamic extremism problem, and until it is dealt with will continue to be a source of trouble for us and support for movements such as al Qaeda.

On the good side, the kingdom avoided sliding into all-out chaos, as some feared it would in 2005, after a series of al Qaeda attacks. Here as elsewhere, the status quo favors the enemy. At best, we are in stalemate.

Chechnya

We can put Chechnya in our "win" category. Al Qaeda suffered a loss here in 2006.

Russian forces killed the jihadist leader, Shamil Basayev, and later wounded his successor, Doku Umarov. StrategyPage goes so far as to say that "the war against gangsters and Islamic radicals in Chechnya has been won."

This is clearly not a major front for the United States or Europe, at least not in the short run. However, with a declining native birthrate, and increasing Muslim birthrate, Russia needs to control Muslim extremism close to its borders.

The Philippines

In the Philippines 2006 also saw much success by government and US forces battling al-Qaeda linked Abu Sayyaf and Indonesian based Jemaah Islamiyah. We can also put it in our "win" category for the year.

Thailand

Unfortunately, events in Thailand took a turn for the worse in 2006, forcing us to put it in the "loss" category. Muslims from the southern part of the country have increased their attacks, culminating in a series of bombs going off in the capital city of Bangkok New Years Eve.

The problem does not appear to be major as of now, so although we'll put it in the "loss" category it is not something with which we need be overly concerned as of now.

Europe

It will seem strange to some that Europe is even included in this analysis. Certainly there is no fighting there, and few acts of terrorism. But we only exclude it if we take the narrow, and in my view incorrect, view of this war as only being against al Qaeda and maybe Hezbollah. Instead, as I stated at the top, the war is against Islamic extremism in general, and Europe is home to plenty of Islamic extremists.

The year began with the "Cartoon Jihad", and ended with equally manufactured Muslim outrage over some remarks by the Pope. While many European newspapers bravely stuck up for their Danish brethern, the reaction by the elites was less than admirable. Many were unwilling to confront the extremists, and gave the usual excuses as why media outlets should "exercise restraint".

There are plenty more reasons for despair. A low-level intifada continues in Parisian suburbs. While some in Britain seem to have awoken, far too many still blame the US and Israel for their trouble with Islamic extremism, believing that if only the Israel-Palestinian problem were solved and the US got out of Iraq, all would be well. Surveys still show that 40-60% of British muslims want Sharia law in their communities, and I'm sure the figure is 100% among muslim leaders. Attempts to confront Muslims with evidence of their extremism are met with the usual cries of "Islamophobia", and debate usually stops.

There have been a few attempts to control the extremism, and demand accountability. From my perspective, though, they are too few and too feeble. Most importantly, there is no attempt to stop or limit immigration by Muslime.

The situation is getting worse in Europe, and although it is incrimental, we have to put it in the "loss" column as well.

Conclusion

Not a good year. All-in-all, probably an overall loss for the good guys. In the short erm I think the biggest challenge is Iraq, in the medium term Iran, and in the long term Europe itself.

In the end I remain confident that we will win, but at the rate things are going the cost may be quite high. We are currently in a sort of "funk", and our president seemed not to know quite what to do throughout much of the past year. It looks like the elections in November seemed to have shaken off much of the lethargy. I look forward to a much more active, and hopefully more successful, 2007.