The Redhunter

But like I said in my opening remarks, what they lack, because they're such a new force, is all of those systems that are necessary to sustain them. We still provide them a lot of fuel; we assist them in getting weapons and ammunition, so it's that logistic space. Once that gets established, then I think that -- I am certain that this force can protect their area because they're so committed, but it's a matter of can they sustain themselves. I think probably in the next six to eight months we ought to be able to get a lot of those systems in place. We're working at it every day. The Iraqis are working it very hard, so I'm hopeful.

This said, the two Iraqi units in his area have made tremendous progress in staffing. When he took over the area, both units were only at 60% strength. Today one is at full strength, and the other 80%. Because of the additional American forces, and because we've convinced many sheikhs to come over to our side, more Iraqis are joining. In other comments he makes clear that the problems are not with fighting spirit but with supply; they simply don't have all that they need.

Here are his comments on the Iraqi government and how it works that bear repeating

Getting to the point of the provincial government, you know, their problem is -- it kind of -- it's tied to the way the Iraqi government works. One of the challenges we have is that the Iraqi government is organized along the ministries, and the money that comes down for services and for facilities comes through those ministries.

For example, if the mayor of Ramadi wants to build a new school, he has to turn to the director general of education for the city of Ramadi and request that that school be built. Then the director general at the municipal level then has to go to the director general at the provincial level, and that ultimately has -- that request has to go all the way up to the Ministry of Education to get the funding to build that school.

So it's very centralized, which means it's not as flexible and not as fast-moving as if, you know, the local government had a large budget and could do these things on their own.

Horrendous problems with Iraqi government bureaucracy (and more than a little sectarian hatred) are the problems Michael Yon relates in Bread and a Circus Part II of II, a tale about getting food to the starving people of Baqubah that has to be read to be believed.

So what of it all?

One, do not go away thinking that all is doom and gloom in Iraq because of the bits that I posted from Col Charleton's press conference. Watch the whole thing and read the transcript. There are many success stories and so it all has to be taken in context.

Two, this is what it's really like on the ground. It's not World War II, where the only think commanders had to be concerned with was finding and killing the enemy (or how not to be found and killed, depending on the situation!). In Bird's Eye View Yon describes the "hidden skill set" possessed by American commanders

I have wondered now for two years why is it that American military leaders somehow seem to naturally know what it takes to run a city, while many of the local leaders seem clueless. Over time, a possible answer occurred, and that nudge might be due to how the person who runs each American base is referred to as the “Mayor.” A commander’s first job is to take care of his or her forces. Our military is, in a sense, its own little country, with city-states spread out all around the world. Each base is like a little city-state. The military commander must understand how the water, electricity, sewerage, food distribution, police, courts, prisons, hospitals, fire, schools, airports, ports, trash control, vector control, communications, fuel, and fiscal budgeting for his “city” all work. They have “embassies” all over the world and must deal diplomatically with local officials in Korea, Germany, Japan and many dozens of other nations. The U.S. military even has its own space program, which few countries have.

In short, our military is a reasonable microcosm of the United States—sans the very important business aspect which actually produces the wealth the military depends on. The requisite skill-set to run a serious war campaign involves a subset of skills that include diplomacy and civil administration.

Third, most obviously sectarian hatred, the Arab penchant for corruption and Byzantine levels of bureaucracy, are all things that we underestimated when going into Iraq. From other things I've read it's seemingly as big a problem as the enemy, and one of the biggest things inhibiting success.

Hopefully military success will translate into political progress. I've thought for some time that we've had it all backwards; for 3 years we put political progress before military success and it didn't work. Now, with the "surge" (properly Operation Phantom Thunder), we've got it right. I think.

Certainly Gen Petraeus and his second in command, Lt Gen Odierno are top-notch and know what they are doing. The unsung heroes are the colonels and leutenant colonels who are fighting in the trenches alongside their troops. This is why I find press conferences by commanders such as Col Twitty and Col Charlton so interesting. I hope you found them informative also.