The Redhunter

Multi-National Corps-Iraq launched a major offensive, Operation Phantom Strike, on August 13 in a powerful crackdown to disrupt AQI and Shia extremist operations in Iraq. It consists of simultaneous operations throughout Iraq focused on pursuing remaining AQI terrorists and Iranian-supported extremist elements. ...

Operation Phantom Strike is a joint Iraqi Security and Coalition Forces operation to eliminate remaining elements of AQI and other extremist groups, preventing them from causing further terrorism and inciting sectarian violence. Additionally, it will intensify pressure on extremist networks across the entire theater.

Moving on to the press conference, Gen Odierno makes clear the different reaction in Iraq to the recent massive suicide bombing by al Qaeda and the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra in February 2006, whick kicked off a wave of sectarian violence so bad many started calling the situation in Iraq a civil war.

This past Tuesday, two Iraqi communities in Nineveh province were devastated when five vehicle and truck-borne improvised explosive devices exploded in Yazidi villages of Qataniyah and al-Jazeera, about 75 miles west of Mosul. Hundreds of innocent civilians were killed in these attacks, which bear all the hallmarks of an al Qaeda attack....

Last year such an attack might have triggered a spiral of revenge killings, but today such horrific events actually unite Iraqis of different ethnicities and confessions in their outrage. Today Iraqis feel that -- the appalling nature of this brutality, and it galvanizes their rejection of al Qaeda and other extremist elements.

Next he addresses the view that al Qaeda is not the main threat, or does not commit most of the worst violence

Q I was curious about sectarian violence. But so are you saying that -- al Qaeda is behind clearly the most sensational and perhaps outrageous violence, but are they behind most of the violence on the ground in Iraq?

GEN. ODIERNO: Based on -- I don't have August figures, but based on July figures, across Iraq -- again, this is vague, but al Qaeda/Sunni insurgents, which we believe most of them still operating in the Sunni insurgency are moving towards al Qaeda -- created about 52 percent of the violence across Iraq, and Shi'a extremists created about 48 percent of the violence across Iraq, based on our figures for July. And that varies by region, obviously. So I mean yes, they still -- they still have some capability. Now, if you compare that to January, when they were up about 70 percent of violence was associated with al Qaeda, we've clearly had a -- and I think that's a combination of two things, as I've said before -- we have degredated (sic: degraded) al Qaeda's ability to conduct operations in Iraq.

But in addition, I think we've seen a little bit of a surge in Shi'a violence based on support from Iran. So it's a combination of both of those factors.

On the status of the Sunni insurgency

Q Okay. General, Jim Miklaszewski with NBC. In talking about the emphasis on al Qaeda and Shi'a extremists, does that mean that Sunni insurgents are no longer considered a significant threat in Iraq?

GEN. ODIERNO: My assessment is -- I think I said this last month also -- my assessment is, with the Sunni insurgency, for the most part, in my mind -- and again, there's probably a few examples where this isn't true, but for the most part, they have made a decision. They have decided that "we're going to go with al Qaeda" or they have decided "we want to reconcile with the government of Iraq" and they're reaching out to coalition forces, like in Al Anbar, like in Abu Ghraib, like we're seeing in southern -- in Mahmudiyah, in Yusufiya, south of Baghdad, as well as we're starting to see now in Salahuddin province, in Tikrit, and how we're seeing now in Diyala province. So we're seeing it around the northern Sunni belts that in fact they're reaching out to us.

So I think it's becoming more and more clear: either you go to al Qaeda, or you come over and you want to reconcile with the government. I think that's where we are today.

One of the biggest concerns is the lengthy deployments due to a too-small military, and the effects this has on soldiers and their families.

Q General, Bill McMichael with the Military Times newspaper. A defense military -- rather a mental health task force has recently recommended giving troops at least one month off for every three months at the front, or some sort of ratio like that. You've rejected that, saying you couldn't get the job done if that were the case. I'd like to explore your thinking a little more along those lines. Are you rejecting their suggestions, or are you saying -- or acknowledging that the political pressure back home is simply too great to give troops that kind of break?

GEN. ODIERNO: No, I think what I rejected was the specific three month in, one month out. I clearly understand there's a problem. I want to make that very clear, that the stress -- there is significant stress here in Iraq. There's significant stress on the soldiers and Marines that operate here in Iraq. We -- what I said before, and I'll say it again -- we have programs that we work very closely with our local -- we don't dictate a policy at the corps level. What we do is we understand what the problem is, and at the small-unit level we try to do the best we can to rotate soldiers on -- sometimes it's a weekly basis, sometimes it's every couple weeks -- for short periods of time so they are not under constant stress. And the commanders are doing that at the very low level.

So, please, I have never rejected the concept that we have to have some sort of stress relief here.

What I rejected was that you're three months in and one month out -- that is very difficult to do here. But we have other ways to mitigate that, and so what we're trying to do is mitigate the risk of this increased stress on our soldiers and Marines, and we do that by rotating them out of these combat outposts and joint security stations back into bigger garrisons, and we do it based on unit responsibilities and capabilities.

Later, more on the same subject

Q General, Bill McMichael from Military Times again. I'll follow up my question Julian was going to follow up on, I think. What's -- do you think in your heart of hearts that these troops are getting enough of a break, the break that they are now being allowed from the front? And what are your concerns about the military's responsibility for the future mental health of these troops given the stress that they're under and given the length of these deployments, these 15-month deployments?

GEN. ODIERNO: Yeah. No, I do worry about it. I do worry about it. Fifteen months is a long time. None of us will deny that. It's a long time for every soldier and Marine and airman out here and sailor who's conducting 15-month deployments. It's a long time if you're the rifleman, it's a long time if you're a company commander, it's a long time if you're the commander of Multinational Corps-Iraq. It's a long time to operate in a stressful situation.
...

You know, when we started this, I would say sometimes when people were exhausted, mentally exhausted, that might not have been accepted. Everybody understands that now. Our leaders understand it. They look for it. They try to identify it. We don't always catch it. We don't always catch it. But I think our awareness is up, I think our programs are in place to collect data, and now it's incumbent on us to take care of these men and women, once they redeploy, to make sure they get the care necessary to help them to progress in the future.

In his concluding remarks, Gen Odierno first discusses recent successes, and stresses that they will only hold if the Iraqi government steps up to the plate.

Again, I continue to be cautiously optimistic about the progress we've made in security over the course of the past several weeks and months. Although our recent tactical successes are not yet enduring trends, we are headed in the right direction. However, the situation remains extremely complex, and different areas of the country will continue to advance at different rates. Some of the gains we made over the past month, like those in Al Anbar province, are more noticeable than other areas.

We understand that our recent tactical successes will only add up if Iraqis take advantage of them, and ultimately, the government of Iraq is the key to progress. We are setting the conditions and buying the government of Iraq time to improve their capacity in order to gradually and steadily empower the Iraqi government and not hand them too much too quickly. This means that's an imperative we continue to press on all fronts -- diplomatic, political, economic and governance -- in addition to our security efforts.

Finally, for all the stress of long deployments and the general hell of war, reenlistment goals are being met and exceeded

I was recently presented with a perfect example of just how remarkable these service men and women are, but before I get into that, I want to comment that two days ago in Multinational Corps-Iraq we reached our re-enlistment goals for fiscal year '07. We are now over 120 percent of our midterm requirements, over a hundred percent of our initial term requirements, over a hundred percent in our midterm requirements, and over 120 percent in our careerists, and this is six weeks early before the end of the fiscal year.

No doubt anyone interested in learning about what is happening in Iraq will want to check a variety of sources. But in my opinion if you're not watching or at least reading the transcripts of the press conferences, you're missing important information. Reading a news story is all fine and good, but you only get the parts that the reporter found important.

Odierno hit on a lot during the press briefing. He's optimistic, but says that the Iraqis will have to consolidate our successes for it all to hold. Our troops are doing a fantastic job, and we need to give them the time they need to complete the mission.

Update

Be sure and visit The Fourth Rail for Bill Roggio's summary of this new operation.

Special to The Fourth Rail is a piece by Wesley Morgan, who is a journalist writing for The Daily Princetonian, and is imbedded in Iraq. He summarizes Operations Phantom Thunder and Phantom Strike as follows:

The primary effect of Phantom Thunder, as intended, was to push al Qaeda and its affiliates out of Baqubah and Arab Jabour while preventing them from moving west again into Anbar. By coordinating two division-level offensives and a major push against enemy routes into Anbar, Multinational Corps Iraq has apparently accomplished this....

Multinational Corps Iraq is now in the beginning stages of Operation Phantom Strike, the follow up to Phantom Thunder, which will focus on clearing al Qaeda out of the rural areas of the Belts. Phantom Thunder lasted two months, and this new operation, also at the corps level, will probably continue into October. You can think of it as the second of two stages in clearing the Belts: Phantom Thunder to displace al Qaeda from its fortified urban strongholds in Baqubah and Arab Jabour, and Phantom Strike to a) prevent the organization from settling into the rural areas of the Belts and b) target any Mahdi Army activity that appears in neighboring rural areas in response to US and al Qaeda activity.