The Redhunter

And that's just the beginning.

AQI was demanding that the tribes give their women to them for marriage. However, the tribes only give their women to other men within their own tribe, or occasionally to someone in a larger confederation of tribes for political reasons. So when AQI demanded women, tribal sheikh's refused.

This led to violence, as these things do: AQI killed a sheikh over his refusal to give daughters of his tribe to them in marriage, which created a revenge obligation (tha’r) on his people, who attacked AQI. The terrorists retaliated with immense brutality, killing the children of a prominent sheikh in a particularly gruesome manner, witnesses told us. This was the last straw, they said, and the tribes rose up. Neighboring clans joined the fight, which escalated as AQI (who had generally worn out their welcome through high-handedness) tried to crush the revolt through more atrocities. Soon the uprising took off, spreading along kinship lines through Anbar and into neighboring provinces.

One thing led to another and today the tribes are mostly allied with us against AQI. Score one for the good guys, however it started.

Up next is AEI scholar Frederick Kagan, who along with retired Army Vice Chief of Staff Jack Keane is the author of the current "surge" plan. In a piece called "The Gettysburg of This War" he explains how President Bush's recent visit to Iraq could mark a key turning point in the war. He then quickly goes on to analyze the situation in Anbar province and how and why it has turned around. Much of what he says mirror's Kilcullens, and indeed he references his above piece in the article.

Kagan's article is long too, but here's the money quote

The Anbaris have certainly not reached out to American forces or the Maliki government because they have suddenly decided that they like us or them. Their turn has been based entirely on self-interest — which is why it is likely to be durable and meaningful. If Anbari leaders were now espousing their longing for Jeffersonian democracy or their enthusiasm for Shia rule, one would have to be highly suspicious of their motives. They are not. They turned toward us initially because they needed allies against AQI. They are joining the ISF rather than working to establish their own militias for similarly self-interested reasons.

Some people say that events in Anbar are irrelivant or a sideshow, because the only thing that counts is some sort of political deal at the national level. Kagan disagrees

One major problem with the current discussions about Iraq in Washington is that they focus so heavily on the congressionally mandated “benchmarks,” initially discussed in 2006 by the Bush Administration. Those benchmarks address the Iraqi central government, and particularly the Council of Representatives — the Iraqi parliament — almost exclusively. As a result, political developments that occur outside the CoR tend to be discounted in this debate, and so the shift in Anbar itself has been devalued inappropriately as it does not seem likely to lead rapidly to the passage of legislation in Baghdad.

But the turn of Anbar is not simply an isolated local phenomenon with no significance in the larger political struggle in Iraq. On the contrary, it is an event that may well have profound long-term consequences even more important than the passage of any given piece of legislation. The Anbari rejection of AQI deprived Anbar’s leaders of the single most effective fighting force they had in attacking the Shia-led Iraqi government and attacking or defending against its militias. If the Anbaris had thereupon asked for the creation of a local, autonomous or semi-autonomous security force that would be a de facto tribal militia, there would have been cause for concern about their intentions. But they did not. Instead, Anbar’s tribal leaders have been offering their sons by the thousands as volunteers in the Iraqi police army.

Of course, I certainly hope he's right. I suppose you can say that Kilcullen and Kagan are hardly disinterested observers, but I would rather hope that all this could be debated on it's merits. And anyway, it's not as if they're the only two saying that the situation in Iraq has dramatically changed since the start of Operations Phantom Thunder and Phantom Strike. Either way, they're both erudite observers who's view deserves close attention.