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November 28, 2007

Book Review - The War of Ideas: Jihadism Against Democracy

Following up on his blockbuster Future Jihad, Walid Phares has written another must-read book; The War of Ideas: Jihadism Against Democracy. Although it is not absolutely necessary to read the former before the latter, it is highly recommended. In Future Jihad, Phares describes our enemy and ....the historical background. Once identified, Phares takes us through the various international battlegrounds in The War of Ideas.

Phares is Lebanese by birth, and came to the United States in 1990. He has a law degree from the University of Beirut, a Masters degree in International Law from the Universite de Lyon in France, and a Ph.D. in International Relations and Strategic Studies from the University of Miami. He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, D.C. His website is WalidPhares.com, the one for this book is TheWarofIdeas.net and the one for his 2005 book FutureJihad.com

Although the war has a military aspect, it is primarily a war of ideologies. On one side stand the forces of tyranny and opression, and on the other those of liberty and pluralism.

How do our enemies plan on winning the "war of ideas"?

All it takes for the jihadists to make progress is to continue to implant their ideology in the minds of the younger waves of followers. And all it takes for the supporters of the radicals within international society (and particularly inside Western democracies) is to prevent the public, especially youth, from understanding this equation.

What is their main weapon?

Al Qaeda and Hezbollah's real strength isn't their terrorist capacity, but the ability of their ideologues to incite and take control of the minds of their adherents to the hightest level of threat - against the very idea of life.

Soldiers from other civilizations will fight to the death, but only if necessary. The jihadi masters have developed the idea of istishhad; "jihadi suicide" or "suicide bomber", although the weapon need not be a bomb.

Clash of Civilizations?

Professor Samuel Huntington published a famous article in Foreign Affairs in 1993 titled "The Clash of Civilizations", in which he argued that rather than individual nations, economic blocs, or even ideologies as we have understood them, large civilizations would become the main players on the world stage. Phares agrees with this assessment, adding that civilizations "exist not only culturally, but also politically, including via their votes in the United Nations." While Huntington believes that clashes between these civilizations is inevitable, Phares does not.

Interestingly, although many Western (usually liberal) scholars discount or are even horrified at the thought of a clash of civilizations, the jihadists endorse it. They descrivbe their struggle as one between the umma (Muslim community) or dar el Islam (house of peace" or "house of Islam) and the dar el harb ("house of war"; any non-Muslim area) More than simply believing in it, however, the jihadists are willing to die for it, and take anyone standing in their way with them.

What is Jihadism?

Jihad is a well thought out concept that has its roots in the Middle Ages. It is not a reaction to specific Western policies, or "the legacy of colonialism". Nor is it a reaction to historical abuses (real and imagined) heaped on Arab peoples by outsiders. Although I explain jihad according to Phares more fully here and here, suffice it to say for now that jihad is defined as "constant effort on behalf of Allah".

What this comes down to is that "historically, jihad was a state tool for war mobilization under Arab and Ottoman Empires". The purpose of such war was to spread the faith. Only the Caliph or his designate could declare a jihad. Once the caliphate was overthrown in 1924, the legal body who could declare jihad ceased to exist. In the wake of this, some Muslims declared that they had the authority to declare jihad. Thus, jihad was "privatized". One of the first to "privatize" jihad was Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The objectives of the jihad are:

1) Tahrir, or "liberation" of Muslim lands from rule by non-Muslim governments.

2) Tawheed, or "unification" of all Muslims into one country with common borders.

3) Khilafa, or "caliphate". The jihadists wish to reestablish the caliphate as the government for Muslims, which will eventually rule the world.

At a risk of repeating what Phares said in Future Jihad, it is still nevertheless useful to restate the members, or three branches of the jihad: the Wahabbists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Khumeinists.

It is important to note that disguising the true nature of "jihad" is part of the war of ideas being waged against the forces of democracy. It is quite common, for example to hear the falsehood of jihad described as a "peaceful inner struggle" that one has to purify oneself so as to satisfy Allah.

The Ideas of Jihad

Jihadi propaganda, and their Western apologists say that if specific grievances were addressed, the fuel for their fire would disippate. Quite the contrary, says Phares. While their propaganda uses specific grievances to manipulate public opinion, "solving" them would do nothing, because more would simply appear in their place. It's really more a game of "whack a mole" than anything else.

Rather, the jihadists are opposed to ideas of pluralism, tolerance, and democracy as we in the West understand them.

They will use peaceful means, and even work within a democracy if necessary, but it's all just a tactic. Radical groups in Europe, North America, and Australia are pushing for Sharia-type laws to be allowed within their own communities. Far from assimilating (wth the usual immigrant give-and-take) into their host countries, all too many are demanding that the host country assimilate into them.

One of the worst aspects of jihadism or radical Islam (some would say Islam itself) is what Phares calls "gender apartheid". Under the Sharia law the jihadists have in mind, women have absolutely no rights and must live under a strict set of rules with no ifs ands or buts. The jihadists fear "womens rights" greatly, for they know that if they lose this battle then they lose their grip on power, and thus the war.

The end goal is to overthrow democracy and institute "pure" Islam, which means harsh Sharia law.

History as Yesterday

We in the West tend to think of anything that happened more than a few hundred years ago as "ancient history", and as such only marginally relevant to how we think and behave today. Not so with the jihadists. Osama bin Laden refers to events that occured a thousand years ago as if they took place only yesterday. Participitants on Jihadist websites talk as if battles that took place during the Middle Ages occured last Thursday.

It would be a mistake to see all this as simply nursing ancient grievances, or as nostalgia for the past glories of Islam. Jihadists believe that they are living out the continuation of ancient history, of ancient struggles. Theirs is the continuation of the one-thousand year running war between Islam and Europe (and parts of Asia) that went on from the 7th to the 17th centuries. To them this war didn't really end; they are fighing the same fight as Saladin did against the Crusaders, and there is no break between ancient and modern worlds.

Their most important slogan is that there is a "war on Islam", or as they describe it: "the war on Islam (al harb ala al Islam). In their view of history, it is the Muslims who have been under assault from the days of Muhammed in the 7th century, not the other way around. All of their wars of expansion, therefore, were really just defensive wars waged to defend themselves against aggression. As might be imagined, the Crusades (1095–1291) as well as 19th and 20th century colonialism play a major role in their version of history.

The First War of Ideas: 1945 - 1990

Phares has identified three distinct phases in the War of Ideas. The first took place during the Cold War. It was ignored by most people, as the Cold War swept everything in its path. Jihadism and democracy crossed paths but there was no overt conflict.

The Wahabists chose to ally with the United States against the athiest communists. Secular Ba'athist regimes allied with the Soviet Union. The Khumeinists of Iran sent shock waves through the Sunni world when they announced that they would oppose both camps.

But as Phares notes, "during the Cold War the Arab and Muslim world split along the fault line of pro and anti-Soviet, rather than pro and anti-American." All of them hated the West. We knew about but ignored this reality.

There were two defining events during this first "ware of ideas: the oil embargo launched in 1973 by OPEC, and the Khumeinist revolution in Iran.

The main consequence of the oil embargo event was that the oil producing Arab governments started to realize the power they had over the West. The price of oil skyrocketed, and they use their money to start start the "oil-funded penetration of Western education", something that continues to this day. Middle Eastern studies programs were set up on many college campuses, and were essentially told to teach the version of history that the Wahabists wanted taught; i.e. a sanitized version that misrepresented the true nature of their objectives. Human rights abuses in Muslim countries was to be completely ignored or explained away.

The Khumeinist revolution put the third leg of the jihad into place. Theirs was not a nationalist revolution, but a theological one. The objective of the Khumeinists is to establish a regional Imamate, dominate the Sunni regimes around them, and chase all Westerners from the area.

The Second War of Ideas: 1990 - 2001

Western elites and opinion-makers (on both sides of the political divide) continued to ignore human rights abuses in the Muslim world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The primary reason is that we were told that people in the Middle East were "upset not at their own governments, but were rather with the remnant of colonialism, Israel, and the new Western Imperialism." Dissidents (yes there are many) were completely ignored.

One of the primary objectives of the jihadists and their Baathist allies was to shield their respective governments from cricisism, and to prevent democracy and liberty from taking root anywere in their countries. They did not want to share in the fate of the Soviet Union. The jihadists wanted to continue to hide their real ideology and goals, and in this they were largely successful. Few in the West paid any attention to Islam in general, and "radical Islam" in particular.

As during the first War of ideas, we in the West were told that the primary problem plaguing the region was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Human rights abuses, we were admonished, were a "domestic affair", and oil money continued to fund Middle East studies programs in our universities that essentially lied about Muslim history.

In the meantime, the Wahabists continued their infiltration of Western societies, the objective of which was to "weaken, delegitimize, and then defeat" us.

The Third War of Ideas: 2001 - Present

Osama bin Laden upset the plans of the jihadists with his September 11 attacks. The Wahabists had planned a long campaign of infiltration into Western Society. The Muslim Brotherhood was busy infiltrating Middle Eastern societies in preparation to taking over their governments. The only way their infiltration would work is if we remained blind to their true nature and goals. bin Laden's attacks, however, forced the issue into the open. The jihadists rightly feared that Americans and others would now begin to study them, and when the truth became known, they would be effectively countered.

In short, bin Laden "jumped the gun." The other jihadists were furious at him, and went into full blown damage control mode. They were desperate to prevent us from learning the answer to the question many in the United States were asking: "Why do they hate us?" Their first goal was to prevent the United States and it's allies from destroying all of their totalitarian regimes. They realized that they couldn't protect the Taliban, that was asking too much. However, if they acted quickly they could protect the various countries in which Sharia or near-Sharia was practiced. They continuned to promote the primacy of "solving" the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Other tactics of the "Wahabi lobby" have been to deflect any serious cricism of Islam, to insist that "jihad" can only be defined as a "peaceful inner struggle", and that there is no such thing as "Islamism". Taking advantage of Western sensitivities towards minorities is another favorite tactic, as is playing on our "colonial guilt complex". Pressure groups scream "Islamophobia" and transform anti-terrorist measures into "singling out Muslims."

As Phares puts it, "the claim that the world hates America is nothing but a retaliation against U.S. efforts (regardless of success or failure) to foster democracy in the region." further,

...the so-called hatred of America - or, as they paint it, of this specific administration - is, in fact, a manufactured political and ideological mobilization against the agenda that the Bush-Blair alliance has pushed in response to rising fascism in the region.... peoples in the region, or more precisely, certain segments of societies, were "conditioned to hate" whomever the regime bosses, the militant cadres, and al Jazeera's ideologues targeted for hating.

More

And in order to stop Ameria and its allies from tuirning the tables on regional totalitarianism, the combined resources of jihadists and authoritarians were put into the mother of all propaganda wars. The "hatred manufacturing" can be controlled, cultivated, and unleashed when needed.

Unfortunately for the jihadists, there has been an American awakening. Scholars and ordinary citizens alike have taken it upon themselves to learn about Islam and the Middle East. I spent most of my formative years studying the communist threat. I read a lot of books during the 1990s, but none about Islam. It took me awhile after 9-11 to get going, but even a quick persual of my book reviews tells you that I am at least trying to inform myself as to the nature of the threat. Indeed Phares cites the Internet as one of the primary means by which we are trying to learn about it.

What To Do About It? Conclusions and Recommendations

Here's what Phares says we should not or need not do to win

It's not about public relations. We in the West have this idea that if only we could elimiate the Abu Ghraibs, close the prison at Guantanamo bay, not torture prisoners, solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and (depending on how extreme one gets) apologize for the sins of colonialism, Muslims will "come around". This mistakes the nature of the conflict, Phares says. The jihadists and their followers do not have a set of specific greviances that they need solved. They want to weaken the West's will to self-defense so they can take us over.

Following are some recommendations taken from the book's last chapter

1. "Democracies must educate their own publics on the history, evolution, and future development of Jihadism and its allies"

2. "Open the debate about Jihadism, and vote for laws that would ban ideologies that discriminate within societies, divide humanity into enemy and peace zones, and legitimize violence outside international law"

3. Muslims too must step up to the plate. "In the Muslim world and its diasporas, what is needed is for more democratic and reformist currents to rise up and express themselves...."

4. And by the same token, we in the West must support Muslim dissidents and democracy groups. We must welcome and chamion their cause, just as we did the dissidents in the Soviet Union and apartheit-era South Africa.

5. "Within the United States and other democracies and among partners in the War on Terorrism worldwide - including those in the Muslim world - reform the educational system to advance public awareness and counter the radicalization of certain societal segments."

6. "Use the public media for education and information." This includes funding and expanding counterterrorist U.S. government funded networks like al-Hurra and Radio Sawa.

7. In short, "expose the jihadi network and lobbies and explain their strategies to the public" the point being that a "U.S.-led campaign needs to be backed by a determined, unified,a nd convinced public."

These conclusions come from a lifetime of reading literature coming out of the Middle East, watching their news shows and Internet videos, and debating Muslims on networks like al Jazeera (born and raised in Lebanon, Phares is fluent in Arabic).

Phares and similar thinkers certainly have their share of critics, most I think from the left, but many from the right. The left will accuse him of "stereotyping Muslims" and all that PC nonsense, but the Bush/Baker establishment right or who claim that they are simply part of the "realist" school do not like what he says either. Lastly, the oil lobby and all that it funds will not want to hear anything bad about their patrons.

Phares asks us to believe that there is a world movement to undermine and take over the West. Although the movement he describes is loosely organized, it is determined and fanatical. During the 1990s or before I would have said he was exaggerating. After all, we had defeated the Nazis and Soviets. How could this bunch destroy us?

I remember years ago listening to G Gordon Liddy on the radio. Liddy would go off about how "the Saudis are our enemy!" At the time I thought that while he made good points, surely he exaggerated. "We need the Saudis" for this or that strategic reason, I thought, and anyway there was no way anyone in the West would fall for their propaganda.

How wrong I was. Although of course I was familiar with the major Middle East terrorist groups, I had little clear idea of their ideology, or didn't know much more than that they hated Israel. 9-11 woke a lot of us up and prompted us to learn what was going on, to seek answers to that "why do they hate us?" question. Phares was writing about jihadism for years before that terrible day. We should have listened to him then, but we were preaccupied and didn't listen. We need to listen to him now.

Posted by Tom at 8:30 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Jihadi Terminology

This is only a list of terms that are useful in understanding the jihadist threat. It is not meant to be a comprehensive list of Islamic terminology. Terms will be added periodically. If readers have other jihadist terms they think should be listed, or have alternate definitions, please be so kind as to leave them in the comments.

Most of these definitions are taken from Walid Phares' The War of Ideas and/or Future Jihad. All quotes are from one of these works. Where I have gone elsewhere for additional information, you'll find a link. Note that because there is no single accepted system for transliteration, spellings vary.

al harb ala al islam - "War on Islam". This is the slogan of the Salafists. To them, all of history since Muhammed is seen as a war of Muslims versus everyone else, and that Islam is constantly under seige as it is being attacked by people of other faiths. This slogan is a primary theme in jihadist propaganda.

Dar el harb - "house of war"; that part of the world not ruled by Muslims. Ideologically it is best translated as "zones of the enemies", with "enemies" being defined not only as infidels, but as anyone who does not subscribe to the jihadi version of Islam.

Dar el Islam - "House of Islam". Not simply that part of the world where Muslims live or are in the majority, but "it is the the Islamic state rules or where the jihadists are struggling for it."

Dhimmi - "people under custody". Historically, the harshness of dhimmi status has varied considerably, but it is accurate to say that the milder forms were only practiced where the Muslim authorities did not have the power to impliment the harsher versions. Dhimmis must comply with the "Omarian Conditions", which include paying the Jizya (tax, or penalty), dressing differently, wear signs on their clothing, and are barred from most public offices. Jihadists have made it clear that they will impose dhimmi status on Christians and Jews in areas that come under their control.

Deobandi - Globalsecurity: Started in Deoband, a city in northern India, in the 1860s and 70s as a reaction to British colonial rule. Deobandis believe "that the reason Islamic societies have fallen behind the West in all spheres of endeavor is because they have been seduced by the amoral and material accoutrements of Westernization, and have deviated from the original pristine teachings of the Prophet." "The Deobandi interpretation of Islamic teachings is widely practiced in Pakistan." Wikipedia: "a Sunni Islamic revivalist movement." "Deobandi purport to be characterised by a strict adherence to the Sunnah and an emphasis on Sharia". Deobandism has also spread to the UK. The Taliban practice Deobandi Islam.

Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood or Brothers) - one of the three branches of the jihad, the other two being the Wahabbis and the Khumeinists. Founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. The Brotherhood arose out of urban areas, and is a true "grass roots organization, having no state sponsor. It's objective is the resurrection of the caliphate and world domination. The method it uses to achive this is the infiltration of societies in the Middle East in an attempt to take over key institutions, such as the military, press, industry, and government. It will form outright terrorist organization to achieve regional goals, Hamas and Islamic Jihad being the primary examples.

Istishaad - usually translated as "martyrdom". "Istishaad includes dying for one's belief, but it also includes taking other people's lives. Dying for religion is martyrdom; killing as well as being killed is the jihadi concept. The philosophical difference is enormous."

Jihad - "constant effort on behalf of Allah" to spread the faith. "Historically, jihad was a state tool for war mobilization under Arab and Ottoman caliphates and various Muslim dynasties." Although "spiritual jihad" is "theoretically and philisophically possible, jihad throughout history was a state public policy on war and peace, and it was sanctioned by religious edicts." The three main branches of the jihad today are the Wahabbis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Khumeinists.

Khilafa - "caliphate" This is one of the three main objectives of the modern-day jihadists.

Khumeinist/Khomeinist - the ideology of the Shiite jihadists as dictated by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Not a nationalist ideology but a theocratic one, the objective of the Khumeinists is to establish a regional Imamate uniting all Shiites centered in Iran. They will also establish terrorist organizations to achieve regional goals, with Hezbollah being the main example. Syria, although ruled by a Ba'athist party, is increasingly allied with Iran, partially because the Alawite sect, a branch of Shia Islam, controls their Ba'athist party.

Kuffar/Kafir/Kufr/kafir - kuffar/kufr = infidels, kufr = infidelism, kafir = infidel. The root is kufr, which doesn't have an exact translation. An approximation would be "agression against the divine", or "sinning against Allah". From a Western philosophical perspective it relates to "the 'other'". The term can also simply mean Muslims who are not "pure" enough, from the perspective of the jihadists. The mechanism for demonizing the "other" is the takfir.

Murtad Answers.com: "A person born of Muslim parents that rejects Islam is called a "murtad fitri" (natural apostate), and a person that converted to Islam and later rejects the religion is called a "murtad milli" (apostate from the community)."

Qadiya to Qadiya - "cause to cause", as in "The jihadist media move from qadiya to qadiya to keep their viewers constantly inflamed and angry at their enemies." Each qadiya is a "hot button issue" designed to inflame viewers. It adds up to a "series of carefully staged psychological operations", the result of which is to manipulate public opinion. It is important to understand, then, that the "outrage" of Muslims is not the "natural relations people in the West imagined."

al Riddah/ridda - "reconversion" of Muslims to back another faith. Wikipedia: "the rejection of Islam in word or deed by a person who has been a Muslim." Ridda is the process, a murtad is the person.

Salaf - "return to the path of the predecessors". Started by Ibn Taymiya (1263 -1328). Taymiya saw the Abbasid dynasty collapse in the wake of invasion by the Crusaders and later the sack of Bagdad by Mongol invaders in 1258. He reasoned these events occured because Allah was unhappy with Muslims. To remedy the situation, he "developed the doctrines of jihadtakfirjihadi and SalafiSalafi is someone who has adopted this version of Islam. The two main jihadist branches of Salafist Islam are the Wahabbis and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Takfir - "rendering (Muslim) opponents infidels", the purpose of which is to purify Islam against those who, in this view, have corrupted it. A Takfiri is someone who has adopted this version of Islam.

Tahrir - "liberation" of Muslim lands from non-Muslim rulers. This is one of the three main objectives of the modern-day jihadists.

TaqiyyaWikipedia: "Within Shi'ite Islamic tradition,[1] the concept of Taqiyya (التقية - 'fear, guard against')[2] refers to a controversial dispensation allowing believers to conceal their faith when under threat, persecution or compulsion.[3]

The word "al-Taqiyya" literally means: "Concealing or disguising one's beliefs, convictions, ideas, feelings, opinions, and/or strategies at a time of imminent danger, whether now or later in time, to save oneself from physical and/or mental injury." A one-word translation would be "Dissimulation."

More on taqiyya at Jihad Watch

Tawheed - "unification" of all Muslims within common borders under one ruler. Existing national boundaries are to be dismantled. This is one of the three main objectives of the modern-day jihadists.

Tikbar - world infidel powers, or countries ruled by infidels.

Wahhabism/wahabism - started by Mohammed Abdel Wahab/Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab (1703–1792). Along with the Muslim Brotherhood, it is one of two main branches of Salafist Islam.

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November 27, 2007

Some Questions for Muslim Schools

The Islamic Saudi Acadamy, located in the Virginia suburbs of Washington DC, should be closed simply because it is operated and funded by the Wahabist government of Saudi Arabia, which is a totalitarian nightmare. But what about Muslim schools where we cannot find a direct link to a jihadist government or organization? How do we determine if the school has a jihadist or Islamist curriculum, or whether it is simply a religious school that happens to be Islamic?

M. Zuhdi Jasser, a Muslim American and former Lieutenant Commander in the United States Navy, answers these questions in an article posted at Family Security Matters. Mr. Jasser is the founder and Chairman of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy, a Phoenix based organization. That Family Security Matters is a pretty conservative outfit vouches for the AIFD by itself, but please visit his website if you'd like to be reassured. These days, it's understandable.

In the article, Mr. Jasser pulls no punches in his description of the Saudis, who's "Wahabism is arguably the primary cancer cell in global militant Islamist ideology." But we shouldn't just stop with the Islamic Saudi Academy, he says, but rather we should use this as a "first step" in bringing accountability to other Islamic schools in the U.S. It's not a small issue, either, for his article cites a 2004 National Center for Education Statistics study which determined that there were 182 Islamic private schools in the United States. This may seem a small number, but these schools can graduate a lot of students. History shows that determined minorites can make a disproportionate impace.

Harboring no illusions, he warns that

The (Islamist) schools around the country are all relatively new and wasting no time in creating a generation of students which are more likely than not to be defenders of Islamism over anti-Islamist systems based in universal liberty. While only a minority of Muslims send their children to these schools, they are a growing and significant minority countered only by a silent majority of Muslims.

What we need to do is "discuss in a comprehensive public manner, the context in which Islamic parochial schools teach Islamic history." This means examining their curriculum. Mr. Jasser has a series of questions that we need answered by Islamic schools:

1. How does the school teach American history and the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights? What is taught about the struggle of our founding fathers against theocracy? Is European Enlightenment ideology taught? Are students encouraged to learn from non-Muslim philosophers especially those who influenced our founding fathers and taught liberty and freedom?

2. Are students taught that sharia is only personal or that it also specifically guides governmental law? Does their answer change whether Muslims are a minority or a majority?

3. Do they view non-Islamic private and public schools as part of a culture of ‘immorality’ and decadence since they are not Islamicized or can non-Islamic schools be morally and equally virtuous?

4. Do they teach their children that ‘being American’ and being ‘free’ is about moral corruption or is being American and free about loving the nation in which they live and sharing equal status before the law regardless of faith tradition?

5. Is complete religious freedom a central part of faith and the practice of religion? In the Islamic school, how are children treated who refuse to participate in school faith practices?

6. Are the children taught Muslim exclusivism with regards to the attainment of paradise in the Hereafter? From that, are the children also taught that government and public institutions must thus be ‘Islamic’ in order for the community as a whole to be able to enter the gates of Heaven?

7. How are student discussions, debate, and intellectual discourses approached regarding American domestic and foreign policy? Do the teachers have a political agenda? Does that agenda demonstrate a dichotomy between Islamist interests and American interests?

8. Is the historical period of Muslim rule of Spain (Andalusia) taught in the context of the history of the world during the Middle Ages or is it looked upon as superior to current day American ideology even after the advances of the Enlightenment?

9. Is the pledge of allegiance administered every day at the beginning of the school day?

Mr. Jasser gets it. He is a true reformer, not one of those "moderates" we are told about who end up holding views antithetical to Western ideas about liberty.

I've blogged about Muslim reformers before, and how we need to support them. Mr Jasser and others like him should be invited to the White House and Congress should invite them to testify. While I can't prove neither has happened, I rather doubt it.

We are in a worldwide war against the forces of jihadism. While part of it will be fought on the battlefield by military forces, in the final analysis it is a War of Ideas. The way you win a War of Ideas is to prevent older believers from passing their ideas into the next generation. I'm going to post a lot more on this shortly, but an obvious first step is to scrutinize Islamic schools, and to do so boldly but fairly. Those that pass muster are more than welcome to particulate fully in our great nation, but those that don't must change or be sent packing.

Posted by Tom at 7:58 PM | Comments (6) | TrackBack

November 26, 2007

More on the Islamic Saudi Academy

One thing that drives me nuts is how so many people, especially on the left but also on the right, tolerate or even give tacit suppor to the Nazi regime of Saudi Arabia. The Islamic Saudi Academy, with two campuses in Alexandria and Fairfax, Virginia, mere miles from our nations capital, is a case in point. Fortunately, some Americans are hard at work to try and close this abomination. Unfortunately, others are working just as hard to keep it open.

From an AP story in today's Washington Times we have an update

Twelve U.S. senators and a federal commission want to shut it down, and its most virulent critics have dubbed it "Terror High." ...

Now the school finds itself on the defensive again. Last month, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom issued a report saying the academy should be closed until it can conduct a review of the curriculum and textbooks.
...

Indeed, many people familiar with the school say the accusations are unfounded. Fairfax County Supervisor Gerald Hyland, whose district includes the academy, has defended the school and arranged for the county to review the textbooks to put questions about the curriculum to rest. That review is ongoing.

Much of the debate is about the content of the textbooks used at the school

Academy officials have acknowledged that some of the original Saudi textbooks use intemperate language, but say they have made significant modifications at the academy to remove offensive passages. They have, for instance, removed from teachers' versions of first-grade textbooks an excerpt instructing teachers to explain "that all religions, other than Islam, are false, including that of the Jews, Christians and all others."

This is absolutely unbelievable. I couldn't care less what is in the textbooks at this school, and here's why:

Imagine that it was the 1980s, and the apartheit government of South Africa had set up a school in northern Virginia. Would anyone care what was in the textbooks? Of course not. The place would be surrounded by people with torches and pitchforks and closed within a week. And rightfully so.

But when it comes to anything having to do with Islam, suddenly everything changes. The Saudi Arabian government is one of the most repressive on this earth. It is totalitarian in nature, and is antithetical to everything we in the West hold dear.

Here are the findings of the USCIRF regarding the academy linked to above:

• It is the only school in the United States that is operated with the direct authority of the Saudi embassy. Twenty such academies are operated by the government of Saudi Arabia in foreign capital cities around the world.

• It operates on two northern Virginia properties owned or leased by the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, with the leased property being leased by “the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia d/b/a (doing business as) the Islamic Saudi Academy.”

• The Saudi ambassador to the United States is the chairman of the school’s board of directors, which, according to the Academy’s web site, “oversees the educational and administrative operation” and “provides direction and guidance to every aspect of” the school’s operations.

• The school is funded by the government of Saudi Arabia.

• On numerous occasions, Saudi Embassy officials have spoken to the press on the ISA’s behalf—including in response to inquiries about its curriculum.

• According to the Academy’s brochure, posted on its own web site, the ISA uses Saudi government “curriculum, syllabus, and materials.” It is these ties to the Saudi government and embassy that bring the school within the Commission’s mandate, which is to monitor foreign governments’ compliance with international religious freedom guarantees.

Women are especially targeted for oppression in Saudi Arabia, the details of which are or should be well known. Yet there is no international outcry. Only we dreaded neocons, joined by a few lonely liberals, sound at all outraged. In the AP story, a Democrat, Fairfax County Supervisor Gerald Hyland, defends the academy. He probably considers himself a champion of women's rights.

But it's not just Democrats. The Bush Administration is to blame as well. Our President is far too cozy with the Saudis. It is to his shame that he has ignored the civil rights abuses rampant throughout the Muslim world. No doubt the hope is that our ventures in Afghanistan and Iraq will eventually produce an atmosphere where liberty can take root, but these are long-term undertakings. We need to act now.

Since the left and establishment right seems determined to ignore the women who are virtual slaves in Saudi Arabia, it is up to us evil conservatives to sound the alarm.

Close the Islamic Saudi Academy.

Previous:

Wahabbists in Northern Virginia

Posted by Tom at 9:01 PM | Comments (12) | TrackBack

November 21, 2007

A Counterproductive Attempt at Legacy

I've wanted to write about this for a few weeks, not, but another story or issue always won out. This today from the AP in the Washington Times sent me over the top

The United States will try to close an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal before President Bush's term expires, giving the administration a little over a year to help the two sides craft a resolution to one of the world's longest and most intractable conflicts. ...

"The parties have said they are going to make efforts to conclude it in this president's term, and it's no secret that means about a year," Rice said. "That's what we'll try and do. Nobody can guarantee that - all you can do is make your best effort."

Just what I suspected; Bush wants to go out a "peacemaker". This might be bearable, but for this, reported by Agence France Presse

US President George W. Bush made more calls to Middle East leaders Tuesday as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pinned the success of next week's Annapolis conference on simply opening negotiations for a Palestinian state, even without a work plan.

"The success of this meeting is really in the launch of negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians for the establishment of a Palestinian state and therefore a two-state solution," Rice said about the conference planned for Annapolis, Maryland, near Washington.

As with so many others, the President and his Secretary of State have it exactly wrong. The problem is not the lack of a "two state solution." The problem is that the Palestinians are ruled by terrorists who want to destroy it. Specifically, neither Fatah nor Hamas have given up their "right of return"

The "Right of return" is one in which the Palestinians insist that the refugees, and their descendants, allegedly displaced during the 1948 war of independence, have the right to return to Israel proper and claim the land that they say they owned. Depending on which website you believe, this would mean anywhere from 3.5 to 6 million Arabs moving into Israel, a country of 6 million Jews and 1 million Arabs. The clear purpose of the "right of return" is to destroy Israel.

Fatah (or "Fateh"), is supposedly the "good" organization with whom we can make peace. Yet on their website they insist on this "Right of return"

The inalienable rights of the Palestinian people include the right to self-determination, the right of return, the establishment of a sovereign state with Jerusalem as its capital.

Also, as part of their constitution (somehow now missing from their website) is this

Obstacles to Peace

The first obstacle to a settlement, then is the Palestinian insistence on a "right of return"

The second obstacle, though, is the Israeli fear that if they give the Palestinians a state terrorist and rocket attacks will continue as before.

The settlements are not an obstacle. If you want to know why, read what I wrote here. The short version, however is this: If the settlements are the problem today, what was the problem before 1967?

But perhaps the bigglest obstacle to peace is that the Palestians are in a state of near chaos. As it is, the Palestinian territories are split; Fatah rules the West Bank and Hamas Gaza.

If Mahmud Abbas ("Abu Mazen", or whatever name he goes by these days) reaches a settlement, will the rest of Fatah go along? What about the other political parties that make up the Palestinian Authority? Will Hamas agree to any settlement?

Of course, it's unlikely in the extreme that anyone except Abbas and his closest associates will agree to anything. The rest of them will reject the settlement, and will continue with their terrorism and Qassam rockets.

Just consider this: Ismail Haniyeh is a senior Hamas official. On March 29, 2006 he was sworn in as Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority. Abbas dismissed him on June 14 2007, but Haneyeh refuses to accept Abbas' authority and says that he is still PM, governing what he can from Gaza. There is a big dispute over the legality of Abbas' dismissal of him but the point is that they can't govern themselves. Haniyeh is part of the rejectionist camp, having declared in December of 2006 that "we will never recognize the usurper Zionist government and will continue our jihad-like movement until the liberation of Jerusalem."

Some say that if we give them (or allow them to have) a country the infighting will cease and they'll behave. I consider this argument unpersuasive.

I used to think that the Palestinians (as they are called, a whole debate unto itself) should have their own country. No more. Until they can behave with a minimum of decency they should not be allowed to rule anything.

As such, any meeting in Annapolis will be counterproductive. The Palestinians will be promised a country before having had to make any concessions. They will then refuse to give up their "right of return" or make any meaningful concessions of their own. Because of this refusal they will not be given a state, just promised one at some indefinate time in the future. Abbas and his cronies will get mad, and this will be a signal to the terror masters that it is time to unleash their minions and start another Intifada. Israel will retaliate, and the world will condem Israel.

Andrew McCarthy, writing in National Review this past June, summed up his analysis if Fatah and the prospects for a peace agreement with them by saying that

The Palestinians are a backward people, indoctrinated toward brutality. They don’t rate a sovereign state or anyone’s help until they civilize themselves. Sovereignty is a privilege that implies acceptance of civilized norms — that is why we speak of states like Iran and North Korea as “rogues.” Regardless of whether there really are scattered Palestinian moderates, it is a dangerous fantasy to assume the Palestinian people, as a whole, are ready to be anyone’s peace partner.

We are enabling their hatred when we provide support without insisting that the Palestinian people — not just Abbas and Fatah, but the people — convincingly foreswear revolution, terrorism, violence, ethnic-cleansing, and the goal of eliminating Israel. We are a generation or more, at least, from any hope of such developments. In the meantime, as long as we subsidize the hatred, we shall be buying more of it, while giving the Palestinians no incentive to reform.

My thoughts exactly.

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November 19, 2007

Iraq Briefings 15/19 November 2007

Continuing with my persusal of different reliable sources to understand the situation in Iraq, today we have to briefings to consider. One is by a Colonel, and the other a Major General. Both officers are in Iraq and have combat commands. They are linked via teleconference to the press briefing room at the Pentagon. Although I provide links to the transcripts, I encourage you to watch both briefings in their entirety.

One briefing is by a Colonel, the other a Major General. Both command combat units in Baghdad, and are linked via teleconference to the press room at the Pentagon.

First up is Col Jeffrey Bannister, Commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division. His division is stationed at Camp Liberty in Baghdad

This video can also be viewed at DODvCLIPS

Here is what I thought was most interesting about this briefing:

The strategy when we arrived was to transition to overwatch of Iraqi security forces. Given the levels of sectarian violence, Iraq was just not ready for this transition, and we instead, as you know, changed to a counterinsurgency strategy or COIN. It has led to the surge of coalition forces, beginning in January, putting more boots on the ground, and gave the Strike Brigade nearly twice as many combat soldiers, covering an area only one-third of the size.... The greatest threat to coalition forces and our Iraqi partners has been the Shi'a extremists with explosive formed penetrators...

Overall, I believe our greatest challenge upon arrival was reducing the level of sectarian violence and its corrosive influence on all aspects of life for Iraqis....

Has eastern Baghdad achieved irreversible security momentum? Not yet. Have we experienced consecutive months of sustained security? Yes. Is this security momentum fragile? Yes. So while we still have much work to do, the mission is not over. I believe we have taken great steps and have accomplished many things the American and Iraqi people can be proud of.

Several points from this. One, we knew that rebuilding the Iraqi Army would be hard, but did it have to be this hard? On the one hand it's disconcerting that when Col Bannister arrived the Iraqi Army was not up to the job, on the other encouraging that he changed strategies instead of living with a bad situation. Some say we should have kept the old Iraqi Army or recalled it (if this was even possible), but as I wrote last year this might have made the situation even worse.

It's also interesting that in his AOR (Area Of Responsibility) sectarian violence is the main problem, not al Qaeda. More on this below. Lastly, Col Bannister is gunshy about being overconfident about the future.

The first quesiton was perhaps the most intersting as it touched on the sectarian violence

Q Yeah, Jonathan Karl with ABC News. What are you seeing in terms of support for Sadr, for Muqtada al-Sadr? Do you have a sense that you still have strong support in your area? Is he much of a factor? What are you seeing in terms of the Mahdi Army?

COL. BANNISTER: Right now we're very encouraged by what we see. It's been late August when he issued his pledge of honor, and you know, back then we're like okay, well, let's see some action to support those words. And since August, we have actually seen some positive steps taken that is -- so we're seeing good action from it. I would group this effort into three because it's going to dovetail into -- he's got some breakaways, as you know, that are not supporting his order, and right now the preponderance of his followers are following his pledge of honor.

So you know, as a follow-on question to this, I would tell you -- the threes I would put it into, I would put it into his loyal followers, his loyalists, and then there's some criminal portions that are kind of in the middle. And then, of course, we have the special groups that may have some external influences that we believe that are not following his orders. So he's got a couple of groups, and we think the ones in the middle are reconcilable, but I will tell you the preponderance of his followers are listening to his order.

In his Nov 1 press briefing Lt Gen Odierno also spoke of al-Sadr's cease-fire.

Next is Major General Mark Hertling, Commander of Multi-National Division-North and the 1st Armored Division. MG Hertling reports to Lt Gen Raymond Odierno, as to all of the divisonal commanders. Odierno, in turn, reports to Gen Petraeus. Hertling has been on the job all of one month, having replaced MG Benjamin Mixon. This is, however, his third tour in Iraq.

I'm not sure if Hertling's replacing Mixon was naturual replacement or if Odierno was dissatisfied with Mixon. As it is I do not have time to do much searching, so if readers have any reliable informatin it would be appreciated.

This video can also be viewed at DODvCLIPS

Here's the transcript.

MG Hertling dispensed with a long introductory statement and went straight to the questions. Here are some of the ones I found most informative

Q Sir, it's Pauline Jelinek of the Associated Press. If I could follow up on the reduction in violence, it seems that a reduction is being, you know, reported overall in Iraq, but that many of the attacks that we hear the most about appear to be in the northern areas. Is that correct? Do you -- what do you see happening, for instance, in Mosul? Are attacks going up there or just not going down as much as elsewhere, and Kirkuk as well?

GEN. HERTLING: Yeah, thank you for reminding me of that. I was reminded of that by General Odierno just the other day. And in fact it is occurring. And if you simply look at a map of Iraq, you understand why it's occurring. Great success by the Awakening movement in Anbar has pushed some of the al Qaeda fighters to the east, into our area. Some of the great success in the Baghdad area has pushed some of the al Qaeda fighters to the north in our area. And as you saw just a few months ago, when Tropic Lightning was still here, they had a pretty tough fight, code-named Arrowhead Ripper, in the Diyala province.

So what you're seeing is the enemy shifting, and in fact whereas attacks -- all types of attacks, but specifically IEDs -- have decreased throughout Iraq, and they have in fact decreased in our area, in MND-North areas, our -- (audio break) -- highest of all of the provinces in Iraq. That's why it's so critical -- my number-one mission remains continue to pursue al Qaeda in our area. And we're getting help from the locals and the Iraqi army and police to do that....

And if I could, I'll add one more thing. You are still going to read about spectacular attacks.

A short while later there was another question about "spectacular attacks"

Q General, Julian Barnes with the Los Angeles Times. I wonder if you could tell us a little bit more detail about your assessment of the strength of al Qaeda in your area, relative to the other parts of the country. And also tell us a little bit more. You talked about the spectacular attacks that are going to continue -- maybe if you could put a little -- tell us a little bit more about how your strategy for deterring or preventing those attacks in the major cities that are in your area of operations. GEN. HERTLING: Yeah, I can. I certainly won't give you any numbers on what we think the al Qaeda figures are for MND-North. Because first of all, I'd probably be wrong. Secondly every time we say, hey, they're decreasing in actions or capability, suddenly they commit a spectacular attack, or one VBIED goes off, and it's front page headline saying, hey, Hertling just said they're reduced in this area, but they just blew up a bomb.

Lastly, two questions about the Concerned Local Citizens that have been much discussed in the news and around the Internet

Q General, it's Luis Martinez of ABC News. You mentioned concerned local citizens earlier.... And what does this also raise about the concerns about whether there's too much decentralization in bringing in all these concerned local citizens in, so that different units aren't aware of who is actually on their side?

GEN. HERTLING: I counted about 18 questions in there. I'll try and address them as they come up.

First of all, there's a little bit of a difference between the concerned local citizens and the awakening movements. First, I think it would be important to define what I believe -- (audio break) -- Petraeus believe defines the concerned local citizens. And it has to do with the three words that make up the title. They're concerned; they're local. And they're citizens abiding by the rule of law.

Some of the other key issues associated with CLCs, as we call them, are the fact that they have small arms weapons. And that's defined as a rifle of a pistol. They don't go around with RPGs or machine guns or truck-mounted machine guns or things like that. They don't -- (audio break) -- they are very closely watched by both the Iraqi security forces and the coalition forces in those areas, to ensure there's not fratricide on the battlefield.
...

Q (Kristin Roberts with Reuters) Sir, you touched on this a little bit, but I'd like to draw you out on what you see as the difference between the CLCs and militias.

GEN. HERTLING: Well, quite frankly, militias are outside the rule of law, and that's the important thing about Iraq right now is it's developing its rule of law. What I don't think the Iraqi government wants to happen is to go back to the chaos that existed when there was militia toting guns all over the various areas that sometimes occurred in the past. The Iraqi police, the Iraqi security forces, army and police are the contributor to the rule of law.

The concerned local citizens -- (audio break). I think the best way you can define them is as an armed neighborhood watch. They're not to go attacking other things, because it's such a confusing battlespace over here anyway with people not wearing uniforms and combatting the government that this only causes them to be more at risk.

So that's how I would define it. A concerned local citizen is someone who is in a closely stationary position, if that makes sense, who basically stays in his neighborhood, who is linked with the police or the Iraqi army, who doesn't carry large-caliber weapons, and who is contributing to the rule of law. A militia travels around wherever they want to go and has basically sometimes gang wars. It's not a Bloods & Crips situation; it's not a Sharks and Jets situation. That's what we're trying to avoid.

A lot of honesty from the commanders, I thought. Neither sought to sugar-coat the situation and both were gunshy about making any sort of predictions for the future. Perhaps this is simply because they were burned in the past. I didn't follow these press briefings in detail until somewhat recently, so I don't have any historical perspective. Whatever the history, I find these briefings posted at The Pentagon Channel to be a valuable source of information. And while we're at it, I'll say again that I am impressed with the journalists as well. They ask insightful, tough, but fair questions. They've obviously learned a lot as well.

Posted by Tom at 8:58 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

November 17, 2007

Moving Forward in Iraq

Here is a survey of some recent articles on the situation in Iraq that I think are useful to understanding the situation over there

First up is one by Kimberly Kagan, appropriately titled "How They Did It". It's a long article, but here's the money quote

"As we assess the security gains made over the past four months, I attribute the progress to three prominent dynamics," General Odierno explained. "First, the surge allowed us to eliminate extremist safe havens and sanctuaries, [and] just as importantly to maintain our gains. Second, the ongoing quantitative and qualitative improvement of the Iraqi security forces are translating to ever-increasing tactical successes. Lastly, there's a clear rejection of al Qaeda and other xtremists by large segments of the population, this coupled with the bottom-up awakening movement by both Sunni and Shia who want a chance to reconcile with the government of Iraq." These dynamics worked together to improve security.

Kagan also helpfully provides a map and chart of current and past operations that are part of the "surge"

The additional forces, General Odierno explained, permitted "a surge in simultaneous and sustained offensive operations, in partnership with the Iraqi security forces. Furthermore, it allowed us to operate in areas that had not yet seen a sustained coalition presence and to retain our hard-fought gains. Our ability to put pressure on al Qaeda and other extremists and deny them safe havens and sanctuaries increased significantly. This was done with the goal of protecting the population and in concert with political and economic initiatives to buy time and space for the government of Iraq."

It's critical, of course, that the Iraqi government eventually seize this opportunity. In my opinion those who say there can only be a political solution to Iraq are putting the cart before the horse. Only when the security situation is stabilized will the political factions be able to come together. We'll see if they can do it. Either way, I don't think a political solution was ever possible in a country heading towards civil war.

Next is an article in the Investors Business Daily (author unknown) titled "Progress, Progress And More Progress"

Among our recent successes

• In Basra, Iraq's second-largest city, British Major Gen. Graham Binns said that attacks against British and American forces have plunged 90% since the start of September.

• Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki reported that terrorist attacks of all kinds are down almost 80% from last year's peak — thanks directly to the U.S. surge of 30,000 new troops.

• Amid growing signs that even Iraq extremists have tired of terrorism and killing, a Sunni religious group closed down the high-profile Muslim Scholars Association because of its ties to terrorists.

• U.S. Major Gen. James Simmons, speaking in Baghdad, said Iran's pledges to stop sending weapons and explosives into Iraq "appear to be holding up." Roadside bombs, the leading killer of U.S. troops, have plunged 52% since March, he added.

• Perhaps most touching, according to a report from Michael Yon, who deserves to be the first blogger to win a Pulitzer Prize, Muslims are asking Iraqi Christians to return to help build Iraq.

Iraqi Muslims recently crammed into St. John's Catholic church in Baghdad to attend a Christian service. According to Yon, "Muslims keep telling me to get it on the news. 'Tell the Christians to come home to their country Iraq.' "

• Finally, there's this from Douglas Halaspaska, a reporter on the Web site U.S. Cavalry ON Point: "I came to Ramadi expecting a war and what I found was a city that has grown from the carnage, and all its inhabitants — both Iraqi and American — healing. I was not expecting what I found in Iraq . . . it was better than all of that."

Again, all this has taken place just in recent days, weeks and months. The positive news has become simply overwhelming.

For those who think that such recent successes can only be illusory because "things can't turn around that quickly", Victor Davis Hanson offers this bit of history

The White House was burned by British forces in late August 1814; a little more than four months later, the British were routed at New Orleans. During the Civil War, the Union army was on the ropes in July 1864 yet outside Atlanta by September. The Germans were driving through France in March 1918, but fleeing toward the Rhine by August. The communists took Seoul in early January 1951, yet were pushed back across the Demilitarized Zone a little more than three months later.

Tony Blankley, editor of The Washington Times, wonders whether we're headed towards an "Old Fashioned" Victory In Iraq

It has become obligatory for both pro- and antiwar commentators to never mention the possibility of victory in Iraq. The most that antiwar people will admit is that the surge has gained a temporary military advantage in a war that cannot be won militarily. The most pro-war commentators will claim is that they see the possibility of "success" perhaps, maybe, someday, somehow.

But as of Veterans Day 2007, I think one can claim a very real expectation that next year the world may see a genuine, old-fashioned victory in the Iraq War. In five years we will have overturned Saddam's government, killed, captured or driven out of country almost all al Qaeda terrorists, suppressed the violent Shi'ite militias and induced the Sunni tribal leaders and their people to shun resistance and send their sons into the army and police and seek peaceful resolution of disputes. And we will have stood up a multisectarian, tribally inclusive army capable of maintaining the peace that our troops established.

One big question is what Iran is up to. We all know that they've been arming the insurgency and sending agents into Iraq. According to Eli Lake, staff reporter for the New York Sun, there are two schools of thought on this

On one side are the civilians in charge of the State Department and the Pentagon, Secretary of State Rice and Defense Secretary Gates, who are arguing that the change in Iraq reflects a strategic decision from Iran.

On the other side are General David Petraeus and his commanders in Iraq, who say the decline in violence reflects not the decisions of the Islamic Republic but rather the success of the military surge aimed in part at Iran's terrorist and influence network.

If Ms. Rice and Mr. Gates win the policy debate, the current American and Iraqi efforts to disrupt Iranian supply lines into Iraq, detain or kill operatives, and freeze assets for Iran will halt. In their place, the moribund Baghdad negotiations that were suspended over the summer will be revived and the American Embassy will work to extract guarantees from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to end its support for terrorism and sabotage.

If Rice and Gates lose, then presumably the interdiction efforts will continue. I don't know who is right, but hope we make the right decision.

The next big test will be to see what happens after we withdraw some of our troops and let the Iraqis take over more and more areas. The Associated Press asks whether they can hold

The first big test of security gains linked to the U.S. troop buildup in Iraq is at hand.

The military has started to reverse the 30,000-strong troop increase and commanders are hoping the drop in insurgent and sectarian violence in recent months — achieved at the cost of hundreds of lives — won't prove fleeting. ...

... But [Maj. Gen. Joseph Fil] said it was now clear that U.S. forces, with Iraqi help, have gained the upper hand in Baghdad.

"Perhaps even most significantly, the Iraqi people have just decided they've had it up to here with violence," he said, echoing the assertion of numerous other commanders that one of the most important developments since early summer has been an erosion of what some call a culture of fear in Baghdad.

Their belief is that the tide has turned in favor of the forces of moderation. But will it last?

W Thomas Smith may be right that the lede is cynical, but it asks the right question.

Meanwhile, Democrats in Congress are still trying to lose the war. Fox News reports that

Democrats (tried but )failed to bring combat troops home from Iraq by December 2008 and place more restrictions on the administration's interrogation program through a $50 billion war-funding measure.

The predictable excuse is that the Iraqi government has failed to perform as it should

Senate Democrats also said money for the Iraq war should be tied to troop withdrawals because the Baghdad government has not taken advantage of the security provided by U.S. forces.

"We have done our part," said Sen. Patty Murray, D-Wash. "The Iraqi government has not done its part."

No doubt that the central government in Baghdad leaves a lot to be desired. And they have not "done their part" as much as they need to. But these things take a lot of time, much more than the mentality of the MTV/video game US legislators will give them.

They forget that Lt Col David Kilcullen (Austrailian Army), former senior advisor on counter-insurgency matters to Gen Petraeus (and now on Sec Rice's staff) reminded Charlie Rose last month that

There has never been a successful counterinsurgency that took less than 10 years.

We might or might not succeed in Iraq even if we continue our current so-far-successful strategy. But we will definately fail if we withdraw troops precipitously as the Democrats want us to do. And the consequences of failure are so severe that we must pursue victory, certainly at a time when our current strategy is so clearly working.

Posted by Tom at 12:50 PM | Comments (4) | TrackBack

November 15, 2007

Waking Up in the UK?

The British might just be waking up to the danger that surrounds them. A poll published earlier this week in the Evening Standard shows that many Brits are not keen on Muslims who won't adopt Western ways (h/t USS Neverdock).

Methodology being important, the story says that those surveyed were "more than 700 "influentials" - a category including business leaders, innovators, politicians and other prominent individuals - carried out for the Standard by opinion pollsters YouGovStone."

Here are some of the key findings:

Strong opposition to the use of the Muslim veil in schools and face covering in public is revealed today in a new opinion poll for the Evening Standard.

Nearly 90 per cent of respondents say that Muslim teachers should not be allowed to wear a veil when teaching.

And 84 per cent say that Muslim pupils should not be allowed to wear a veil at school.

... Among the most striking findings are that half believe that Islam is a "generally intolerant" faith and that Muslims are "isolated" from the rest of the community.

At the same time, about 40 per cent hold the opposite opinion, while seven out of 10 believe that Muslims make a positive contribution to the economy.

More than 70 per cent also say that they would be happy to vote for a Muslim as London Mayor.

There is strong opposition, however, to the censorship of images or words that might offend Islamic sensibilities and the idea of making Eid a public holiday.

Almost three-quarters of respondents also blame Islam for the 7 July bombings, although nine per cent say it played no role and a further 13 per cent say its influence was minimal.
...

On Islamic attitudes towards others, for example, 49 per cent say they regard the religion as a generally intolerant faith.

Although 44 per cent have the opposite opinion, the survey also reveals that 51 per cent think that the Muslim community is "somewhat isolated" or "mostly isolated" from the rest of society in the capital. Only four per cent of respondents believe that Muslims are "mostly integrated".

Views on the wearing of the niqab or any other full-face covering in public are still firmly against, with 58 per cent describing it as either entirely or somewhat unacceptable.

For example, one respondent states: "I would find it difficult to do business with anyone I could not see." Four out of 10 of those questioned, however, do not oppose the niqab.
...

More than 80 per cent say they oppose the notion of making Eid a public holiday and 54 per cent say they would be concerned if there were plans to build a mosque in their street.

Of these, about half say that they would actively oppose any such proposals.

On the Muslim contribution to society, 20 per cent say that Muslims contribute a "great deal" to the capital's economy, with another 51 per cent saying that they make a "fair amount" of impact on business.

Opinion on the Islamic impact on arts and culture is more divided, with 45 per cent saying that Muslims make "not very much" or no contribution, compared with 42 per cent who take the opposite view.

A more favourable verdict is reached on the Muslim role in academic and intellectual life, with 52 per cent of respondents taking a positive view, far more than the 33 per cent who suggest the impact is small or non-existent.

Half of those questioned think the media should avoid publishing material that would gratuitously offend Muslims but only five per cent favour any formal curbs and 82 per cent are opposed to censorship.

More than a third say there should be total freedom of speech regardless of the damage that this might cause to other people's feelings or to community relations.

Opinion on the introduction of quotas to boost Muslim recruitment to the Metropolitan Police is split, with 41 per cent opposed, 34 per cent in favour and 25 per cent having no view.

More than 70 per cent, however, say that they would back a suitably qualified Muslim candidate who stood for Mayor, compared with 16 per cent who say that they would not.

The majority of respondents also want immigration to be either greatly or slightly reduced, although the 55 per cent taking this view in respect of Muslim migrants is slightly lower than the overall figure of 61 per cent who want cuts to the numbers arriving from elsewhere in the world, regardless of religion or ethnicity.

On terrorism and extremism, 72 per cent of those surveyed say that Islam was to blame for the London bombings.

A total of 29 per cent also want political groups with fundamentalist Islamic agendas to be banned, although a far greater number - 58 per cent - say this should only be the case if a direct link to terrorism can be proved.

This poll is generally good news, I'd say. It means that they've achieved the first goal; recognizing there's a problem. The second is to do something about it.

The first thing to do is to reduce or eliminate Muslim immigration. The second is to demand social integration and acceptance of Western values. The third is that Muslims need to stop playing the role of the "victim". We can go on from there, but these would be a good start.

Posted by Tom at 10:00 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack

November 14, 2007

Send the Troops A Holiday Card

Yesterday Move America Forward hosted their first rally in what will be a 40-city cross country pro-troop to rally support for our troops and their mission in Iraq, Afghanistan, and all around the globe.

Here's their promotonal video

And here's some news coverage

Here's how you can help:

Mail the cards to their headquarters:

Move America Forward
ATTN: Holiday Card Program
770 L Street - #1400
Sacramento, CA 95814

Here's the map, and they've got the complete itinerary on the website

Americans have set up many organizations to help our troops. One that I've used for the past few years is Adopt-A-Platoon. Go to their website and check out their many opportunities for sending letters and packages to our troops.

Posted by Tom at 7:59 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

November 13, 2007

Yes They Want Nukes

If you thought that my warnings yesterday about why we should not let Iran get nuclear weapons were alarmist, today we have this AP story via the New York Times:

Iran has met a key demand of the U.N. nuclear agency, handing over long-sought blueprints showing how to mold uranium metal into the shape of warheads, diplomats said Tuesday.

Iran's decision to release the documents, which were seen by U.N. inspectors two years ago, was seen as a concession designed to head off the threat of new U.N. sanctions.

But the diplomats said Tehran has failed to meet other requests made by the International Atomic Energy Agency in its attempts to end nearly two decades of nuclear secrecy on the part of Iran
...

The agency has been seeking possession of the blueprints since 2005, when it stumbled upon them among a batch of other documents during its examination of suspect Iranian nuclear activities. While agency inspectors had been allowed to examine them in the country, Tehran had up to now refused to let the IAEA have a copy for closer perusal.

Well that was awfully nice of them to let us have the documents. But how did they get them in the first place? After all, aren't we supposed to believe that their nuclear program is peaceful? Here's the Iranian explanation:

Iran maintains it was given the papers without asking for them during its black market purchases of nuclear equipment decades ago that now serve as the backbone of its program to enrich uranium -- a process that can generate both power or create the fissile core of nuclear warheads. Iran's refusal to suspend enrichment has been the main trigger for both existing U.N. sanctions and the threat of new ones.

I guess the documents were just thrown in as a bonus. Kind of like when you buy a new cell phone they throw in a car charger.

Just to be sure we're all on the same page regarding the documents, the AP story goes on to explain that

Both the IAEA and other experts have categorized the instructions outlined in the blueprints as having no value outside of a nuclear weapons program.

Anyone still want to maintain that Iran isn't seeking nukes?

Paul Mirengoff of Powerline attended a breakfast hosted by The American Spectator two days ago. Former Ambassador to the UN John Bolton was the featured speaker. Here's what he had to say about Iran

Our policy has been, let the Europeans handle it. Europe's policy has been "speak softly and carry a big carrrot." This dynamic has caused us to waste four years. Finally, we have Sarkozy and perhaps Merkel on board, and we've been able to implement some decent sanctions. But they are too little too late. The only question now is when (not whether) Iran will get nukes. And given the price of oil, the answer is probably sooner rather than later. Our options, then, are regime change and the use of military force. There's some chance of regime change because the regime is fragile. Failing that, as a last resort the U.S. or Israel should strike Iran's nuclear facilities. However, this is a risky strategy because Iran may have facilites we don't know about. In that case, you get the adverse consequences of the stirke without the benefit. Bolton doubts that Iran would withhold oil because the revenue is too important to the regime. Iran would likely retaliate by supporting terrorism, but Iran's support of terrorism is already substantial.

I'd say he has it just about right.

Unfortunately, the Bush Administration seems determined to forge ahead with our current strategy of endless negotiations and sanctions that will not deter the mullahs. We should be pursuing regime change but are not. What we're going to end up with is a situation where the choice will be between letting Iran have the bomb and hoping for the best and a military strike, which as Bolton says is risky.

Part of me thinks that the President will assess the 2008 race late next year and if it looks like the Democrat will win, will order strikes because he (rightly) won't trust his successor to do it. On the other hand, this ridiculous business of seeking an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord makes he think he's looking at his legacy and wants to go out a peacemaker.

If Israel had a strong leader I'd say they would present Bush with an ultimatum; you strike or we will. Bush would have to hit Iran because 1) Israel couldn't get the job done (they don't have big bombers that can carry the deep penetrator bombs) and 2) an Israeli strike would inflame the region even more than a U.S. one would. But unless Israel gets new leadership (Bibi where are you?) I'm not sure I even see this happening.

Either way, Bolton is right in that the situation will come to a head sometime in the next few years. It might not be September 1939 yet, but it's just about 1938.

Posted by Tom at 8:40 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

November 12, 2007

More Reasons not to let Iran get the Bomb

David Frum linked to an article by Barry Rubin at The Gloria Center that is worth quoting in its entirety

The Iranian nuclear issue is too important and dangerous to be miscomprehended. So here are some life-and-death factors to keep in mind about it:

First, Iran is not about to obtain nuclear weapons, certainly not ones that it could use. That dreadful outcome is still several years away. Despite all the bragging going on by Iranian leaders in Persian-language statements about how they are getting closer to atomic bombs—coupled with denials of any such intention in English-language ones—it just isn’t that easy to do.

Second, neither Israel nor the United States is about to attack Iran. There are lots of reasons why this is so but they can be boiled down to the following: it is hard militarily to carry out such an attack, it is politically dangerous, and can lead to very serious consequences. An attack is something better to avoid, if possible. And it is certainly too early for such a high-risk, potentially high-cost venture.

Third, why then are Israel, the United States and others making such a big fuss about Iran right now, since it is neither the last moment nor a prelude to an attack soon? The answer is that it is the last moment for three other things:

* If international terms, if diplomatic and economic pressure is going to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons it has to be intensified right now or it will be too late to generate the needed non-military threat to Tehran.

* In technological terms, Iran is right on the verge of being able to build nuclear weapons all by itself without any more foreign help or equipment.

* In political terms, if Iranian leaders and people aren’t worried about the country’s isolation and the nuclear program’s high costs, they will more likely keep in power the regime’s most extreme faction—and the ones most likely to use nuclear weapons in the future.

So in several real ways it is truly a moment of now or never, not because of an imminent attack but due to the fact that this era gives the last chance to avoid one.

But there is a fourth set of factors extremely important yet hardly ever mentioned. True, the most horrifying outcome would be if Iran used these weapons against Israel, possibly triggering a region-wide nuclear and conventional war which will make previous conflicts look like a picnic.

Yet while this risk alone justifies decisive action to stop Iran’s nuclear success, this may not happen, you could argue. Or perhaps you don’t mind seeing Israel incinerated or think it can take care of itself. Why, then, should Iran having nuclear weapons bother you?

The reason is that even more likely to take place than an Iranian attack on Israel are a number of other dire circumstances that would be devastating for everyone in the region and the world in general. Briefly, these include the following disasters:

* Appeasement: Frightened by Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons and uncertain of Western protection, Arabic-speaking states will rush to meet Iran’s demands.

* This means they will be afraid to cooperate with U.S. policy or provide facilities for Western efforts to contain Iran. And that development will make them even less able to protect themselves against Tehran, further reinforcing the effect.

* Given Iran’s rejectionist stance, no Arab state or the Palestinian Authority would dare move toward peace with Israel. Even if you believe such a thing is possible now, forget about it for 20 or 30 years.

* Since Iran always favors higher oil prices (with Saudi Arabia, which already has lots of money, holding them down), the combination of Iranian pressure and heightened regional insecurity will send the cost of petroleum sky-high, far above anything hitherto dreamed.

* Intoxicated with a belief that Islamism is on the march to victory, tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands will join radical Islamist groups, either clients of Iran or independent ones.

* It is quite conceivable that even if the Iranian government makes no decision to give nuclear weapons to terrorists super-extremist elements in the regime will do it on their own.

* With the regime having nuclear weapons, any opposition will be too intimidated to try to change it, no matter how much support dissidents have.

* Nobody in the region will be willing to oppose greater Iranian influence in Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere. And even if you believe this is possible now—though I don’t—it is certainly obvious that Syria, nestled under Iran’s nuclear protection, will never move away from its alliance with Tehran

* In fact, new members may join the current radical HISH alliance (Hamas-Iran-Syria-Hizballah), thus further building the extremist forces. The result could be a turning point with Islamists toppling one Arab nationalist regime after another.

* Of course, all of the above would escalate regional instability.

Does the above sound exaggerated? I don’t think so but even if you want to reduce such dire predictions to a lower level the prospects are still quite harrowing. Remember that even if Iran never uses nuclear weapons to make mushroom clouds it will quite effectively use them for strategic and economic leverage.

Oh and for the millionth time Ahmadinejad is proclaiming that the return of the Mahdi is near.

Posted by Tom at 8:22 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

November 10, 2007

Wahabbists in Northern Virginia

Last week I wrote about Hate in London Mosques, and in the piece mentioned the Saudi Islamic Academy in northern Virginia. Lo and behold but just the other day Stephen Spriell has an article on the academy over at National Review. Appropriated titled "Virginia is for Radicals? A troubling school", Spriell writes that the "curriculum(of the academy) has been the target of legitimate criticism for its use of textbooks that promote jihad and justify violence against Christians and Jews."

The Saudi Islamic Academy maintains two schools, or campuses, in northern Virginia. Their main campus is at 8333 Richmond Highway Alexandria, VA 22309, just outside of Washington DC, where grades 2-12 are taught. The "West Campus" is at 11121 Pope's Head Rd Fairfax, VA 22030, also only a few miles from the capital, where Kindergarden and first grade classes are held. Their website, as you might imagine, makes them look like just another school, albiet a religous one.

The truth of the matter is that according to a 2006 study by Freedom House and the Institute for Gulf Studies, which studied the textbooks at this and other Saudi schools,

The descriptions of the "other" - Muslim "defiants", "polythiests," and "infidels" - in these Islamic studies textbooks for the current academic year do not comport with the picture of "moderation and tolerance" presented by the Saudi ambassador to Washington and other Saudi officials. These books continue to reflect a curriculum that inculcates religious hatred toward those who do not follow Wahhabi teachings. When the current school year ends, thousands more will graduate from Saudi public schools steeped in the belief that those of differing religious faiths are morally inferior and even evil. Their texts will have taught them that peaceful coexistence with so-called "infidels" is unattainable and that violence to spread Islam is not only permissible, but an obligation.

As the Director of the CIA, James Woolsey, said while testifying before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs on November 16, 2005

On all points except allegiance to the Saudi state Wahhabi and al Qaeda beliefs are essentially the same.

Last month the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom(USCIR), described by Spruiell as "a watchdog group created by Congress eight years ago" released a study in which they essentially said that if the Saudis could not clean up their act the State Department ought to close the school.

The USCIR did not actually view material used at the northern Virginia school, but rather those textbooks used in Saudi Arabia. When criticized for this, their response was that to have contacted the school directly would have violated their mandate. Instead, they contacted the Saudi Embassy which was noncooperative.

In a Post article last month school administrators aaid that they had revised their material last summer. They did this by taking textbooks sent from Saudi Arabia and ripping out objectionable pages.

The Post, in turn, criticized the commission, pointing out that Fairfax County Supervisor Gerald Hyland (D) had asked to view material at the school and was "immediately" granted access. He viewed English-language material and found nothing objectionable. Further, they editorialize that it's unfair to ask the school to prove a negative; that they aren't teaching hate. They concluded that the commission "crossed a line".

To an extent the Post has a point. And if it was anyone but a Saudi school I'd be sympathetic to their arguments. But we are talking about Saudi Arabia here, a country not too different than the wost totalitarian nightmares of the twentieth century.

In their defense, Spruiell asks "suppose the school had given the commission a set of books with some pages ripped out: What would that prove?" and that

For now, let’s just accept the premise that a foreign government should not be exposing students in America to a religious curriculum that even a panel of Saudi royal advisers has concluded “encourages violence toward others, and misguides the pupils into believing that in order to safeguard their own religion, they must violently repress and even physically eliminate the ‘other.’” How do we verify that such a curriculum is not being taught in schools operated by that foreign government?

One way to do it would be to ask the foreign government to provide unaltered copies of all its teaching materials for public review or else close down its school. The State Department is the only government agency with the authority to enforce such a policy. Unfortunately, it doesn’t seem interested in this solution, and the only alternative it’s offering is more assurances that Saudi Arabia will get around to removing the hate from its textbooks — eventually.

Further, how does Supervisor Hyland know that he saw everything? And what about the material in Arabic?

What I Think is Going On

What the Wahabbists of Saudi Arabia are trying to do is infiltrate our societies and pull the wool over our eyes as to their true intentions. As the reedom House and the Institute for Gulf Studies shows, they are teaching their young people that "violence to spread Islam is...an obligation."

Walid Phares summed it up well in his 2005 book Future Jihad. He identified six methods, or tactics, that the Wahabbists use as part of their infiltration strategy

1) Economic jihad: Oil as a weapon - Because we need their oil, we collaborate with them. This give them the opening that they seek.

2) Ideological jihad: Intellectual penetration - The Wahabis have spend much time and money penetrating academia. Many if not most Middle East studies programs are funded by Saudi money. For their money the Saudis want and get a sanitized version of Islamic history.

3) Political jihad: Mollification of the public - One, reassure the public that there is nothing to worry about, and two, promote acceptance of Islam in general and their verison in particular. They want us to turn to their approved sources for information about Islam.

4) Intelligence jihad: Infiltration of the country - The first step is to control the Islamic community in the target country. They do this by trying to gain control of the mosques, Muslim community centers and the like. The next step is to encourage their members and sympathizers to join Western governments, intelligence agencies, police units, and military.

5) Subversive jihad: Behind enemy lines and protected by its laws - As long as they obey the laws of the target government, they are relatively safe. As Phares put it during an interview on NBC after 9-11: "The safest place on Earth to hide from the dragon is inside its belly."

6) Diplomatic jihad: Controlling foreign policy - "Arabists" in the US State Department have been a problem for some time. Because we listened to Saudi advice we became convinced that the Taliban weren't really so bad, we missed al Qaeda because they didn't want us to know the truth about how close OBL's philosophy was to Saudi Wahabism, we let Hezbollah take over Lebanon, and we stalled too long over Sudan and let a genocide develop.

What we have at the Saudi Islamic Academy and the controversy surrounding it are examples of 3, 4, and 5 in action.

Where are the Liberals?

Suppose we were talking about a school set up by apartheit-era South Africa. Can anyone doubt what the reaction of the left would be? Would anyone, right or left, accept assurances that whatever went on in the home country the material in a "South Africa Academy" school didn't teach racial bigotry?

Yet these are the people who lecture us daily on our own shortcomings, real and imagined. They're currently all up in arms over waterboarding, and would have anuerisms if they saw a Christmas scene on public property, yet most are utterly blind to the dangers of jihadism.

The Bush Administration Asleep

The Bush Administration, and traditional conservatives are equally to blame. Our relationship with Saudi Arabia is far too cozy.

This is the administration that says it's main foreigh policy goal is to promote democracy, yet also ignores the problem of Saudi Wahabbist infiltration.

What to do?

So let me say it outright: Saudi Arabia is our enemy.

A country can be our enemy and no, we don't have to attack them militarily. We can even trade with them and they can be our enemy.

But what we have to do is stop pretending like the Saudis are our friends. They need to sell us their oil as much as we need to buy it from them.

Here are a few quick policy suggestions:

1) Reduce our dependence on foreign oil. I wrote a long piece on this a few months ago, so won't repeat my arguments or recommendations here.

2) Start a human-rights campaign to expose abuses in Saudi Arabia and other similar Islamic states.

3) Set up a quid-pro-quo system in that if the Saudis want something from us they have to make an advance toward liberalism.

4) Shut down or limit as much as legally possible Saudi influence in the West. This should be done by shutting down the Saudi Islamic Academy and stopping Saudi funding of Middle East studies programs in academia.

5) Stop listening to Saudi advice on anything.

6) Fire or find a way to reduce the influence of "Arabists" and Saudi sympathizers in the State Department. The State Department seems to have it's own aganda much of the time, whereas in reality it is supposed to carry out the will of the president.

7) Fire Condi Rice. While I once, thought she held great promise, I'm done with her. Between our relationship with Saudi Arabia and her nutty insistance on another round of "peace talks" between Israel and the Palestinians I've had about enough.

Posted by Tom at 2:00 PM | Comments (6) | TrackBack

November 2, 2007

Lt. Gen. Odierno's Nov 1 News Briefing

Lt. Gen Ray Odierno is commander of Multi-National Corps Iraq, and he reports directly to Gen Petraeus. The divisional commanders report to Odierno. Assuming command of MNC-Iraq on Dec 14, 2006, he is part of the "new team" that was brought in to save a deteriorating situation.

If you're not watching it already, bookmark The Pentagon Channel now. In addition to press briefings by a variety of officials, from colonels to Secretary Gates himself, they broadcast a range of news and information shows about what our military is doing around the world.

Of the press briefings, I find the ones conducted by Lt Gen Odierno to be among the most informative. Other than Petraeus, he is arguably the most impressive general officer that we have.

For some reason they haven't posted the video of his Nov 1 briefing on the PentagonChannel website, but it is mentioned in this edition of Around the Services

Odierno is in Baghdad, and is linked via teleconference to the briefing room at the Pentagon. Here is the transcript, and these are the major take-aways from the briefing and subsequent questioning by reporters

GEN. ODIERNO: ...I do want to first give you an update on where I see us at. I'll go back a little bit in history, then talk a little bit about what we will do in the future, and then I'll open it up for questions. But first I would like to present -- just give you a quick operational update. It has been nearly a year since III Corps arrived in theater and took command of Multinational Corps-Iraq. When we arrived last year, Iraq was a nation immersed in a cycle of terror and sectarian killings. As the violence continued to build, a shift in strategy was deemed necessary to protect the Iraqi people from extremist influences threatening to tear apart at the seams. ...

Due to Phantom Thunder and Phantom Strike, we have been able to eliminate key safe havens, liberate portions of the population and hamper the enemy's ability to conduct coordinated attacks. We have experienced a consistent and steady trend of increased security over the last four months, and I believe continued aggressive operations by both Iraqi and coalition forces are the most effective way to extend our gains and continue to protect the citizens of Iraq.

Slide, please. As depicted on this slide, over the past four months, attacks and security incidents have continued to decline. This trend represents the longest continuous decline in attacks on record and illustrates how our operations have improved security since the surge was emplaced. Of note, this four-month decline includes Ramadan, a time during the previous three years when enemy activity has traditionally spiked.

If I was smarter I could figure out how to post each slide here as an image, but as it is you can Download his slide show here.

If you view the slide show it becomes pretty obvious that the situation started to get out of control after the bombing of the Samarra Mosque in February of 2006, but took a definate turn for the better once the "surge" got underway earlier this year.

For several minutes Gen Odierno discusses each slide, though they pretty much speak for themselves. He then gets to the all important question of why has the situation improved?

As we assess the security gains made over the past four months, I attribute the progress to three prominent dynamics. First, the surge allowed us to eliminate extremist safe havens and sanctuaries, just as importantly to maintain our gains. Second, the ongoing quantitative and qualitative improvement of the Iraqi security forces are translating to ever-increasing tactical successes. Lastly, there's a clear rejection of al Qaeda and other extremists by large segments of the population, this coupled with the bottom-up awakening movement by both Sunni and Shi'a who want a chance to reconcile with the government of Iraq.

This matches with what I've been posting from other sources. Select "Iraq" at right under "Categories".

Then it was on to the questions. Here are few of the more interesting exchanges

Q Hi, general. This is Courtney Kube from NBC News. You mentioned among the causes of the progress that you're seeing is the surge, that it's allowed you to maintain the gains. Are you all concerned that as it starts to draw down next month, you'll lose some of those gains and perhaps cause you not to be able to move into tactical overwatch position in '08?

GEN. ODIERNO: Well, first off, as we went through the -- this, my recommendation to General Petraeus was in fact to reduce from 20 to 15 brigades over the next several months, and I did that because I believe that we will be able to continue to move forward with the progress.

Based on the progress we have made against the enemy, based on the continued improvement of the Iraqi security forces, and continued on the support of the population we are now receiving, I feel that we will be able to continue to hold on to the gains that we have. Again the drawdown will be deliberate and slow over the next several months, which allows us to continue to conduct operations as we move forward. And I feel confident that we'll be able to maintain the gains that we've sustained so far.

...

Q General, it's Al Pessin from Voice of America. What about the political side? Have the Iraqi politicians done enough to take advantage of the time and space that the surge provided so that again as the surge draws down, you maintain that aspect of the stability?

GEN. ODIERNO: Yeah, what we've seen is, I think, they still need to do more. They still obviously have some legislation they have to pass. But frankly to me, the most important thing is to really become involved in providing the basic services to the Iraqi people which, in my mind, would make a huge difference. ...But to answer your question, I think there's still much more work they have to do. We are working with them, for them to move forward with this. Again they are planning and they are saying the right things, and that's good. We now need to see a bit of action on the ground.
...

Q General, Peter Spiegel from the Los Angeles Times... I wonder if you can just talk specifically about why you think the Shi'a violence has declined.

GEN. ODIERNO: Yeah, first, I would just say that there's several reasons there has been some decline. I think it's across several different lines, and you mentioned some of them.

One is, first, in the beginning of the year, with the government of Iraq, we went after significantly the leaders of the special groups, criminals, that were really behind much of the violence, and we were able to take many of these leaders off the streets....

There's been a cease-fire announced by Sadr. We applaud that.
...

Q Could I just ask -- that last point about the ethnic cleansing, you know, that there's some argument that this has become Bosnia and -- that the violence is going down because finally the Serbs and the Muslims are different places. Do any of your data show that Sunni and Shi'a are now in their own little enclaves and, therefore, not killing each other?

GEN. ODIERNO: Yes. No, I mean there's been shifts. Listen, there's been shifts in the population in Baghdad. That happened, and I would argue that's happened over the last couple years. But I would tell you I've not seen any significant shifts that have changed it from January, when we got here, to now. There might have been some minor shifts, but very little.

What we are seeing, though, is we are starting to see some cooperation between these groups.... So those are the kind of signs we're seeing that are not quite in line with what you've suggested.
...

Q General Odierno, can I just clarify that? In the year 2008, to what extent will U.S. forces basically be in a different mission? In other words, how much simply tactical overwatch, how much just going after al Qaeda and other insurgent groups?

And can you really separate the two missions?

GEN. ODIERNO: Well, first, it's about -- I can. The first part is about local security. You know, first you've got to provide -- protect the population and provide security to the local people. So you have a local security issue, which is done by the police and in some cases now, until the police become strong enough, d