« Moving Forward in Iraq | Main | A Counterproductive Attempt at Legacy »

November 19, 2007

Iraq Briefings 15/19 November 2007

Continuing with my persusal of different reliable sources to understand the situation in Iraq, today we have to briefings to consider. One is by a Colonel, and the other a Major General. Both officers are in Iraq and have combat commands. They are linked via teleconference to the press briefing room at the Pentagon. Although I provide links to the transcripts, I encourage you to watch both briefings in their entirety.

One briefing is by a Colonel, the other a Major General. Both command combat units in Baghdad, and are linked via teleconference to the press room at the Pentagon.

First up is Col Jeffrey Bannister, Commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division. His division is stationed at Camp Liberty in Baghdad

This video can also be viewed at DODvCLIPS

Here is what I thought was most interesting about this briefing:

The strategy when we arrived was to transition to overwatch of Iraqi security forces. Given the levels of sectarian violence, Iraq was just not ready for this transition, and we instead, as you know, changed to a counterinsurgency strategy or COIN. It has led to the surge of coalition forces, beginning in January, putting more boots on the ground, and gave the Strike Brigade nearly twice as many combat soldiers, covering an area only one-third of the size.... The greatest threat to coalition forces and our Iraqi partners has been the Shi'a extremists with explosive formed penetrators...

Overall, I believe our greatest challenge upon arrival was reducing the level of sectarian violence and its corrosive influence on all aspects of life for Iraqis....

Has eastern Baghdad achieved irreversible security momentum? Not yet. Have we experienced consecutive months of sustained security? Yes. Is this security momentum fragile? Yes. So while we still have much work to do, the mission is not over. I believe we have taken great steps and have accomplished many things the American and Iraqi people can be proud of.

Several points from this. One, we knew that rebuilding the Iraqi Army would be hard, but did it have to be this hard? On the one hand it's disconcerting that when Col Bannister arrived the Iraqi Army was not up to the job, on the other encouraging that he changed strategies instead of living with a bad situation. Some say we should have kept the old Iraqi Army or recalled it (if this was even possible), but as I wrote last year this might have made the situation even worse.

It's also interesting that in his AOR (Area Of Responsibility) sectarian violence is the main problem, not al Qaeda. More on this below. Lastly, Col Bannister is gunshy about being overconfident about the future.

The first quesiton was perhaps the most intersting as it touched on the sectarian violence

Q Yeah, Jonathan Karl with ABC News. What are you seeing in terms of support for Sadr, for Muqtada al-Sadr? Do you have a sense that you still have strong support in your area? Is he much of a factor? What are you seeing in terms of the Mahdi Army?

COL. BANNISTER: Right now we're very encouraged by what we see. It's been late August when he issued his pledge of honor, and you know, back then we're like okay, well, let's see some action to support those words. And since August, we have actually seen some positive steps taken that is -- so we're seeing good action from it. I would group this effort into three because it's going to dovetail into -- he's got some breakaways, as you know, that are not supporting his order, and right now the preponderance of his followers are following his pledge of honor.

So you know, as a follow-on question to this, I would tell you -- the threes I would put it into, I would put it into his loyal followers, his loyalists, and then there's some criminal portions that are kind of in the middle. And then, of course, we have the special groups that may have some external influences that we believe that are not following his orders. So he's got a couple of groups, and we think the ones in the middle are reconcilable, but I will tell you the preponderance of his followers are listening to his order.

In his Nov 1 press briefing Lt Gen Odierno also spoke of al-Sadr's cease-fire.

Next is Major General Mark Hertling, Commander of Multi-National Division-North and the 1st Armored Division. MG Hertling reports to Lt Gen Raymond Odierno, as to all of the divisonal commanders. Odierno, in turn, reports to Gen Petraeus. Hertling has been on the job all of one month, having replaced MG Benjamin Mixon. This is, however, his third tour in Iraq.

I'm not sure if Hertling's replacing Mixon was naturual replacement or if Odierno was dissatisfied with Mixon. As it is I do not have time to do much searching, so if readers have any reliable informatin it would be appreciated.

This video can also be viewed at DODvCLIPS

Here's the transcript.

MG Hertling dispensed with a long introductory statement and went straight to the questions. Here are some of the ones I found most informative

Q Sir, it's Pauline Jelinek of the Associated Press. If I could follow up on the reduction in violence, it seems that a reduction is being, you know, reported overall in Iraq, but that many of the attacks that we hear the most about appear to be in the northern areas. Is that correct? Do you -- what do you see happening, for instance, in Mosul? Are attacks going up there or just not going down as much as elsewhere, and Kirkuk as well?

GEN. HERTLING: Yeah, thank you for reminding me of that. I was reminded of that by General Odierno just the other day. And in fact it is occurring. And if you simply look at a map of Iraq, you understand why it's occurring. Great success by the Awakening movement in Anbar has pushed some of the al Qaeda fighters to the east, into our area. Some of the great success in the Baghdad area has pushed some of the al Qaeda fighters to the north in our area. And as you saw just a few months ago, when Tropic Lightning was still here, they had a pretty tough fight, code-named Arrowhead Ripper, in the Diyala province.

So what you're seeing is the enemy shifting, and in fact whereas attacks -- all types of attacks, but specifically IEDs -- have decreased throughout Iraq, and they have in fact decreased in our area, in MND-North areas, our -- (audio break) -- highest of all of the provinces in Iraq. That's why it's so critical -- my number-one mission remains continue to pursue al Qaeda in our area. And we're getting help from the locals and the Iraqi army and police to do that....

And if I could, I'll add one more thing. You are still going to read about spectacular attacks.

A short while later there was another question about "spectacular attacks"

Q General, Julian Barnes with the Los Angeles Times. I wonder if you could tell us a little bit more detail about your assessment of the strength of al Qaeda in your area, relative to the other parts of the country. And also tell us a little bit more. You talked about the spectacular attacks that are going to continue -- maybe if you could put a little -- tell us a little bit more about how your strategy for deterring or preventing those attacks in the major cities that are in your area of operations. GEN. HERTLING: Yeah, I can. I certainly won't give you any numbers on what we think the al Qaeda figures are for MND-North. Because first of all, I'd probably be wrong. Secondly every time we say, hey, they're decreasing in actions or capability, suddenly they commit a spectacular attack, or one VBIED goes off, and it's front page headline saying, hey, Hertling just said they're reduced in this area, but they just blew up a bomb.

Lastly, two questions about the Concerned Local Citizens that have been much discussed in the news and around the Internet

Q General, it's Luis Martinez of ABC News. You mentioned concerned local citizens earlier.... And what does this also raise about the concerns about whether there's too much decentralization in bringing in all these concerned local citizens in, so that different units aren't aware of who is actually on their side?

GEN. HERTLING: I counted about 18 questions in there. I'll try and address them as they come up.

First of all, there's a little bit of a difference between the concerned local citizens and the awakening movements. First, I think it would be important to define what I believe -- (audio break) -- Petraeus believe defines the concerned local citizens. And it has to do with the three words that make up the title. They're concerned; they're local. And they're citizens abiding by the rule of law.

Some of the other key issues associated with CLCs, as we call them, are the fact that they have small arms weapons. And that's defined as a rifle of a pistol. They don't go around with RPGs or machine guns or truck-mounted machine guns or things like that. They don't -- (audio break) -- they are very closely watched by both the Iraqi security forces and the coalition forces in those areas, to ensure there's not fratricide on the battlefield.
...

Q (Kristin Roberts with Reuters) Sir, you touched on this a little bit, but I'd like to draw you out on what you see as the difference between the CLCs and militias.

GEN. HERTLING: Well, quite frankly, militias are outside the rule of law, and that's the important thing about Iraq right now is it's developing its rule of law. What I don't think the Iraqi government wants to happen is to go back to the chaos that existed when there was militia toting guns all over the various areas that sometimes occurred in the past. The Iraqi police, the Iraqi security forces, army and police are the contributor to the rule of law.

The concerned local citizens -- (audio break). I think the best way you can define them is as an armed neighborhood watch. They're not to go attacking other things, because it's such a confusing battlespace over here anyway with people not wearing uniforms and combatting the government that this only causes them to be more at risk.

So that's how I would define it. A concerned local citizen is someone who is in a closely stationary position, if that makes sense, who basically stays in his neighborhood, who is linked with the police or the Iraqi army, who doesn't carry large-caliber weapons, and who is contributing to the rule of law. A militia travels around wherever they want to go and has basically sometimes gang wars. It's not a Bloods & Crips situation; it's not a Sharks and Jets situation. That's what we're trying to avoid.

A lot of honesty from the commanders, I thought. Neither sought to sugar-coat the situation and both were gunshy about making any sort of predictions for the future. Perhaps this is simply because they were burned in the past. I didn't follow these press briefings in detail until somewhat recently, so I don't have any historical perspective. Whatever the history, I find these briefings posted at The Pentagon Channel to be a valuable source of information. And while we're at it, I'll say again that I am impressed with the journalists as well. They ask insightful, tough, but fair questions. They've obviously learned a lot as well.

Posted by Tom at November 19, 2007 8:58 PM

Trackback Pings

TrackBack URL for this entry:
http://www.theredhunter.com/mt/refer.cgi/1025

Comments

Note to Readers The videos have obviously changed. Apparently The Pengagon Channel is only archiving them for about a month or so, afterwards the link changes to a show called "The Grill Sergeants."

Posted by: Tom the Redhunter at December 20, 2007 7:56 PM

Post a comment




Remember Me?

(you may use HTML tags for style)