The Redhunter

(note that what follows is topical, and is not necessarily arranged in chronological order)

Why Operations Phantom Phoenix and Iron Harvest?

Q Hi. Mark [unintelligible], Time Magazine. Just following up, could you maybe offer your own assessment as to why things are so persistently violent in Diyala Province given the steady build up of U.S. forces? And secondly, could you share your thinking on why you needed to launch this operation now?

GEN. HERTLING: Yeah. Diyala Province specifically, as Governor Ra'ad reminds me every time I see him, is a little Iraq. It has all the problems and challenges in this province that all of Iraq has in terms of culture, tribal affiliations, religions, and just overall dynamics. It also was a province that didn't see a lot of forces ensuring stability over the long haul. There would be forces that would go in and
then come out just because it was an econ -- all of Northern Iraq has been an economy of force region over the last several years. So I think that may be part of it; that there wasn't the stable security that we're trying to establish now with the Iraqi Army. As well as the fact that the Iraqi Army division that's standing up in this particular province is one of the newer ones. So as General Salem gets his feet on the ground and continues to build his organization-which he's doing by the way, he's building another brigade in the next several months-I think that will provide security as well as some increases in police forces in that particular province as well.

Q And the second question: why now?

GEN. HERTLING: Why now? Because we can. Baghdad is more secure. Anbar is more secure. And we can focus a little bit on -- we're pursuing. That's
what we're doing. Why now? Because the other places are more secure and the enemy has moved into these provinces more.

Concerned Local Citizens

GEN. HERTLING: You have all reported on instances of intimidation of the population...and a variety of brutal and barbaric acts against civilians who are attempting to secure stability. You all and we are calling them the CLCs, the concerned local citizens....

Q May I just ask you -- I wanted to get some figures; how many CLCs do you figure there are in Kirkuk? How many in Diyala altogether at this
point?

GEN. HERTLING: In my four provinces, we have a total of 15,000.
Actually it's 14,094. And I could break it down a little bit more. I can talk to you later on because we've got a list by province and what it is.
...

Last night, we were able to get six IEDs off the road only because of tips from concerned local citizens in Kirkuk. That's because the police force is very good and the Army is very active.

The Shia-dominated national government is worried that these CLCs will become an alternative power structure. But from what I can tell the CLCs are vital to the "awakening" and our counterinsurgency strategy. As such, we're going to have to find a way to integrate them into the new gov't so that both sides are satisfied.

I think that the CLCs are evidence of the "bottom up" rebuilding of Iraq. Anti-war types in Washington are concerned with national benchmarks. While the national benchmarks are not completely unfounded, I think that if we can build local communities and civil societies from the ground up we'll achieve success.

Muqtada al-Sadr

GEN. BERGNER:

We also welcome the recent commitment by al-Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr calling for the continued compliance with his pledge of honor to halt attacks and outreach from him with other Iraqi leaders to expand the peace. The Sadr Trends compliance with this pledge of honor is improving the conditions for national reconciliation and security for all Iraqis. It also continues to allow coalition and Iraqi security forces to increase the pressure on al-Qaeda terrorists. Though bands of criminals are seeking to tarnish Sadr's pledge of honor, the coalition forces will continue to show restraint against the faithful followers who fulfill his commitment. The criminals who do not honor his pledge and who terrorize Iraqi citizens, assassinate Iraqi officials, and turn further towards Iranian support for extremists will not be shown the same restraint as they dishonor the pledge made by al-Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr.

Some say that we should have killed al-Sadr early on. Maybe so, and I believe we had cause to do so. But our opportunity for that has passed, so unless we have direct evidence of criminal actions, perhaps it is best if we deal with him politically.

Preparing the Battlefield

GEN. HERTLING: As I was talking to you here last month, we were in the early stages of gathering intelligence and setting forces, both U.S. and Iraqi, for operation Iron Harvest which Kevin just mentioned. We began collection efforts in key areas to find out how al-Qaeda in Iraq is operating in the northern region, specifically in Diyala Province although we're conducting operations in all four of the provinces where we have soldiers. Coalition forces and Iraqi security forces conducted several intelligence-driven operations over the last several weeks which resulted in [a] significant amount of information we are now using to continue to attack AQI (al-Qaeda in Iraq).

Here is Gen Hertling's press briefing on Nov 19. I cannot find any for December, but I think this is the one he's referring to.

"Spectacular Events"

GEN HERTLING:As many of you reported recently, while we have seen a reduction in the number of attacks in most of the areas of Iraq and to a lesser degree in Northern Iraq, there has been a marked increase in AQI activity in Diyala Province in the form of high profile, spectacular events. This does not mean an increase of attacks, but it does mean an increase in these kinds of high-profile events....So, while the number of attacks are actually down throughout Iraq and in our area as well, these spectacular events and individual acts of intimidations are designed to incite fear in the population. ...

Q I'm Debbie Block, Voice of America Radio and TV. Would you please explain what you mean by spectacular events? That could mean a lot of
things. ...

GEN. HERTLING: A spectacular event is when a woman with a suicide vest, an individual, goes up to a group of people and blows themself up. And it immediately becomes newsworthy because of the uniqueness and by-I hate to use the word to describe it-but by the spectacular event that it is. A large truck filled with explosives blowing up a bridge when nothing else has happened in the area for months. When the people who are trying to destroy the infrastructure of Iraq will go after a specific target with all their might to not only affect that target, but also get a splash on the news or in media outlets so it appears that things are still reeling from violence which in many cases they are not. But because of one event, it appears this is happening everywhere. So that's what I would categorize as a spectacular event. Something that happens once or twice and it leaves a mark on an entire area or an entire province that things are out of control.
...

I think these spectacular attacks of suicide bombers and suicide vests are, in fact, going to be AQI's Achilles' heel. They're going to continue to kill innocent people. And that, in fact, is what's generated the concerned local citizens in the first place and it's sort of a reverse counterintuitive logic. They're trying to intimidate people to join them by killing them and it's causing more people to go against them.

Whether we on the right like it or not the media is going to make a big deal of out these high-profile attacks. We have to live with the world as it is, so reducing these types of attacks has to be a priority. AQI is all too aware of the role the media plays in this war for us to do otherwise. As for whether these types of attacks help or hurt AQI, I think it works both directions. On the one hand, they make us look impotent. This in turn drives the anti-war crowd here at home to demand an immediate pullout. On the other hand, Gen Hertling is probably right in that it also drives ordinary Iraqis to take action to defend themselves. Our objective is to channel that action into legal operations, such as Concerned Local Citizens groups, police, and Iraqi Army functions.

Determining Success

GEN HERTLING:While we will continue to pursue extremists, we know we won't measure the success of this operation by the kinetic affects over the next few weeks. Instead, success will be found in the weeks and months after this operation is complete as citizens see improved security and economic advancements. I just came from the town of Sherween where I talked to several of the local citizens who are already beginning to see the affects of al-Qaeda leaving their area and it was a significant emotional event for me.

Q Could you give us a little bit of detail on the civilian projects
that go along with these operations?

GEN. HERTLING: Yeah, that's a great question. Thanks for asking that. As we complete kinetic operations, one of the things that we try to do is follow up immediately with joint security stations which are the stations in the middle of key areas where there has been violence in the past. It will have both coalition -- will have all coalition forces, Iraqi security forces, Iraqi police, and the concerned local citizens in the center parts of town to ensure security stays -- remains. What we're doing in Diyala as a follow on to that is rapidly pushing money back into the area to improve the destruction of living quarters, of houses, of mosques. ...If I could add one more thing to that though. I mean one of the things that is critical to our operations is the linkages with the PRTs, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
...

Q ...How can you measure your success? ...

GEN. HERTLING: My belief is that as long as we're pursuing them and they haven't set up stakes, we're in great shape. We're continuing to pursue al-Qaeda throughout the width and depth of the battle space. What's very different now though is with what's occurred over the last couple of years, as you well know, is the stand up of the Iraqi security forces.

Q Is that how you're going to measure your success?

GEN. HERTLING: I think we're going to measure our success in a couple of -- and if I were to show you the ways we measure our success in terms of decreased attacks, reduction in IEDs, less small arms fire, all the normal kinetic things are one area. But the other thing is the improvement, and this is where the PRTs help, the improvement in the economy. The improvement in the local government. Some things that you see now that you wouldn't have expected a year ago in terms of how governors are talking to the central government, how businesses are beginning to stand up. The momentum is there. We just have to continue to help it and help the Iraqi people maintain security.

GEN. BERGNER: And that's really the point that I'd just echo for General Hertling is it's about population security. You have to go into these areas, you have to go re-establish local security so that the population feels that. And it gives rise to things like concerned local citizens, the courage to help protect their own community. It enables the further expansion of the Iraqi security forces into those areas. And all of those are the precursors, obviously, to the kinds of economic development, return of the rule of law, reconstruction activities that the Iraqi people need very much. And so in the process of pursuing al-Qaeda, you are expanding population security into these communities.

Contrary to what we constantly hear from the left, those of us who want to pursue victory in Iraq know that it cannot be achieved by kinetic effects only. But in order for political reconciliation to take place there must be security. Phantom Phoenix is designed to provide that security.

Problems Within AQI

GEN HERTLING:We've got some very interesting reflections about AQI leadership in ISI and Mosul in terms of them running out of money and doing things like kidnapping and intimidations and murders for hire that's trying to get them money. And we've also seen some reflections that the lower level fighters are very upset with their leaders for two reasons. Number one that they are taking some of the money they're supposed to use to pay them, those fighters, and leaving the country with it. And number two, the number of people that have been captured in Ninawa Province, specifically in and around Mosul, have been telling about the disorganization and naming other names within AQI which has allowed us to continue to target others.

I think we tend to concentrate on our own problems and failures and forget that the enemy is beset with them too. AQI has simply not succeeded in its goal of chasing us out of Iraq and establishing a base for their caliphate. On the contrary, we have ramped up our forces to deny them sanctuary. Whether in the long run it will be successful only time will tell.