The Redhunter

I think that Odierno gave a very good explanation of what the "surge" was all about, and was honest in his assessment of the situation. "Cautious optimism", I think, best describes his outlook. I do not think you can say that he's looking at the situation through rose colored glasses, but neither is he unduly pessimistic.

Following are the major points that I took from the interview, followed by how each is related to the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 (also available on The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual">Amazon). FM-3-24, edited by Gen Petraeus and released in December of 2006, is the basis for our 2007 strategy in Iraq. (I cannot find a transcript on-line, so any errors are my own.)

Odierno: "(The "surge") was all about protecting the population. It started because of a significant rise in sectarian violence at the end of 06...and what happened was they (the Iraqi people) gave up their passive support of al Qaeda, and now they are rejecting al Qaeda throughout the country....the difference this time was because of the increased amount of coalition forces as well as Iraqi forces we stayed in the Mahallas once we cleared it with enough combat force that would not allow them to take back those areas,.that's what's made the difference."

FM 3-24 / 1-131 SECURITY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW IS ESSENTIAL The cornerstone of any COIN (counterinsurgency) effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads.

3-67 PHYSICAL SECURITY. During any period of instability, people's primary interest is physical security for them and their families. When HN (host nation) forces fail to provide security or threaten the security of civilians, the population is likely to seek security guarantees from insurgents, militias, or other armed groups. This situation can feed support for an insurgency.

Odierno: "What I worry about is, there's a window. And we need is some political progress in order to maintain this window. And if we don't maintain the window, the populate will feel that they have no where to turn and I don't know what will happen then, and so this is what makes this somewhat of a tentative security gain right now. Because unless you have the populace behind you you will not maintain security."

FM 3-24 / 1-113 LEGITIMACY IS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE. The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government.

Odierno: "Here is the bottom line ,is what happened was is they for the first time felt that they were secured enough to where to fight al Qaeda and they chose, they chose they'd rather work with the coalition forces than work with al Qaeda, they want to be part of the future of Iraq...to be recognized by the government of Iraq, and that means a lot to them, so that's why the reconciliation effort as we move forward is so important."

Here is LtCol (Dr) David Kilculen (former senior counterinsurgency advisor to Gen Petraeus) on the importance of getting the population on your side

"...what is essential here is making the population choose. The gratitude theory - "be nice to the people, meet their needs and they will feel grateful and stop supporting the insurgents" - does not work. The enemy simply intimidates the population when COIN forces / government are not present resulting in lip-service as the population sees COIN forces / government as weak and easily manipulated. In time, this leads to hatred of COIN forces / government by the population. On the other hand, the choice theory - "enable (persuade, coerce, co-opt) the population to make an irrevocable choice to support COIN forces / government usually works better. The population typically desires to "sit on the fence" and not commit to supporting any side in an insurgency / COIN environment. COIN forces / government need to get the population off that fence and keep them there. This requires persuading the population, then protecting them, where they live."

Odierno: (Discussion of the importance of the "three R's": reconciliation, returning of displace persons, and reconstruction) "We have moved from a majority of lethal operations at the beginning of 07 to a majority of non-lethal operations in the beginning of 08."

FM 3-24 / 1-153 SOME OF THE BEST WEAPONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENTS DO NOT SHOOT. ...While security is essential to setting the stage for overall progress, lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation,and restored hope. Particularly after security has been achieved, dollars and ballots will have more important effects than bombs and bullets. There is a time when "money is ammunition." Depending on the state of the insurgency, therefore, Soldiers and Marines should prepart to execute many nonmilitary missions to support COIN efforts. Everyone has a role iin nation building, not just Department of State and civlil affairs personnel.

Odierno: "There is no doubt they (the Iraqi Army) are fighting. They are staying they are fighting, they are fighting bravely...About 80% of the battalions that are available in the Iraqi army are capable of doing planning and executing operations. That's a significant improvement. Where they still need help is in logistics, they still are having problems sustaining themselves over the long term."

FM 3-24 THE HOST NATION DOING SOMETHING TOLERABLY IS NORMALLY BETTER THAN US DOING IT WELL. It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as to assess how well it is done. Where the United States is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires establishing viable HN leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant US support.

Odierno: "(at the beginning of the surge) First, we decided to push everyone (American troops) out into the population, and that was done before we brought forces on....We got more and more people out into the neighborhoods as the surge went on and we had less and less people at the large forward operating bases....and we learned that was a very successful tactic.... We're finding that with the interaction with the population you gain their trust and confidence and they give you information..more accurate information."

FM 3-24 / 1-149 SOMETIMES, THE MORE YOU PROTECT YOUR FORCE, THE LESS SECURE YOU MAY BE. Ultimate success in COIN (counterinsurgency) is gained by protecting the populate, not the COIN force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations must be conducted, risk shared with the populace, and contact maintained...These practices endure access to the intelligence needed to drive operations. Following them reinforces the connections with the populace that help establish real legitimacy.

1-159 Unsuccessful Practices: ...Concentrate military forces in large bases for protection.

Odierno: "As long as they (the Iraqi people) feel safe... they will continue to support us... if they feel rejected by their government.. that will be a turning point on what decision they make."

Odierno: (Q: "What is the most valuable lesson you'd like to pass along to your successor?")
Number one is you have to secure the population, that is everything. And that doesn't mean we have to do it, you can do it with Iraqi security forces....

Odierno: "It is a very complex environment..."

Odierno: "I go out on patrols 4 or 5 times a week... And it is very interesting now that we've moved into the neighborhoods....When the soldiers go downtown they (the people) know them by name....That's really what's changed, those relationships, those confidence levels... And also doing it side by side with the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police, where the population is gaining confidence in them as a security force."

Odierno: "If Iraq becomes a real contributor in the Middle East, with a democratic government, that is an ally with the United States, that helps to being peace and stability to the Middle East, I think you'll see 2007 as the turning point. But there's still a lot of work to be done."

Odierno: "The work has to be done mainly by Iraqis....And we have to have patience with them to move forward, and I think if we do that we'll be successful."

FM 3-24 1-159 ...Successful Practices: ...Place host-nation police in the lead with military support as soon as the security situation permits.

Odierno: "It's also important for us to remember those who have given their lives, and those who's lives have been changed forever because of injury...so that their sacrifice was not in vain.

Odierno: "I think this is the right thing to do on many different levels, I think it is the right thing for our own country, because I think overall it will provide stability in the Middle East, it will also protect against future terrorism. Secondly, I think it is right for the Iraqi people. 99% of the Iraqi people want to move forward and have good lives for their children, and they have sacrificed and been resilient, and we owe it to them as well."

Odierno: "I also want to thank the American people...."

Odierno: "We need to push the (Iraqi) government to move forward, we need to push the government to be unified with all Iraqis. Those are the kinds of things that if they don't happen could derail the sacrifice and progress that's been made so far this year."

FM 3-24/ 1-4 Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule. Achieving this condition requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as feasible.

1-108 In almost every case, counterinsurgents face a populace containing an active minority supporting the government and an equally small militant faction opposing it. Success requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by most of that uncommitted middle, which also includes passive supporters of both sides. Because of the east of sowing disorder, it is usually not enough for counterinsurgents to get 51 percent of populat support; a solid majority is often essential.

Me: The effort in 2006 to write FM-3-24 was led by then LtGen David Petraeus. Petraeus stared out OIF as a major general commanding the 101st Airborne during the initial invasion. In June of 2004 he was promoted to lieutenant general and was placed in command of e Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq, which had the responsibility of training the new Iraqi security forces. In October of 2005 he returned to the United States and assumed command of the Combined Operations Center in Ft Leavenworth, KS, where he led the project to write FM-3-24. It was released on Dec 15, 2006. Petraeus was promoted to full General and placed in command of Multi-National Forces Iraq in January of 2007.

2007 has certainly been a learning experience. It seems clear that we got things backward the first several years of OIF(Operation Iraqi Freedom); we focused on political and economic progress hoping that they would quell the insurgency, when exactly the opposite is the truth.

So the fact is that sending more troops to Iraq was right and essential because it allowed commanders such as Odierno to redeploy troops from large operating bases into the population. We could do this with 20 brigades, but not with the pre-surge level of 15. Critics who said we were only "sending more troops to do the same thing" would have had a point if what they were saying was true. However, with the additional troops we employed an entirely different strategy, and this is what made the difference.

On the other hand, we on the right should not be so quick to dismiss the importance of the "benchmarks" that were established by congress last year. They are in fact important, and just because one suspects that some Democrats put them in place hoping the Iraqis would fail and thus provide an excuse for immediate withdrawal does not diminsh their importance. On the one hand we need to push the Iraqis to make solid gains, but on the other we can't be so quick to cut-and-run of they don't do everything on our timetable.

Odierno and all other generals I have seen interviewed stress that our gains are fragile and could be reversed if we pull out too soon or if the Iraqis themselves do not uphold their end of the bargain. Establishing hard-and-fast timelines is not the answer, but putting pressure on the Iraqis is. Reasonable people can disagree on at what point we might need to cut our losses and withdraw, but from where I sit were are nowhere near that point now. Much progress is in fact being made and if current trends hold I believe we will win.