The Redhunter

COL. JAMES: Our mission is to secure the population, interdict accelerants moving towards Baghdad, defeat extremists and neutralize resistance groups, primarily focused on defeating sectarian violence, and build capacity of the Iraqi security forces, government institutions and economic programs. And our last task is focused on transitioning security and local development tasks to the Iraqi security forces and local governments.

The current security situation is stable, and I am optimistic about the future. Sunni extremists are severely disrupted. They no longer find sanctuary and support from the population. We attribute the current security situation to three major reasons; reason number one, our COIN(counterinsurgency) strategy adjustment and the surge deployment; reason number two, Iraqi security force capabilities have incredibly increased, or extremely increased; and the third is the Sons of Iraq program and the population standing up to defend their neighborhoods.

I'll expand on each of these three reasons for a second. First, we are living with the population. The five-brigade surge gave coalition forces the resources required to concentrate combat power in extremist-dominated areas. They allowed us to occupy key terrain in these areas to avoid enemy reoccupation.

Here are the relevant sections from U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. In 2006-7 then Lt Gen David Petraeus led the team that produced this manual. It is basically the instruction book for our troops in Iraq

A-24 The first rule of COIN operations is to establish the force's presence in the AO (area of operations).... This requires living in the AO close tot he populace. Raiding from remote, secure bases does not work.

FM 3-24 1-131 SECURITY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW IS ESSENTIAL The cornerstone of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads.

1-149 Ultimate success in COIN is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations much be conducted, risk shared with the populace, and contact maintained.... Following (these practices) reinforces the connection with the populace that help establish real legitimacy.

3-67 PHYSICAL SECURITY. During any period of instability, people's primary interest is physical security for them and their families. When HN (host nation) forces fail to provide security or threaten the security of civilians, the population is likely to seek security guarantees from insurgents, militias, or other armed groups. This situation can feed support for an insurgency.

Me: A bit of history is needed here. Our strategy from the beginning of the insurgency to the end of 2006 was three fold: One, keep most of our troops in 5 large bases, and send them out on targeted raids. Two, concentrate on building up the Iraqi government and economy. Three, build Iraqi security forces in the hope that we could build them up faster than the insurgents could take over areas of the country. While the second goal was correct, one and three were misguided and ultimately failed. We forgot that classic counterinsurgency doctrine was to secure the population first, and the only way you could do that was to live among them. As Wesley Morgan wrote in the Feb 11 2008 print edition of National Review, "Classic counterinsurgency doctrine, long forgotten by U.S. military institutions, makes clear that while raids have their place, they cannot be the major focus if any kind of sustained progress is to be expected. The center of gravity in counterinsurgency operations is the population, not the enemy, and the objective is the population's security, not the destruction of the insurgents - an impossible goal."

Why didn't we do this earlier? Morgan says that prior to the surge "force levels available in Iraq dictated the strategy, rather than the strategy dictating the force levels." I'm not totally sure of this means that previous commanders of MNF-Iraq, LtGen Sanchez and Gen Casey, simply didn't ask for more troops, if they asked and were denied, or didn't ask because they knew they wouldn't get them. Ultimately, responsibility for failure resides with them, past CENTCOM commander Gen John Abizaid, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and ultimately President Bush.

But by the same token, simply having sent more troops without a new doctrine to guide them would have been fruitless also. It was a combination of more troops, the proper application of counterinsurgency doctrine, corps-level operations, and the various "awakenings", or reconciliations, that have turned the situation around.

COL. JAMES: Secondly, the Iraqi security force has proven -- is improved significantly. The difference between their capacity during my last deployment and now is truly amazing. We partner with four Iraqi army brigades, two Iraqi army battalions and, as well, 15 police headquarters. Most of these organizations are capable of processing intelligence and executing precise independent operations. We still have some equipment issues, but we continue to work this hard, and I see positive momentum in this area....

Q Sir, it's Mike Mount with CNN, and I suppose I'll ask this kind of obvious question that always gets asked of you folks. You had mentioned that the surge troops were part of one of the elements that is kind of keeping security in the area. What would happen, do you think, if surge troops in your area are pulled out? Do you think the security forces there are strong enough, and the Sons of Iraq are strong enough to hold? Or are the surge troops a really strong, key element in your area?

COL. JAMES: Good question, Mike, and that is a question that we often receive, and it's a good one.

As you think about the security forces, as they've developed over time, we have focused on the surge force coming in and buying time.

It's a bridging strategy to allow the Iraqi security forces and government to develop over time, while concurrent with that, we reduce the capability of the enemy force. And I've seen just in my short period of time here that that has been extremely successful.

6-29 Training HN (host nation) security forces is a slow and painstaking process. It does not lend itself to a "quick fix".

FM 3-24 THE HOST NATION DOING SOMETHING TOLERABLY IS NORMALLY BETTER THAN US DOING IT WELL. It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as to assess how well it is done. Where the United States is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires establishing viable HN leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant US support.

6-1 Success in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations requires establishing a legitimate government supported by the people and able to address the fundamental causes that insurgents use to gain support. Achieving these goals requires the host nation to defeat insurgents or render them irrelevant, upholding the rule of law, and provide a basic level os essential and security for the populace. Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.

COL. JAMES: Thirdly, the Iraqi population is tired of their families being terrorized by extremists and have stepped up to secure their neighborhoods.

1-4 Long term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule. Achieving this goal requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as possible.

COL. JAMES: ...With the security window opened, we continue the exploitation phase, focused on governance and economics. We have an embedded reconstruction team resourced with governance and economics experts. Mr. Van Franken (sp), our EPRT leader, has a team, and as his team is an essential part of our brigade combat team, we include them in all operational planning and execution.

Under economics, they focus on developing small businesses, agricultural associations, poultry and fish farms and reconstruction projects. Under governance, they focus on local governance training, governance linkages and beladiya assistance, which are the public works and the essential services for the people.

FM 3-24 7-7 ...Effective commanders know the people, topography, economy, history, and culture of their area of operations (AO). They know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance within it...

7-8 Another part of analyzing a COIN (counterinsurgency) mission involves assuming responsibility for everyone in the AO. This means that leaders feel the pulse of the local populace, understand their motivations and care about what they want and need. Genuine compassion and empathy for the population provide an effective weapon against insurgents.

COL. JAMES: But the three things that I see as very important is, the opportunity exists because of very competent Iraqi security forces, both Iraqi army and Iraqi police. We have a population in our AO that is hungry for freedom, and you can see that in their eyes as they stand point as part of the Son of Iraq. Or you see a family member, be it a mother or a daughter, walking to market. You can see all the activity.

Right now we're in the middle of the Arba'een festival time period, and you can see their women and children walking down these highways to that celebration.

FM 3-24 quote from Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, 1966 "Much can be learnt merely from the faces of the population in villages that are subject to clear-and-hold operations, if these are visited at regular intervals. Faces which at first are resigned and apathetic, or even sullen, six months or a year later are full of cheerful welcoming smiles. The people know who is winning."

Me: We're getting there, but we're not there yet. This is going to take time, but we're on the right track. Lt Gen Odierno laid it out well in an interview on Feb 14 in which he said that the key now was that political progress at the top and bottom need to meet in the middle. Progress, I think, is being made. It's in fits, in starts and stops, but it's moving. Like Bismark said, democracy is like making sausage; while the result might be good the process is ugly viewed up close. Lt Col T.E Lawrence ("of Arabia" also had it right when he said that "War upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife." It can be done, but it's not easy and takes time. Iraq won't be won dramatically World War II style, it'll be won one step at a time, and when it's over you will barely notice it.