The Redhunter

The Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) review of captured Iraqi documents uncovered strong evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism. Despite their incompatible long-term goals, many terrorist movements and Saddam found a common enemy in the United States. At times these organizations worked together, trading access for capability. In the period after the 1991 Gulf War, the regime of Saddam Hussein supported a complex and increasingly disparate mix of pan-Arab revolutionary causes and emerging pan-Islamic radical movements. The relationship between Iraq and forces of pan-Arab socialism was well known and was in fact one of the defining qualities of the Ba'ath movement.

But the relationships between Iraq and the groups advocating radical pan-Islamic doctrines are much more complex. This study found no "smoking gun" (i.e., direct connection) between Saddam's Iraq and al Qaeda. Saddam's interest in, and support for, non-state actors was spread across a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. Some in the regime recognized the potential high internal and external costs of maintaining relationships with radical Islamic groups, yet they concluded that in some cases, the benefits of association outweighed the risks. A review of available Iraqi documents indicated the following:

• The Iraqi regime was involved in regional and international terrorist operations prior to OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. The predominant targets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq.
• On occasion, the Iraqi intelligence services directly targeted the regime's perceived enemies, including non-Iraqis. Non-Iraqi casualties often resulted from Iraqi sponsorship of non-governmental terrorist groups.
• Saddam's regime often cooperated directly, albeit cautiously, with terrorist groups when they believed such groups could help advance Iraq's long-term goals. The regime carefully recorded its connections to Palestinian terror organizations in numerous government memos. One such example documents Iraqi financial support to families of suicide bombers in Gaza and the West Bank.
• State sponsorship of terrorism became such a routine tool of state power that Iraq developed elaborate bureaucratic processes to monitor progress and accountability in the recruiting, training, and resourcing of terrorists. Examples include the regime's development, construction, certification, and training for car bombs and suicide vests in 1999 and 2000.

From the beginning of his rise to power, one of Saddam's major objectives was to shift the regional balance of power favorably towards Iraq. After the 1991 Gulf War, pursuing this objective motivated Saddam and his regime to increase their cooperation with - and attempts to manipulate - Islamic fundamentalists and related terrorist organizations. Documents indicate that the regime's use of terrorism was standard practice, although not always successful. From 1991 through 2003, the Saddam regime regarded inspiring, sponsoring, directing, and executing acts of terrorism as an element of state power.

That sounds pretty damning doesn't it? Not if you're a leftist who insists that the only thing that's important is finding a document similar to the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy which ties Saddam directly to al Qaeda. if so then you latch on this this sentence in the second paragraph of the Executive Summary quoted above.

This study found no 'smoking gun' (i.e., direct connection) between Saddam's Iraq and al Qaeda

And, in fact, al Qaeda is mentioned in the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, which was passed in October of 2002 by the U.S. Congress.

Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;

This "whereas" is one of 24 justifications in the document for authorizing force in Iraq.

Before we go on, a few points are necessary.

1. Whether the statement in the Joint Authorization is true or not does not in and of itself invalidate the war, and
2. Even if the statement is false it does not, ipso facto, mean that "Bush lied". Unless, of course, you're the only person on earth who has thought something to have been true and later turned out to have been mistaken.

So what's in the report? On page 34

Captured documents reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda - as long as that organization's near-term goals supported Saddam's long term vision.

From page 41 about his support of terrorism in general

Saddam Hussein was demonstrably willing to use terrorism to achieve his goals. Using this tactical method was a strategic choice of Saddam's, often requiring direct and indirect cooperation with movements, organizations, and individuals possessing,in some cases, diametrically opposed long-term goals.

And on page 42 we have this

Saddam supported groups that either associated directly with al Qaeda (such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, let at one time by bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri) or that generally shared al Qaeda's stated goals and objectives."

Summarizing the report, Thomas Joscelyn writes on The Weekly Standard blog that

The Iraqi Intelligence documents discussed in the report link Saddam's regime to: the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (the "EIJ" is al Qaeda number-two Ayman al Zawahiri's group), the Islamic Group or "IG" (once headed by a key al Qaeda ideologue, Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman), the Army of Mohammed (al Qaeda's affiliate in Bahrain), the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (a forerunner to Ansar al-Islam, al Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq), and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a long-time ally of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan), among other terrorist groups. Documents cited by the report, but not discussed at length in the publicly available version (they may be in a redacted portion of the report), also detail Saddam's ties to a sixth al Qaeda affiliate: the Abu Sayyaf group, an al Qaeda affiliate in the Philippines.

Also see Saddam's Dangerous Friends: What a Pentagon review of 600,000 Iraqi documents tells us, by Stephen F. Hayes in The Weekly Standard, and Media swings and misses on IDA's Saddam report on
Regime of Terror.

My own brief look at the IPP report does not show that any al Qaeda people were in Iraq at the time of the invasion. Obviously it shows that there was not a formal, or even informal, alliance. What it does show is that Saddam used many terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, to further his goals.

Going back to the Joint Resolution, we see "terrorism" or a form of the word mentioned no less than 19 times. Here are a few examples

Whereas after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally agreed, among other things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them, and to end its support for international terrorism;

Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations;

Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of American citizens;

(emphasis added). There are more references, but you get the point. And I think it's pretty clear from the report that Saddam's Iraq was guilty of these acts.

The Nature of Our War

Our enemy is not simply al Qaeda. We are fighting what Lt Col (Dr) David Kilcullen has called a "global insurgency". The insurgency consists of many groups, all around the world, who share the common goal of reestablishing the Caliphate and subduing the West. That this may sound fantastic does not make it less so, or less possible that it might well be achieved.

Al Qaeda is at the head of the snake. It is the "top" organization, but this is not a strict hierarchy. Neither Osama bin Laden nor his top aids are vital to its functioning. Killing them would have no more effect on winning the war than the death of Ho Chi Minh in 1968 had in ending the Vietnam War.

Kilcullen explains what this has to do with Iraq

Indeed, current actions in the War on Terrorism appear disparate if viewed through a terrorism paradigm. Some (like international law enforcement cooperation to counter terrorist financing) fit the terrorism paradigm neatly, while others (the Iraq War, counter-proliferation initiatives, building influence in Central Asia, containment of North Korea and Iran) appear unrelated to an anti-terrorism agenda and are thus viewed with suspicion by some. However, if viewed through the lens of counterinsurgency, these actions make perfect sense.

The left wants to limit the WOT to a very narrow police action against al Qaeda. They don't even see it as a war, nor do they see the enemy as anything more than terrorists. This is why they see it as a crime problem, rather than as the global insurgency that I believe it to be.

The bottom line is that one, Saddam was deeply involved in supporting terrorism, whatever his formal links with any one organization. Two, that all Islamic terrorist groups represent a threat to our friends and interests, and three, that this does show that the Bush Administration was correct to make terrorism part of the Joint Resolution to authorize the war.