The Redhunter

Violence levels are down throughout most of Iraq. Since the June 2007 report, deaths from ethno-sectarian violence are down nearly 90%. Total civilian deaths and Coalition deaths have each dropped by over 70%. A number of factors have contributed to the decrease in violence in Iraq, to include a Coalition focus on securing the population, progress against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), rejection of AQI by significant portions of the population and the continued strength of the tribal Awakening movement and Sons of Iraq (formerly known as Concerned Local Citizens,) limitations on malign Iranian influence, Muqtada al Sadr's order to jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) to suspend attacks, actions in source and transit countries against foreign fighter facilitation networks, and an increase of over 100,000 Iraqi Army, police, and border forces.

However, their remain a number of concerns. AQI and other extremist groups remain resilient; though they have sustained significant losses, these groups continue to post a substantial threat and continue to carry out barbaric attacks. While their strength and influence are significant reduced in Anbar Province, Baghdad, the belts around Baghdad and many areas of Diyala province, AQI elements remain highly lethal in parts of the Tigris River Valley and in Ninewa Province. AQI members have,in particular, been targeting key figures in the Awakening movement and Sons of Iraq groups and have also been conductiona smaller number of less effective, high-profile attacks against the local population. Additionally, ethno-sectarian struggles over power and resources continue, and among Shi'a groups, criminal activity and infighting continue to impede progress.

Several things are noteworthy from what we have so far. One, that tremendous progress has been made in the all-important area of stopping insurgent violence. Just this past Sunday, newly arrived in Iraq Marine Corps Maj. Gen. John F. Kelly (I Marine Expeditionary Force FWD) said in a press briefing that he was stunned at how low the levels of violence were in comparison with his previous tours. Other commanders have echoed similar themes, documented here at The Redhunter.

Second, the adoption of classic counterinsurgency tactics played a large role in bringing us to where we are. Although some will try and portray the Anbar Awakening as a completely indigenous movement, the truth, as Maj. Gen Walter Gaskin said in December that it would not have happened without U.S. forces.

Lastly, that although we have achieved much, the gains are fragile and we still face significant challenges. "Fragile" was just the word used by Maj. Gen. Joseph Fil in December to describe the gains made by his 1st Cavalry. Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, in his February "exit interview", also made clear that things could still go very wrong.

Continuing, here is a section the summarizes the economic and governmental issues

On the economic front, enduring improvements are dependent on the the GoI's (Government of Iraq) still-tenuous ability to provide essential services and improve oil, electricity, and water infrastructure. Advances in these areas are critical to keeping Iraq on the path to sustainable economic development. On the political front, much will depend on continued legislative progress and the implementation of recently passed legislation, improvements in the effectiveness of Iraq's ministries and whether Iraq's political leaders have the will and ability needed to turn nascent political accommodation at the local and national levels into lasting national reconciliation. Further progress will depend on the continued ability of Iraqi leaders to capitalize on the hard-fought gains achieved by the Coalition and Iraqi forces and other courageous members of Iraqi society who are dedicated to peace.

The report itself is a mix of good-news-bad-news, but there is definitely more of the former than the latter. Quoting anything from the body of the report runs the risk of becoming too selective to be useful, and I think the Executive Summary accurately represents the facts presented in the report.

My conclusion is pretty straightforward; we're on the right track, and rather than talk about how fast we can pull out, we ought to be talking about how to consolidate and expand upon our gains. People who either want us to lose or don't care take the first position, those who want us to win the latter. I look at our current crop of political candidates and judge them on whether they want to win or lose in Iraq. So far, the choice is pretty clear.