The Redhunter

First up, Rich Lowry on Kennedy and Khrushchev

The earnest, young American president wanted to forestall any possibility of misunderstanding and to win Khrushchev's commitment to the international status quo. The blustery, risk-taking Soviet premier wanted to bludgeon Kennedy into making concessions that would further the Soviet goal of global revolution. With such clashing objectives, the two leaders didn't exactly hit it off.

When Kennedy thought he was being accommodating, Khrushchev thought he was being weak. He pocketed rhetorical concessions by Kennedy and demanded more. Afterward, Kennedy called it "the roughest thing in my life." Kennedy adviser George Ball later said that Khrushchev had perceived Kennedy as "young and weak," and Kennedy confidant Gen. Maxwell Taylor thought Khrushchev concluded he could "shove this young man around." Vienna was the backdrop for Soviet assertion in the Cold War flash points to come.

Not exactly the type of meeting we want to repeat, Senator Obama. Best you bone up on your history before talking about diplomacy again.

Obama partisans will claim that he will do better than Kennedy. Perhaps. But nothing he says shows that he understands just how risky these unscripted meetings are. What is striking about his statements is that he shows no knowledge of what actually happened at these summits. He just keeps repeating the mantra that "Kennedy met with Khrushchev, and Reagan with Gorbachev," as if that alone settles it.

Further, what exactly does he plan on saying to these dictators that will persuade them to change their policies? He never says. All we hear about from his partisans is the mantra about the "need for talk" and "aggressive personal diplomacy", but never a word about what he will actually say

Apparently we are to simply believe that the magic of Obama will be enough to carry the day, because he is, well, Obama. Details are not necessary.

Lowry then take on Reagan-Gorbachev

Reagan believed in personal diplomacy, but concluded upon taking office that it was pointless to talk to Soviet hard-liner Leonid Brezhnev. In stiffening U.S. defenses and pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative, his administration sought to convince Moscow, in the words of Secretary of State George Shultz, that restraint "was its most attractive, or only, option," while pressuring the tottering Soviet economic system.

When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, the administration thought it had the strategic upper hand, and a man it could work with. Reagan met with his counterpart in Geneva and Reykjavik. Keenly aware of his inability to keep pace in a high-tech arms race, Gorbachev wanted any deal contingent on prohibiting SDI. Reagan said "no." Out of his weakness, Gorbachev eventually gave the Reagan administration the kinds of arms cuts it wanted and openings in the Soviet system. The Cold War was about to end.

Note also that Reagan never met with Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, or Konstantin Chernenko believe he did not believe it to be worth doing so. So he didn't just rush off and meet with every Soviet leader, as Obama implies.

Lastly, if you need it here he is actually saying he'd meet with Ahmadinejad

And from last year's YouTube debate, he said he'd meet without preconditions.

QUESTION: In 1982, Anwar Sadat traveled to Israel, a trip that resulted in a peace agreement that has lasted ever since.

In the spirit of that type of bold leadership, would you be willing to meet separately, without precondition, during the first year of your administration, in Washington or anywhere else, with the leaders of Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba and North Korea, in order to bridge the gap that divides our countries?

OBAMA: I would. And the reason is this, that the notion that somehow not talking to countries is punishment to them -- which has been the guiding diplomatic principle of this administration -- is ridiculous.

And here's the video (h/t LGF)

Go and read the whole transcript if you want context. Nothing else he says changes the fact that he said that he'd meet with the leaders of Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba and North Korea without preconditions. He didn't say anything about "preparations". That's all just recently added spin.

Oh, and it's also on his website

Diplomacy: Obama is the only major candidate who supports tough, direct presidential diplomacy with Iran without preconditions. Now is the time to pressure Iran directly to change their troubling behavior. Obama would offer the Iranian regime a choice. If Iran abandons its nuclear program and support for terrorism, we will offer incentives like membership in the World Trade Organization, economic investments, and a move toward normal diplomatic relations. If Iran continues its troubling behavior, we will step up our economic pressure and political isolation. Seeking this kind of comprehensive settlement with Iran is our best way to make progress.

Again, nothing about "preparations".

Update

From an article last year by Frank Gaffney on why negotiating with Iran is a bad idea

First, such negotiations will legitimate one of the most dangerous regimes on the planet. By acceding to the pressure to accord the mullahocracy in Tehran the status of equal partners and members in good standing of the "community of nations" -- especially against the backdrop of its increasing aggressiveness, we reward that bad behavior. It should come as no surprise that there will be more of it in the future.

Second, embracing Ahmadinejad and his mullahs in this way can only alienate our natural allies: the people of Iran. They have lately been demonstrating a growing willingness to challenge the Islamofascists who have oppressed them for so long. The intensifying economic pressure of recent months -- a product of efforts to divest the stocks of publicly traded companies doing business with Tehran, the declining price of oil and international economic sanctions (such as they are) -- has helped make the Iranian regime even more unpopular at home. Now, it is inevitable that such pressure will be alleviated, as governments and businesses seize on the new diplomatic opening to rush in and prop up Ahmadinejad.

Third, the adoption of the negotiating track effectively forecloses other options for dealing with the danger posed by the Iranian regime. In particular, efforts to bring about its downfall will be precluded. Diplomats predictably will insist that nothing be done -- for example, through covert operations, more far-reaching and effective economic sanctions, military preparations, or political warfare -- that will jeopardize the prospects for successful negotiations.

The cumulative effect of these three repercussions will be to buy more time for the mullahs in Iran. They will use this time not to slacken their efforts to destabilize Iraq and hand the United States an epic defeat there, to suspend (let alone dismantle) their nuclear-weapons programs or to terminate their active and generous support for terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda.