The Redhunter

COL FERRELL:...The primary enemies that we were dealing with in our area of operations was al Qaeda and Sunni extremists who had been left alone for long enough to create a sanctuary in Arab Jabour.

Al Qaeda had used this sanctuary to control the population through fear and intimidation. They used homes, farms and places of business as bases of operation and bomb-making factories, devastating the region's economy. People lacked consistent access to basic necessities, like clean water and electricity, let alone a functioning health care or education system.

They had -- the area had no sustained security presence provided by either coalition or Iraqi security forces. We began operations on June 15th, when elements of the Spartan Brigade Combat Team attacked to seize a foothold in Arab Jabour against a well-entrenched al Qaeda threat. Organized defensive belts existed throughout our area of operations, and deep-buried IEDs were common as the enemy was confident they would be able to keep coalition forces out and the local population controlled. They were wrong.
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When we first arrived, we were experiencing on average of 30-plus attacks a week. Now we're seeing less than one per week.
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The security environment that was created by these operations and increased the Iraqi army role in the area set the conditions for the local citizens to step up and begin to take control of their future. Over this past year, we've helped create city councils in each of our population areas. Neighborhood councils now give our communities a direct voice to the government.

All this is straight out of Gen. Petraeus' U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. The objective in fighting any insurgency is that the counterinsurgents must achieve security first. Only then can political progress at any level take place. From FM 3-24:

1-4 Long term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule. Achieving this goal requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as possible.

1-113 LEGITIMACY IS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE. The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government.

1-131 SECURITY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW IS ESSENTIAL The cornerstone of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads.

The first question hits on the all important topic of whether our gains are sustainable, but what's important is how Col Ferrell gives his answer

Q Sir, it's Kristin Roberts with Reuters.

In terms of the security situation, are there any events on the horizon that might threaten the security gains or raise specific security challenges? And can you talk a bit about the sustainability of the security gains you've seen, as the country moves toward provincial elections?

COL. FERRELL: I think, in our specific area of operations, that the security gains are sustainable. We have forces that will be staying there, coalition forces that will be staying in the battlespace.

The progress of the Iraqi army battalions, that are working with us, has made great strides. The people of the communities are making tremendous strides. They are working hand-in-hand to prevent the threats from coming back.

There's always a threat. We know that. But the communities work. We work. The Iraqi security forces work. They do not want it. They've experienced now fighting for so many years. They see the changes that they've worked so hard over the last year-plus to gain; that they will move this forward. That's the key.

Ferrell points more to the attitude of the people rather than the military strength of the Iraqi Army as being key. They must believe that the counterinsurgents will win, and that it is in their interests that they win. They must get off the fence and into our side. The question, then, is how to get the people from apathy to action.

Part of the way this is being done was explained by Mr Smith as he answered a question by Tom Bowman of NPR about the Iraqi government not sending ministers down t examine essential services and see what needed to be done.

MR. SMITH:... And through developing relationships, which -- this society is built upon relationships, and then they take it very seriously -- we were able to bring these officials into an area that they would not have dreamed of going into.

And that -- and as they came into the area and you saw the Shi'a meeting the newly formed town council of Arab Jabour for the first time, and that -- so you have a Shi'a district chairman sitting down with a Sunni town council and seeing them embrace. And the thing that I can't project here in words in that is the excitement in their eyes and the reunion and the reconciliation that took place at that moment. And that was the start. That was at the very beginning of that. That was the first part of October in that, when we engaged.

And from there, you know, we followed that protocol in that, and we have gotten assistance in that from the Ministry of Health. We've gotten assistance from the Ministry of Energy. We've gotten assistance from the Ministry of Irrigation and their representatives in those areas in that. So just speaking from our area, you know, they have been cooperative to the best of their ability, and funds are starting to break free in assistance.

In other words, the people are taking action at the local level in cooperation with officials at the national level. "Political progress" is a term much bandied about, and it's true that it needs to occur if we are to truly win this war. But what's important to understand is that it's not just a top-down process. It must occur at the local level too, and then hopefully the two meet in the middle.

Then, as is so often at these briefings, Al Pessin asks the hard question. I'm impressed that he seems to know what is really going on.

Q Colonel, it's Al Pessin from Voice of America. I wanted to follow up on Kristin's first question.

As you know, the surge was accompanied by a change in doctrine, a change of approach. That change of approach, I'm told, couldn't have been done without sufficient security forces.

Now, with the surge brigades leaving, what makes you confident that this approach will continue to succeed without all these extra U.S. troops there?

COL. FERRELL: I will tell you that I think that we were at the right place at the right time. And I understand the surge and the mission set that we got as we came in, and we were able to get after it. And I think it was very classic in the counterinsurgency aspects. It's the clear, hold, build as we moved through and a very slow, very methodical approach as we came in. But now we've been able to build the Iraqi security forces to come in.

As we move elements of the brigade combat team out of the battlespace -- and our brigade is very unique as the last surge brigade -- all of 2nd Brigade, 3rd ID, the brigade that works for me, is not working specifically here in this battlespace. So I have task- organized units that belong to other organizations that will be staying. So there will be a reduction, given, but there will be a coalition presence.

But what has changed is a significant increase in our area of operation of Iraqi security forces. When we first started, there was one Iraqi battalion -- no Iraqi police and one Iraqi battalion that was on the periphery of the brigade's area of operations. Nowhere did they really want to venture into our specific area of operations. And it took several weeks to get that to change. And it's taken time now to get them to the point that they do independent operations, the one battalion.

We have since, just in the last two months, received a second battalion. And we will see that it will continue to expand Iraqi security force presence over the coming weeks and months with plans that are designed for our specific piece of terrain with a larger presence of Iraqi army.

And additionally, we have just recently opened an Iraqi police station. We will have a permanent police station in Arab Jabour about the first of September, but there's a temporary station that now is open. We have over 400 candidates that is going through the process to become policemen. And we will see that bring more security to the area.

So you have Iraqi police officers. You have Iraqi army, the increased volume of Iraqi army. And then you still have that coalition presence that will facilitate the sustainment.

And don't forget the population. Don't forget the Sons of Iraq that are still there. But more importantly, don't forget the population and what they've been through and the changes and the transformation that they've been through and what they see now, what they have as they move forward. They wanted normalcy in their life. They're starting to see that and they're moving forward. I think that is one of the biggest keys that we have a tendency to overlook, here.

An entire chapter in FM 3-24 is devoted to building up the host nation forces. A few excerpts

6-1 Success in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations requires establishing a legitimate government supported by the people and able to address the fundamental causes that insurgents use to gain support. Achieving these goals requires the host nation to defeat insurgents or render them irrelevant, upholding the rule of law, and provide a basic level os essential and security for the populace. Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.

6-29 Training HN (host nation) security forces is a slow and painstaking process. It does not lend itself to a "quick fix".

And from the much quoted "Zen-like" section

1-154 THE HOST NATION DOING SOMETHING TOLERABLY IS NORMALLY BETTER THAN US DOING IT WELL. It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as to assess how well it is done. Where the United States is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires establishing viable HN leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant US support....

Finally, in response to a question, Col Ferrell addresses the fighting spirit of the Iraqi Security Forces. While no doubt some Iraqi forces are sub-par, and even turn from the enemy, many or even most fight bravely, and get precious little credit for it in the American press. Ferrell has two Iraqi battalions in his battlespace.

COL FERRELL:...Over time, they will both improve. And as more forces come in and they get the strength and capabilities and build the capacity, we'll see independent operations across all of them. They have the desire. That's the one thing I want you to understand.

The soldiers I deal with, and I've got great, you know, great knowledge of working with them on the ground and being engaged with them in the fight firsthand. The company commanders, a couple of the battalion commanders, but the company commanders are the ones that I have personal knowledge of down there.

They are out leading soldiers. They want to take the fight. They want to rid their area just as much as any of our soldiers. They know what's right and they'll get after it.

Just as interesting as the questions the journalists ask are the ones they don't ask. They don't question the basic military progress or success we have achieved. They don't insinuate that the briefers are misleading them. To be sure, I didn't start to watch these briefings until early 2007, and I don't even know if they did this teleconference type earlier than that. But judging from how the war was reported, I have to think that reporters were more skeptical. Either way, I find these briefings a good source of information about what's happening, and in sum they tell me that as of now we are winning.