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July 12, 2008
Iraq Briefing - 10 July 2008 - Changes Since 2006
This briefing was by Maj. Gen. Michael Oates, Commander of Multi-National Division-Center, and the 10th Mountain Division, and Major General Ali Salih Farhood OOothman (I am not certain of his unit's designation). They are connected via telecommunications link to the Pentagon from Camp Victory in Baghdad.
From the MNF-Iraq website, "Multi-National Division - Center, also known as Task Force Mountain, assists Iraqi Security Forces with security and stability missions in the area south of Baghdad ranging from Najaf to Wasit provinces. MND-Center is headquartered by the 10th Mountain Division (Light) from Fort Drum, New York."
The 10th Mountain Division replaced the 3rd Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch) in this role on June 3.
Maj. Gen Oates reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin, in turn, reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until last March. Until Petraeus takes his new position, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.
I have no information about the Iraqi chain of command and frankly do not have time to do the research.
This video and others can be viewed at DODvClips. The transcript is at DefenseLink. More videos, briefings, and military news can be seen at The Pentagon Channel.
What is most interesting about this briefing are the differences Oates sees in Iraq from his last posting here in 2006:
GEN. OATES: Ladies and gentlemen, I would just like to make a couple of brief observations. I've been back to Iraq now for about six weeks, and I previously departed here in late 2006. And there's three very distinct changes that I've observed. The first is the security situation is much improved over my last two tours here. In fact, it's indisputable that the level of attacks are phenomenally low, and that's a great development.The second is the capability, competency and initiative of the Iraqi security forces is significantly better than when I left here in 2006.
And the third most significant thing I've seen different is that there is now a measure of Iraqi government action to address the basic needs of their population, and that was virtually unseen previously.
So we have some work left to go, and I'd like to highlight a couple of those. We are going to continue to work to improve the professionalism of the Iraqi security forces. But quite frankly, in most of my area of southern Iraq, they are already doing great work, most of it through their own initiative.
The second is, I believe we can coach some practical civics classes to some of the local governance to help them understand the sheer mechanics of assessing the Iraqi population's needs and how to go about funding and getting those programs under way.
Third is we need to continue to kill or capture the extremist group leaders and al Qaeda in Iraq, who threaten both the coalition force and the government of Iraq.
And finally, we need to focus on defeating the Iranian malign influence, principally the transfer of lethal munitions that comes largely through southern Iraq.
So we have some work yet to go. I've assigned some focus areas for my division for this year. The first will be that we assist the Iraqi government with achieving fair and safe elections in the fall this year.
The second is we will look at ways we can assist them at the local level in developing economics, so that they can begin a robust employment program for a great number of their males that still lack work.
Third is, we're going to professionalize the Iraqi army. This army, since it's been formed, has been fighting. They did not have the luxury we do of going to schools; they were fighting right out of the box. And now we intend to go back and rework some of those areas. We will work to defeat the Iranian clandestine lethal smuggling network as it proceeds through southern Iraq.
And finally, we will continue to work to defeat al Qaeda's influence and the special group leaders that operate in this area. And that's our focus for this year.
In summary, the improvements Maj. Gen. Oates sees are:
- Improved secutity, as evidenced by a lower level of attacks
- Improved Iraqi security forces
- The Iraqi government is starting to provide basic needs
The first lead to the second, which led to the third. You can have no progress without security, but in the end the Iraqis have to step up.
The things we have still to do are:
- Make sure the upcoming elections are free and fair. This is vital because gaining the confidence and trust of the populace is crucial to winning a counterinsurgency.
- Assist the Iraqis in their economic development, which means putting more men to work.
- Professionalize the Iraqi Army. In other words, take it from a "start up" to where it can not only fight on it's own but earn the respect of the Iraqi people.
Note this and virtually everything else coming out of Iraq against the blatantly false statement Obama still has on his website regarding violence in Iraq and lack of political progress
At great cost, our troops have helped reduce violence in some areas of Iraq, but even those reductions do not get us below the unsustainable levels of violence of mid-2006. Moreover, Iraq's political leaders have made no progress in resolving the political differences at the heart of their civil war.
Maybe Mr "fight the smears" should work on getting his facts straight. No less a source than The New York Times says that "throughout Iraq, violence is at its lowest level in four years." Further, as of three months ago the Iraqis had met 12 of the original 18 benchmarks and have made substantial progress on 5 more. Not exactly "no progress."
What amazes me about our troops is how they are able to perform all sorts of tasks beyond direct warfighting. Winning an insurgency is about a lot more than killing bad guys. It's about building up the local economy and government, and you can't just rely on the State Department and USAID to do that.
Q General Oates, yesterday, General Dubik told the House Armed Services Committee that he felt as though Iraqi ground forces will be able to operate largely autonomously by the middle of next year, by next summer. Based on what you've seen so far there in your area of operations, would you agree with that assessment, in terms of what sort of progress they're making?GEN. OATES: That's a great question. My observation over the last six weeks, watching the Iraqi army in particular operate in the southern areas and most recently in Maysan province and Amarah, is that they're very capable. They are seeking the initiative in planning their operations. And they just recently completed a very successful operation in Maysan province logistically and with their own planning.
I do believe that they are very capable.
I'm not prepared to give you a date on when they can operate autonomously, but I will tell you that my partner here, General Oothman, operates in his area with very little support from us, and when he needs certain capabilities that he does not possess, he asks and we provide. And I might ask him maybe to assess when he thinks his division might be fully capable without assistance.
...Contrary to popular opinion, their maintenance program has actually gotten much better than what I recall from '06. And so while it's not where they want it to be, it is getting better.
And I would tell you, personally, the rate of change in the Iraqi army is what has impressed me the most. They plan their operations. They consult us but they do plan them. And then they initiate the action.
GEN. OOTHMAN: (Off mike) -- and to be independent in our effort now combating in this battle. We have some of our battalions are fully ready. In Karbala and Najaf, we have the authority over all the matters in Najaf and Karbala -- (inaudible). In the next five days we are going to have the authority of Al Qadisiyah.
The challenge we do face in general in the whole Iraqi army is the logistic and the supplies and the administrative work. For instance, we don't have any medic facilities or hospitals where we could take our injured or killed people to. We don't have the garages or the shops to fix and maintain our vehicles, especially the humvees.
At the beginning, we started concentrating on the battle and we neglected the administrative and logistic work. We are seriously working in concert with coalition forces to establish such administrative institution.
Time and again we hear this about the Iraqi Army. I've listened to just about every press briefing held by a division or brigade commander and they all say the same thing; the problem is not so much in the fighting capability of the Iraqis as it is in their logistics. They simply do not have all that they need. No medical facilities or hospitals is pretty bad.
We can't send them any more money. We can provide advice, but this is something that they're going to have to solve on their own.
Al Pessin gets to the heart of the matter and what most concerns most Americans; did the surge work and when can our troops come home?
As with all American commanders, Gen Oates is cautious in his response and won't provide dates or a timeline.
Q General Oates, this is Al Pessin from Voice of America. Can you tell us what the impact is on your area of the end of the surge and whether you think during the time that you're scheduled to be in Iraq, whether it would be possible to further draw down U.S. forces in your area without endangering the gains that have been made?GEN. OATES: Sure. Let me start with the impact of the surge. I think the security situation is probably the best we've ever seen it, at least in my area, and I attribute that to three different things all working together. The first is, in fact we have done a great job both with the Iraqis and with coalition forces to really weigh into al Qaeda and the militia groups. They have been severely attrited, and although not completely defeated, they are not the force that they were a year ago.
The second is the capability of the Iraqi forces -- to include their police, but mostly their army -- has significantly improved. And they are largely in control of most of the neighborhoods in Iraq. And then the third thing is that the government of Iraq itself has taken positive steps to reach out to its population. And this can't be discounted. It's a significant impact in that people begin to realize, although they're not where they need to be to deliver essential services, they've made huge strides. And that's a major component of the security situation.
From the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 (Essentially the "bible" for our troops in Iraq since it was published in Dec of 2006. Gen. Petraeus led the team that wrote it):
Chapter 6: Developing Host Nation Security Forces6-1 Success in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations requires establishing a legitimate government supported by the people and able to address the fundamental causes that insurgents use to gain support. Achieving these goals requires the host nation to defeat insurgents or render them irrelevant, upholding the rule of law, and provide a basic level os essential and security for the populace. Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.
6-6 U.S. and multinational forces may need to help the host nation improve security; however, insurgents can use the presence of foreign forces as a reason to question the HN government's legitimacy. A government reliant on foreign forces for internal security risks not being recognized as legitimate. While combat operations with significant U.S. and multinational participation may be necessary, U.S. combat operations are secondary to enabling the host nation's ability to provide for it's own security.
6-29 Training HN (host nation) security forces is a slow and painstaking process. It does not lend itself to a "quick fix".
Back to the briefing:
GEN. OATES: (continued) With regards to our own troop status, I think right now we're looking at the current situation, and our mission really is to sustain the security environment we have. The next real milestone for me personally is the election period in the fall. I believe that if we can hold the security gains we have and continue to make progress in the areas I've already described, I think it would be an appropriate time at the election to make an assessment of where we're at. And if asked, I'll make that recommendation to my boss. I know that we are in this self-described period of assessment now and observing.I will caution that the absence of attacks does not necessarily mean you have security. We do have fewer attacks. We're trying to see -- observe this time period to determine whether the security situation will hold.
Q Do you see the potential for further drawdowns as you move later into your time in the country into the winter and next spring?
GEN. OATES: I think the force allocations will be determined based on the situation on the ground. So, if the situation remains in good shape and we're able to continue to make progress with the professionalism of the Iraqi army, especially in the areas that General Oothman and I have described, I think that would be appropriate. Obviously, those decisions will be made by my seniors, but they'll certainly ask me about that and we'll provide an assessment at that time.
"The absence of attacks does not necessarily mean you have security." At first glance this seems to contradict what he said at the beginning, but I think here mostly serves as a caution. We on the right have been (rightly) trumpeting the decrease in the level of violence, and that's all fine and good as far as it goes. We should just be cautious about declaring victory too soon.
On the other side, the left needs to understand that we cannot withdraw the troops too soon, or we risk losing all that we have gained. Whoever wins the White House needs to listen to incoming MNF-Iraq commander Gen. Odierno before making decisions.
What threats remain?
Q General, this is Lisa Burgess with Stars and Stripes. A question for both of you, please. Which would you say is the greatest threat right now, with the understanding that both groups have been attrited, al Qaeda or the special militias?GEN. OATES: I'll put that to the subject-matter expert first. And then I'll attempt to comment. Which, does he think, is the greatest threat? Or what is the greatest threat?
GEN. OOTHMAN: In my area of operations, I have the al Qaeda organization and I have the militias. In the capital cities of my provinces, I have the militias.Actually the more threat in my AO are the militias, especially the special forces, Special Groups, they call them. They are trained and equipped by the Iranians.
Those groups, they don't face you in the field. I mean, they put IEDs and they try to stab our forces from the back of the politicians. The militias reach a level. They can't face our Iraqi army. Therefore most of them are in Iran.
Therefore the Iranians, they train them, equip them, provide the necessary materials they need. And they send them back through our borders, to assassinate some of the targets and politicians or our military leaders.
They can't face us, but they have certain missions, or they do have the rockets -- some rocket attacks. They have different kind of groups, some of them to launch rockets, others to put IEDs. Others try to assassinate leaders.
GEN. OATES: I would say currently my greatest concern is al Qaeda, not because they're terribly strong right now but because they remain very virulent. They remain dedicated and set in destruction of both the coalition force and Iraqis. They really don't have any problem attacking anyone, to include all innocent civilians. And so we know that they're actively trying to reenter Iraq and reestablish -- they have been seriously attritted, but they are very virulent and they are very dedicated.
The Shi'a extremist groups are very worrisome. As long as they continue to be supported by external actors, Iran in particular, I believe that they'll practice mischief in Iraq, and that's not helpful. But I believe that they present probably a longer-term threat than al Qaeda to the government of Iraq. And we're dealing with both these threats right now.
MR. WHITMAN: Generals, we have actually gone past the time that we've allocated for this. We certainly appreciate you taking the time. But before we bring it to a close, let me just throw it back to you in case there's any final thoughts that you have before we end this.
GEN. OATES: I appreciate the opportunity today.
It's not by mistake that General Oothman and I are here together. We do -- literally, in our area, everything is done together in partnership, and that's a very fundamental change across Iraq today as well. The Iraqi army is very capable, and I'm very proud to serve along with them. Make no mistake about it; they're taking the initiative in driving most of the operations, at least in my area right now. I remain here as a full partner to assist him in areas where he's still developing -- logistics, medical, intelligence, signal, those kinds of things -- and to provide whatever additional assistance I can to develop his officer corps and his NCO corps. But they are making huge strides.
I believe that this year we have a great opportunity, with the government of Iraq, with the elections beginning in the fall and the continued focus on developing economics, especially employment opportunities; that we can hold this security situation; that it will continue to improve.
And I'm very optimistic about the future.
There is no reason at this point for undue pessimism regarding Iraq. Caution, yes. There are many dangers and things that could go wrong. But we're on the right track and there's no need to change strategy now.
Posted by Tom at July 12, 2008 10:00 PM
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