The Redhunter

COL. WHITE: ...And before I begin, I'd like to say this is my second tour in Iraq. My first was as a commander of the Iron Dukes -- 2nd Battalion, 37th Tank Regiment, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division -- from May 2003 to July of 2004, where I served in Baghdad. First Armored Division, as you all know, was extended for three months during Muqtada al-Sadr's first uprising and my battalion fought for five weeks in An Najaf.

Honestly, the progress here in Iraq since my last visit is absolutely phenomenal. I can state this because a portion of my current brigade sector was also a portion of my battalion sector five years ago. Five years ago, as a battalion commander, I never worked with an Iraqi army unit. The combined security cooperation effort depended almost solely on an Iraqi police force heavily infiltrated by the Jaish al-Mahdi. At that time, we supported the recruitment and training of a nation organization named the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps.

Today, I'm partnered with an Iraqi army division and the qadha has six fully functioning Iraqi police stations with a district headquarters, highway patrol and an emergency response unit. Now Iraqi security forces routinely plan, prepare and execute offensive operations and the population clearly respects and trusts them.

Our mission, in partnership with the Iraqi security forces is to secure the population and interdict accelerants -- accelerants being described as enemy forces and munitions -- from entering Baghdad.

Clearly, there is a measurable improvement in the security of the Madain. And this improvement is primarily a function of the hard work done by our predecessor unit, the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, known as the Hammer Brigade, which is one of the surge brigades that operated out here in the Madain prior to our arrival.

When Colonel Wayne Grigsby's brigade assumed responsibility for the Madain in 2007, attacks averaged two and a half a day. In April, as we began transitioning with the Hammer Brigade, attacks were down to one per day. And today, as I sit here and speak to you, attacks are less than one per day, with over half of those directed at Iraqi security forces.

I believe the significant reduction and the fact that attacks remain low can be attributed to two things: first and obviously, the astounding efforts of the Hammer Brigade over 14 months and now our 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, in an area that really saw very little U.S. presence prior to 2007. Now the populace is absolutely assured of our commitment and the commitment of the Iraqi security forces. The second contributor to the decrease in attacks is the ever-increasing professionalism of the Iraqi security forces. Coupled with the security contributions of the Sons of Iraq, we have achieved a point here in the Madain where operations are by, with and through Iraqi security forces.

All these efforts combined deny anti-Iraqi forces sanctuary and provide a solid foundation of hope for the free citizens of the Madain.

So as you can see progress has been tremendous. I've seen this in briefing after briefing by commanders who have had previous tours in Iraq. Go over to the sidebar of this blog under "Categories,", select "Iraq II 2007 - 2008", scroll though the briefings and you'll see what I mean. More importantly, the reporters never challenge this assertion. The key new is moving forward to economic and political progress.

Fortunately, both seem to be happening. The Iraqi government has met most of the benchmarks set by Congress, and oil revenues are helping spur the economy. It is vital that we Americans not get stupid and short sighted by demanding the Iraqis "pay us back" before this thing is settled. Sadly, I've seen this call for "pay back" come from some on the right as well as the usual suspects on the left.

On to the Q & A. The camera shows that this briefing was pretty sparsely attended. Odd that this would be so. Given that these are military/Pentagon reporters, I wouldn't think that that they're all off covering the conventions. Maybe it's just an acknowledgment that the war is winding down. No bad news is no news.

The first major topic was the Sons of Iraq (SOI), formerly called Concerned Local Citizens, which have been discussed extensively in numerous briefings. They function as a sort of super-neighborhood watch. Many are armed, but not by us or the Iraqi government. The point is to get the Iraqis involved in their own security.

Many of the SOI are Sunni, and are thus regarded with suspicion with the mostly Shiite government in Baghdad. Reports are that the Iraqi government wants to disband them....but that may only be in certain areas, I'm not totally sure.

Our objective is to integrate members of the SOI into the police, army, or government, but this is easier said than done.

Q Colonel, Jeff Schogol with Stars and Stripes. I've seen reports that the government of Iraq is actually arresting members of the Sons of Iraq. Are you having to deal with any of that in your area?

COL. WHITE: Well, here in the Madain, as I mentioned, we've got 6,000 Sons of Iraq. ...We have not experienced any warrants or any arrests at this point in time for any of our Sons of Iraq, and I think that really goes back to a question of who reconciled with the government of Iraq and who -- and who did not.
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Q Could you talk about how the -- what progress you're making in either integrating these Sons of Iraq into the security forces or training them for other jobs?

COL. WHITE: Absolutely. And I think this is a common theme across Iraq, but let me talk about specifically in the Madain. Again, I have a pretty low number of Sons of Iraq, and it's -- and it's based on the security situation here and the need for them. We have a number of programs that we transition. The first and most important for us and for the government of Iraq is that transition from Sons of Iraq into either the Iraqi police, the Iraqi army or the Iraqi National Police.

We currently have over 400 packets in with Ministry of Interior to transition Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi police force. Next month we'll begin a recruiting drive again for another 1,000 Iraqi police shurta. Now not all of those will be Sons of Iraq, but it's another opportunity for us to engage the Sons of Iraq. They consistently look at how they can backfill into the Iraqi army with Sons of Iraq after they are recruited and trained.

But that is just one area where we transition Sons of Iraq. Here in Madain we have nine civil service corps projects that are solely employing Sons of Iraq. Most of them are down in the Salman Pak area. I do have two that are in the Jisr Diyala area, and then we have three more that we're looking at for the Nahrawan area, to assist us in providing them the training that is required to seek and gain a sustainable job over time.

There are a number of Iraqi initiatives that will also begin, as we are familiar with it, on the new fiscal year. And as we study and look at those programs, I'll be able to pass along what we think from a percentage-wise that we be able to transition.

But truly we remain committed to the Sons of Iraq. The government of Iraq has also recently said they're very committed to maintaining the Sons of Iraq here in the Madain -- can't speak for the rest of Iraq.

So we'll see. The SOI are not so important as an institution, but as an idea or attitude. It is vital that the Iraqis believe that their government cares about them and that it has their best interests at heart. Further, they must believe that they can take part in that government, that they have a say in their future. I'll be watching these briefings and other news sources carefully for future developments.