The Redhunter

Regular readers will recognize almost everything here, because these are themes that have been the subject of many posts since the "surge" started. Interspersed with my comments are some of the press briefings in which our commanders have spoken of the strategy and tactics that Petraeus discussed in his speech (note that I have covered many more briefings than appear here. See sidebar, categories, Iraq II 2007 - 2008

• Surge - focus on securing the population


• Before the surge, 55 dead bodies every morning in Baghdad


• The only way to secure a population is to live with the population, to share the risk. You cannot "commute to the fight." See Iraq Briefing - 04 Feb 2008 - "We do not drive or commute to work" and Iraq Briefing - 22 Feb 2008 - "We are Living with the Population"


• Gradually get the population to tell you who the bad guys are


• You must use all the tools in your kitbag. Military force, yes and necessary. But you can't win with that alone. Yes before you can have legislation you must have security. But by the same token once military force has done it's part you then move into economics and building projects.


• The idea is to "spiral upward" - kind of the opposite of a "vicious cycle" downward.


• The political line of operation (Ambassador Crocker) often or sometimes trumped the military


• Petraeus and Crocker worked very closely together. The presented a united front, usually meeting together with Maliki or visiting congressional delegations.


• Cannot allow the enemy to have any sanctuaries, at least within Iraq. See Iraq Briefing - 02 June 2008 - "Attack, Attack, Attack"


• Before you start to clear, you must have a plan to hold and build. Clearing then leaving does not work. See Iraq Briefing - 14 April 2008 - "From Clear to Hold and Build".


• Promote reconciliation; reach out to those who are willing to be part of the new Iraq


• Col. Sean McFarland meeting with Sheik(s) to recognize the Anbar Awakening and reach out to them. See Iraq Briefing 10 December 2007 - Maj Gen Walter Gaskin (the subject is Anbar) and Iraq Briefing - 13 March 2008 - Tremendous Turnaround in Al Anbar


• We could not hand off responsibility to Iraqi security forces until at the very least they ceased to become part of the problem. One of the first things Petraeus had to do was arrest some top level Iraqis - sometimes at the behest of Makiki himself. Although Petraeus doesn't say so, this is another reason why the Rumsfeld/Abizaid/Casey strategy of reducing American forces while counting on the new Iraqi Army to take over was failing. See Iraq Briefing - 04 March 2008 - State of the Iraqi Army, and Iraq Briefing - 24 July 2008 - Confident and Capable Iraqi Leadership


• Be upfront with the press. "Don't put lipstick on a pig" Just tell it as it is. No spin


• Ray Odierno's nickname is "The Big O"


• Me: General Odierno is now the commander of MNF-Iraq, having assumed command earlier this month. During the vital period of 2007-08, he was number two in Iraq, a Lieutenant General in command of Multi-National Corps Iraq. I covered many of his briefings, but his "exit interview" is perhaps the most incisive (and brief, so it won't take much of your time).


• Correct interrogation techniques. We must uphold our values even when the enemy is barbaric


• Several times he mentions Field Manual 3-24 (Petraeus lead the team that wrote it in 2006, while he was a Lieutenant General, and it provided the strategy for what became known as the "surge"). See Book Review - U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24


• You can never stop learning and adapting. The enemy may be barbaric but they are thinking. It is an enemy to be respected in that it is a thinking enemy. What works one day may not work another. What works in one area of the country might not work in another. What works in Iraq might not work in Afghanistan.


• Mentioned the Sons of Iraq (SOI, originally called Concerned Local Citizens) as important to success. They were important to sustain the progress. Me: The SOI were the subject of most briefings, which shows their importance).


• Get the irreconcilables out of society, detain them, and take the pressure off the population. Eventually you might be able to reconcile some of them though and release some.


• Education, social services job opportunities important to long term success. See Iraq Briefing - 09 June 2008 - Job Creation to Defeat the Insurgency and Iraq Briefing - 04 August 2008 - Achieving Durable Security


• They call the strategy "Anaconda" because the idea is to squeeze the insurgents from all directions at once. For example, money is the oxygen for the insurgency, more important over time than ideology


• - The February 2006 bombing of theal-Askari Mosque (the "Golden Mosque") which set off a tit for tat cycle of violence that was spiraling out of control


• Aug 2007 was the turnaround, when the militia lost the support of the populace. Eventually they declared a ceasefire.


• The violence went back up when PM Maliki sent the Army into Basra, but it was a temporary increase.


• The sectarian ethnic cleansing didn't stop because all the people had left/been "cleansed", but because of our troops.


• Violence has of course come down but is still too high. See Iraq Briefing - 09 March 2008 - "Levels of violence -- stunning to me how low they are"


• We found more and more weapons caches as we began to live with the populace. It's starting to fall off because we think we've found most of them


• Mentioned many of the divisional commanders, Major Generals such as Lynch, Fil, Hammond, Oates, as he went around the map of Iraq. All of them were key to our success. There is more work to be done, though.


• Total 200 Iraqi combat battalions today. See Iraq Briefing - 24 July 2008 - Confident and Capable Iraqi Leadership


• Iraq is only producing half of the electricity of what they need. Progress is never as fast or as easy as you'd like.


• Oil production has hit a record for recent years (not sure about way back).


• Many countries have sent ambassadors back to Iraq


• Debt relief is moving forward


• Iraq is open for business


• There are potential storm clouds:


• The SOI need to be reintegrated. 50,000 have, but there is a long way to go


• Can we meet the rising expectations of the population?


• AQI will try to reignite the violence


• Other Sunni and Shiite extremists will try and return


• Iranian special groups


• Violence during elections


• Political disagreements


• Return of displaced families


• Various ethnic disputes


• So progress is real but fragile. Me: This has been echoed in briefing after briefing. See for example Iraq Briefing 17 December 2007 - Maj Gen Joseph Fil


• Our military is vastly better than at any point in our history. We have never fought a war this long with a professional military. See Gen Barry McCaffrey (ret) report "The Most Brilliantly Led Military We Have Ever Fielded"


• We have and need leaders who can do it all; major combat operations to stability, reconstruction, humanitarian operations.


• How we train our leaders is different now.


• Counterinsurgency is the "graduate level" of warfare. Still, our leaders can do all types of operations.


• Video goes out at 65 min, resumes at 68:13


• The way our soldiers have responded to the challenges should be an inspiration to us all


• Our soldiers reenlist knowing they'll be sent back to a combat zone. No bonus can make you do that. They do it because they believe in what we are doing.


• Tom Brokaw said that what he saw in Iraq that day (big reenlistment) led him to say that he had seen the new greatest generation


• We are deadly serious about being first with the truth


• I stand by my bottom-line assessments. See The Gen Petraeus - Amb Crocker Hearings Day 1 and The Gen Petraeus - Amb Crocker Hearings Day 2


• - All units must work as an integrated whole. "Fusion Cells" that broke down barriers between intel centers and government departments. Everyone must work together.