The Redhunter

COL. JOHNSON: Thanks. To the press corps, good morning. Thanks for attending today. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our current status here in Afghanistan and to provide some insight from the perspective of a brigade-level task force that has actually been in the fight for the past eight months.

First, let me say that we recognize and appreciate the role all of you play in keeping the American public informed on the tremendous service of their sons and daughters in uniform.....

Combined Task Force Currahee is comprised of approximately 5,000 NATO soldiers, built around the 506th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Airborne Division out of Fort Campbell, Kentucky. It also includes three U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams or PRTs, one Czech Republic PRT and coordination with a Turkish PRT.

We also have unique enablers, such as a human terrain team, law enforcement professionals and interagency advisors at the brigade level from the Department of State, USAID and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Next February and March, we will also be joined by two Agribusiness Development Teams from the great states of Indiana and Tennessee.

The precise composition of the task force has changed over time and, up until last month, also included a Polish battle group that now serves as a separate brigade-level task force in Ghazni Province.

We partnered to accomplish our mission with two brigades in the headquarters of the Afghan National Army 203rd Corps, the 2nd Zone of the Afghan Border Police, which is roughly a brigade-sized element, and our regional, provincial, district-level Afghan National Police, composed of almost 5,700 policemen.

Our operational area is part of the U.S.-led Regional Command East, led by CJTF 101, and currently includes the five provinces of Paktika, Paktia, Khost, Lowgar and Wardak, three of which border Pakistan. The under our -- the area under our responsibility is vast, covering almost 43,000 square kilometers.

The terrain is extreme, with an average elevation at around 6,000 to 7,000 feet, and mountains at 10,000) to 11,000 feet. I'm speaking to you from the province of Khost, which includes our lowest elevations, from 3,500 to 5,000 feet....

As I said, the focus of everything we do is the Afghan people, and our intent is to separate the people from the enemy physically, but more important, psychologically. The enemy we face is very complex, but can be broadly defined as any actor the draws the population away from the vision of legitimate government of Afghanistan. This could range from criminals to ideological Taliban led by Mullah Omar to power-based groups such as those led by Jallaludin Haqqani and Hekmatyar Gulbuddin, alliance groups such as the Taliban of Pakistan, led by Baitullah Mehsud, as well as to a variety of foreign fighter elements -- some organized, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or the Islamic Jihad Union -- to ultimately al Qaeda.

As we separate the Afghan people from this complex enemy, we also strive to connect them with the legitimate government of Afghanistan and also connect them with their Afghan national security forces. We do all of this from behind, ensuring that our number-one priority is the capacity-building of the institutions, so vital to convincing the people to reject any alternate vision.

We discussed the "Human Terrain Teams" last week in Col. Spiszer's Afghanistan briefing, and saw the important role that they play. Follow the link for detains. Spiszer also discussed the challenges posed by the extreme terrain in his area of responsibility also, even going so far as to call it his greatest challenge.

The most important statement, though, I think, was Johnson's statement that they were trying to " separate the people from the enemy physically, but more important, psychologically." When I saw this it brought back that most important aspect of winning a counterinsurgency, that of "hearts and minds."

Unfortunately, it's also probably the most misunderstood phrase in warfare. Here's the definitive explanation:

"Hearts" means persuading people that their best interests are served by COIN success. "Minds" means convincing them that the force can protect them and that resisting it is pointless. Note that neither concerns whether people like Soldiers and Marines. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, successful trusted networks grow like roots into the populace. They displace enemy networks, which forces enemies into the open, letting military forces seize the initiative and destroy the insurgents.

Please, please, follow the link before that quote for the whole story.

Col Johnson continues:

Broadly speaking, our purpose here is to transform the environment in a way that increases the legitimacy of the Afghan government, at the provincial and the district level, an influences the people of Afghanistan to reject the ultimate vision offered by the anti-Afghan forces.

To secure the people and to accomplish our purpose, the preponderance of our effort has focused on conducting combined planning and operations, with our ANSF brothers of the ANA 203rd Thunder Corps as well as the regional police.

This is exactly what we did in Iraq. Before anything else can be done, the populace must be secured. Political and economic progress can only occur after security is achieved, not before.

It is also all straight out of the book then-Lt Gen. David Petraeus wrote (ok, he led the team that wrote it); the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. FM-3-24 provided the theory behind everything that we did in the "surge" in Iraq. It doesn't take a genius to know that there are lessons here we can apply in Afghanistan.

As to why we are still at this point in Afghanistan, well that's a long story. Suffice it to say here as Lt. Col. (Dr) David Kilcullentold Charlie Rose "There has never been a successful counterinsurgency that took less than 10 years." For what it's worth, Kilcullen contributed to FM 3-24 and was senior counterinsurgency adviser to Gen. Petraeus during most of the surge.

Bottom like though, is that now that we've won the kinetic phase of Iraq we should be able to send more troops to Afghanistan. Hopefully President Obama will beat up our "allies" to do their share, but I'm not holding my breath that they'll come through.

Col. Johnson again:

Quickly shifting to development, we all know that we cannot ultimately succeed here with military power alone, and it is critical to comprehensively approach all of our operations. Where we achieve separation from the enemy, we have to quickly follow with non-lethal effects, such as the infrastructure development necessary to improving the quality of life for Afghans.

In our area, our flagship development project is the $100 million, USAID-funded Khost to Gardez Road, which we call the K-G Pass Road. It will connect the Khost Province, where I'm at, with the rest of the interior of Afghanistan. It also cuts at the heart of the operational intent of our main enemy in this area, the Haqqani Network, which aims to isolate Khost and has a clearly stated objective to prevent the road's construction.

The K-G Pass Road is an example of the "hearts" aspect, of "persuading people that their best interests are served by COIN success."

Also, if we can convince the farmers to grow wheat instead of poppies, we deny the Taliban et al a major source of funding. See the UN report here and the US government report here for details on how that is proceeding.

From the Q & A, here's how we're trying to increase agricultural production of food crops and entice the farmers to stop growing poppies:

Q Colonel, it's Jim Garamone, from American Forces Press Service. You mentioned in your introduction something about two teams -- two Agribusiness Development Teams -- I guess one from Tennessee and the other one I didn't quite catch. What are these teams? Are they military teams? Are they -- and what are they going to do for you when they arrive?

COL. JOHNSON: We're really excited about gaining these two Agribusiness Development Teams in our area of operations. They are multi-disciplinary teams that are provided by the National Guards from different states.

There have already been some states -- as a matter of fact, I used to have the province of Ghazni under my area of responsibility. And they currently have an Agribusiness Development Team from the great state of Texas. We are going to gain two additional ones, one from Indiana and one from Tennessee.

And they bring forward a significant amount of expertise in agriculture in a wide variety of ways, not only hydrology, farming, dairy to chicken farming. But as you know -- and I may not have described well in my opening statement, but Afghanistan is largely an agrarian society. But right now, it is largely subsistence farming. And there is a tremendous amount of capacity and potential that is lost every year and food security remains a prime concern over here.

These Agribusiness Development Teams are going to assist the Afghans through Afghan government as well as the development of business models to move from subsistence farming to really sustainable farming, where they have an entire system that allows them to increase production and take advantage of all of the great potential that is here.

They lose a lot of potential every year. And as an example, here in the province of Khost, much of the wheat that is produced here is -- you know, really provides excess capacity for the province, and most of it has to go to Pakistan for processing into flour and then is returned back to Afghanistan and sold at premium, especially when flour prices are high.

Q Colonel, how large are these teams?

COL. JOHNSON: They're roughly 50 to 80 soldiers strong. Much of it, however -- there is a security force element to it. But I would tell you at the heart of it is about 20 or so soldiers that have a significant amount of agricultural, you know, experience. And much of them -- and the entire agribusiness development team also has great backing with academia. They're tied to university systems and a large and growing collaborative network back in the United States that's going to help them, you know, solve problems while they're deployed over here.

Look, I know things aren't going as well as hoped in Afghanistan. I've discussed this in some detail before, so click on "Afghanistan" under "Categories" at right for more.

It is not at all clear, though, that had we not "been diverted' by Iraq we would have won in Afghanistan. Go back and follow the link to Kilcullen's interview with Charlie Rose. it's long but well worth it. Remember that it took the Brits 12 years or more to defeat the communist insurgents in Malaya. We didn't win in El Salvador in a year or two either. Fighting insurgencies is not like World War II. This is what they call "low intensity" war for a reason; it's not all bombs and bullets and it's not all over quickly.

But I also don't really care, as the last thing I want to do is argue over what we should have done. We are where we are. We need to finish up in Iraq and tackle Afghanistan anew. Let's get on with it.