The Redhunter

COL JAMES: ...There are five key points I'd like to make about the current situation in our area of responsibility.

First, the population feels secure, and the quality of life is improving.

Attacks are down from eight a day last year to less than two per week. When we arrived, the population could not move in 30 percent of our area of responsibility. They now enjoy freedom of movement throughout both provinces. The population believes in the Iraqi army and police, and no longer allows sanctuary to extremists.

The capabilities of the Iraqi security forces have improved dramatically over the last year, enhancing security and enabling positive and real growth in local economies and governments.

The second point: The Iraqi security forces are capable and competent. The Iraqi army and police have made great strides in terms of manning, equipping, basing and training. The Iraqi army is capable of conducting precise offensive operations, based on intelligence that they have personally generated. The army and the police work extremely well together, and the population believes in both organizations.

We continue to assist with training and provide reconnaissance and -- correction -- aviation assets as required.

The third point: Governance and economics continue to flourish in both provinces. The security situation allows the governors, provincial council leaders and directors general to routinely travel to north Babil and throughout Karbala, feats that were inconceivable only a year ago.

This -- (audio break) -- provincial leadership resulted in initiation of more than 100 government-sponsored projects in north Babil alone. Another 50 projects were facilitated by coalition forces but funded by ICERP, Iraqi money, applied at the local level.

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams mentor the provincial leadership, encouraging development and investment in areas outside the provincial seats of government. We continue to enable reconstruction team operations in both provinces.

The fourth point: We're focused on several key tasks for the future.

Number one, the successful execution of free and fair elections in January.

Number two, the transfer of the Sons of Iraq program to the Iraqi army and government Iraq for management, payment and eventual transition to other forms of productive employment.

Number three, continue to work professionalization of the Iraqi security forces.

And number four, further basing adjustments -- (audio break) -- forces in accordance with the pending SOFA agreement.

Finally, our soldiers and families are the greatest in the world. None of these -- correction -- none of these successes would be possible without the dedication and sacrifice of our soldiers and their wonderful families.

Their ability to rapidly adapt to the complex and dangerous situations never ceases to amaze me. I am honored to command such a dedicated group of warriors.
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MR. VAN VRANKEN: Good morning. I'm Howard Van Vranken. For the last 11 months I've been the team leader of the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team attached to Colonel James' 4th Brigade Combat Team, 3rd ID, working in -- primarily in north Babil....

The population's looking forward to the Iraqi High Electoral Commission's education campaign. That's going to kick off later this month, with the support of the EPRT and the PRT. In general, we're beginning to see vigorous campaigns by candidates. It's -- a significant importance in this election is the full participation of the Sunni population, who boycotted, in large part, the 2005 provincial elections. They recognize that the boycott was a mistake, a serious blunder on their part, and they're committed to maximizing their participation in -- (audio break). That's a big change and a big improvement, quite frankly.

There's still a lot of work to do. The progress that we've seen is not irreversible. But budget execution, the provision of essential services and improving the rule of law stand out as areas that still need to be improved.

I've said and explained why a million times here on Redhunter but it bears repeating again; security for the populace must come first, and only then can political and economic progress take place. This is why Col. James' first point above is so important.

Don't take it from me, listen to Col. James himself explain the details himself in his Feb 22 2008 briefing, which I covered here on Redhunter.

Pay close attention also to his second point, that "the Iraqi security forces are capable and competent." You don't need to be a military strategist to know that we can't be there forever and that the Iraqis must take over. The point here is that Col. James has been talking about the progress of the Iraqis for some time now, see for example his July 22 briefing which he co-hosted with Brigadier General Abdul Amir, commanding general of the 31st Iraqi Army Brigade.

Also of note is status of the Sons of Iraq. Originally called Concerned Local Citizens, the SOI program is a sort of "super neighborhood watch" of Iraqi citizens who patrol their neighborhoods and report suspicious activity to the authorities. Many of the SOI were armed, but with their own private weapons, as we did not provide them any. Because no one knows a neighborhood like the people who live there, the intelligence they provided was invaluable. More importantly, it got Iraqis "off the fence" and into our camp, taking responsibility for their own security. It also provided jobs and a paycheck; initially courtesy of the U.S. taxpayer.

Ultimately, the program was temporary in nature. Now that we've largely wrapped up the insurgency, the program is being disbanded. The idea is to move the SOI participants into civilian jobs or the Iraqi security forces. The problem with the former is lack of jobs, with the latter suspicion by the Maliki government. Most or many of the SOI are Sunnis, and Maliki is a Shiite. This has caused many to worry that Maliki just wants to disband the SOI without making sure as many as possible get jobs; a recipe for disaster. The U.S. command understands this full well, with Lt. Gen. Austin sending Maliki a not-so-veiled warning on the matter last September. More on the SOI later in this briefing.

Lastly, we heard Mr. Van Vranken, leader of the Provisional Reconstruction Team attached to the 4th Brigade. The PRT's don't get the attention they deserve, and many people seem not to know they even exist. The fact though, is that they're vitally important. Providing basic services pulls the rug out from under the insurgency and denies them important propaganda points. The program has also been very successful, more so in Iraq than Afghanistan.

It also shows that people who say things like "all the Bush Administration has done is use military force, so it's time to try something different," simply do not know what they are talking about.

A Washington Post story from January 2007, when the surge and PRT program in Iraq was just getting started, is useful in explaining what it is all about.

(Provisional Reconstruction Teams provide) the U.S. military with funds for local, quick-fix reconstruction projects; and a separate quick-response fund.

All of those preexisting efforts will be expanded, along with a Pentagon-led jobs program to revitalize dormant state-owned industries and new "microfinancing" for Iraqi entrepreneurs. Having largely abandoned the huge, unsuccessful construction projects that marked its early years in Iraq, the United States will now emphasize putting Iraqis back to work to dissuade them from joining Shiite militias and the Sunni insurgency.

"It's not a bad choice under the circumstances," said one veteran of the administration's initial reconstruction effort. "Everybody who had half a brain cell knew this is what we should have done four years ago" instead of paying private U.S. contractors to rebuild and modernize infrastructure and trying to turn Iraq's highly centralized, government-owned economy into free-market capitalism overnight.

In summary, not only did our military strategy change, our reconstruction one did too. We moved from large-scale projects to financing small Iraqi entrepreneurs. Big surprise; capitalism works.

On to the Q & A with the assembled reporters:

Q This is David Morgan from Reuters. Colonel James, given the improvements that have taken place, as you say, and the optimism about the SOFA, the lack of tension over the approaching elections, how do you see the role of the U.S. military changing over the next several months? And from a practical point of view, really, how much longer would it be necessary to have a U.S. military presence in your area?

COL. JAMES: Yeah, absolutely. The progress has been enormous over the past year. The successes we have had in reducing the attacks, as I mentioned in my statement, it's -- the Iraqi security forces have improved to a point now where they can handle the security situation with minimal support from coalition forces.

We envision -- and Babil Province alone, I'll take that as an example -- that we can reduce our footprint from a brigade combat team of roughly 3,800 soldiers down to about a battalion's worth of about 1,000 soldiers to be able to handle the security situation, and that is changing because on 22 November -- correction, October -- when we did a provincial Iraqi control of the province, they took the lead. And so now we're in a support role as opposed to leading the security fight.

So we're now much less of a footprint providing resources as required and training as required, but the Iraqi security forces have been in the lead for the majority of the time we've been here and will continue in the future.

So I see us being able to reduce our footprint in Babil Province while the Iraqi security forces take this over. And we're seeing that now and we're prepared to do so.

Now, we're going to rip out -- we're going to transition with another brigade that's coming here over the next month, and when they take over, they will fall in on us about with a like-size organization, but that's just to draw equipment and pieces -- to set them up for success to be redistributed in other places with a multinational division center -- expanding as it covers more provinces. But for the most part, we can reduce almost two-thirds as far as the coalition footprint goes, but still providing the support to the Iraqi security forces, really continuing to build up their confidence that they continue to build on daily.

Q Hey, this is Courtney from NBC again. What's the timeline that you expect you can reduce from a brigade down to a battalion? What's the estimated date you think you might be able to be down to a battalion in Babil?

COL. JAMES: You know, I don't have specific timelines. I could just tell you that the conditions exist on the ground right now operationally with the Iraqi security force capability and the government's ability to control those security forces in Babil Province, that we could reduce down to about a battalion's worth now, I mean, the operational set is available now to do that. And we will see that eventually happen, but it will be in the near-term; I don't have specific timelines associated with that because it has to do with some repositioning of forces throughout the theater.

Got that? We're going from a brigade of 3,800 soldiers in Babil Province to a battalion of 1,000.

Next, Courtney Kube asked for details about about the Sons of Iraq program

Q Can I also ask about the Sons of Iraq program in your area? Can you give us sort of an update on that, how many you have, if any have been transferred over to Iraqi security forces?

COL. JAMES: Absolutely. The Sons of Iraq program has been a great program for securing the population and thickening the security lines where we don't have Iraqi army and Iraqi police. Right now, we have 5,115 Sons of Iraq in Babil Province and that's what we manage as a brigade combat team. I am optimistic about this program in the future. It's going to really require the government of Iraq and the Iraqi security forces to take it over from us and be able to transition it.

You know, I look at it in two ways, transition -- correction, transfer -- which is transferring the Sons of Iraq program over to the Iraqi army and the government of Iraq managed by the Iraqi army and that is going really well. We started that months ago. The Iraqi army is paying our Sons of Iraq forces -- (audio break) -- and they've been doing that for a period of time now. So that system is in place, but we're still paying them with coalition money. Around the turn of the year, January, February time frame, the GOI is going to take over that payment and the system will already be in place and plugged in and be able to work the transfer. So I'm very positive about the transfer of Sons of Iraq to Iraqi army control and the GOI.

Then the next step is transition to other forms of employment, be it the Iraqi security forces or any other employment like farming or industrial-type jobs, those kinds of things. Right now, we're looking at 20 (percent) to 30 percent transitioning of the Iraqi army and police and then further transitioning to other jobs potentially related to security -- FPS or facility protection services, those kinds of things. But it's going to really require the government of Iraq to get involved, working through the reconciliation cell and processing the Sons of Iraq into these other forms of employment, productive off-ramps.

At this point in time, its been slow-go with us trying to get Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi forces. We've prepped all of the packets and we've handed them over to the reconciliation cell and that's working right now, it's just -- it's slow, but I believe when the GOI takes this over, it will gain momentum.

MR. VAN VRANKEN: I'll just highlight. I think it's been an essential program over the course of the past year and I've got full faith that the Iraqi government is going to do as they've pledged to do and that is to maintain it and to work to find suitable employment for those current Sons of Iraq. So I think it was a good program and it's headed in the right direction the way it is now.

"...slow-go with us trying to get Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi forces...." The words of Clausewitz come to mind: "

Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction which no man can imagine exactly who has not seen war.

Yes I know, if we had done this or that differently Iraq would be a lot easier. But it's all very easy in hindsight, isn't it? In the midst of a problem, you're getting a hundred different opinions, and only in retrospect is it "obvious" which one was correct. I'm just glad we have finally got the place right. Now lets just hope our new president listens to his Secretary of Defense and military commanders like Col. Tom James on just how fast we should draw down. The situation is still fragile in Iraq, and if we don't do it right we lose all that we've gained.

Previous Briefings by Col. James

Iraq Briefing - 24 July 2008 - Confident and Capable Iraqi Leadership
Iraq Briefing - 22 February 2008 - "We are Living with the Population"