The Redhunter

COL. FRANCEY: ...The latest indication that things are headed in the right direction here was the successful execution of the provincial elections last Saturday. The security was planned, rehearsed and executed by the Iraqi security forces. And the elections were run by the Iraqi high electoral commission.

The electoral process was handled smoothly and professionally. Most atmospherics indicate that the populace believes the election to have been safe, secure and legitimate.

Conditions as a whole are good. Security is stable; essential services improving. And with day to day freedoms of democracy recognized, a new normal is being embraced. I'd be happy to take any of your questions at this time.

Before moving to the Q & A, I must make a comment about Col Francey's style. When I first started watching, I thought that Col Francey was reading some of his answers from a sheet of paper, especially as he answered the first question. In the next minute or so I realized that wasn't the case, and thought that just a personal habit of his to keep his head down. Observing further, he simply looked tired and worn out, as if he hadn't had much sleep recently. His answers were halting and he looked as if he was having trouble thinking and forming answers.

I also think it may just be a problem he has with eye contact, as he often avoided looking into the camera. He seemed to get better as the briefing went on, which leads me to think it was mostly an issue of fatigue.

All in all, a somewhat strange performance and quite out of the ordinary. I wish there was another briefing of his that we could compare this one to.

Q Colonel, this is Nancy Youssef with McClatchy Newspapers. There has been some concern that the bad actors that were perpetuating the violence in the past are still there, and that they are laying low until the American forces leave. What evidence do you have about where those, for example, former Sadrists were? Have they left the country, or left your province? Are they laying low? What intelligence do you have about some of those people who were perpetuating violence in the past?

COL. FRANCEY: Yeah, and, well, just let me apologize if I misled anybody. Things are stable, but there are still some bad people out there, and we continue to work to kill or capture them every single day. It's an ongoing condition. But let me just try to give you an example of what it is that I face every day.

When I got here I -- (audio break) -- were pretty good shape. I saw it as a window of opportunity to try and win the hearts and minds and start to work with the Iraqi government to start the reconstruction effort, and work in schools, water projects -- all of those types of things. And the results were a population within Wasat that started tasting freedoms that they had never tasted before. And they enjoy those freedoms.

So now what we are seeing, as some of the bad actors start returning, these people don't want to give up those freedoms and don't want to return to what -- the way it was. They are calling on the tip line, they're coming to the front gate, and they're saying, "So-and-So is back. Follow me. I will lead you to them." It's exciting to watch it.

This is pretty much what we hear from all briefers; we've stomped the insurgency down, but they're still out there and if we aren't careful they may come back.

"Hearts and Minds" is one of the most misunderstood phrases in all of warfare. The full explanation is here, but the short version is

Hearts: The population must be convinced that our success is in their long-term interests.

Minds: The population must be convinced that we actually are going to win, and we (or a transition force) will permanently protect their interests.

Note that it has nothing to do with making the people like the counterinsurgents. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts.

Further, we need to remember that this is an insurgency we're fighting, not the Wehrmacht. Insurgencies tend to peter out, they're not won in grand World War II fashion. As Col. (Dr) David Kilcullen (Australian Army, ret), senior advisor to Gen Petraeus in 2007 for counterinsurgency told Charlie Rose, "There has never been a successful counterinsurgency that took less than 10 years."

It has been said many times that the first thing the Iraqis said to us when we started the surge, sending troops back into their communities, was "Are you staying this time?" When we said yes, they helped us. They had not helped us nearly as much earlier because we did not stay. This will also be true in Afghanistan. Only when the people are convinced that the counterinsurgents are there for the duration will they commit to their side.

The first task of counterinsurgents is providing security for the people. Without that nothing else is possible. But once that has been achieved, it is essential that they move toward providing essential services and a representative government for the people. In the end, the people will only commit to a government that serves their interests.

In the same interview cited above Kilcullen said that in the end "All counterinsurgency solutions are political." and that "The role of the military in counterinsurgency is to hold the ring and create space that allows the political process to take place." It's obviously this latter stage where we are now, but that doesn't mean all military operations are over.

Q Colonel, it's Jim Garamone with American Forces Press Service. You mentioned that -- you mentioned earlier that essential services are improving. Can you quantify that? How much are they improving?

COL. FRANCEY: Not enough. The -- you know, you just look across, there's still plenty of places that are -- don't have fresh drinking water, clean drinking water; many places that the sewerage is in very, very bad disrepair, if there is any sewerage.

And trash is a rampant problem in most of the bigger cities.

You see some of the projects ongoing. And do I think there are enough? No, and it's the party line that I continue to preach, to the provincial government, every time I have an opportunity.

I think they can do more. And we saw some movement, over the last three-four months. Don't know if it was tied, as part of their electoral process. But we have seen quite a few projects over the last three or four months. Hopefully that will continue, once we seat the new provincial governments as well.

That was a no-holds barred answer. And about what you can expect in most third-world countries.

Q Hey, Colonel, this is Courtney Kube from NBC News again. Do you see any -- given the fact that your province is primarily Shi'a, do you see a lot of influence from Iran in any way? Are they -- is Iran trying to help out with its agriculture problem, try and come in and provide infrastructure to curry favor with the local Iraqis in the area or anything?

COL. FRANCEY: Mm. Yeah. You can imagine being the -- one of provinces that borders with Iran -- every time I get a visitor, that's the number-one subject everybody wants to talk to me about. Iranian influence is in Wasat. You got to recognize, if you were in southern Texas, Mexican influence would be in Texas. It's something that's there. It's always been there and will always be there. (Audio break.)

What is the malign influence that we want to balance or defeat? The Iranian influence will be there. You can see it both in non- kinetic -- I see certain projects that will start popping up in different areas, and I know it's not GOI money, and I know it's not U.S. money. So I can -- and I now there aren't any outside investors coming in quite yet, no.

I would say I'd love to have some come in any time.

So, yeah, I think there is a lot of Iranian influence that's ongoing. To what degree -- I think it's still very manageable. You talk to the people on the street and they don't want it there. And there seems to be a pretty strong push across the -- with Iraqis for -- (audio break) -- nationalism. And I think they'll be okay.

Q Could I follow up on that, please? You said that the Iranian influence is manageable. Could you elaborate one what manageable Iranian influence looks like?

COL. FRANCEY: You know, if I have people in Wasat that don't have food, but Iran is importing watermelons or fruits and vegetables, is that Iranian influence within Iraq? If I have them importing other construction materials that are being used, because it's not coming in from other -- (audio break) -- influence that's not all that bad.

I see -- if you move up to some of the towns up around the border, you'll see some clinics or schools that are being worked on and, no, it's not our money but it's a pretty good project. And not saying that I can definitely attest to that being Iranian money that's building that school, but if it is, is that such a bad thing? I don't know.

Is it -- what's manageable? If the people have their individual freedoms and they're allowed to be Iraqis and not be leading down a path of Iranian support, then I think it's okay. But people will -- the people will speak, when I talk to the people -- (audio break) -- official positions, they'll tell you, we see it out there. We don't like it, and we're going to get rid of it. We just need time.

We can't just "seal the border" and be done with it. Since time immemorial the people in the region have engaged in commerce, and you can't just cut it off. I remember reading Michael Yon's account of what he saw at the border (can't find the link just now) and he was amazed at the enormous number of vehicles that passed through each day.

What Col Francey is saying then that Iran and this part of Iraq are intertwined just as the U.S. and Mexico along our respective border and it is what it is. We may be able to cut off illegal immigration (if we had the fortitude) but to eliminate all trade would be counterproductive. Ditto with Iraq and Iran. The key in each case is to keep out the people you don't want.

An interesting if somewhat odd briefing.