The Redhunter

GONSALVES: ...Blackjack is currently integrated as part of the security framework in Kirkuk, a disputed area in Northern Iraq. Since arriving, Blackjack was directed to enhance Kurdish‑Arab relations and to disrupt insurgent activities in Kirkuk. Our challenge during the integration was fully understanding the nature of Kurd‑Arab tension and promptly defining the operating environment, so that we could ensure that we were able to contribute to security in the area in a meaningful way with our Iraqi partners.

We have identified thirteen drivers of instability in Kirkuk, and we have worked through the mitigators for each, which have translated into enduring framework tasks for units throughout our area.

Col Gonsalves then breaks down the "drivers of instability" as follows:

1. a disputed status of Kirkuk and the KRG boundary,
2. a perceived lack of legitimate representative governance,
3. security forces,
4. insurgents,
5. oil,
6. drought,
7. SOI transition, (Sons of Iraq, originally called Concerned Local Citizens)
8. delivery of public services,
9. land‑property disputes,
10. the return and absorption of displaced people and unemployment

Maybe I'm not quite counting as he is or I missed something but that's what I got from the text. He continues

GONSALVES: Key enduring tasks for Blackjack include protecting the people, enabling the political process to move forward, enabling communication, building trust within all communities, maintaining neutrality, reporting to our higher headquarters, liaisoning with the Peshmerga and connecting security forces throughout Kirkuk.

Protecting the people so that the political process can move forward is the entire key to counterinsurgency, as spelled out by Gen Petraeus in his 2006 U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. FM 3-24 provided the theoretical basis for the strategy change in what is popularly called the "surge."

It is important to note that security must come first, and only then is political progress possible. It won't work the other way around.

KAGAN: Thank you so much, Colonel Gonsalves, and thank you very much for describing the work that the brigade is doing.

I would like to go back to these drivers of instability that you mentioned and ask you, on the ground in Kirkuk and in neighboring areas, what kind of tension do you see between the Arab and Kurdish population, and how does it manifest itself on the ground?

GONSALVES: Well, for example, in Kirkuk City, the Kurds, the Arabs, the Turkmen, Christians, they all have been working together for a number of years, and they feel very comfortable with them solving their problems at the lowest level.

What we saw when we first got here was a very structured Provincial Council that has been together since 2003, with some minor changes. So they feel that, politically, they can solve their problems.

What they see is suggestions or implementation of programs from the Central Government that disrupt their ability to govern themselves. So, for example, we have had a security group formed from Baghdad to look at how they are going to infuse additional security forces in here, what changes do they need to make, and it has upset a lot of the people. Now what we see is Arabs supporting this working group in order to probably, possibly bring in more Iraqi Army and issue an operations command here, move some of the Peshmerga out, put in some national police. So that those are the things that we see that would drive a wedge or some instability between the Kurds and Arabs.

The locals want more autonomy than the central government is willing to allow. Without more details it's impossible to know who is in the right, but obviously it is something that needs to be cleared up.

Continuing on to the makeup of the enemy insurgents that are still in Kirkuk:

KAGAN: You spoke about enemy groups coming into the area. Can you tell me what enemy groups you are actually encountering? Let's begin with that one.

GONSALVES: Well, right now, obviously, the AQI influence is still here, and that's what we think are the results of the VBIEDs that we saw and the first two round of attacks in March and April, and then the one that happened last night and today, we believe are AQI.

But also, we have a second set here, and that is the JRTN, and we talked about this a couple of months ago, the Naqshbandi. Some of the extremists are funded through Syria, through al‑Duri and his network, some of the former Baathists. We see, you know, anywhere from two to 400 of those elements here within the province, and we are seeing attacks from those individuals.

Now, we are collecting on those cells and acting on those cells and capturing some of those elements, but it takes a while to get into those cell networks and neutralize those cell networks.

So those are the two primary elements that we see here in Kirkuk.

Many Americans correctly worry that for all that we have done to build up the new Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police, they are too dependent on us. This is to some extent correct, but in briefing after briefing I have seen commanders stress that it is the Iraqis who are taking the lead in operations, with American forces there only as backup and to provide advice.

KAGAN: Can you tell me what ‑‑ we wonder if you've conducted some operations with your Iraqi Security Force partners against these enemy groups, and if so, could you describe a couple of them for us? For example, we are sort of checking on some operations that were ongoing last month.

GONSALVES: Yes. And obviously, the ISF, both the IP and IA are always in the lead. They are warranted operations, and the majority of the time, we are providing the enablers, the air weapons team or the scout weapons team, ISR assets, medivac, the outer cordon or the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). Those are the types of things that we are supplying them with.

For many of the Iraqi Police, they do the operations pretty much solely on their own, and same thing for the Iraqi Army. Now, obviously, some brigades are more capable than others, and we are working with those to build those capacities and capabilities of those forces up, but we have done ‑‑ like I told you before, we have captured fourteen HVIs (High Value Individuals). Many of those have been done by the Iraqis by themselves, and obviously, with the capabilities that we have, we can locate targets, help them locate those targets.

There is much more, and you'll want to watch the videos and read the transcript to get a full understanding of the situation in Kirkuk.

It is disturbing that we are still having trouble in Kirkuk and Mosul, but the casualty count and level of violence is nowhere near 2006 levels. I haven't seen articles indicating that the situation is getting out of control, and in press briefings the reporters don't seem overly concerned either. I'll keep an eye on the situation and report as necessary.

My overall assessment is that Iraq is a country with huge problems, but one that has progressed tremendously in the space of just a few years. The insurgency remains in the north, but seems to be under control. Whether the Iraqi security forces can keep things under control when we completely withdraw is anyone's guess, but I am optimistic that they can. There will continue to be the occasional "spectacular attack," but we have to put them in the context of the overall trend in violence. Just as important is political, economic, and social progress. The Iraqis are headed in the right direction, but have aways to go. But so far so good.