The Redhunter

COL. LUSK: ...Our mission here in Iraq is to secure the population of those that reside within our operating environment, in order to support and enhance the continued development of Iraqi civil capacity.

Since we assumed responsibility for our area in May of this year, from the 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division -- who had returned back to home station after 15 months of successful operations in support of the surge -- we have set out to accomplish our mission by focusing primarily along two main lines of effort. The first being our partnership with the Iraqi security forces and the combined security operations that we do together, as well as civil capacity.

And we see both of these lines of efforts being inextricably linked to the goal of securing the population. One complements and indeed facilitates the progress in the other.

An important component of our overall campaign plan is indeed partnership, and we do partner in all that we do, whether it be with the Iraqi security forces, local/provincial government or governors and officials, tribal leaders, or with the everyday citizens of Iraq.

Now we recognize that the responsible drawdown of U.S. forces is forthcoming, and partnering is a vital component in order to allow us to continue these efforts long after U.S. forces have either been reduced or redeployed from the region.

So if I could address Iraqi security force partnership for a moment, "by, with and through our Iraqi partners" has been the mantra that this brigade has followed since their arrival here in Iraq....

Now our Iraqi security force partners include the 17th Iraqi Army Division, which comprises about 10,000 jundi, or soldiers; the 2nd Iraqi Federal Police Division, comprised of approximately 3,000 shurta, or police officers; another 2,000 local Iraqi police; as well as about 20,000 members of the Sawa, or the Sons of Iraq; totaling of about 35,000 members of the Iraqi security forces....

In summary, hundreds of projects have been aimed at increasing access to water, primarily drinking and agriculture; have been implemented; as well as dozens of schools have either been built or renovated in order to enhance or improve the educational opportunities for future generations of Iraqis. Dozens of essential service projects, such as roads, sewers and electrical repairs have been undertaken....

By the time we redeploy, we project that we will have committed to over 200 projects and about $20 million total towards this effort, with approximately a million dollars of it being targeted to small, independent business owners throughout our area of operation. ...

Now despite the seemingly large numbers of security forces, the maintaining of hard-earned security gains would not be possible without the support of the people. Many have become our good friends and indeed they often invite us into their homes in order to share a meal, a cup of chai or just simply casual conversation.

And if I could civil capacity for a moment, early on it became evident that enhancing and supporting the expansion of civil capacity would be a vital cornerstone to our mission.

To this end, we have committed a vast amount of our resources in terms of effort, time, money and resident expertise such as engineers, agricultural experts and law-enforcement professionals, just to name a few.

In terms of security gains, you know, our primary mission, as stated before, is to protect the people of Iraq.

As I have said many tiimes on this blog, the all-important task of protecting the population is straight out the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, written by then-Lt. Gen. Petraeus and published by his team of military and civilian specialists in December of 2006. Successful counterinsurgency strategy focuses on protecting the population as the means toward winning their "hearts and minds."

And it is exactly why the counterterror strategy advised for Afghanistan by people such as Vice President Biden will not work. As FM 3-24 says directly, "raiding does not work."

On to the Q & A

Q Yeah, this is Kernan Chaisson with Forecast International. You mentioned one of the things that is going on is clearing IEDs. Could you give a little bit of a feel for how that is working now? ...

COL. LUSK: Okay. And I think I heard Jay, and you were talking about the clearance of IEDs and how we go about doing that. And I think you were particularly interested in the -- in the technology.

...I will say that it's my observation, again, inside of the operating environment that we have, that most IEDs, if indeed are found, are found by the population, which is probably even more evidence of what I've said in my opening statements, that most people have indeed -- are denouncing the violent ways of the past and indeed as an IED -- they consider that as an attack against their neighborhood and potentially a threat to their future stability. So they're very much involved in the process, and therefore they take advantage of tip lines for contacting the Iraqi security forces, or perhaps even if us if they see us going down to -- to let us know that something's going on. So probably more so than anything, it's the population that's helping find any IEDs that are out there.

Section A-60 of Field Manual 3-24: "Whatever else is done, the focus must remain on gaining and maintaining the support of the population. With their support, victory is assured; without it, COIN efforts cannot succeed." So we see from the above answer that the people will help us if we protect them and gain their support.

The Sons of Iraq (SOI) program (originally Concerned Local Citizens) has been a subject in many briefings and discussed much on this blog. Briefly, it was mostly a Sunni operation designed to get "buy in" from the citizens on legitimacy and to provide jobs for men who might otherwise become insurgents. A sort of "super neighborhood watch," the U.S. did not provide them weapons, but everyone in Iraq seems to have an AK-47. When the insurgency was (mostly) defeated, the objective turned to getting jobs for SOI. Originally the mostly Shia government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki balked and dragged it's feet, but consistent and firm U.S. pressure has mostly persuaded them to honor their obligations.

Unfortunately, from the Colonel's answer we see that problems remain:

Q Otto Kreisher again. You mentioned you had 20,000 sons of Iraq in your area. There's been some concern/frustration particularly in Anbar province that the government has not, you know, offered jobs or any future for the sons of Iraq.

What's your experience with how those people are responding to what the government is doing for them?

COL. LUSK: Okay, I think, your question was primarily along the SOI or the sahwa, the transition to government jobs. And I think I could probably summarize by saying that indeed this has got to be a very challenging decision that they're weighing through on a daily basis or considering.

Since our arrival, of course, there was a great deal of skepticism up front, as to whether any transition of the sahwa would indeed take place.

And indeed, the government of Iraq, through the IFCNR and other agencies here in Iraq, has gone through a lot of efforts in order to make that transition occur. And there have been approximately 3,000 in our area that have transitioned to government jobs already.

Now, the balance -- of course, though, the challenges that they have before them, I would think, is the need to fulfill this obligation of transitioning some of the other -- the Sons of Iraq into government jobs, versus when to do so; especially keeping in mind the security needs leading up to the elections. And while I have absolutely no insight as to what they're -- what they're deciding now, I can only imagine that it's got to be a pretty daunting decision that they're getting ready to go through.

Lastly, on the all-important issue of Afghanistan, which has been much in the news lately. The question is, what lessons of Iraq are applicable to Afghanistan?

Q: I just wanted to go back to my question on -- that so much assessments and meetings are going on as far as how to deal and have victory in Afghanistan. What can they learn from Iraq as far as situation in Iraq is now different than in Afghanistan? ...

COL. LUSK: ... there's -- probably about the only thing I can think of that would be -- that would be some continuity between this. ... And indeed it's the importance of relationships and indeed the genuine commitment that you make, to your partners, and your partners not only being the security forces of the respective areas but also the population.

And indeed if the genuine rapport and the relationships are built then I think from that, anything else is possible. So that's probably the one key lesson that probably could -- that could transfer from here to Afghanistan. And other than that, I would just have to say that I'm absolutely ignorant as far as things in Afghanistan personally having not ever been there.