October 1, 2007
Chinese Threat Update - The Window of Vulnerability
This story in today's Washington Times says it all; we've been caught flat-footed
While the United States has been tied up in Iraq, China has been modernizing its military and its air defenses are now nearly impenetrable to all but the newest American fighters, the senior U.S. military official in Japan said.
Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright, commander of the roughly 50,000 U.S. forces in Japan, Washington"s biggest ally in Asia, said in an interview last week that the Iraq war is reducing the availability of U.S. troops and equipment to meet other contingencies.It"s also eating funds that could go toward replacing or upgrading planes that are being pushed to their operational limits, he said.
China, meanwhile, is rapidly filling the skies with newer, Russian-made Sukhoi Su-27 "Flankers" and Su-30s, along with the domestically built J-10, a state-of-the-art fighter that Beijing just rolled out in January.
The proper response is to spend more money on the US military, not to pull out of Iraq. I've gone over a million times why we we need to stay in Iraq.
The bottom line to this article is that until new systems come on line we face a window of vulnerability. Consider:
Right now the most advanced aircraft on our carriers is the F-18 Super Hornet, E and F versions. A larger varient of the F-18 Hornet, it fills the role that the cancelled A-12 was supposed to fill.
To replace the ageing F-18s we're developing the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, but it won't go into widespread production for a few years. The F-35 will once again give our carriers the punch they need, but until then we're vulnerable.
On the Air Force side, our F-15s and F-16s are getting old. The F-15 first flew in 1972, and the F-16 in 1976, and the F-18 in 1978. Yes they've been upgraded, but you can only do so much with an old airframe. The F-22 Raptor is superb, but we've only got a few. As the article above indicated, it's about the only fighter in our inventory which can reliably penetrate Chinese defenses.
Our submarine force is effective, but also showing it's age. It is mostly composed of Los Angeles-class boats, the first one of which was launched in 1976. We built 3 super-advanced Seawolf-class boats, but canceled the design as too expensive. The new Virginia-class boats will beat anything anyone else can put in the water, but we've only got 3 built so far, and authorization is for only 2 per year.
"War with China: 2008 - 2010?"
In April 2005 I wrote a lengthy post called "War with China: 2008 - 2010?" I based my estimate on two Naval War College papers which talked about a "window of vulnerability" that we face before these new weapon systems come on line.
Be aware that nothing is guaranteed, and Democrats and weak Republicans in Congress can cut funding for any of the above. A President Hillary would certainly find cutting the military attractive to fund her massive health care programs.
War with China is certainly not inevitable. But the best way to ensure it doesn't happen is for us to have overwhelming strength so that they do not become tempted to strike.
Posted by Tom at 9:51 PM | Comments (6) | TrackBack
April 27, 2006
Some People Still Don't Get It
Chinese President Hu Jintao refuses to back santions against Iran for continuing to develop nuclear weapons and ignoring international pressure to stop.
Big surprise.
China's foreign policy is to distract the United States from it's objective of taking back Taiwan. During the 1990s it used the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons to do this. China could have easily pressured the Koreans into halting it's program, but did not do so. China probably doesn't want to see North Korea obtain nukes, but it doesn't want to end their program, either. They are playing a double game, the objective of which is to distract the United States.
China is doing the same with regard to Iran. Now that Iran is in the news front and center, they see this as a means of distracting the West. As such, they are not going to take any action that might actually convince the Iranians to end their nuclear program.
Some in Congress Get It
Fortunately, this is one area in which our Congress actually gets it right
The House yesterday overwhelmingly passed a bipartisan bill that toughens sanctions against Iran until the country dismantles its nuclear programs, with supporters saying the move is a "key component of our war on terror."Lawmakers voted 397-21 for the Iran Freedom Support Act, created "to hold the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior and to support a transition to democracy in Iran."
The bill sends the message "the United States expects Iran to be a responsible member of the international community," said House Majority Leader John A. Boehner, Ohio Republican.
So far so good.
Unfortunately, Some People Still Don't Get It
There was opposition to the bill, and it came from both sides of the isle
Rep. Ron Paul, Texas Republican, said the measure reminds him of a 1998 congressional resolution that called for regime change in Iraq, which he thinks was the first step to the "very unpopular, expensive" Iraq war.
The Civil War was unpopular among many people in the North, and it too was expensive. Only 1/3 of Colonists supported independence, 1/3 were loyal to the crown, and 1/3 didn't care. Until Dec 7 1941 the vast majority of Americans wanted nothing to do with the war in Europe, and didn't want to give any aid whatsoever to Britain. But sometimes you do what you have to do. It's called leadership, Representative Paul.
Further, he is saying that he though that the 1998 resolution was all feel-good words but heaven forbid we actually take it literally. Sorry, Rep, but there's a new sheriff in town and he means what he says.
Rep. Earl Blumenauer, Oregon Democrat, noted all lawmakers "hate this regime," but he favors "strong, smart, constructive, diplomatic efforts" -- characteristics that he says are not present in the bill. "I am very worried about where this all ends," he said.
Heaven help us if this guy gets any real power.
Rep. Eric Cantor, who is Jewish, said Congress must take such threats seriously. "This bill should be the first step and not the last," the Virginia Republican said.That's what opponents fear.
Fear what?
"It is bad for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, but there are things that are worse," such as giving the country a reason to use one, said Rep. Jim Leach, Iowa Republican.
What the...? Does this Leach guy not read the papers? The president of Iran, "Mad Mahmoud" Ahmadinejad, says every week that he'll blow Israel off the face of the earth as soon as he nuclear weapons.
Oh but it gets better
Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich said the Bush administration has "made a mess of international relations," with the war in Iraq."Don't we have enough problems in Iraq to clean up before setting the stage for another conflict with Iran?" the Ohio Democrat asked.
I see. And by this logic we shouldn't have done anything about Hitler because we had our hands full in the Pacific with the Japanese.
Morons and idiots. What will their excuse be if Iran does nuke Israel and kills millions of Jews?
Did you notice that about half of these fools were Republicans?
Tell me again why I should work to make sure the GOP keeps control of Congress.
Posted by Tom at 9:33 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
April 23, 2006
China Update - The Mid-Term Threat
The way I see it, the United States faces four threats from foreign entities. From near term to long term, they are:
1) Islamic Terrorism
2) Iranian nuclear weapons
3) China
4) An increasingly Islamic Europe
That last one may be a bit surprising to some people, but the fact is that if current demographic and political trends continue, there will be a seriously large, and fortunately radical Islamic, element in Europe by mid-century. The Islamists could well gain enough political power in Europe to present us with a military threat. Kinda out there, I know, but not outside the realm of reason.
China Threat Update
China is a threat to us because they are determined to take control of Taiwan. Although they would like to do so peacefully, they could decide to use force if peaceful means fail, or if certain events occur, such as the government of Taiwan declaring itself independant of the mainland.
The United States will come to the aid of Taiwan no matter who is president, for historical, political, and moral reasons.
Assume that for whatever reason, China decides that they need to use force to gain political control of Taiwan. What exactly will they do?
The Foreigner in Formasa links to an article in The Weekly Standard by Christian Lowe that summarizes a Rand Corporation study that poses four actions, or "counter-transformation options", that China might take to defeat or deter the US military.
Following are Lowe's summaries of the four options identified in the Rand study and my comments on each
* Conventional Modernization "Plus": A defense strategy marked by further purchase and development of submarines, aircraft, space weapons, and anti-ship missiles "to strike at perceived U.S. vulnerabilities." The study suggests this is the most likely strategy for China to adopt, largely because of the availability of sophisticated Soviet-bloc weaponry. To counter this the American military needs to boost its defensive training and continue developing anti-missile and anti-sub countermeasures.
Although this is their mostly likely strategy, it is also, I believe, the one least likely to lead to success. To be sure, China is building up it's military at a pace that would astound the uninformed. Further, they've done it without much fanfare, and it has caught our intelligence agencies by surprise. As I wrote in War with China: 2008 - 2010?, the problem China faces is that while their capabilities are growing arithmatically(2, 4, 6, 8), ours are growing exponentially(2, 4, 8, 16). Chinese military analysists watched US capabilities grow from the 1991 Gulf War to OIF in 2003, and what they saw worried them. Even worse, the US is slated to bring several new high-tech weapons systems on-line by the end of this decade, such as the F-22 Raptor, the F-35 JSF, and Virginia class submarines. Even the newest Russian technology will be a generation or two behind these systems.
More to the point, a fight on the high seas plays to US strengths. We got very good at this during World War II, and had fifty years worth of planning to do it again against the Soviet Union. Despite all the hoopla, the PLAN is not yet a threat, and may well be a paper tiger.
* Subversion, Sabotage, and Information Operations: An offensive strategy that aims to scare the population of Taiwan into believing it has no option but capitulation. This, coupled with computer network attacks to cripple U.S. logistics, could "delay U.S. intervention long enough to allow information operations and other coercion against Taiwan to have the desired affect." Rand researches suggest increased training for American logistics forces without the use of computer networks to simulate a potential attack and work through it.This would certainly be in keeping with the great Chinese theoretician Sun-Tsu, whos 6th-century BC work The Art of War remains a classic of military theory. He emphasized just such things as subterfuge, believing that the best way to defeat an enemy was to attack his weak points, not to attack him head-on, as option #1 would entail.
The disadvantage of this approach is that I wonder of the Taiwanese population is as weak as would be required for this method to work. It is highly time-dependant, and therefore more risky. Further, US planners are well aware of our vulnerability to computer attack, and just as with a fight on the high-seas, computers are our specialty.
* Missile-Centric Strategies: Continue the development and deployment of conventional ballistic and cruise missiles to overwhelm Taiwan at strategic points and deny U.S. forces' defense in depth. This approach attacks "weak points in the enemy rear, denies the U.S. military the ability to use regional bases (Guam for example) as sanctuaries, changes the dynamics in the early stages of a conflict and provides an effective response to strategic attacks by American conventional forces." In response, the American military might have to create even more missiles and missile defenses to counter Chinese threats, change its basic strategy to confront China "to render irrelevant the capabilities of the missile forces," or even pull back from a potential conflict.I've always thought that this would be the strategy that China would employ. Missile defense will not be able to stop more than a handful of attacks in the near-future, and China has hundreds of short-range conventially-armed missiles aimed at Taiwan. This, coupled with the announcement of a naval blockade, might frighten the Taiwanese population into the acceptance of a polically-acceptable "solution".
* "Network-Centric Warfare" strategy: A Pentagon-invented term, network-centric warfare (NCW) envisions weapons systems and sensors tied together with a computerized network of communications and intelligence gear that will give a commander a wider and deeper view of the battlefield. It would allow for rapid and complex decision-making in combat, helping to overwhelm an adversary's ability to react. China's development of similar technology and operational concepts could threaten America's major military advantage and put some of its most important assets--such as aircraft carriers--at great risk. But the Rand researchers admit China is a long way from matching the United States in this kind of complex technical challenge.
I haven't read the Rand Corporation study (you have to purchase it), but rather doubt that China is capable of challenging us in this field. I remember that before the 1991 Gulf War the newspapers were full of articles that compared US and Iraqi weapons. On paper, it looked about even, with the US holding perhaps a slight edge. Of course, the way it played out, we might as well have been fighting a 19th-century force. Dittos for the invasion of Iraq in March and April of 2003.
The reason we were so successful in both operations had less to do with our weapons than how we "put it all together." Now is not the place for a complete discussion of topics such as C4ISTAR and "network-centric warfare", but suffice it to say that these are not exactly the strong points of a military just now entering the 1980s technology-wise.
The Bottom Line
All this having been said, Lowe says that "the (Rand) study paints an alarming picture of Chinese military progress and a dogged focus on countering American military advances." However, we have one major advangage; people.
"Ironically, a confrontation between two technologically advanced, network-centric militaries willlikely reduce the importance of technology in favor of people and their ability to make rapid but accurate decisions with incomplete or overwhelming amounts of information," Rand notes. "In such a contest, volunteer military personnel drawn from an open, educated society like that of the United States would appear to have the advantage over a stove-piped military embedded in an authoritarian state. But the blinding pace of social, cultural and technological change in China strongly suggests that this conclusion will not always remain true.".
Not to sound condescending, but the Chinese threat is not on most people's radar screens now. It ought to be.
Posted by Tom at 8:31 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack
March 9, 2006
China - Taiwan: Endgame
Here's the short version of how a war over Taiwan might go. I will expand on this later when I have more time.
China will not, in my opinion, attempt an amphibious or airborne attack, because they do not have the logistical capabalities to support any troops they manage to get across the straights. Rather, they will announce a blockade of Taiwan, enforced with submarines and air power.
Commerce to and from Taiwan will immediately end. It doesn't really matter whether the PLA has the military capabilities or not, for no shipping company in the world will take such a risk.
China will then bombard Taiwan with a few hundred of the medium-range missiles, all armed with conventional warheads. The targets will mostly be military, along with ports and civilian airports. The damage will not be great, or even "military significant", but this is not the point. Their purpose is do demoralize the Taiwanese and convince them that they are helpless and that their leaders cannot defend them.
The United States will quickly bring forces to bear by sending as many carrier battle groups into the area as possible. I don't think it really matters whether a Republican or Democrat is in office, either will feel obliged to respond unless Taiwan did something particulally egregious to bring on the criris. Of course, we will already have submarines in the area, and China will already be missing several of theirs.
In the meantime there will be furious battles in the skies above and around Taiwan. I'm not sure how well the Taiwanese will do, and some of the reports I read are not encouraging. Losses on both sides will be severe, but in the short run I think the Taiwanese can hold their own. The US Air Force will be engaged with aircraft based in Japan, Guam, and Okinawa. Depending on the year this takes place (my theory is late 2008 - 2010), we will either have mostly F-15s, or a mix of F-15s, F-22s, and maybe some of the JSF F-35. If the latter aircraft are involved, the Chinese will find themselves short of planes very quickly.
At this point the Chinese will be demanding that the ROC government accept their terms for a cease-fire, which will amount to reunification under mainland rule. I don't know enough about Taiwanese politics or the people there to say how firm their resolve is, for right now I'm just stating the issues. Either way, the point is that China will try to force and an end favorable to itself before the US Navy arrives.
The Chinese military has a saying; "sink a carrier, win the war". It is important to note that this is not meant in a traditional military sense. What they mean is that by sinking or heavily damaging a carrier they believe that the American people will say "this isn't worth it", and will demand an end to hostilities. Given that there are some 6,000 sailors on one of these behemoths, the casualties would be astronomical whether the ship is sunk or not.
I don't know that the American people would definately respond in this manner, because it is also possible that they (the majority) will respond in by demanding the destruction of the entire Chinese fleet. It all depends, I think, on the circumstances that lead up to the conflict.
Assuming the Chinese are unsuccessful in inflicting serious damage on the American fleet, the war will soon turn against them. Time will work against China. The presence of several carrier battle groups will bolster morale on the island nation. We will turn the tables on the Chinese, blockading their ports, and sinking their ships or forcing them to hold up in port.
At this point the Chinese leadership will be desperate, and the most dangerous part begins. They will feel much pressure to threaten, or even use, nuclear weapons. They will certainly threaten the continental United States and our bases in the Pacific. They will also threaten Japan, whose navy and air force will be involved, albeit in limited roles.
The US response will be cautious. Having been successful up to this point, it would be foolhardy to provoke the Chinese leadership into making a rash decision. We will probably issue a statement saying that we will not attack the Chinese mainland, and will put forth a strong diplomatic effort to convince the parties to return to the status quo, perhaps with the promise of further negotiations in the future. Depending on the military situation, we might even announce that we were pulling a carrier battle group back a bit farther from China.
The big question is whether the Chinese leadership will get so desperate that they feel that they will use nuclear weapons in some limited fashion to "save face". If they do, they will most certainly not hit the United States itself, they might try to hit a carrier battle group, or come close enought to cause some damage. Lobbing a few missiles and then claiming a propaganda victory is not out of the question. Another, more frightening scenario, is that they hit Guam or Okinawa (where they could hit both the US and Japan).
All conjecture, of course. Heaven forbid it should come to any of this.
While you're hear, hop on over to The View from Taiwan, where Michael Turton has written a lengthy and very intesting fictional account of a war over Taiwan. Interestingly, his scenario also takes place in 20008.
Posted by Tom at 9:37 PM | Comments (4) | TrackBack
March 8, 2006
Chinese Threat Update
Readers of this blog know that I have been worried about the possibility of conflict with China over Taiwan. In April of 2005 I wrote War with China: 2008 - 2010?", in which I set forth my reasons why I believe that if China makes a move, it will come shortly after the 2008 Olympics in Bejing. Nothing I have seen since then has changed my mind.
The good news is that the US military in general, and Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld in particular, are well aware of the danger.
In this post I am going to review some of the political and military developments since I wrote that post.
The Third Goal
Chinese foreign policy under the communists has centered around taking back three territories that they say they lost during the "century of humiliation": Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. China (People's Republic of China, or "PRC") took back Tibet in the 1950s, got Hong Kong in 1997, and now only Taiwan is left.
Getting back Tibet and Hong Kong were relatively easy, there was no one to oppose the former, and the British lease was up on the latter anyway. Taiwan poses a challenge. The United States has always said that it will oppose reunification by force, and indeed in 1979 Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, making this policy legally binding on the president.
Taiwan (the Republic of China, or "ROC") was for decades run by the authoritarian Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek. Starting in 1987, however, has evolved into a democracy. Although the Chinese communists have moderated since the days of Mao Tse-Tung, the spectre of a totalitarian giant attacking a peaceful democracy will not play well on the world stage.
The Chinese Military Build-Up
Those who accuse the United States of being recklessly adventuristic would do well to cast their eyes on the immense growth of the Chinese Army and Navy (PLA - Peoples Liberation Army, and PLAN, Peoples Liberation Army/Navy).
As Bill Gertz documented the massive Chinese ___ in his book "The Chinese Dragon Awakens", excerpted in the Washington Times last June. Gertz told about what he heard from Pentagon officials
China is building its military forces faster than U.S. intelligence and military analysts expected, prompting fears that Beijing will attack Taiwan in the next two years, according to Pentagon officials.U.S. defense and intelligence officials say all the signs point in one troubling direction: Beijing then will be forced to go to war with the United States, which has vowed to defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack.
China's military buildup includes an array of new high-technology weapons, such as warships, submarines, missiles and a maneuverable warhead designed to defeat U.S. missile defenses. Recent intelligence reports also show that China has stepped up military exercises involving amphibious assaults, viewed as another sign that it is preparing for an attack on Taiwan.
The Problem with China
John Derbyshire, a longtime China watcher who writes for National Review, said the other day that "I try to keep tabs on the China watchers and their moods. The current mood is darkening." Indeed so. He pointed to a BBC article in which the Chinese announced a 14% increase in military spending, a huge amount by western standards. Derbyshire also quotes Australian sinologist Geremie R. Barme from the Jan '06 China Journal:
"With the accession of Hu Jintao ... many presumed that the relatively lax ideological rule of the Jiang Zemin years would continue. Ever-optimistic observers even thought that here, finally, China had a Soviet-style reformist of its own (recall putative Sino-Gorbachev's past, Qiao Shi for example)."It was probably the 2003 commemoration of the 110th anniversary of Mao Zedong's birth, and the speech that Hu Jintao made at the Great Hall of the People in December that year, that put paid to such a notion..."
In other words, forget about a Chinese Gorbachev, much less a Yeltsin.
China is in an unusual situaion, one that I believe is without parallel this past hundred years, at least for a large nation. It is an officially communist country that has almost totally abandoned the economic tenants of communism. Yet the Communist Party of China maintains absolute rule, and immediately represses any perceived threat to it's power. It's only idiology is power for it's own sake.
The Chinese communists now practice a sort of "crony capitalism", whereby one can start a business and make money, but only by the grace of the state. An independent judiciary and what the West calls "rule of law" are non-existent.
This offers the average Chinese nothing to believe in. A seek out new religions such as Falun Gong, but given the persecution of believers by the state few take the risk. Most are apparently happy, for now, just trying to take part in the new Chinese semi-capitalist economy.
Chinese leaders are attempting to deal with this problem through the "Three Represents" campaign. As outlined in a paper last year by Jia Hepeng, published by the Cato Institute,
The Three Represents Campaign has long been considered to ensure that the Party expand its membership to include private entrepreneurs, redefine its societal role, modify its core tenets, and institutionalize its rule. The constitutional status of the slogans seems to corroborate that conclusion. The assertion, however, overlooks another side of the ideological movement: the CCP’s desire to absorb capitalists into a preexisting Party line and to indoctrinate them with the Party ortho-doxy. By doing this, the CCP is in fact strengthening its orthodox ideology so as to increase its authority and legitimacy.
Hepeng concludes that the ability of the communists to bring the capitalists into it's fold and get them to buy into their idiology (whatever it is these days) is "very limited". Thus the party will "continue its pragmatic policies in economic and social fields" but will relaunch similar campaigns everytime it detects a threat to it's legitimacy.
But the state knows that this will not work over time. It therefore does what all totalitarian nations eventually do; play the nationalism and anti-foreigner cards. In the case of China, this means making it appear that the "century of humiliation" (the 19th) and World War II were only yesterday. Their solution is to whip up popular passions over Taiwan, and at the same time whip up anti-Japanese and anti-American sentiment.
Chinese Threat Update
A recent BBC story headlines "Military Balance Goes Against Taiwan"
In its annual report to the US Congress in July last year, the Pentagon said China had 450 short-range ballistic missiles - considerably more than was previously thought - and was expected to deploy 75 additional missiles a year for some years to come.All of them are based in the Nanjing military region opposite Taiwan
.
These missiles are mostly equiped with conventional warheads. What China will do is use them in conjunction with an attempted naval blockade of the island. The Chinese know that their chances against the US Navy are dicey. However, they can rain missiles on Taiwan with relative impunity. Their hope is that they can force Taiwan into making favorable concessions that would lead to de facto reunification.
Chinese shipyards have been busy turning out ships, both civilian and military. In the past 10 years they have gone from being a minor player to the third-largest builder of ships in the world. Take a look at this chart of Chinese warships and it becomes apparent that China is busy replacing older ships and submarines with new models at a rapid pace.
China is not only on a building spree, they have been purchasing advanced Russian submarines at an alarming pace. Last year they purchased 8 Russian Kilo class diesel-electric subs, the best the Russians have to offer. No one should dismiss these simply because they are not nuclear powered. Since the Chinese are only going to send them to the waters around Taiwan, they do not need the range that nuclear power offers. Diesel-electic subs are very quiet when running on batteries, and in a few instances have been able to get within torpedo range of US carriers.
However, despite their growing numbers and new technologies, Chinese ability to use these new naval weapons effectively is open to serious question. They are currenly able to only keep a tiny fraction of them at sea at any one time. While they can "surge" during a crisis, it would appear that they do not have much confidence in their abilities as of yet.
The US has engaged Japan as an ally against China, something China has noted with growing alarm. In response, the Chinese have played the World War II card, as noted above, trying to whip up anti-Japanese sentiment at home, and playing to historical fears regionally in an attempt to scare off the Japanese. So far it has not worked.
The Japanese have the world's second largest defense budget, something that is not widely known, and put most of that money into their navy and air force, the two branches that would be the most useful in a war over Taiwan.
In an October 2005 interview in the Taipei Times, retired Japanese Rear Admiral Sumihiko Kawamura said that he does not yet see the PLAN as being a threat yet to the US or Japan. Commented Admiral Kawamura
Regarding PLAN's ability to project power, its range only extends to the waters around Taiwan. PLAN's submarines have a very limited ability to prevent the US and Japanese navies from projecting their power to the waters around Taiwan.As for its ability to control sea lanes, it would be impossible for PLAN to control the waters between China and Taiwan if it faced a US and Japanese joint naval force. In contrast, within the so-called first island chain [islands including the Aleutians, Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines and Singapore], PLAN has a very limited capability to deny the US and Japan command of the seas.
So if China invaded Taiwan, PLAN would not be able to sustain logistic support from China because it cannot control the waters between Taiwan and China.
Finally, China also has a limited capability to conduct a blockade of sea lanes.
While certainly true, it may be irrelevant. As noted above, China has been building not only naval forces but medium-range missiles as well. They will use these to bombard Taiwan and demoralize the population into demanding that it's government agree to terms favorable to the mainland Chinese. Even with the most aggressive anti-missile development and deployment, no system that I am aware of will be able to stop but a fraction of these weapons.
Chinese-Russian cooperation has become significant also, with the two countries engaged in sevaral joint military operations. Several times the two militaries have engaged in joint exercises. The issue is not that Russia would help China in a showdown, for they would not. The issue is that, one, China is learning advanced techniques from Russia, two, this provides Russia an opportunity to "show off" the weaponry they hope to sell China, and three a show of ideological unity over issues such as Taiwan and a joint desire to see the US replaced as having dominant influence in that part of the world.
China is also in bed with several African dictators, most notably those who govern Sudan, where they see a reliable supply of oil to feed their growing economy. China has several thousand troops in Sudan to guard the oil terminals, which is rare for a country that has traditionally not sent soldiers far from home. Zimbabwe is another country that has received much Chinese attention. Both the Sudan and Zimbabwe are among the most repressive regimes on the Aftican continent.
Let's not forget about the Internet, or "cyberwarfare", as it is sometimes called. Although these things are difficult to prove, there is much evidence that China is behind a series of attacks on US military computers. The biggest and most organized hacking was the 2003 "Titan Rain" incident
This was a massive and well organized attack on American military networks. The people carrying out the attack really knew what they were doing, and thousands of military and industrial documents were sent back to China. The attackers were not able to cover their trail completely, and some of the attackers were traced back to a Chinese government facility in southern China.
In 2005 they attacked the British parliament network, although the report cited above indicates that the "defense won the round". The US and British governments have stepped up security in the wake of these incidents. All of this, however, is just a test run for what will be all-out cyberwarfare if things get hot around Taiwan.
The US Response
GlobalSecurity provides a link to the US Pacific Fleet here. The Pacific Fleet consists of the 3rd Fleet and the 7th Fleet. The 3rd Fleet covers the eastern and northern Pacific, while the 7th is responsible for the western Pacific and Indian oceans.
The 7th Fleet consists of the following Battle Groups;
# Kitty Hawk Battle Group
# Nimitz Battle Group
# Vinson Battle Group
# Lincoln Battle Group
# Stennis Battle Group
# Reagan Strike Group
Each Battle Group consists of one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, two or three destroyers, one or two frigates, two attack submarines, and a supply ship.
In addition, the Pacific Fleet consists of Submarine Group 7 and Submarine Group 9, with a total of 31 attack boats. Attack submarines would, of course, operate on their own when not assigned a carrier. Surface force strike groups may be formed also, but likely would not operate this way in a war over China.
In a move designed to bolster our defenses in the western Pacific,StrategyPage reported recently that over the next 4 years, the US Navy will transfer six Los Angeles Class boats from the Atlantic to the Pacific. This brings the total number of Pacific fleet boats to 31, as opposed to 21 for the Atlantic fleet.
The United States also maintains much air power in the region, most notably on Guam , where we have a variety of aircraft stationed, including B-1bs and B-52s.
The Japanese maintain a fairly powerful navy, and a complete list of their ships can be found on the Global Security website. They lack aircraft carriers, and so their ships would need to be covered by aircraft based out of Japan.
Conclusion
Again, I see no reason to change my view that if China moves against Taiwan, it will be in 2008. I will quote the Naval War College paper cited in a previous post:
China’s military power will peak relative to that of Taiwan and the regional forces of the United States sometime between 2005 and 2008. In this window, improved naval and air capabilities—including ballistic and cruise missiles—will give China its best chance to effect Taiwan’s acquiescence. After 2008, Taiwan’s expected defensive gains and the seemingly exponential military advances of the United States will preclude a successful attack on the island.
By "exponential military advances of the United States" the author is referring to US weapons systems like the F-22 fighter and Virginia class submarines.
Chinese military analysists watched US capabilities grow from the 1991 Gulf War to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and are alarmed at the increase in US capabilities. Any war over Taiwan will play to US strengths, unlike a situation like the insurgency in Iraq, which arguably does not. The US is at it's best in a tradional shoot-out, and the Chinese know full well that we spent over forty years studying how to fight the Soviet Navy
The reason I believe that China will wait until 2008 is that the Olynmpics will be held in Bejing that same year. They will not risk a boycott by attacking sooner.
In summary, there is a very real threat from China over Taiwan. We will come to the island's defense if it comes to war, and we have the military power to stop a Chinese attack or attempted blockade. A missile barrage aimed at destroying the morale of the Taiwanese people introduces an asymettrical concept whose results are problematical.
However, we should caution ourselves against "mirror image" thinking. Just becase our studies show that we can blunt a Chinese advance does not mean that they share our assumptions. By our way of thinking, the Chinese would not possibly want to risk the immense damage to their economy that would result from even a successful war. But as some of the evidence above indicates, ideology may be stronger than reason, and so we must be prepared for the worst.
Posted by Tom at 9:30 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack
June 27, 2005
Part II: "Thefts of U.S. technology boost China's weaponry"
Today the second part of Bill Gertz' series was published in the Washington Times, "Thefts of U.S. technology boost China's weaponry"
As with Part I, it is Gertz at his best:
China is stepping up its overt and covert efforts to gather intelligence and technology in the United States, and the activities have boosted Beijing's plans to rapidly produce advanced-weapons systems. "I think you see it where something that would normally take 10 years to develop takes them two or three," said David Szady, chief of FBI counterintelligence operations.
Again, the good news is that the FBI is aware of China's efforts. The bad news is that their efforts are massive:
To counter such incidents, the FBI has been beefing up its counterintelligence operations in the past three years and has special sections in all 56 field offices across the country for counterspying.But the problem of Chinese spying is daunting.
"It's pervasive," Mr. Szady said. "It's a massive presence, 150,000 students, 300,000 delegations in the New York area. That's not counting the rest of the United States, probably 700,000 visitors a year. They're very good at exchanges and business deals, and they're persistent."
Read the whole thing.
Posted by Tom at 8:49 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
The "Chinese Dragon Awakens"
Yesterday was the first part of Bill Gertz' three part series on China, "Chinese Dragon Awakens", published in the Washington Times.
The gist of the series can be found in the opening paragraphs:
China is building its military forces faster than U.S. intelligence and military analysts expected, prompting fears that Beijing will attack Taiwan in the next two years, according to Pentagon officials.U.S. defense and intelligence officials say all the signs point in one troubling direction: Beijing then will be forced to go to war with the United States, which has vowed to defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack.
China's military buildup includes an array of new high-technology weapons, such as warships, submarines, missiles and a maneuverable warhead designed to defeat U.S. missile defenses. Recent intelligence reports also show that China has stepped up military exercises involving amphibious assaults, viewed as another sign that it is preparing for an attack on Taiwan.
Gertz is the National Security reporter for the Times and over the years has written of number of highly informative books on military and foreign policy matters. He regularly appears on Fox News also, in addition to his articles in the Times. His ability to get detailed information up-to-date about security threats is second-to-none, and it is obvious he has some very good contacts in the defense establishment.
How dangerous is China?
"We may be seeing in China the first true fascist society on the model of Nazi Germany, where you have this incredible resource base in a commercial economy with strong nationalism, which the military was able to reach into and ramp up incredible production," a senior defense official said.
Fortunately, the US military is well aware of the problem. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has spoken recently about the Chinese threat, and wondered aloud, obviously in a rhetorical question, why China would build up it's military when it faces no military threat to itself.
The two-year timeframe Gertz mentions is in line with what I've seen elsewhere. In a longish post last April, "War with China: 2008 - 2010?" I examined some open-source literature and came to a similar conclusion. However, given that the 2008 Olympics would be held in Bejing, my theory is that China will wait until after the games are over to make their move. They will not want to suffer the fate of the Soviets, who's Moscow games in 1980 were boycotted by many nations in reponse to their invasion of Afghanistan.
Gertz has much more to say in his article, so you'll want to read the whole thing.
Posted by Tom at 8:36 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
April 11, 2005
War with China: 2008 - 2010?
In an earlier post called "The Looming Threat", I wrote that China would likely attack Taiwan sometime "before 2015". In light of better information, I am revising my estimate to say that if there is a war it will occur sometime between 2008 and 2010.
I've changed my time estimate because of two factors; first, additional research has let me to conclude that the military "window of opportunity" for the Chinese will start to close in 2008, and second I have given more thought to the meaning of the 2008 Olympic Games, which will be held in the Chinese capital of Beijing.
I. Why a Chinese Attack?
Many would dismiss a Chinese attack as improbable. The point out that from a logical standpoint, China has no need to occupy or control Taiwan. By attacking China risks throwing their economy into chaos, being isolated on the world stage if not becoming an outright pariah, risking a nuclear escallation, and even if the succeded they would lose the ability to use the issue of Taiwan to whip up popular sentiment at home. And, as the outcome of war is never certain, if they lost it might spark a revolution at home that could topple the leadership. Certainly this is enough to give the pause.
At the same time that we take these objections seriously, we must remember the fallacy of "mirror image" thinking. If we have learned nothing else since 9-11 is should be that others do not share our way of thinking. What we consider logical others see as illogical. Facts we consider important are not even in other people's mental universe. Not everyone else works off of our set of assumptions.
Let us therefore consider reasons why, in light of the above objections, China might still make a move against Taiwan:
Saving Face
The Oriental concept of "face" is very important and something that we often underestimate. The simple fact is that rightly or wrongly the Chinese feel that they were embarrassed by the West in the 18th, 19th, and first half of the 20th century and that they must recover. This is no place to recite Chinese history, but suffice it to say that during this time China was colonialized by foreign powers and her people often treated quite shabbily. The Chinese also believe that they lost several territories during this time and to regain face need to reacquire them.
The "lost territories" are Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The Chinese reacquired Tibet by force in the 1950s and Hong Kong by diplomacy in 1997. Only Taiwan remains, and by all accounts that I have come across they are bound and determined to get it back. For example, I recall an article several years ago by John Derbyshire, writing in National Review, in which he said that the one thing that struck him during a visit to China is that despite disagreement on a variety of issues, all of the Chinese people he spoke with were unanimous in their attitude toward Taiwan: "We want it back."
Isn't it the Economics, Stupid?
The biggest objection that I can find is that a military move on China, even if successful, would result in boycotts and embargoes (and maybe even a blockade) that would cripple their economy. And in normal circumstances this would keep them from attacking. However, as I will show below, there may come a time in which the leadership ignores the danger and starts to believe their own propaganda. In short, they may become overconfident.
II. Why Defend Taiwan?
It is reasonable to ask why we should defend Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression. Some, like the libertarian Cato Institute, say that we ought to let Taiwan defend itself. This is not the place for a full treatment of Taiwan's own actions and drift towards declaring independence, so suffice it to say that I believe that we ought to defend Taiwan for the following reasons:
We have obligated ourselves to help defend the island democracy with the Taiwan Relations Act (1979). American presidents, including President Bush, have given their word that we would help to defend Taiwan. We must be good to our word or need to abrogate the treaty and speak clearly that we will not come to Taiwan's aid.
The government of Taiwan ("Republic of China") is now a democracy. We should defend democracies against tyrannies. Even when Taiwan was ruled by the authoritarian Kuomintang, it was still better than the Communists on the mainland, thus worth defending under the concept of comparative justice.
Defense of Taiwan easily meets the requirements of Just War Theory.
Taiwan will not sit still and let us do all of the fighting. They will, in fact, end up doing most of the fighting and dying. It is often forgotten, for example, that during the Korean War the South Koreans suffered more casualties than did Americans.
III. The Preparation
We are currently seeing signs that the Chinese are preparing to make a move. The preparation falls into three categories; the legal, the military, and the morale
The Legal
Last month China's rubber-stamp "National People's Congress" passed an "anti-secession law" authorizing the use of "non-peaceful means" against Taiwan. It was assumed by many analysts that China is setting the legal grounds for action against Taiwan, military or otherwise.
The Military
Under Deng Xiaoping China embarked on a modernization program. One of the "four modernizations" was the military. During the Cold War, the bulk of China's military was oriented towards the Soviet threat. When the USSR dissolved, the military threat went away also. As such, China has been free to move her forces to face new challenges. One of those is retaking Taiwan.
The Chinese are engaged in a crash program to build up their navy, the branch that would have the biggest role in an attack.
Nevertheless, as this Navy War College paper makes clear, the Chinese will not have the ability to stage a "D-Day" style amphibious invasion of Taiwan:
The most dramatic but least feasible PRC threat is an amphibious attack with hundreds of thousands of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops supported by ballistic missile barrages, aircraft, naval forces, and all manner of modified merchant ships. A host of analysts and government reports have poured cold water on this frequently discussed scenario, revealing China’s sea and airlift shortcomings, the numerous force-concentration problems associated with Formosa beach landings, and, not the least, Taiwan’s super-hardened land defenses. Piers Wood and Charles Ferguson, for example, persuasively argue that China lacks not only the amphibious assault ships to bridge the strait with enough firepower and men but also the port capacity to employ hundreds of potentially useful civilian craft.12 Their conclusion was shared by Admiral Dennis Blair, former commander of the U.S. Pacific forces, who not long ago reported that “the PLA is still years away from the capability to take and hold Taiwan.”13
By comparison, a naval blockade could bring Taiwan to its knees with relative ease and minimal international protest. A sustained interruption of key sea lines of communications would be economically disastrous for the Taiwanese economy, which relies heavily on shipping for its lifeblood trade and energy needs, some two-thirds of which are fulfilled by fossil fuel imports.14 Even a temporary closure would likely prove debilitating for the import/export-dependent economy. Shortly prior to Taiwan’s 1996 election, for example, all merchant marine traffic to Taiwan was halted for days after China fired several unarmed DF-15 short-range missiles toward the island’s two largest ports, the closest of them falling approximately twelve miles from land. Traffic into Taiwan’s northern port was similarly blocked the previous year after China lobbed six DF-15s into the strait some eighty-five miles north of the island.1
Most likely, therefore, the Chinese would force Taiwan to negotiate "at missile point" and would come away with favorable terms if not outright annexation. Amphibious invasion or airborne attack is extremely unlikely.
Another Naval War College Paper puts it in starker terms still:
Given the many weaknesses of the PLA Navy, the U.S. Navy will remain superior to the Chinese fleet for many years to come. That is not the issue. The danger, rather, is the possibility of an expansive, even bellicose, Chinese foreign policy provoking open conflict with a weaker neighboring state. Arms races and exacerbated regional tensions, on the one hand, and an entangling of American armed forces, on the other, are opposite evils to be avoided. However, the Chinese navy has markedly improved in capabilities and is clearly aiming for a blue-water capacity. It has already developed an "active defense and inshore warfare" strategy commensurate with its improving ability to deal with limited wars and regional conflicts, at the same time as the U.S. Navy is concentrating on the world's littorals in support of its own new maritime strategy. The U.S. Navy's recent white papers ". . . From the Sea" and "Forward . . . from the Sea" have changed its focus to operations near land. There is irony in the fact that while the U.S. Navy is slowly shifting away from its sea control mission, the PLA Navy is actively pursuing command of the regional waters.
Window of Opportunity
According to the authors of the first Naval War College paper cited above, the Chinese will have a "window of opportunity" that will begin to close in or around 2010:
PRC - People's Republic of China. The official name of Communist China. Typically called just "China"
PLA - People's Liberation Army. All branches of the military are referred to as the "PRC" as in "PLA Navy" or "PLA Air Force"
ROC - Republic of China. The official name for the government of Taiwan, on the island of Formosa.
...China’s military power will peak relative to that of Taiwan and the regional forces of the United States sometime between 2005 and 2008. In this window, improved naval and air capabilities—including ballistic and cruise missiles—will give China its best chance to effect Taiwan’s acquiescence. After 2008, Taiwan’s expected defensive gains and the seemingly exponential military advances of the United States will preclude a successful attack on the island.
For a full discussion of the military details see the two papers cited above.
Barring a major technological surprise, espionage action, or plain bad luck on our part, the US Navy will be able to successfully defeat the PLA Navy and Air Force, even during the "window of opportunity." We will suffer losses, perhaps serious.
But as the author of the NWC paper above stated, the question is speed; can the United States get enough forces into the area fast enough, and defeat the Chinese fast enough, before Taiwan is forced to capitulate?
The Nuclear Wildcard
One cannot discuss war between the United States and China without discussing nuclear weapons. Indeed, some have used the threat of escalation as a reason why China would not attack. This may well be so. But it also may be an example of the "mirror image" thinking that we need to avoid.
During the Cold War we adopted the theory of MAD, or Mutual Assured Destruction. MAD said that neither side would dare to attack the other because both would end up destroyed. But while the Soviets gave lip service to this theory, a review of their internal literature showed that they did not necessarily buy into it. They conducted war games with the express intent of finding a way to fight and win a nuclear war.
So it may be with China. Not that they would want to fight such a war, but they may well believe that they can "absorb" losses better than we could. During the 1950s, when the Soviets and Chinese were still on somewhat friendly terms, the former "...professed not to fear nuclear war because they did understand the force of nuclear weapons, but the believed they could afford to lose a few hundred million of their people, people being the one thing they had in abundance." (Operation Solo, p 94). Although the days of Mao's rule are long gone, his government is still in place.
Lastly, there is the October 2000 testimony by Senator Jon Kyle that in 1995 "...General Xiong Guangkai warned a visiting U.S. official that China could use military force to prevent Taiwan's gaining independence without fear of U.S. intervention because American leaders `care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan.' An editorial in a military-owned newspaper this March was more blunt, warning that, `The United States will not sacrifice 200 million Americans for 20 million Taiwanese.'"
IV. The Olympics
The 2008 Olympics will be held in Beijing. Although it is a matter of national pride for any country to host the Olympic games, it assumes special importance for totalitarian regimes. One will recall that the Soviets felt more hurt by our boycott of the 1980 games than we did by their boycott of the 1984 games in Los Angeles. Likewise, the Chinese will place great importance on putting forth the best front during the games. The entire thing is a chance for them to showcase their "national greatness" and to show the world that they are not "backward".
If China makes a military move against Taiwan before the games they risk a boycott by large numbers of countries, regardless of how the war turns out. The US would certainly boycott, and would put great pressure on other countries to do likewise. Even if most countries attended despite US pressure, the games would be forever marred. Given the importance the Chinese put on "face", I cannot believe that they would allow this to happen.
I therefore do not believe that China would attack Taiwan before the 2008 games. Given the military "window of opportunity" cited above, I do not think that they can wait much after 2008 either. This leads me to the conclusion that if they move it will be between 2008 and 2010.
The Propaganda
Discussion of the Olympics leads to another observation, one about the importance of setting the stage for an attack; the importance of propaganda. China will not only use the Olympics to make themselves look good, they will use the occasion to remind us of how Taiwan should be part of the PRC. Unfortunately, there will be all too many Western journalists who will lay their critical faculties aside during the games.
The Hitler Analogy
The 1936 Olympic games were held in Berlin, Germany. Hitler saw them as an occasion to showcase his regime, which is exactly what he did. Although many Americans believe that runner Jesse Owens spoiled Hitler's plans, the fact is that is not so. Although the story of Owens winning a gold medal and Hitler refusing to shake hands with him is literally true, it was not seen as important at the time. The story did not gain prominence until the 1950s, when the civil rights movement picked up in the United States. Rather, the Olympics were seen at the time as a huge propaganda victory for Nazi Germany.
The benefit to Germany of a successful Olympics was that it raised their "self esteem" and made them feel that they could, in fact, conquer the world, or at least the European part of it. This, of course, is precisely what they set out to do.
V. The Allies
The United States had two allies in the region, Japan and South Korea. We can most likely count on the former to help us, but assistance from the latter will probably not be forthcoming.
The Japanese have shown great interest in recent years in missile defense. They are extremely worried about both China and North Korea. Their military is larger than I think is commonly believed, a fact well-known by the Chinese. Politically, they have shown the will to "step out" beyond their traditional post-World War II military isolation, sending troops to Iraq, for example.
South Korea has moved in the opposite direction. With the ageing of the Korean War generation, the youth do not feel beholden by past American sacrifices. Anti-American demonstrations have become more and more common in recent years. The South Korean government's "Sunshine Policy" towards the North is often at odds with US goals. They will likely not risk antagonizing China by aiding the US during a war.
VI. Summary and Conclusion
Here are the main points made in this paper:
- The Chinese want to incorporate Taiwan into their country, and will do so by force if they believe they can be successful.
- The United States should come to the aid of Taiwan in the event of a crisis
- Chinese military action, if it occurs, will come by way of blockade and threat of missile attack, not by traditional amphibious or airborne attack.
- The United States will be able to defeat the PLA forces, but perhaps not in time to prevent Taiwanese capitulation.
- If the Chinese decide to take military action, it will occur sometime shortly after the 2008 Olympics.
- The United States will have the assistance of Japan but not South Korea
- State clearly and unambiguously that we will defend Taiwan if the Chinese attack.
- Maintain a high level of military preparedness in the western Pacific region.
- Conduct regular military exercises in the western Pacific region.
- Sell Taiwan advanced weaponry, but with an eye towards not unnecessarily provoking the Chinese.
- Encourage, even demand, that the Taiwanese not declare their independence. To do so would be unnecessary and might provoke Chinese military action.
Be sure to check out By Dawn's Early Light's most recent post on a possible war with Taiwan. While you're there, check out his past articles on the subject too (listed in the sidebar at right). Bill takes on several issues that I have not, including "why the US will create strong alliances with India and continue to strengthen its Japanese and Australian security arrangements to avert a war over Taiwan and wait out for a democratic China."
In my post I argued that China would use the 2008 Olympics to showcase their regime and demoralize Taiwan. In the comments section to a post of his last week I asked Bill about this and he responded:
I think it is more likely that Taiwan will use the Olympics than China. What if Taiwan declares independence a month prior to the Olympics? That makes much more sense than China invading immediately before or after.
I hadn't thought of that, but it makes sense to me too.
Correction
As per Bill Rice's comment, the Taiwanese angle was actually made by Dan.
Posted by Tom at 11:00 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
March 16, 2005
The Looming Threat
Several times I've said on this blog that China is a threat that is lurking in the background. The situation appears peaceful now, but appearances are deceiving. The Chinese are bound and determined to take back Taiwan, by force if necessary. Right now they are laying low, stockpiling weapons and working to lay the political groundwork. Sooner or later they will likely force the situation, and I think this will occur sometime before 2015, though not for a few years yet.
Last week China passed a law authorizing the use of force against Taiwan if the latter declares it's independence. While China has since said that the law is "misunderstood" and is a "law for peace" it seems clear that they are laying the legal groundwork for military action.
Likewise, over the past ten or fifteen years China has become much more aggressive on military acquisitions. From the break with the Soviet Union in the late 50s to the end of the Cold War, the bulk of the Chinese military was oriented towards a war with Russia. They could not afford a two-front strategy in anything but name. When the Soviet Union collapsed, it's military came apart also, freeing the Chinese to concentrate on Taiwan.
For a more complete strategic analysis see my July 2004 post "China, Taiwan, and Concepts of Sea Power"
The other day China's "Prime Minister" held a press conference in which he laid more political groundwork for action against Taiwan. The PM gave the standard Chinese line on their view of history. John Derbyshire describes what the PM said
China the victim, you see, is only pursuing justice to right historical wrongs.
Tensions with Japan? Must be Japan's fault: "The fundamental problem is that Japan should correctly view history. ... take history as a mirror and face forward to the future. This year marks the 60th anniversary of China's victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45). This part of history reminds us of the untold sufferings the war brought to the people in China..." Also, of course, a by-product of U.S. meddling: "The security alliance between Japan and the United States is a bilateral matter between these two countries. Yet we are concerned in China because it is related to the question of Taiwan..."The anti-secession law? Why, the people of Taiwan want to be united with the mainland: "We have enacted this law to give expression of the will of the entire Chinese people, including the 23 million compatriots in Taiwan, their will to safeguard national unity and territorial integrity and oppose secession of Taiwan from the country." In any case, the law really has nothing to do with force or intimidation: "This law is meant to strengthen and promote cross-Straits relations."
And always, always, that self-righteous, self-pitying whine: "In the recent hundred of years, China was subjected to bullying and humiliation. Yet till now our country has never sent a single soldier abroad to occupy an inch of foreign land." (Ask a Tibetan about that.)
You would never know, unless you looked at the past 56 years of Chinese history, that the smooth-taliing Mr. Wen is front man for a gang of lawless cutthroats.
What exactly does China want? Derbyshire again:
What they want is regional hegemony. They want to be in East Asia — perhaps in all of Eurasia — what the U.S.A. has been in the Americas this past couple of hundred years. In their dreams, Russia will be their Canada: huge, underpopulated, cold, and not very consequential. India will be their Brazil.** Laos (say) will be their Guatemala (say). There are some holes in the analogy. The U.S.A. never had to contend with an offshore nation a tenth as populous yet ten times wealthier than itself, as China has to keep Japan in mind. Nor do the Indians look to be slipping quietly into their assigned role as providers of coffee, nuts, and salacious dances to the new superpower. Still, it is plain from their visible diplomatic strategy that the Chinese think they can pull it off
That's part of it, I'll agree. But it's not "hegemony" as a European or American would understand it. Not is is simply the pursuit of natural resources as was the Japanese goal some 80 years ago with their "Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere". It's a little of the latter, to be sure (witness the China-Philippines squabble over the possibly oil-rich Spratley Islands), but I think it's more ideology.
North Korea is the asian threat that dominates headlines, but my thoughts are that China is using them as a diversion. Tom Donnelly, writing in the Weekly Standard, seems to agree, chastising the Clinton and Bush Administrations for ignoring the problem:
Disturbing also are trends within our own military budget. The Navy and Air Force being starved to feed the hunger in the Army and Marine Corps for ground troops. While this helps us today in the War on Terror, a lack of Aircraft Carriers could come back to haunt us in the years ahead. Money is always finite and the business of policy is to make hard choices. Let's hope and push our politicians to make ones that keep the Chinese threat in mind.
In short, the United States continues to look through the wrong end of the telescope. We're thus blinded to a whole host of worrying developments that reveal China's progress as a geopolitical--and increasingly global--competitor. The Chinese "legislature" just passed an "anti-secession law" that not only "legitimizes" an attack on Taiwan but greater internal repression as well; the Beijing government sees secessionists everywhere. China is beginning to string together a necklace of client states in the oil-rich Middle East--Iran and Sudan, to name two--and even into the Americas, cozying up to Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez. Venezuela supplies about 13 percent of daily U.S. oil imports, and just as Beijing fears the U.S. Navy's ability to sever China's connection to international energy markets, China wouldn't mind being able to return the favor with Chavez's help.
Posted by Tom at 11:26 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
