The Redhunter

June 29, 2008

"Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" - June 2008

Last week the Department of Defense released it's latest quarterly report to Congress; "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" June 2008.

The short version is that as measured in May, violence in Iraq dropped to its lowest level in four years. This is very good news.

This said, I do not have time to go through all 74 pages of the report, so readers can download it and judge for themselves.

Here is the bottom line from the Executive Summary

In summary, the security, political and economic trends in Iraq continue to be positive; however, they remain fragile, reversible and uneven. Recent events in Basrah, Sadr City and elsewhere have generated new challenges and opportunities for the future. As in the past, continued progress will require Iraqi leaders to yake additional selfless and nationally-oriented actions in the spirit of reconciliation and compromise if Iraq is to achieve its potential as a stable, secure, multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian democracy under the rule of law.

This seems pretty consistent from what our commanders have been saying. Readers will note that I've covered most press briefings that have come out of Iraq for the past year and a half.

Here are some additional key quotes from the report's summary:

The security environment in Iraq continues to improve, with all major violence indicators reduced between 40 to 80% from pre-surge levels. Total security incidents have fallen to their lowest level in over four years. Coalition and Iraqi forces' operations against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) have degraded its ability to attack and terrorize the population. Although AQI remains a major threat and is still capable of high-profile attacks, the lack of violence linked to AQI in recent weeks demonstrates the effect these operations have had on its network. Equally important, the government's success in Basrah and Baghdad's Sadr City against militias, particularly Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Iranian-supported Special Groups, has reinforced a greater public rejection of militias. This rejection, while still developing, is potentially as significant for Iraq as the Sunni rejection of AQI's indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology. Overall, the communal struggle for power and resources is becoming less violent. Many Iraqis are now settling their differences through debate and the political process rather than open conflict. Other factors that have contributed to a reduction in violence include the revitalization of sectors of the Iraqi economy and local reconciliation measures. Although the number of civilian deaths in April 2008 increased slightly from February and March 2008, in May 2008 civilian deaths declined to levels not seen since January 2006, when the Coalition began tracking this data....

The emergence of Sons of Iraq (SoIs) to help secure local communities has been one of the most significant developments in the past 18 months in Iraq. These volunteers help protect their neighborhoods, secure key infrastructure and roads and locate extremists among the population. What began primarily as a Sunni effort, now appears to have taken hold in several Shi'a and mixed communities....

Recent operations in Basrah, Sadr City and Mosul remind us, however, that security gains can be uneven, fragile and tenuous if not accompanied by continued progress toward national reconciliation and economic development....

In a broader sense, the government's efforts in Basrah reflected two positive and long-awaited improvements. First, Prime Minister Maliki demonstrated a willingness to confront militias and extremists, regardless of sectarian identity....

Second, Iraqi forces demonstrated an improved capability to lead and execute significant
counterinsurgency operations....

Iran's negative role in Iraq has emerged as a major security challenge....

The Iraqi economy grew 4% in real terms in 2007 and is projected to grow 7% in real terms for 2008, reaching an estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of $60.9 billion. Oil production increases of 9-10% this year--coupled with the higher prices of oil--should drive growth in that sector and support increased government spending. The non-oil sector is likely to grow at 3%. Core inflation fell to 12% in 2007 compared to 32% in 2006--the result of an improving security environment in the second half of 2007....

The GoI's inability to execute its capital budget remains a concern. The GoI is hampered by spending units' lack of capacity and cumbersome budgetary approval and funding
processes. Despite these difficulties, the overall trend for capital budget execution
continues to improve....

Due to greater emphasis by government leaders, Iraqis have seen an increase, albeit uneven, in the delivery of essential services such as electricity, water, sanitation and healthcare. Despite these improvements, the population's level of satisfaction with essential services remains low.

So from this it looks like we're doing pretty well. Gains are fragile, yes, but the same could be said about the situations in Japan or Germany in the late 1940s. It would be a shame to throw it all alway with a precipitous pullout.

One last quote from the section of the report titled "Political Stability":

With recent improvements in security, the current political environment in Iraq is becoming more hospitable to compromises across sectarian and ethnic divides.

What is it that Petraeus and his coauthors said in U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24? Oh yeah, that you have to have security before you can have political progress. Looks like they kind of got that one right too.

Posted by Tom at 9:33 PM | Comments (4) | TrackBack

June 15, 2008

Krauthammer Hits a Homer

Once again, Charles Krauthammer hits it out of the park. I'm just going to reprint the whole thing

In his St. Paul victory speech, Barack Obama pledged again to pull out of Iraq. Rather than "continue a policy in Iraq that asks everything of our brave men and women in uniform and nothing of Iraqi politicians. . . . It's time for Iraqis to take responsibility for their future."

We know Obama hasn't been to Iraq in more than two years, but does he not read the papers? Does he not know anything about developments on the ground? Here is the "nothing" that Iraqis have been doing in the last few months:

1. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent the Iraqi army into Basra. It achieved in a few weeks what the British had failed to do in four years: take the city, drive out the Mahdi army, and seize the ports from Iranian-backed militias.

2. When Mahdi fighters rose up in support of their Basra brethren, the Iraqi army at Maliki's direction confronted them and prevailed in every town -- Najaf, Karbala, Hilla, Kut, Nasiriyah, and Diwaniyah -- from Basra to Baghdad.

3. Without any American ground forces, the Iraqi army entered and occupied Sadr City, the Mahdi army stronghold.

4. Maliki flew to Mosul, directing a joint Iraqi-U.S. offensive against the last redoubt of al-Qaeda, which had already been driven out of Anbar, Baghdad, and Diyala provinces.

5. The Iraqi parliament enacted a de-Baathification law, a major Democratic benchmark for political reconciliation.

6. Parliament also passed the other reconciliation benchmarks -- a pension law, an amnesty law, and a provincial elections and powers law. Oil revenues are being distributed to the provinces through the annual budget.

7. With Maliki having demonstrated that he would fight not just Sunni insurgents (e.g., in Mosul) but Shiite militias (e.g., the Mahdi army), the Sunni parliamentary bloc began negotiations to join the Shiite-led government. (The final sticking point is a squabble over a sixth Cabinet position.)

The disconnect between what Democrats are saying about Iraq and what is actually happening there has reached grotesque proportions. Democrats won an exhilarating electoral victory in 2006 pledging withdrawal at a time when conditions in Iraq were dire and we were indeed losing the war. Two years later, when everything is changed, they continue to reflexively repeat their "narrative of defeat and retreat" (as Joe Lieberman so memorably called it) as if nothing has changed.

It is a position so utterly untenable that John McCain must seize the opportunity and, contrary to conventional wisdom, make the Iraq War the central winning plank of his campaign. Yes, Americans are war-weary. Yes, most think we should not have engaged in the first place. Yes, Obama will keep pulling out his 2002 speech opposing the war.

But McCain's case is simple. Is not Obama's central mantra that this election is about the future not the past? It is about 2009, not 2002. Obama promises that upon his inauguration, he will order the Joint Chiefs to bring him a plan for withdrawal from Iraq within 16 months. McCain says that upon his inauguration, he'll ask the Joint Chiefs for a plan for continued and ultimate success.

The choice could not be more clearly drawn. The Democrats' one objective in Iraq is withdrawal. McCain's one objective is victory.

McCain's case is not hard to make. Iraq is a three-front war -- against Sunni al-Qaeda, against Shiite militias, and against Iranian hegemony -- and we are winning on every front:

We did not go into Iraq to fight al-Qaeda. The war had other purposes. But al-Qaeda chose to turn it into the central front in its war against America. That choice turned into an al-Qaeda fiasco: Al-Qaeda in Iraq is now on the run and in the midst of stunning and humiliating defeat.

As for the Shiite extremists, the Mahdi army is isolated and at its weakest point in years.

Its sponsor, Iran, has suffered major setbacks, not just in Basra, but in Iraqi public opinion, which has rallied to the Maliki government and against Iranian interference through its Sadrist proxy.

Even the most expansive American objective -- establishing a representative government that is an ally against jihadists, both Sunni and Shiite -- is within sight.

Obama and the Democrats would forfeit every one of these successes to a declared policy of fixed and unconditional withdrawal. If McCain cannot take to the American people the case for the folly of that policy, he will not be president. Nor should he be.

Give the speech, senator. Give it now.

Indeed. McCain needs to get in front of this issue and define himself before the Democrats do it for him. He also needs to hammer on Obama's many liabilities before the Democrats manage to re-define him, but that's another story.

The fact is, every single one of the left's talking points about Iraq is in shatters. But to Obama, it doesn't matter. For him to now concede that we are winning (I said winning, not won), would be to anger the nutroots base of his party. It would risk his "aura" of being larger-than-life-Obama, and might force his followers to actually confront the reality of the situation, rather than simply spout warmed-over MoveOn.org talking points. Too many Democrats are invested in a U.S. defeat.

As I have said many times on this blog, President Bush has done a miserable job of presenting the case for Iraq to the American people. Secretary of State Rice has served him poorly, both at NSC and now at State, and ought to be fired. The American people will listen to a new voice, but only if he speaks. Of all the Republican candidates he was always the one with the strongest national security credentials. He needs to speak forcefully and often about Iraq. Krauthammer is right; McCain needs to give this speech.

Posted by Tom at 8:30 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

May 27, 2008

Yes We Are Safer

To the left it is an article of faith that we are no safer today than we were on Sept 12 2001. Nothing the Bush Administration has done matters one bit. Their primary argument seems to be that Iraq is a distraction from the "real" war.

John Hinderaker of Power Line has done us all a service by actually researching terrorist attacks against the United States at home and abroad. Here's what he found:

On the stump, Barack Obama usually concludes his comments on Iraq by saying, "and it hasn't made us safer." It is an article of faith on the left that nothing the Bush administration has done has enhanced our security, and, on the contrary, its various alleged blunders have only contributed to the number of jihadists who want to attack us.

Empirically, however, it seems beyond dispute that something has made us safer since 2001. Over the course of the Bush administration, successful attacks on the United States and its interests overseas have dwindled to virtually nothing.

Some perspective here is required. While most Americans may not have been paying attention, a considerable number of terrorist attacks on America and American interests abroad were launched from the 1980s forward, too many of which were successful. What follows is a partial history:

1988 February: Marine Corps Lt. Colonel Higgens, Chief of the U.N. Truce Force, was kidnapped and murdered by Hezbollah.

December: Pan Am flight 103 from London to New York was blown up over Scotland, killing 270 people, including 35 from Syracuse University and a number of American military personnel.

1991
November: American University in Beirut bombed.

1993
January: A Pakistani terrorist opened fire outside CIA headquarters, killing two agents and wounding three.

February: World Trade Center bombed, killing six and injuring more than 1,000.

1995
January: Operation Bojinka, Osama bin Laden's plan to blow up 12 airliners over the Pacific Ocean, discovered.

November: Five Americans killed in attack on a U.S. Army office in Saudi Arabia.

1996
June: Truck bomb at Khobar Towers kills 19 American servicemen and injures 240.

June: Terrorist opens fire at top of Empire State Building, killing one.

1997
February: Palestinian opens fire at top of Empire State Building, killing one and wounding more than a dozen.

November: Terrorists murder four American oil company employees in Pakistan.

1998
January: U.S. Embassy in Peru bombed.

August: Simultaneous bomb attacks on U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killed more than 300 people and injured over 5,000.

1999
October: Egypt Air flight 990 crashed off the coast of Massachusetts, killing 100 Americans among the more than 200 on board; the pilot yelled "Allahu Akbar!" as he steered the airplane into the ocean.

2000
October: A suicide boat exploded next to the U.S.S. Cole, killing 17 American sailors and injuring 39.

2001
September: Terrorists with four hijacked airplanes kill around 3,000 Americans in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania.

December: Richard Reid, the "shoe bomber," tries to blow up a transatlantic flight, but is stopped by passengers.

The September 11 attack was a propaganda triumph for al Qaeda, celebrated by a dismaying number of Muslims around the world. Everyone expected that it would draw more Muslims to bin Laden's cause and that more such attacks would follow. In fact, though, what happened was quite different: the pace of successful jihadist attacks against the United States slowed, decelerated further after the onset of the Iraq war, and has now dwindled to essentially zero. Here is the record:

2002
October: Diplomat Laurence Foley murdered in Jordan, in an operation planned, directed and financed by Zarqawi in Iraq, perhaps with the complicity of Saddam's government.

2003
May: Suicide bombers killed 10 Americans, and killed and wounded many others, at housing compounds for westerners in Saudi Arabia.

October: More bombings of United States housing compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia killed 26 and injured 160.

2004
There were no successful attacks inside the United States or against American interests abroad.

2005
There were no successful attacks inside the United States or against American interests abroad.

2006
There were no successful attacks inside the United States or against American interests abroad.

2007
There were no successful attacks inside the United States or against American interests abroad.

2008
So far, there have been no successful attacks inside the United States or against American interests abroad.

I have omitted from the above accounting a few "lone wolf" Islamic terrorist incidents, like the Washington, D.C. snipers, the Egyptian who attacked the El Al counter in Los Angeles, and an incident or two when a Muslim driver steered his vehicle into a crowd. These are, in a sense, exceptions that prove the rule, since the "lone wolves" were not, as far as we know, in contact with international Islamic terrorist groups and therefore could not have been detected by surveillance of terrorist conversations or interrogations of al Qaeda leaders.

It should also be noted that the decline in attacks on the U.S. was not the result of jihadists abandoning the field. Our government stopped a number of incipient attacks and broke up several terrorist cells, while Islamic terrorists continued to carry out successful attacks around the world, in England, Spain, Russia, Pakistan, Israel, Indonesia and elsewhere.

So if we're not safer, where are the terrorist attacks? i

As for Iraq, I can do no better than quote the words of General Petraeus himself as he testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 8 and explained why winning in Iraq helps us defeat al Qaeda everywhere, and helps us defeat terrorism in general:

As we combat AQI we must remember that doing so not only reduces a major source of instability in Iraq, it also weakens an organization that Al Qaeda's senior leaders view as a tool to spread its influence and foment regional instability. Osama bin laden and Ayman al- Zawahiri have consistently advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq, and we have also seen Al Qaeda-Iraq involved in destabilizing activities in the wider Mideast region....

...withdrawing too many forces too quickly could jeopardize the progress of the past year; and performing the necessary tasks in Iraq will require sizable conventional forces, as well as special operation forces and adviser teams.

The strategic considerations include recognition that: the strain on the U.S. military, especially on its ground forces, has been considerable; a number of the security challenges inside Iraq are also related to significant regional and global threats; a failed state in Iraq would pose serious consequences for the greater fight against Al Qaeda, for regional stability, for the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and for the efforts to counter malign Iranian influence.

After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of command that we continue the drawdown in the surge to the combat forces and that upon the withdrawal of the last surge brigade combat team in July, we undertake a 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation. At the end of that period, we will commence a process of assessment to examine the conditions on the ground and over time determine when we can make recommendations for further reductions. This process will be continuous, with recommendations for further reductions made as conditions permit.

This approach does not allow establishment of a set withdrawal timetable, however it does provide the flexibility those of us on the ground need to preserve the still-fragile security gains our troopers have fought so far and sacrifice so much to achieve.

With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and early 2008 can form a foundation for the gradual establishment of sustainable security in Iraq. This is not only important to the 27 million citizens of Iraq, it is also vitally important to those in the Gulf region, to the citizens of the United States, and to the global community.

It clearly is in our national interests to help Iraq prevent the resurgence of Al Qaeda in the heart of the Arab world, to help Iraq resist Iranian encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed ethno-sectarian violence that could spill over Iraq's borders and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable Iraq to expand its role in the regional and global economies."

Posted by Tom at 9:58 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack

December 29, 2006

New Plan for Iraq III

If we're going to surge troops, let's make sure we do it right, say Frederick Kagan and Jack Keane, authors of a proposal to win the war in Iraq that has received a favorable review by the White House. Writing in the Washington Post two days ago, they say that

We need to cut through the confusion. Bringing security to Baghdad -- the essential precondition for political compromise, national reconciliation and economic development -- is possible only with a surge of at least 30,000 combat troops lasting 18 months or so. Any other option is likely to fail.

The key to the success is to change the military mission -- instead of preparing for transition to Iraqi control, that mission should be to bring security to the Iraqi population. Surges aimed at accelerating the training of Iraqi forces will fail, because rising sectarian violence will destroy Iraq before the new forces can bring it under control.

Writing in the New York Post, Ralph Peters largely agrees. The theme of his article is do it right or not at all, but if we do it, go for broke:

Focus exclusively on security. Concentrate on doing one thing well. Freeze all reconstruction and aid projects. Halt every program and close every office that doesn't contribute directly to pacifying Iraq.

Empty the Green Zone. Pack off the contractors. Reduce the military's overhead to those elements essential to support combat operations. Make it clear to "our" Iraqis that it's sink-or-swim time. Remove our advisers from any Iraqi unit that can operate marginally without them (and let the Iraqis do security their way without interference).

Above all, establish unity of command: Stop pretending there's a fully functional government in Baghdad, recall our ambassador until the fighting's over and make this a purely military effort until Iraq has been pacified.

Peters may go a bit far in some of his ideas, but he's generally on the right track, as are Keane and Kagan; the war is still winnable, we must prevail, so no more half-measures.

Opinion on whether the Keane-Kagan plan is a good one or not is split, mostly but not exclusively along predictable lines.

Barack Obama and John Edwards, both presidential hopefuls, have come out against a troop surge surge. Hillary Clinton says that she's against it too, "unless it is part of a larger plan to end the violence in Iraq".

Democrat presidential candidates Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich of Ohio and Iowa Gov. Tom Vilsack have are against a surge, as are Senators Joseph Biden and Christopher Dodd.

John Kerry says that he's against increasing the number of troops "absent some kind of political resolution in Iraq".

Unsurprisingly, Senator Joe Lieberman is strongly in favor of a surge. Writing in today's Washinton Post, he says that our basic problem in Iraq is a lack of security, and unless that is fixed, nothing else much matters. Money quote

In Baghdad and Ramadi, I found that it was the American colonels, even more than the generals, who were asking for more troops. In both places these soldiers showed a strong commitment to the cause of stopping the extremists. One colonel followed me out of the meeting with our military leaders in Ramadi and said with great emotion, "Sir, I regret that I did not have the chance to speak in the meeting, but I want you to know on behalf of the soldiers in my unit and myself that we believe in why we are fighting here and we want to finish this fight. We know we can win it."

On the Republican side, Senator John McCain has been calling for an increast in troop levels for some time. Recently he urged the president to reject the Baker-Hamilton recommendations and increase the level of troops in Iraq. As Larry Kudlow points out, if the president does decide to send in more toops, McCain's support will be crucial.

To be fair, there are some Republicans against a surge too, notably Rep Duncan Hunter, who believes that the job can be done with existing Iraqi troops.

Others, such as conservative blogger Paul Mirengoff of Power Line, are also skeptical, writing that "unless there is very good reason to believe that a sustainable troop surge can bring permanent security to Baghdad, it may be time to redefine what constitutes success."

Likewise, Glenn Reynolds points out that some generals are "not thrilled" with the idea of a surge either, because in their view "the strife in Iraq is mainly a military problem; in their view it is largely political, fed by economic distress."

So there you have it. Not a comprehensive survey, but I believe that from it we can reach a few conclusions. One, the hard left is unalterably opposed to any increase in troops no matter how good the plan. They do not care whether we win or lose, apparently seeing no ill effects from a loss.

A few Democrats hedge their bets. They say that they might be in favor of a troop increase, but only if certain vague conditions are met. Call me partisan, but think that they're just trying to have it both ways; if it succeeds they can say they were for it, and if it fails they can say that they had been against it all along.

On the left, Lieberman is the odd man out, but this is hardly a surprise. With the death of the Cold War Democrats over twenty or thirty years ago, he's the only one to have picked up the mantle of the late Henry "Scoop" Jackson.

On the right opinion is much more split. A few seem to have given up on the enterprise, some just think that a surge is the wrong strategy, and others will support it if their questions can be answered.

So in the end it all falls on mostly predictable fault lines. Those who turned against the war once it was discovered that there were no WMD do not think that anything we do can win it, and those in favor of the war believe that it can be won but are divided on strategy.

As I've mentioned in previous pieces on this matter, I think it can be won and that the Keane-Kagan plan represents our best choice for success. I used to think that more economic development and free elections would do the trick. I now believe that without security they don't matter so much, or at least they won't have as much effect as we would like.

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New Plan for Iraq II
Here's the New Plan for Iraq

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December 21, 2006

New Plan for Iraq II

In a post earlier this week I predicted that there would be a shake-up in CENTCOM, that both Generals Abizaid and Casey would be replaced. It was reported yesterday in the LA Times that Abizaid would retire in March. However, the storys says that Abizaid made his decision a few months ago, so it was apparently not the result of any recent decisions to change strategy.

According to unnamed officers cited in the Times article,

Gates faces a clear choice between generals who have agreed with Abizaid's push to quickly hand over security responsibilities to Iraqi forces and a small but increasingly influential coterie of officers backing a more aggressive U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign.

My guess is that he'll go for a general who favors the more aggressive strategy. This would mean that General George Casey will be replaced too, since he and Abizaid advocated the "small US footprint" strategy, and the rapid handover to Iraqi forces. The article says that Casey is due to leave his current assignment early next year, and the question then is whether he will go up or out.

I'll stick my neck out and say that Casey will not move up to become commander of CENTCOM. He'll either retire, or like General Ricardo Sanchez, he'll be "reassigned".

They're both good men and have tried their best. Even a casual reading of their biographies indicates that they're pretty smart, and there's no guarantee that if others had been in their place the situation would be better. By saying they need to be replaced i am not disparaging them. But Lincoln replaced his generals when they couldn't produce results, and Bush needs to do likewise.

More Troops?

New Sec Def Gates traveled to Iraq, and one of the things he discussed with commanders was whether more troops were needed. An AP story in the Washington Times has Abizaid noncommittal to the idea, and Casey more wary. Understandably, they want to know what their exact mission would be. Additional troops, they say "might only bring a temporary respite to the violence" while denuding other theaters of personnel who would be needed in a crisis.

Fox News "All Stars" Fred Barnes and Morton Krondake worried that if we do decide to send more troops, whether it will be enough to make any difference. Krondake refers to the Kagan-Keane plan that I reviewed in my "New Plan for Iraq" post on Tuesday, and says that it

... involves cleaning out the bad guys, holding the territory, having troops living in the neighborhoods to provide ongoing security, and then when the Iraqi security forces can take over, then you move on to Anbar. This is a two-year operation and the question is, is 30,000 enough to do it?

In other words, no more halfway measures.

The always insightful Mario Loyola also worries that more troops might not make any difference.

The generals know what they are talking about: There is no reason to believe that an increase in force levels will have any effect at all on the levels of violence in Baghdad. The violence is occurring in a security vacuum, but that doesn't mean that it's occurring because of a security vacuum. Remember Algeria in 1990s — a huge army was powerless against a modest insurgency. ...

The president has a problem: all the violence in Baghdad makes it look like we're losing the war, regardless the pace of reconstruction or political progress. Now the violence in Baghdad has become the political determinant of victory and defeat—and hence the primary focus of military strategy.

The generals have kept their eye on the ball: The deteriorating security situation in Baghdad is at root not a military problem but a political one. All the troops in the world will not reduce the violence if a political reconciliation continues to elude the major warring factions—and the increased presence of U.S. troops is more certain to increase the violence than reduce it. Occupation is a "toxin," as Abizaid points out, and "a wasting asset," as MacArthur once said.

On the other hand, Stanley Kurtz countered (on The Corner) that

Mario, the other day you said, “all the violence in Baghdad makes it look like we’re losing the war, regardless [of] the pace of reconstruction or political progress.” Yet it strikes me that there is no political progress, only regress. Baghdad is a Hobbesian anarchy of independent militias (see that Robert Zelnick article, “Iraq: Last Chance.”) In such an atmosphere, there can be no political stability and no hope for anything other than the dominance of militias. A troop surge may or may not work at this point, but I don’t see how we save Iraq without one. The current situation is not one of gradual military-political progress. It is one of hastening decline toward inevitable disaster if nothing substantially new is done to stop it.

Mario, you say that the “deteriorating security situation in Baghdad is at root not a military problem but a political one.” Well, that’s true in a sense. Yet politics, at its root depends on a monopoly of the legitimate means of force. In Iraq, there is no such monopoly on the national level. It exists–and then only tentatively–within tiny, local, militia controlled patches. So the root political problem is also, and simultaneously, a military problem. We either break the militias in the achingly slow, complicated, and methodical way recommended by Gerecht, or we concede that Iraq has fallen apart.

He also cites an editorial by Ruel Marc Gerecht in the New York Times, “In Iraq, Let’s Fight One War at a Time,” in which, after reviewing the situationwith the Shia militias, Gerecht's bottom line is that

The key for America is the same as it has been for years: to clear and hold the Sunni areas of Baghdad and the so-called Sunni triangle to the north. There will probably be no political solution among the Iraqi factions to save American troops from the bulk of this task. The sooner we start in Baghdad, the better the odds are that the radicalization of the Iraqi Shiites can be halted. As long as this community doesn’t explode into total militia war, Iraq is not lost, and neither is Mr. Bush’s presidency.

I tend to go with what Kurtz and Gerecht say. Loyola makes great points, and may well turn out to be right. To be honest the situation is so complicated, and I just don't have time to go through it all (it's amazing I get as much written here as I do), that I could be mistaken. But my impression is that waiting around for a political solution is not going to produce results.

So my assessment right now is to go with the Kagan-Keane plan, and replace the commanders.

Consequences of Failure

I know I keep harping on this, but it's so important that I think it a useful reminder whenever we're discussing Iraq strategy.

An article in yesterday's Washington Times tells of a CIA exercise in which some 75 analysists and outside experts conducted a simulation of what might happen if we were defeated in Iraq.

The CIA this month conducted a simulation of how the Iraq war affects the global jihadist movement, and one conclusion was that a U.S. loss would embolden al Qaeda to expand its ranks of terrorists as well as pick new strategic targets, according to sources familiar with the two-day exercise. ...

A source familiar with the simulation said it was a "red team" exercise in which participants played the role of global jihadists and war-gamed how the U.S. involvement in Iraq will influence their terror movement.

Although it takes no policy positions, the simulation's key finding appears to bolster Mr. Bush's contention that a U.S. loss in Iraq will have far-reaching ramifications.
...

Al Qaeda has made stopping democracy in Iraq a top priority, according to U.S. military officials. It has recruited hundreds of suicide bombers to come to Iraq and inflict mass casualties to spur a Sunni-Shi'ite Muslim civil war. The group wants to wear down U.S. troops to the point where they will retreat. Al Qaeda's ultimate goal is to turn Iraq and other Middle East countries into hard-line Islamic states, U.S. military officials say.

One key finding from the "red team" exercise is that al Qaeda will follow past practices. Jihadists perceived the victory over the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1988 as a seminal event that spawned the creation of al Qaeda under the direction of Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda leaders thought that if jihadists could defeat a global power in one theater, it could bring down governments in other nations.

Update

Bill Roggio is in Iraq, embedded with the Marines. While there, he's also been able to spend some time with the Iraqi Army. He reports on their shortcomings and successes. Check it out; what he says may not be quite what you expected.

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Here's the New Plan for Iraq

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December 19, 2006

Here's the New Plan for Iraq

There's a new plan for victory in Iraq.

Ok, it hasn't been officially adopted yet, but according to Fred Barnes a "senior advisor" said that the President's reaction after being briefed on it was "very positive."

The plan was authored by Retired General Jack Keane and Frederick W. Kagan, and is posted on the American Enterprise Institute's website. Here's a quick summary by Barnes

It envisions a temporary addition of 50,000 troops on the ground in Iraq. The initial mission would be to secure and hold the mixed Baghdad neighborhoods of Shia and Sunni residents where most of the violence occurs. Earlier efforts had cleared many of those sections of the city without holding them. After which, the mass killings resumed. Once neighborhoods are cleared, American and Iraqi troops in this plan would remain behind, living day-to-day among the population. Local government leaders would receive protection and rewards if they stepped in to provide basic services. Safe from retaliation by terrorists, residents would begin to cooperate with the Iraqi government. The securing of Baghdad would be followed by a full-scale drive to pacify the Sunni-majority Anbar province.

...

The Keane-Kagan plan is not revolutionary. Rather, it is an application of a counterinsurgency approach that has proved to be effective elsewhere, notably in Vietnam. There, Gen. Creighton Abrams cleared out the Viet Cong so successfully that the South Vietnamese government took control of the country. Only when Congress cut off funds to South Vietnam in 1974 were the North Vietnamese able to win.

Some people may be shocked to learn that yes, we did destroy the VC and most NVA troops in the south. Indeed, Linebacker II (December of 1972) put the fear of god into the communists to the point where they returned to the negotiating table as we wanted them to. As Barnes indicates, had not congress cut off funds the ARVN troops would have stood a fighting chance of holding off the NVA in 1974-75. But I digress.

On to the actual plan. I have not read the whole thing, as I just don't have time right now. Here's the important part of the executive summary on the AEI site

We must act now to restore security and stability to Baghdad. We and the enemy have identified it as the decisive point.

There is a way to do this.

o We must change our focus from training Iraqi soldiers to securing the Iraqi population and containing the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now it must become the first priority.
o We must send more American combat forces into Iraq and especially into Baghdad to support this operation. A surge of seven Army brigades and Marine regiments to support clear-and-hold operations starting in the Spring of 2007 is necessary, possible, and will be sufficient.
o These forces, partnered with Iraqi units, will clear critical Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shi’a neighborhoods, primarily on the west side of the city.
o After the neighborhoods have been cleared, U.S. soldiers and marines, again partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to maintain security.
o As security is established, reconstruction aid will help to reestablish normal life and, working through Iraqi officials, will strengthen Iraqi local government

This approach requires a national commitment to victory in Iraq:

o The ground forces must accept longer tours for several years. National Guard units will have to accept increased deployments during this period.
o Equipment shortages must be overcome by transferring equipment from non-deploying active duty, National Guard, and reserve units to those about to deploy. Military industry must be mobilized to provide replacement equipment sets urgently.
o The president must request a dramatic increase in reconstruction aid for Iraq. Responsibility and accountability for reconstruction must be assigned to established agencies. The president must insist upon the completion of reconstruction projects. The president should also request a dramatic increase in CERP funds.
o The president must request a substantial increase in ground forces end strength. This increase is vital to sustaining the morale of the combat forces by ensuring that relief is on the way. The president must issue a personal call for young Americans to volunteer to fight in the decisive conflict of this age.

Failure in Iraq today will require far greater sacrifices tomorrow in far more desperate circumstances.

It would seem to me that the key here is in the 3rd recommendation at top: "After the neighborhoods have been cleared, U.S. soldiers and marines, again partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to maintain security." I base this on our attempt to secure Baghdad in October and why it didn't work; see my posts Baghdad Security Plan and Baghdad Security Plan II.

If adopted, will it work? Beats me. Opinions are a dime a dozen, and I'm sure there'll be a million of them soon, some undoubtably in the comments section of this post, too. Just on NRO's The Corner blog alone, opinions on increasing troop strength vary. Mario Loyola says that " if we send 60,000 more troops to Iraq, the effect on the violence could easily prove to be negligible-to-zero", and compares the situation to the insurgency that Algeria went through in the 1990s, which "arose volcanically in the very teeth of an enormous army that was fully in control of the security situation everywhere." On the other hand, Rich Lowry and others there have consistenly argued for more troops. Anecdotal evidence (sorry, no links) from a variety of other sources seems to indicate that we can clear, but we can't hold, because the troops are always needed elsewhere and the Iraqis can't or won't themselves.

General Keane discussed the plan on This Week with George Stephanopoulos (quotes from The Corner)

GENERAL KEANE: In terms of the strategy itself, it's a fundamental change in the mission. The mission, people are focusing on the surge of the troops, but the essence of it is we changed the mission to the security of the people in Baghdad. We've never taken that on as a military mission before. Our mission has been transition to the Iraqi security forces and we made some inadequate attempts to secure Baghdad twice in the past.

We cleared out the insurgents and the Shia death squads from the areas but never committed ourselves to phase two of the operation, which is significant, and that is to put a 24/7 force in the neighborhoods to protect the people and they do not go back to their bases at night. It is a security of the people that's the key to success.

Baghdad would probably take . . . well into the fall of the year. And then we would turn to al-Anbar with a different mission. . . . And that would take another six to seven months, and that would probably go into '08, as well.

The economic package to this is very important. It has two phases to it. The first one would be basic services while we're protecting the people. And then another economic package for enhanced quality of life services that would be tied to an incentive package in terms of their cooperation and their willingness to help us in turning over who the death squad members are and who the insurgents are.

And that takes time for the people to realize that this really is a secure situation. And bring the economic packages in and they begin to isolate the insurgents who are trying to sneak back in. Our problem in the past in Fallujah, in Samara, twice in Baghdad, has always been the same problem, we ran the insurgents out and we never put the protection force in to secure the people.

So Keane and Kagan are not just agitating for "more troops" without any real idea as to what they'd do. That's a good thing, too, because Ralph Peters has some very hard questions for anyone who would do so

What would the specific tasks be? "Restore security" is too vague - we need to identify no-nonsense objectives. And which new tactics would be authorized? Would the rules of engagement change?

How would we handle prisoners, given that a crackdown would generate tens of thousands (and the Iraqi system releases the worst offenders)? What if the Maliki government rejects our plan?

At that point, the think-tank boys give you a deer-in-the-headlights look and spurt empty generalities. Our military is supposed to figure out the pesky details.

But it's the details that make the difference between succeeding and failing.

Read the whole thing. Peters has often been very critical of the way we've been fighting in Iraq, but it's only because he wants us to win.

BTW, there is an existing plan, and it's on the White House website.

And I know I've said this many times, but it bears repeating what Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence, better known as "Lawrence of Arabia", said about defeating insurgencies, that it's like "eating soup with a knife". In other words, you can do it, but it's messy and takes a long time. (see my post on this here) This said, citizens of a democracy want to see progress. I think that the American people can be patient and can accept casualties, as long as they see the goal as worthwhile and that progress is being made. Fortunately we've got a president who doesn't give up easily.

Posted by Tom at 8:34 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack

December 16, 2006

Iraq War Update

Time for a general update on where I think we are in this war. And although this post says it's about Iraq, it's really not just about that country. Iraq is only part of a larger war. And call this larger war what you will; Islamic fascism, extremism, or radicalism, or even just Islamism or Jihadism. Just don't use "War on Terror", because we're not fighting a tactic. Our enemy is the ideology that has infected Islam.

And just to make myself even more clear, no I do not believe that Islam is an evil religion, or even necessarily violent. I made that clear in this post. Islam in the way it is practiced does have a problem with intolerance, violence, and extremism, but that is another matter.

As such, it is a mistake to see Iraq or Afghanistan as "the war". They are theaters in the war. Important ones, to be sure, but only in the sense that France and the low countries were an important theater in World War II. Even then, our enemy was that varient of totalitarianism that went by Nazism or Fascism.

Overview

This is no doubt the most important theater of the war. Although some American liberals do not see it as part of the War on Islamic Fascism(the term I'll use), that's not what the radicals believe. They think that Iraq is the main front in the war. If some folks don't want to listen to President Bush, they ought to at least listen to the enemy.

Now, I know perfectly well that much of the problem in Iraq is intersectarian fighting.

But much of this was prompted by al Qaeda in Iraq, and their constant attempts over the past several years to prompt a civil war between the Sunnis and Shias.

The point is that the situation does not seem to be getting better. We are apparently in a sort of stalemate, which I would think in the long run favors those who want an Islamic dictatorship.

No doubt there is much we could and should have done differently. But even if we had not made the mistakes that, say, Thomas Ricks says we made, there is no guarantee that things would have turned out differently. As Charles Krauthammer said, "We have given the Iraqis a republic and they do not appear able to keep it". There is only so much that we can do. Either the Iraqis will pick up the ball and run with it or they won't. As StrategyPage reminds us, corruption and military incompetence is endemic in that part of the world, and awefully hard to overcome. To be fair, the Iraqis are just coming out of 30 years of vicious dictatorship. One wonders how we would have faired if, rather than George III, our colonies had been ruled by Louis XVI. Perhaps it's not a wonder the French Revolution turned out the way it did.

We also shouldn't blame the American people too much. There is a temptation on the right, I think, to become frustrated that American's won't tolerate a long war, even one that by historical standards isn't very costly (see chart). I think Mara Liasson has it right when she commented on Fox News that "I don't think the American people are rising up against casualties. I think that they're looking at Iraq and they don't see success. They see Iraqis killing each other, they don't see the government coming together, and that's the problem. I don't think it's the casualty level."

Here's the chart I referred to above, click on it to enlarge

It's also not that our troops aren't killing the enemy in droves. They are. But Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki has proven ineffectual, and can not or will not deal with either the insurgents or private armies such as the Badr Organization (armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)) or the Mahdi Army (controlled by firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr).

Consequences

The consequences of failure could be horrific. Independent journalist Michael Yon is in Cambodia, and visited one of the museums dedicated to "The Killing Fields" of the 1970s. It's a post well worth reading, for the horrors inflicted by the Khymer Rouge rival anything the Nazis did. If we leave Iraq, it's quite possible the country could descend into Cambodia or Rwanda-levels of violence.

Retired General Barry McCaffrey spells out what withdrawal could look like:

We could immediately and totally withdraw. In less than six months, our 150,000 troops could fight their way along strategic withdrawal corridors back to the sea and the safety provided by the Navy. Several million terrified refugees would follow, the route of our columns marked by the burning pyres of abandoned military supplies demolished by our rear guard. The resulting civil warfare would probably turn Iraq into a humanitarian disaster and might well draw in the Iranians and Syrians. It would also deeply threaten the safety and stability of our allies in neighboring countries.

And this doesn't even speak to the general loss of US prestige and power that would no doubt result from a precipitous pull out. It would mean a return to Carterism, to the 1970s. Just as the Soviet Union was newly ascendant then, the Islamic Fascists would gain much strength if we lose in Iraq.

A Coming Change of Strategy?

Many of us wondered what President Bush would do about the report by the Iraq Study Group ("The Baker Commission"). Fortunately, he seems to have rejected most of it's conclusions, especially the ones that suggested that we essentially plead with Syria and Iran to help us stabilize Iraq. The question is, what comes next?

I think that the President is on the verge of a major announcement. I know you're also probably read that elsewhere, so I'm not claiming any special insight. Charles Krauthammer is one, for example. Fred Barnes also suggested as much on the Fox News Special Report with Brit Hume last Thursday night.

The President won't want to interrupt the holidays, so he will probably make it sometime in early January. He will, I predict, announce a fairly significant change in strategy. It will consist of two parts; a temporary "surge" of troops, and various leadership changes.

Many on the right, at least, have been advocating more troops as of late. The Washington Times and National Review(and here) have each advocated sending in more soldiers and marines. According to this story in the Los Angeles Times, it's what the Pentagon wants, and has recommended to the President be done.

To be sure, simply sending in more troops won't by itself do it. As Michael Ledeen points out, we ought to loosten up the rules of engagement as well. This is not without risk, because it will result in additional damage and casualties it will likely alienate some Iraqis (see this undated video of a firefight in Fallujah for a taste of realism).

I also think it likely that General Abizaid and General Casey will be replaced as well. They're both good men, but they've had their chance. Lincoln changed generals quite often when they weren't getting the job done. Unfortunately, President Bush has not. It is possible that he or Rumsfeld General Sanchez over Abu Ghraib, but there is no hard evidence to support this. Bush tends to appoint someone, and then stay with them until the bitter end. He stayed with Rumsfeld for years, and when he finally did fire him it was at the worst possible time, just after the GOP had lost the November elections so as to make a defeat look worse. Nevertheless, it's time for new blood at CENTCOM. We've got many talented generals, and it's time to give some of them the top slots.

Another benefit to doing these things is that it would show the Iraqi government, the militias, and the terrorists that yes we do mean business and no we're not going to quit the fight as you hope we will. Amir Taheri raised the point in an op-ed a few weeks ago that it's not just that we doubt the Iraqis; they doubt us, too; "uncertainty about the United States' policies is also the No. 1 issue of Iraqi politics", he reminds us. They can read history too, and know that from Vietnam to Beruit to Somalia, we've bugged out before victory was secured.

Additional Plans

I would be remiss to suggest that "more troops" or "new people" were all that was needed. The situation is more complicated than that.

First, we ought to beef up the size of our military as a whole. Now, as I pointed out even this is not so simple.

The LA Times story linked to above points out that

The problem with any sort of surge is that it would require an eventual drop-off in 2008, unless the president was willing to take the politically unpopular move of remobilizing the National Guard and sending reserve combat units back to Iraq.

But military officials are taking a close look at a proposal advanced by Frederick W. Kagan, a former West Point Military Academy historian, to combine a surge with a quick buildup of the Marines and the Army. That could allow new units to take the place of the brigades sent to Iraq to augment the current force.

I would think that all of this would require additional monies, which only Congress can provide. It is, of course, now controlled by the Democrats, many of whom want just the opposite of a troop buildup, especially in Iraq. At best, they will want presidential concessions in other policy areas. While some negotiating will be necessary, the president can stem the damage by playing the "Truman Card". President Truman, after suffering a loss of congress to the GOP in 1950, said something to the effect that "the heck with them, I'm just going to do what I well please for the next two years."

Clifford May, writing at National Review, provides six steps we might take:

We might start by stabilizing Baghdad — as we said we would. When the United States says it’s going to do something that should not mean trying for a while, then giving up. If stabilizing Baghdad requires more troops — or different commanders — send them. A victory in the Battle of Baghdad, the most diverse area of Iraq with more than a quarter of the country’s population, would have major and beneficial consequences.

Second, we are at war with al Qaeda and al Qaeda’s most lethal forces are in Iraq. So we must stay and fight them in Iraq. We don’t flee the battleground.

Third, when we chased Saddam Hussein from his palaces, we thought we had broken his regime. Big error. Baathist insurgents still need to be hunted down.

Fourth, we have to deal with the regimes in Iran and Syria. That means finally demonstrating that we can and will hurt them if they to continue to conspire to kill Americans and Iraqis who work with us. Once that is done, once they understand we have the power and the will to take them on, sitting down to talk may make sense.

Fifth, we intensify and accelerate the training of Iraqi forces so that sooner, rather than later, they can stand up to the bad guys on their own.

Sixth, we act as an honest broker between Iraq’s Sunni and Shia communities. Who else can play that role? It may be that these populations need fences to be good neighbors — a process of separation is already underway. We can make that process less painful and perilous. We ought to consider what Brookings scholar Michael O’Hanlon calls the Bosnian model: Each of Iraq’s ethno-religious groups would establish autonomy within a unitary Iraqi state. Oil wealth would be shared by all cooperating and stabilized areas of the country.

All of these things make sense, although with most it's not a question of what but how.

Charles Krauthammer boils it all down to two things we must do

First, as I’ve been agitating, establish a new governing coalition in Baghdad that excludes Moqtada al-Sadr, a cancer that undermines the Maliki government’s ability to work with us. It is encouraging that the president has already begun such a maneuver by meeting with rival Shiite and Sunni parliamentary leaders. If we help produce a cross-sectarian government that would be an ally rather than a paralyzed semi-adversary of coalition forces, we should then undertake part two: “double down” our military effort. This means a surge in American troops with a specific mission: to secure Baghdad and (together with the support of the Baghdad government — a sine qua non) suppress Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

A little better and more succinct than what May offered, I believe, although he is essentially on the right track.

Lastly, we'll go back to Barry McCaffrey, in the Washington Post editorial cited above, for his ideas on how to win:

First, we must commit publicly to provide $10 billion a year in economic support to the Iraqis over the next five years. In the military arena, it would be feasible to equip and increase the Iraqi armed forces on a crash basis over the next 24 months (but not the police or the Facilities Protection Service). The goal would be 250,000 troops, provided with the material and training necessary to maintain internal order.

Within the first 12 months we should draw down the U.S. military presence from 15 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), of 5,000 troops each, to 10. Within the next 12 months, Centcom forces should further draw down to seven BCTs and withdraw from urban areas to isolated U.S. operating bases -- where we could continue to provide oversight and intervention when required to rescue our embedded U.S. training teams, protect the population from violence or save the legal government.

Finally, we have to design and empower a regional diplomatic peace dialogue in which the Iraqis can take the lead, engaging their regional neighbors as well as their own alienated and fractured internal population.

Hmm. I agree with the investment, doubt that it's a good idea to advertise a drawdown schedule, and wonder what in the world he's talking about with regard to a "regional peace dialogue"? Sounds too much like Baker-Hamilton to me.

Conclusion: Krauthammer gets an A, Mays a B, and McCaffrey a D+. Surge troops, replace the generals, and increase the overall size of the military. Dare the Democrats to oppose you, Mr Bush. It's crunch time, we're playing catch-up football, and it's not just your place in history that matters, but whether we're going to win a victory in this war on Islamic Fascism or go back to the days of Carterism and malaise.

Posted by Tom at 8:30 PM | Comments (7) | TrackBack

December 2, 2006

The Coming Loss of US Power Worldwide?

You don't have to go far to find advice on how to win in Iraq. Some say send more troops, others say that no, troop levels are not the problem and thus not the solution. I do not know which is right, but I do know this, that if we lose it will be a disaster that will rival or exceed that of the Vietnam debacle.

I extensively quoted from an article by David Rivkin the other day in which he laid out the situation with great clarity. Read the whole thing, but his conclusion is that

A U.S. loss in Iraq would be taken as a sign that the time had come to launch ever bolder attacks on American soil and against American interests overseas, and to push for the creation of a global caliphate. Thus, an America that fails to stop suicide bombings on the streets of Baghdad, Fallujah, and Ramadi is likely to face them on the streets of New York, Washington, and Los Angeles.

The bottom line is that, with our ability to project power against the Islamist forces dramatically diminished, we would have to fight a largely reactive war, focusing mainly on homeland defense against an emboldened enemy. History’s lessons concerning such warfare are not encouraging. To take but one example, the Roman Empire in the 4th century ceased strategic offensive operations and, ultimately, was overwhelmed by the barbarians.

I think he is exactly right. In a comment on The Corner, Victor Davis Hanson adds that it would not just be the perception of a loss of power, but an actual loss of power

If we lost in Iraq and fled, it would not be the perception at all, but the reality of power that would be gone, in the sense the United States would never in our lifetime intervene successfully again on the ground abroad-convinced it would inevitably lose.

I think we are also close to seeing the permanent end of any Anglo-American military collaboration. And there would be legitimate questions raised also whether the U.S. military could win any future war—given the knowledge that, barring some instantaneous victory, the American public would not allow it the time or the latitude to destroy its enemies.

Unfortunately it looks like we're headed down that direction.

It is possible that we could tangle with China over Taiwan. If we do, it will be quick and decisive. One way or another, within a week or two we'll know who's won. Likewise, if North Korea goes nuts and attacks the South, it won't last more than a month or so.

But both of those are hypotheticals. We're in a real war now, one against Islamic fascism or Jihadism. Like the Cold War it's going to take decades to win, but unlike it this one's going to be hotter more often.

Giving Up?

We're all aware that the Iraq Study Group, sometimes called the Baker Commission, is about to issue it's report. We've all also heard the various reports of what it will contain. I tend to fear the worst in these situations, and have a bad feeling that the Bush Administration is looking for political cover so that it can begin to withdraw troops - yes you read that right.

Mona Charen believes that we're about to give up.

America is the world’s hyperpower. No other nation or group of nations can challenge us militarily or economically. Unlike sickly Europe, we are growing, not contracting. But we are about to be defeated in Iraq by a few thousand cutthroats.

How did this happen? It’s simple: The only thing powerful enough to defeat us is ourselves, and we’ve done it.
...

The writing is not just on the wall, it’s on the floors, ceilings, tables, and chairs — we are about to give up.

Charles Krauthammer says that it's more the Iraqis fault than ours:

We have given the Iraqis a republic and they do not appear able to keep it. ...

The problem is not, as we endlessly argue about, the number of American troops. Or of Iraqi troops. The problem is the allegiance of the Iraqi troops. Some serve the abstraction called Iraq. But many swear fealty to political parties, religious sects, or militia leaders.

He does see a "glimmer of hope" in the breakdown of the Shiite coalition, and says that we ought to try and form a new one that truely cuts across sectarian lines.

Lastly, we have Bill Kristol, who on Fox News Sunday with Chris Wallace, declared that Four months from now, if things continue to slide downhill, if the president hasn't adjusted course, if hawks like Senator McCain haven't been satisfied that there's been an increase in troops or that we have a real strategy for victory, I think . . . we could be looking at a Democratic House and some Republicans who are willing to just pull the plug on Iraq.

He might be right.

Consequences Again

As I mentioned in the beginning, and in the other post of mine that I linked to, a loss in Iraq will embolden the Jihadists to a huge degree. Right now they're as tied up in Iraq as we are, but once we're gone, they'll be free to attack us elsewhere. And believe you me, they will.

As Rivkin said, we'd then be fighting a reactive war. The problem with defending against terrorism is that you have to be perfect, you have to stop them everywhere all of the time. The terrorists, however, can afford to lost most of the time as long as a few of their attacks are successful, because this is what our media will concentrate on.

Right now the ratio of US to insurgent casualties are incredible. Jim Geraghty has done the research

In Iraq, I’ve seen several sources cite “about 55,000” insurgents killed; they’re listed as “Iraqi insurgents,” but I have not seen any specification of what percentage are Iraqi and what percentage are foreign fighters.

As of this writing, the number of U.S. troops who have died in Iraq stands at 2,867. I’ve also seen the figure 2,493 for deaths from hostile action.

This suggests that about 22 bad guys are killed for every U.S. combat death; 19 to 1 if you use the total U.S. death figure.

I can find no clear and specific number as to how many Taliban and al-Qaeda have been killed in Afghanistan since the start of hostilities there in 2001. I would prefer a better source than Wikipedia, but they list 5,500 killed and 1,000 captured. According to Wikipedia, 187 Americans have died in hostile action, 102 died in non-hostile action.

Again, about 29 to 1 in terms of combat deaths, or 19 to 1 in terms of all U.S. deaths.

StrategyPage points out that contrary to the popular perception, Iraq is not the most dangerous place on the planet

There are other parts of the world that are more violent than Iraq. Africa, for example, especially Congo, Sudan and South Africa. Only South Africa has a sufficiently effective government to actually keep track of the death rate, mostly from crime, but it's over 50 per 100,000. It's worse in places like Congo and Sudan, but the numbers there are only estimates by peacekeepers and relief workers. In southern Thailand, a terror campaign by Islamic radicals has caused a death rate of over 80 per 100,

None of this is to say that the levels of violence in Iraq aren't unacceptably high. They are. My point is that that it's no reason to pull out. As I said in my last post, for the most part the same people who are telling us that we have to get out of Iraq because it's supposedly in a state of civil war were telling us that we had to get into Kosovo/Bosnia because it was, and now lament that we didn't go into Rwanda to stop that civil war.

But I've drifted off-topic. If we pull out of Iraq without winning, no country will trust us again. They'll make the smart play and make a deal with the Jihadists.

Don't think that we can put up the barricades and hide in our own countries. Mark Steyn is surely right when he says that Europe is already lost, to find out why read my post on his latest book.

So the left may get it's Vietnam, but unlike then the enemy will not be content to say at home and consolidate their power. The Vietnamese communists were nominally part of the worldwide communist movement, but unlike the Soviets they weren't expansionist. The Jihadists are, to say the least.

This goes so far beyond Iraq, and it's distressing that the anti-war liberals don't seem to know this, or even care to ask. At the least Iran will be even more emboldened than it is. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey will go nuclear as they won't trust the US. China may make it's move against Taiwan. Kim Jong Il may go even nuttier than he is and attack the South.

I wrote a few months ago in two posts that the stars seem to be aligning against us, and it's 1938 or even 1939 all over again. I see no reason to change the conclusions I reached in either of them.

Posted by Tom at 8:30 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack

Civil War? Not

There's been a lot of talk about whether Iraq is in a state of civil war or not. NBC News said that after "careful consideration" it has decided that it would now use the term "civil war" to label what was going on over there. In fact, as you shall see if you keep reading, the liberals in the media plan on using the term "civil war" as a reason for us to pull out of Iraq regardless-of-consequences.

StrategyPage has another view, one that I think is really more accurate. In a piece called "The Final Solution", and published almost a week before NBC's announcement, they say that

There's been a lot of talk about whether Iraq is in a state of civil war or not. NBC News said that after "careful consideration" it has decided that it would now use the term "civil war" to label what was going on over there. In fact, as you shall see if you keep reading, the liberals in the media plan on using the term "civil war" as a reason for us to pull out of Iraq regardless-of-consequences.

StrategyPage has another view, one that I think is really more accurate. In a piece called "The Final Solution", and published almost a week before NBC's announcement, they say that

Most of the Iraqi troops are Shia Arab, and they talk openly fighting for a "Sunni Arab Free" Iraq. Shades of the "Final Solution." While the faint hearted Sunni Arabs continue to flee across the border, or to the few Sunni Arab areas in Iraq that do not host Sunni Arab terrorist groups, many Iraqi Sunni Arabs have vowed to fight to the end. This is a major issue in the Arab world, where the struggle between the Sunni and Shia branches has long been fought without much violence. But in Iraq, this thousand year old feud is very real, very deadly, and being closely watched by Iraq's neighbors.

Ethnic cleansing has been a StrategyPage theme for several months now, and indeed it seems that is what is happening. James Robbins points out that most people think of a civil war as a situaion in which there are rival governments,, and concludes that

...this is not merely a civil war; it is an international conflict with significant regional impact. Reducing the conflict in Iraq to a civil war does not clarify our options. Maybe the people who are so committed to the expression can explain what difference it makes in policy terms, that is if this is anything more than a semantic game. If it is a civil war, what then? How does that affect our over all strategy? What changes need to be made? How can we win it? Unless this word play leads to concrete policy recommendations, it is a great waste of time.

The anti-war people are telling us that we have to get out of Iraq because it's in a civil war and we cannot stop civil wars. Or that it's not worth the price. Something along these lines.

But aren't these mostly the same folks who told us that we had to get into Kosovo/Bosnia because they were in a civil war and we had to stop it? And aren't they mostly the same people who go around saying "never again" with regard to Rwanda, where the fighting between the Tutsi's and Hutu's was a civil war if there ever was one?

Now, I think that President Clinton was right to stop the bloodshed in Kosovo and Bosnia. It became apparent that the Europeans couldn't put out a fire in their own backyard, and that the UN was as usual useless, so he did what he had to do. Good for him. I don't blame Clinton for not acting on Rwanda, as it was a situation that the UN was supposed to have been controlling, and it's easy to moralize after the fact.

No, what bugs me is these people who are using the term "civil war" as a political weapon.

So if the whole "civil war" business isn't about the reality on the ground, what is it about? In his Media Blog, Stephen Spruiell has it about right, I think:

Let's cut right to what this "civil war" fanfare in the media is really all about: It has nothing to do with the ongoing violence in Iraq, and everything to do with the fact that these media organizations, which are struggling to maintain their relevance in a rapidly changing industry, feel the need to assert themselves and remind the public of their importance, and what better way than by calling the war for the insurgents and starting a push to solidify public opinion in favor of immediate withdrawal?

Spruiell links to another post at NewsBusters where they post the "screen cap" from the NBC story, which says "Civil War: How Can the U.S. Get Out of Iraq?"

Get it? This is going to be the new theme of the anti-war crowd, that because Iraq is in a civil war we have to get out. Look for more of this to come.

As usual, some of the berst analysis is over at Belmont Club. Check out Wretchard's latest. Here are some of the most important parts:

The first and fatal miscalculation by the Sunnis was to think they could drive the US Armed Forces from Iraq, a gamble which they lost. Encouraged by the absence of a crushing campaign in northern Iraq, itself possibly caused by the absence of the 4ID from the OIF order of battle, and alienated by the American decision to "de-Baathize" Iraq, many former military Sunnis chose to continue resistance using guerilla tactics. ...

The Sunni insurgency compounded its military failures by ruthlessly suppressing any attempts by their ethnic leaders to participate in political process sponsored by the Coalition and by murdering any Sunni who came forward to join the new Army and Police. The result was that Sunnis were underrepresented in both the Constitutional convention and in the elections of 2005. It was a double-whammy. Not only were Sunni military resources depleted, but they self-selected themselves out of the American sponsored Iraqi government.
...

Westhawk observes that American officers believe that "Iraq’s Sunni Arabs will continue to fight because they believe they face either extermination or banishment if they do not." With the Sunni military struggle essentially hopeless, efforts to redress the balance within the Iraqi political process arrived too late. The door had been barred by Shi'ite extremism fueled by Moqtada al-Sadr and separately, the agents of Iran. In a remarkable display of nonstatesmanship, the Shi'ite parties headed by Iraqi PM Maliki and goaded by al-Sadr proved less interested in building an Iraq than upon obtaining revenge upon their former masters.

I suppose one can say that it's a civil war in the sense that you have two camps, Sunni and Shia, who are fighting each other. Each has a militia and/or terrorist/death squads. Unfortunately the debate is marred by bad faith on the part of some in the anti-war camp, such as NBC News, who are using the issue to advance their political agenda.

But either way, I'm not sure what difference it makes. If we went into Kosovo/Bosnia to stop a civil war, and are supposed to regret that we didn't go into Rwanda, shouldn't we stay to stop the violence in Iraq?

Posted by Tom at 8:00 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

November 28, 2006

"No Substitute for Victory"

Apologies for the light blogging recently. Holiday and other events have conspired to keep me away from the computer.

I'm gathering information for a general Iraq update, but since it will be somewhat depressing I thought that first I'd lay out the stakes. Lo and behold but David Rivkin did that for me in the November 20 print edition of National Review. You can view his article on-line if you have a digital subscription.

Rivkin's thesis is that "Iraq matters". Whether it was right for us to have gone in or not is now beside the point. Dithering over who is to blame for the mistakes we have made is also not productive. Rather, Iraq "is an integral part of the war against Islamist terrorism... and that the consequences of defeat would be dire."

Iraq matters a great deal in the broader War on Terror precisely because building democracy in the heart of the Islamic world enables us to pose an ideological challenge to our enemies — unlike ineffectual soft-sell efforts to convince Islamists of our basic goodness.

I said much the same thing in August of 2004 in a post in which I said that going into Iraq put us on the strategic offensive, the advantage of which was that we were taking the war to the enemy. Rather than skirmishing with his advance units, we had gone straight to his headquarters in a daring raid. What Rivkin adds is the ideological element, and I think he has a point.

We can argue over concepts of liberty and democracy, and of course while the two are related they are not quite the same thing. And we can also say that while Iraq may have democracy and some liberty, since it does not have security the former two don't matter much. Fine and good. But the Islamists are certainly worried. They know that if democracy and liberty take hold in Iraq they are doomed. Rivkin spells it out for us

The Islamist ideology is animated by the idea that sharia-based governance is both inevitable and the only alternative to the Middle East’s existing corrupt and authoritarian regimes. Just as the Soviets understood that the demonstration of one Communist regime’s illegitimacy would be a demonstration of all Communist regimes’ illegitimacy — the real reason for the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine — al-Qaeda and other Islamists readily grasp that the success of democracy in Iraq would have catastrophic consequences for their legitimacy. Indeed, because Iraq’s much-maligned constitution fuses Islam and democracy — unlike, say, the secular Turkish constitution — it poses a uniquely powerful challenge to the jihadist ideology. U.S. critics of the Iraqi government focus solely on its shortcomings and fail to realize that the jihadists view its mere survival — no matter how weak it is, or how plagued by internal fighting, or how tenuous its ability to provide security — as a grave threat. The jihadists know that the establishment of a democratic polity that empowers women and calls for all of Iraq’s communities to enjoy political and economic rights would be a fundamental blow to their cause. This is the main reason Islamic extremists of all stripes have unleashed horrific violence on Iraq.

I remember all the angst when the Iraqi constitution was first announced. Many Americans were very disappointed that it incorporated Islam, and did not include many protections that we would consider vital, such as a Western-type bill of rights.

But before we despair we need to consider a few things. One, our own constution initially allowed for slavery and did not give the vote to women. Yet we have been able to rid ourselves of the first and enable the latter while keeping the originial document. Further, the only democratic example in the Islamic world is in Turkey, and the "Mustafa Kemal model" is much despised by Arabs. Further, it depended too much on the force of will of a a single powerful person.

The simple fact of the matter is that any Arab constitution is going to incorporate Islam and we might as well get used to it. Better, I think, to work towards long-term reform of Islam than try and marginalize it, which didn't work for the Shah and won't work in Iraq. Perhaps we can reform it if we can install some sort of democratic government.

The Consequences of Defeat

There is a certain type on the left, and even some on the paleo-right, who almost laugh at the idea that there will be dire consequences if we are defeated in Iraq. They point to Vietnam and say "See! You tried to scare us with your domino theory and nothing happened!"

But Iraq is not Vietnam, for a million reasons. The Islamists will use Iraq as a springboard to overthrow the regimes in surrounding countries. They will ally with Iran. They will come after us in Europe and America.

Given these stakes, even partially successful democracy promotion in the Islamic world and the creation of a modestly pro-American and strongly anti-jihadist government in the heart of the Middle East would be a stunning strategic defeat for al-Qaeda and its allies. It would be a brilliant geopolitical stroke, fusing American idealism with the imperatives of realpolitik. Conversely, the consequences of a U.S. loss in Iraq would be manifold and dire. Most obviously, the fates of Baghdad and Kabul are inextricably intertwined. This is because the Taliban and Qaeda elements in Afghanistan would surely be emboldened by a U.S. defeat in Iraq, while the pro-Karzai forces would be demoralized. A defeat in Iraq would also make it difficult to retain support, both in the U.S. and internationally, for Western efforts in Afghanistan.

More fundamentally, those who claim that the current Hobbesian chaos in Iraq can be neatly separated from other Middle East trouble spots, and that it does not affect America’s influence in the region, are utterly wrong. The war of all against all, with nationalism and Islamic extremism thrown in as the major motivating forces, is not limited to Iraq; it occurs frequently throughout the region, appearing in places where American troops have never set foot.

Certainly at this point the goal of a democratic, anti-jihadist Iraq looks difficult to achieve. We should consider, however, that in most past wars there were points at which the eventual victor faced severe setbacks if not outright defeat. But sticking to the point, I concur that Rivkin's essential point that a defeat in Iraq would have devastating consequences across the region if not the globe. Those who see everything through the lens of Vietnam ought to consider what happened in the 1970s after our defeat in Vietnam.

We also know that Islamist forces have perceived a long series of American retreats — in places ranging from Vietnam to Beirut to Mogadishu — as a sign that, in bin Laden’s charming words, the U.S. is a “weak horse.” His sentiment is not uncommon; Islamists are constantly searching for evidence of their foes’ weakness.

One of Reagan's biggest mistakes was pulling the Marines out of Beirut after the bombing of their barracks. At the time we did not see that we were setting a pattern, one that would be repeated in our pullout of Mogadishu, and the non-response to the bombing of the USS Cole.

The U.S. retreated from Vietnam after being engaged there politically and militarily for nearly a decade and suffering almost 60,000 war deaths and 150,000 casualties. It paid a huge geopolitical price in the form of emboldened Soviet foreign policy in the 1970s and ’80s and a precipitous decline in U.S. credibility worldwide.

Those who claim that "the domino's didn't fall" after our withdrawal from Vietnam ought to study the history of the 1970s more carefully. Carterism led to an agressive Soviet Union. The result was the invasion of Afghanistan, increased Soviet influence in Africa, and insurgencies in Central America. If anything, the Islamists will be worse. At least the communists didn't seek to directly attack our homeland; the Islamic terrorists will.

A U.S. loss in Iraq would be taken as a sign that the time had come to launch ever bolder attacks on American soil and against American interests overseas, and to push for the creation of a global caliphate. Thus, an America that fails to stop suicide bombings on the streets of Baghdad, Fallujah, and Ramadi is likely to face them on the streets of New York, Washington, and Los Angeles.

The bottom line is that, with our ability to project power against the Islamist forces dramatically diminished, we would have to fight a largely reactive war, focusing mainly on homeland defense against an emboldened enemy. History’s lessons concerning such warfare are not encouraging. To take but one example, the Roman Empire in the 4th century ceased strategic offensive operations and, ultimately, was overwhelmed by the barbarians.

Eating Soup With A Knife

It is possible that we will lose in Iraq. I do not discount this.

It is also quite possible that we can win. Countries have pulled themselves out of seemingly impossible situations before and gone on to victory.

Insurgencies can be defeated. However, unlike fighting a conventional army, defeating an insurgency is difficult, messy, and takes a lot of time. In the words of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence, better known as "Lawrence of Arabia", it's like being like eating soup with a knife. Back in March of this year I wrote a post on this very subject, taking Lt. Col. John Nagl's recent book Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife as a guide.

In his conclusion, Rivkin says much the same thing

There are no easy shortcuts to victory. Counterinsurgency campaigns are won by staying in the fight and grinding down the insurgents. Defeating the insurgencies in Malaysia and Algeria took years of hard fighting, with high civilian and military casualties.

Once again, whether it was right for us to have invaded Iraq is beside the point. The simple fact is that it is part of our war against Islamic terorrism, and those who say otherwise are dead wrong. The consequences of defeat would reverberate for decades, and it is not clear to me that we could recover. As Mark Steyn points out, we can lose this war; not the one in Iraq, but the entire one against the Islamists. Losing Iraq would only be the beginning of the end.

Posted by Tom at 9:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

November 11, 2006

Ratchet up the Pressure in Iraq?

I've seen several interesting articles recently about what to do with Iraq. Usually we just hear two options; "stay the course" or "pull out now". The first will probably not result in victory, and the latter certainly won't. For someone who does believe that victory must be our goal, I believe that we need to come up with something new and fast. Last July I wrote about some new ideas that had been suggested to me in a roundtable discussion in Foreign Affairs by commenter jason. I didn't agreeing with most of the ideas presented, but that didn't mean they weren't worth considering. As we've seen, our plan for securing Baghdad against the recent insurgent offensive isn't working (here and here).

The good news, as Chester reports, is that

A small group of officers assembled by Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to draw up alternatives to the U.S. military strategy in Iraq is expected to conclude its work in December, according to defense sources. Some observers anticipate the recommendations will call for a dramatic change of course in the Persian Gulf nation and perhaps in the war on terrorism more broadly.

First today we'll take a look at what William J. Stuntz says in The Weekly Standard.

First off he talks about the natural inclination not to "throw good money after bad." Looking at Iraq the same way one would look at a financial investment, one could be excused for thinking it's time to cut our losses and pull out. But of course, Iraq is not a financial investment. Unlike in financial matters, in war a "willingness to raise the stakes often wins the game."

Why do insurgent gangs, who have vastly smaller resources and manpower than the American soldiers they fight, continue to try to kill those soldiers? The answer is, because they believe they only have to kill a few more, and the soldiers will leave. They need not inflict a military defeat (which would be impossible, given the strength of the American military)--all they need to do is survive until American voters decide to throw in the towel, which might happen at any moment.

The proper response to that calculation is to make emphatically clear that the fight will not end until one side or the other wins, decisively. That kind of battle can only have one ending, as Abraham Lincoln understood. In a speech delivered a month after his reelection, Lincoln carefully surveyed the North's resources and manpower and concluded that the nation's wealth was "unexhausted and, as we believe, inexhaustible." Southern soldiers be gan to desert in droves. Through the long, bloody summer and fall of 1864, the South had hung on only because of the belief that the North might tire of the conflict. But Lincoln did not tire. Instead, he doubled the bet--and won the war.

In other words, now is the time to ratchet things up by sending in more troops. Stuntz continues

Send just enough soldiers and guns and tanks to do the job, and you may soon find you have sent too few. The enemy concludes that if it can raise the marginal cost of the conflict just a bit, if casualties are a little higher or the expense a tad greater than you imagined, you'll quit the field. On the other hand, send vastly more soldiers and materiel than required to the battlefield, and the enemy soon decides that the fight is hopeless--that, as Lincoln so elegantly put it, our resources are unexhausted and, as we believe, inexhaustible.

Maybe. One certainly has to think that the insurgents (and yes I know they're a mixed bunch) are just trying to wait us out, always figuring that if they can kill just a few more Americans we'll give it up.

Possibly referring to the policy review led by Gen Pace, Ralph Peters says that

One proposal under discussion within the administration is to "send everything we've got" - to deploy every possible Army and Marine unit, no matter how worn and weary, for six months to "clean things up.

Let's hope that it's at least under consideration. I'm tired of half-measures. So is Rich Lowry.

Richard Fernandez over at Belmont Club cites a post at Westhawk in which the latter runs through a point-counterpoint regarding the benefits of fighting in Iraq.

What contribution has offense made to preventing another terror attack on the U.S. homeland? This gets into controversial territory. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 seemed to shut down the Al Qaeda terrorist training factory that had produced thousands of trained cadres. Critics of the Iraq war claim that the terror training factory just moved to Baghdad and al-Anbar province, as a result of the American decision to invade Iraq.

Proponents of the “fly paper” theory argue that many foreign terrorists have been drawn to the Iraq jihad, only to die shortly after arriving. Critics counter by asserting that the Iraq war has energized a new generation of Islamic youth to take up arms against the U.S.

But, war proponents say, bringing a long and nasty war into the heart of a dysfunctional Arab world has accomplished two positive things for the West. First, it has shown the Arabs what a monster Al Qaeda really is. Second, it will force the Arabs to reform their neighborhood.

This remains to be seen.

I reprint this not to refight our justification for being there but because of what Westhawk says in the second sentence in the second paragraph; if Iraq is simply energizing Islamists and swelling their ranks, perhaps a troop drawdown would be best.

Moving to a bit more complicated analysis and suggestions, we go next to Armed Liberal. His post is rather long, and much of it quotes an article by Phil Carter at Slate. Following are excerpts from Carter's piece

First, the U.S. military must reverse its trend of consolidation and redeploy its forces into Iraq's cities. Efficiency and force protection cannot define our military footprint in Iraq; if those are our goals, we may as well bring our troops home today. Instead, we must assume risk by pushing U.S. forces out into small patrol bases in the middle of Iraq's cities where they are able to work closely with Iraqi leaders and own the streets....

Second, the United States needs to reinforce the most successful part of its strategy so far - embedding advisers ($) with Iraqi units. Our embedded advisers achieve more bang for the buck than any other troops in Iraq; one good 12-man adviser team, living and working with an Iraqi unit, can bolster an entire Iraqi battalion. Without these advisers, Iraqi army and police units remain ineffective - or worse, they go rogue....

To combat the insurgency, America must adopt a more holistic approach than simply building up the country's security forces. We have the seeds of this in Iraq today - the State Department's Provincial Reconstruction Teams. I worked closely with the PRT in Diyala to advise the Iraqi courts, jails, and police, and I saw their tremendous potential. However, having been hamstrung by bureaucratic infighting between the State and Defense departments, these teams now lack the authority, personnel, and resources to run the reconstruction effort effectively....

Lastly, we're going to have a report from the Baker Commission pretty soon. Unlike some, I'm not optimistic about what it's going to propose. My guess is they're going to recommend some version of "declare victory and leave." Mario Loyola seemed to agree in a post yesterday at NRO's The Corner

In today's Wall Street Journal, Reuel Marc Gerecht has a great editorial (subscription) on the problems facing the new Secretary of Defense — and all of us — in Iraq. Among other things, it's time to begin massively diminishing the expectations for Baker's Iraq Study Group, which looks likely to confirm the dilemma we face in Iraq without resolving it:

As will soon be apparent, the Iraq Survey Group [sic*] of which Mr. Gates is a member and to which I'm an adviser, has not discovered any way for the U.S. to exit Iraq — except under catastrophic conditions. Its recommendations will probably be the least helpful of all the blue-ribbon commissions in Washington since World War II because it cannot escape from an unavoidable reality: We either declare defeat and withdraw completely tout de suite, or we surge troops into Baghdad and fight. The ISG will surely try to find some middle ground between these positions, which, of course, doesn't exist.

If one works through the different scenarios, they all return quickly to a Rumsfeldian position that the U.S. needs to do more in Iraq with less — a position that has been proven flatly wrong since the spring of 2003. This is why Washington has not been able to draw down even though the president, his defense secretary and his generals have dearly wanted to do so. Any meaningful reduction of U.S. forces is very likely to collapse the Iraqi Army into Shiite and Sunni militias and bring on massive carnage, the likes of which the Middle East has not seen since the Iran-Iraq War. If Mr. Gates signs off on the ISG's recommendations, which will probably be completed before he assumes office, he will be party to a doomed strategy — and everyone in Washington and abroad will recognize it as a failure as soon as they start to work through it — before he even sets foot in the Pentagon. It may not be easy for Mr. Gates to recover from this initial flop.

However, when the ISG bombs, the Bush administration may finally get serious about correcting its mistakes in Iraq.

Daniel Henninger nearby makes another interesting point. Baker's Iraq Study Group is weighted away from "neocons" and towards "realists" from the Bush I administration — the same people who betrayed Iraq's Shiites in 1991 by coldy standing on the sidelines while Saddam slaughtered them. It seems odd that this group of people (whom I generally admire) thinks maybe we should abandon them again.

[* An ironically Freudian slip — He means the Iraq Study Group — The Iraq Survey Group was the one that figured out that there are no WMD in Iraq]

And I post this not to slam Baker, as Loyola and I will hopefully end up being mistaken, but because it touches on the question of consequences if we draw down troops.

An no reader will be surprised, my inclination is to rachet things up along the lines of what Stuntz and Carter propose. Whether the Democrats will allow any of this is another discussion entirely. I suppose the Administration could just act quickly and hope for a quick resolution, but that would completely destroy relations with the Democrats and it's doubtful that we could win quickly in Iraq in any event. More likely Bush will wait for the Baker Commission's report, and then will consult with the new congressional leaders before acting.

But I'm not optimistic on the latter, because the AP reports that "George McGovern, the former senator and Democratic presidential candidate, said Thursday that he will meet with more than 60 members of Congress next week to recommend a strategy to remove U.S. troops from Iraq by June.".

At this point a critic from the left or right would be forgiven for saying "if ratching up the pressure is such a good idea, why didn't Bush do it 2 years ago when he had the political capital?" Unfortunately I don't have a good answer to this. Bush had 3 and a half years to fight the war with GOP majorities in Congress, and they pretty much let the Administration do what it wanted in Iraq.

In an earlier post I mentioned that the big battle in the Democrat party was going to be between the new breed of pro-gun socially conservative congressmen like Heath Shuler, and old-time lefties like Charlie Rangel. How that battle is resolved may determine the fate of Iraq.

Posted by Tom at 2:40 PM | Comments (5) | TrackBack

November 6, 2006

The Troops in Iraq Don't Want to Withdraw

For all the talk from many Democrats about the supposed need to withdraw (er, "redeploy") the troops from Iraq, most of the troops actually there do not seem to agree. Don't take it from me, but from a good liberal paper like the Washington Post (via Captain's Quarters)

FORWARD OPERATING BASE SYKES, Iraq, Nov. 5 -- For the U.S. troops fighting in Iraq, the war is alternately violent and hopeful, sometimes very hot and sometimes very cold. It is dusty and muddy, calm and chaotic, deafeningly loud and eerily quiet.

The one thing the war is not, however, is finished, dozens of soldiers across the country said in interviews. And leaving Iraq now would have devastating consequences, they said.

With a potentially historic U.S. midterm election on Tuesday and the war in Iraq a major issue at the polls, many soldiers said the United States should not abandon its effort here. Such a move, enlisted soldiers and officers said, would set Iraq on a path to civil war, give new life to the insurgency and create the possibility of a failed state after nearly four years of fighting to implant democracy.

"Take us out of that vacuum -- and it's on the edge now -- and boom, it would become a free-for-all," said Lt. Col. Mark Suich, who commands the 1st Squadron, 89th Cavalry Regiment just south of Baghdad. "It would be a raw contention for power. That would be the bloodiest piece of this war."

The soldiers declined to discuss the political jousting back home, but they expressed support for the Bush administration's approach to the war, which they described as sticking with a tumultuous situation to give Iraq a chance to stand on its own.

You'll want to read the entire article, but the quotes above capture its essential thesis.

Note that the troops don't comment on strategy or tactics. Nor do they, or the Post writer, indicate whether they think we're winning or losing. As I've said before, I think that at best we're in a stalemate, possibly losing. Indeed, I've said for some time now that I'm open to ideas on what to do - as long as it's not cut-and-run.

But what one finds striking about the troops that White interviewed was their realism. As the Captain said, "None of them have any illusions that Iraq will suddenly and miraculously find peace." Rather, they know that in order to win this thing we've got to be committed for the long haul. I remember reading in interview with General Casey a few months ago where he said that it takes an average of 9 years to defeat an insurgency.

Nor do the troops underestimate the enemy they're fighting. From the Post article

First Sgt. David Schumacher, 37, of Watertown, N.Y., is on his eighth deployment to a foreign battlefield since a tour in Somalia, and his third tour in Iraq.

"The insurgents are more strategic this time, they're smarter," he said. "We're trying to anticipate their next move, and they're trying to anticipate ours. There's still a lot to do

I've met dozens of troops inside and outside of Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington DC. See here and here. They, too, respect the enemy. But none that I've met are discouraged, either. They're an amazing bunch, and ever time I go there I feel honored to be in their presence.

Most amazingly, it's the men and women actually on the battlefield that worry about us back home. They worry about our committment.

Sgt. Jonathan Kirkendall, 23, of Falls City, Neb., said he fears that many Americans think that building the country to viability will be "quick and easy," when he believes it could take many years. Kirkendall, of the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division in Baghdad, is on his third dep