The Redhunter

July 1, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 30 June 2008 - Support Needed from the Central Government

This briefing is by Col Lewis Craparotta, Commander of U.S. Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team 1. He is connected via telecommunications link to the Pentagon from Camp Fallujah, which is in the Anbar Province of western Iraq.

Regimental Combat Team 1 is part of Multi-National Force-West. MNF-W is headquartered by the U.S. I Marine Expeditionary Force. Their area of operations include the cities of Ar Ramadi and Fallujah.

Col Craparotta reports to the commander of I MEF, Maj. Gen. John Kelly. Kelly reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin, in turn, reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until last March. Until Petraeus is confirmed by Congress for this position, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This video and others can be viewed at DODvClips. The transcript is at DefenseLink. More videos, briefings, and military news can be seen at The Pentagon Channel.

While many things were discussed, it seems that the ,main theme of this briefing is that localities in Col Craparott's area of responsibility need more support from the central government:

Q Hi Colonel, it's Courtney from NBC News again. Just to clarify, so the support that the area is looking for from the government of Iraq, is that all monetary or is there another -- any other kind of support that's still lacking? And is that the number one thing that you're hearing from the sheikhs when you go out and meet with them, or what are their main concerns? Are they concerned that the U.S. is going to draw down and the violence will return? Could you talk a little bit about those meetings that you have with them?

COL. CRAPAROTTA: Yes, Courtney. I think they're concerned about funds and the availability of funds down to the local governments. And we're still working through the whole process of how the money actually gets from the provincial government down to the local governments. But we're working that very hard and I think we're on- track in that area.

The other element of support that we need comes from the ministries. And I will tell you that we need support from the Ministry of Interior, for example, when it comes to our police force. We're short vehicles; we're short other resources. So again, some of the support from the ministries directly to the province have been lacking. And we expect that that support should pick up as we transition to provincial control and we tie that link between the provincial government and the national government.

Q Has this lack of resources caused any kind of operational problem? I mean, has the Iraqis -- have they not been able to complete a mission or have they had to borrow things from the United States?

COL. CRAPAROTTA: Well, we've been providing them training and support all along. That's part of our mission. But we're at a point now where if we can get this additional support from the central government, that in my view the -- certainly the policemen that I work with, we would see a -- we could see a dramatic increase in their effectiveness with some additional support.

Q Colonel, it's Mike Mount again from CNN. Keeping on the theme with this support, is this -- what's the cause of the delay? Is this the continued friction between -- you know, a Sunni-Shi'a thing between the two governments? I mean, why do you think the support will come after the turnover and why hasn't their been support up to now?

COL. CRAPAROTTA: I think, quite frankly, it's a matter of priorities.

And if you look at the provinces, the 18 provinces across the country, the priority is probably not as high in Al Anbar, based on the success we've had in the security situation here.

Therefore they've put some resources in other provinces that have been higher up on the priority list. But again I expect that some of that will change when we transfer to PIC(Provincial Iraqi Control).

There was more along these lines but you get the point. It's all part of what Clautzwitz called the friction of war. Yes we've made much progress since the "surge", but there are still problems and things that we and our Iraqi partners need to do better.

It will come as not surprise that another concern is how soon the Iraqis can take control of their own affairs

Q Colonel, you were pretty optimistic in your opening statement about the Iraqi police. I'm just wondering, have they caught up in terms of training to the Iraqi army? And how would you assess their readiness? And what more needs to be done?

COL. CRAPAROTTA: I think the police, certainly the police here in Fallujah and the police in Ramadi, are ready to take the lead.

I will give you an example. Yesterday, certainly, we sat down with the police and the army and talked about this incident in Karmah. And we decided there was a need to conduct an operation that has been -- was completed this morning. And the Fallujah District police chief, Colonel Faisal, when I asked him what he needed to execute the operation he told me that he would just as soon I watch my students go out there and execute and that he was confident he could do it, and if I was available to provide a QRF, that that would be enough.
...

Q Colonel, it's Luis Martinez with ABC News.

The Iraqi operation down in Basra required a shifting of forces within Iraq by the Iraqis themselves. How does that affect your situation or the security posture for your people inside Anbar province?

COL. CRAPAROTTA: Well, initially, we had some concern, because again, we're at a point where the surge was over here in AO East, and we were relying heavily on the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police. And when we transitioned forces outside of Anbar, we really reduced the amount of Iraqi army available to me by two-thirds. But the Iraqi police have been able to get the job done. And I know I keep saying it, but I have complete confidence in the police force, and I think their record over the past four or five, six months certainly speaks for itself if you look at the security situation here in AO East.

And this lead to a discussion on the impact of increased effectiveness of the Iraqi security forces

Q Yeah, I was -- Colonel, it's Luis Martinez again. I was going to continue on this line of questioning. Sound like a prosecutor -- (chuckles) - sorry about that. With the Iraqi forces no longer being -- with that brigade still remaining in Basra, how -- are you increasing patrols? I mean, you said that you were increasing reliance on the Iraqi police, but how does that affect your posture, in the sense that obviously they have different capabilities and different missions? COL. CRAPAROTTA: Well, without going into too much of what we're doing operationally, we are reducing some of our presence in the urban areas and relying more on the police there.

Good news, and hopefully the Iraqi forces will be able to keep a lid on the violence and destroy AQI if they raise their head.

The Colonel's closing statement is worth reprinting

COL. CRAPAROTTA: ...I'd just maybe close by saying that I hope as the Fourth of July approaches that everybody's as proud of the service of the fighting men and women as I am. They continue to do a tremendous job over here under very difficult circumstances. And they've earned both the respect and the admiration of the Iraqi people here in eastern Anbar.

The cooperation with the State Department and the work of the Embedded Reconstruction Teams cannot go unrecognized here today. They've enabled success, and the accomplishments that we've made in governance, economics and reconstruction would not have been possible without them. And I expect that their role will increase in the coming months as we transition to provincial Iraqi control.

And then lastly -- and I've said it several times -- is our Iraqi partners. These are brave leaders, and they see a future for this province and this country, and they work every day with that future in mind. They're sheikhs; they're soldiers; they're policemen, mayors, city council members. Each of them has stepped up for the people and the future of this country.

And we know the fight's not over, but we're going to win the fight together, with the support of the Iraqi people. And success for us is simply providing these citizens with the greatest opportunity to enjoy a safe and a prosperous future here in al Anbar.

So thank you very much.

Craparotta's mention of the vital work don by the ERT's illustrates the point that reconstruction facilitates reconciliation and solidifies security gains.

Reconstruction in Anbar was also discussed at a GRD Roundtable briefing in Iraq the other day. Col. Robert Vasta said that the reason why reconstruction is proceeding is that now there is security. No security, no rebuilding. That and partnership with the Iraqis are responsible for recent successes. 21 minutes into the video he says that improvements in security are "...impossible to emphasize how important that has been to the reconstruction of Iraq"

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June 28, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 26 June 2008 - Operation Basha'er as-Salaam

This briefing is by U.S. Army Colonel Charlie Flynn, commander of the 1st Brigade, , 82nd Airborne Division, based out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He is linked via telecommunications to the Pentagon from Contingency Operating Base Adder at Tallil Air Base. They deployed to Iraq in July of 2007. This is their fourth combat rotation, with two each to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Update: I do not have an independent source to prove this, but commenter Ginny says that the 1st Brigade is part of Multi Multi-National Division - Center . Until recently, MND-C was headquartered by Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch's 3rd Infantry Division. They have redeployed home, and have been replaced by the 10th Mountain Division (Light) from Fort Drum, New York, whose current commander is Maj. Gen. Micheal L. Oates.

I am also not entirely sure of the chain of command with regards to the 1st Brigade, because some of the 82nd is in Afghanistan. The commander of the 82nd Airborne is Major General David Rodriguez, and on April 7 he gave a briefing from Afghanistan, so Col Flynn must report to someone in Iraq, most probably the commander of MNSTC-I, who I am unable to identify. Anyway, the commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq is Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, who reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq. Petreaus reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until last March. Until Petraeus is confirmed by Congress for this position, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be found at DODvClips. The transcript is at DefenseLink. More videos, briefings, and military news can be seen at The Pentagon Channel.

COL. FLYNN: ...I'm sure you've been following the events unfolding these past 10 days in southern Iraq and in Amarah with keen interest. First Brigade has played a supporting role in advising and assisting this Iraqi- planned and -led operation, and I'll be happy to discuss that with you today....

The operation in Amarah, Basha'er as-Salaam, is a clear sign of the development and professionalism of the Iraqi forces and will only serve as a model of transformation occurring in the government of Iraq, the Iraqi security forces and our area here in southern Iraq....

In light of recent events in Maysan province, security in southern Iraq can be assessed overall as stable, dotted with occasional periods of tension. These periods of tension are due to intra-Shi'a clashes. These clashes have been the workings of JAM special groups and local criminals. All of these groups have casual attitudes towards violence. This attitude has backfired, and they've lost significant support from the population due to their careless actions.

A concern remains with special groups and the spikes of violence they perpetrate for their convenience. While they are disruptive, they will not disable the government of Iraq. Special groups and criminals seek to drive a wedge between political progress and the population. As such, they'll attack Iraqi forces, coalition forces and civilian aid organizations just to make their point.

In an effort to eliminate these malign groups and extremists, Iraqi forces and government officials have stepped up and assumed active roles against these threats. Specifically, in Amarah, we've seen tribal leaders and citizens actively engage the Iraqi forces to enforce the rule of law. They've provided valuable information on the location of weapons caches and criminals. During a four-day amnesty period before operations began, tips produced caches, two of which resulted in over 200 artillery rounds, 51 antitank mines and 44 mortars.

Thursday, June 19th officially started clearing operations within the city of Amarah. The local populace was hesitant to come out of their homes at first, but by mid-morning the people began greeting the Iraqi forces in the streets, displaying a positive attitude about the government of Iraq taking care of the city and creating a safer environment to call home.

Everything we're doing has the objective of getting the populace off of the fence and into our camp. This is done by achieving local security, which has the effect of convincing the populace that the government will win and it is futile to resist, and that it is in their interest that the government win.

There were many good exchanges between the journalists and Col. Flynn, but Jim Michaels and Al Pessin got to the heart of the matter; when can the Iraqis handle their own security?

Q Colonel, Jim Michaels with USA Today. You described the relationship with -- in the Amarah operation with U.S. forces as kind of a supporting and overwatch. I'm wondering: From what you've been able to see, when do you think that the Iraqi security forces will be capable of conducting these types of operations with little or no U.S. support?

COL. FLYNN: I think to a degree -- I'm not sure if they can conduct any unilateral operations by themselves other than the standard patrolling that can go on day to day, which is relatively significant. You know, what -- I think what we are able to provide them, as a partner, is a degree of technical assistance, advice and some unique enabling capabilities that we have because of the maturity of our force.

For example, their EOD teams are performing great up there, their explosive ordnance teams against IEDs. However, their engineer clearing teams don't have quite the equipment that we have. So if we match them up together, they can do their own counter-IED work, but over time, they'll get there. And right now, they're just doing great work with the capabilities that they do have, and I think our enabling and our assistance and our partnering with them really, when they're -- when we are shoulder to shoulder with them, gives them a degree of confidence in doing their operations, and I think that's what's most helpful here.

Q Colonel, it's Al Pessin from Voice of America. Two sort of related questions.

One is, how would you put this Amarah operation in the broader context, of trying to bring stability to that part of the country and especially to combating the Iranian influence?

And secondly you said in your opening statement that people know they won't be abandoned when they see the Iraqi troops come in. How do they know that? And is that accurate? Do you have enough sources down there to have that sort of persistent presence, that we've heard about, that we've heard is necessary to bring stability?

COL. FLYNN: First of all, I'll say that having watched the operation and partnered with forces in Basra, in late March, and then watching and partnering again, providing assistance to the Iraqi forces here in Amarah, in June, they have learned some great lessons. And they've applied those in this operation.

In terms of having a persistent presence and having forces available to do what needs to be done, certainly at the period of time we're in right now in Amarah, the Iraqi ground forces commander, Lieutenant General Ali, identified a need for more forces, during the initial phase of the operations, in order to establish security, remove the caches and then arrest the criminals that they had warrants for.

In terms of their presence staying after, they are going to move forces elsewhere. And they're going to bolster the Iraqi army and the police in that area.

And they're going to afford them a window of opportunity to create that stable, secure environment, so that the threats don't reemerge, and the criminals don't come back into that area and try to reestablish their networks.

Q Colonel, I'd also asked about the bigger picture, as to how significant you think the Amarah operation is. Is it of major significance or is it just another in what's going to be a long series of these?

COL. FLYNN: Well, there's nearly 10,000 Iraqi forces in the province conducting operations. We've got a little over 500 in various stages -- capabilities helping them. So I think that the forces that the Iraqi government has chosen to use in Amarah are significant. I think the combined efforts of the police and the army are significant. And seeing them work together and in unison is a positive trend.

I've said this time and again, but the truth is that training host nation forces is a time consuming process and there are no shortcuts. The only question is if whether the Iraqi security forces will be ready to stand on their own Sen. Obama wins in November and makes good on his promise to withdraw U.S. troops no matter what.

Previous
Iraq Briefing - 07 January 2008 - Col Charles Flynn

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June 25, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 23 June 2008 - Reasons for Success

This briefing is by U.S. Army Lt. Gen Lloyd Austin, Commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Via telecommunications link he is linked to the Pentagon from Baghdad.

The Corps commander runs the day-to-day (or "tactical") operations in Iraq. The various commands in Iraq, the biggest of which are headquartered by a U.S. Army division or the Marine Corps MEF unit, report to Austin. Gen. Petraus sets overall policy and Austin implements it.

Lt. Gen. Austin reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until last March. Until Petraeus is confirmed by Congress for this position, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This video and others can be viewed at DODvClips. The transcript is at DefenseLink. More videos, briefings, and military news can be seen at The Pentagon Channel.

During his opening statement, Austin gave several reasons for our recent success in Iraq. This was followed up by some good, hard, questions from the press corps, which is just how it should be.

GEN. AUSTIN: ...Now I attribute most of these hard-fought gains in security to a few key factors: Our coalition forces are aggressively pursuing the enemy; the improving capability of the Iraqi security forces; and the Iraqi people participating in the rebuilding process of Iraq.

The first factor is the incredible hard work by our young soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, as well as our coalition partners. And because of their efforts, we've been able to make significant security gains by maintaining our pursuit of al Qaeda and special groups criminals. And we believe that we have al Qaeda on their heels, and we do not intend to let up....

And since I arrived here, I've seen the Iraqi security forces conduct both offensive and stability operations, and I've seen them do it in Basra, in Sadr City, in Mosul and now in Amarah, which is in the Maysan province. And what I've seen is that the Iraqi security forces are performing extremely well, and operations in these key cities have demonstrated that they have improved from where they were just a year ago in terms of deploying their combat formations; for example, the Charge of the Knights operation in Basra, where the Iraqi security forces moved several brigades to Basra from other provinces, and this would just have absolutely have not been possible a year ago....

In addition, the Sons of Iraq program that developed from the Sunni Awakening movement has helped tremendously. It has helped in denying safe haven to the extremist groups and have assisted our coalition forces and our Iraqi partners in securing neighborhoods in previously contested areas....

Al Qaeda has been pushed out of Baghdad and other strategic population centers, and now the Iraqi security forces are leading operations against them in Mosul. And we're working with the Iraqis to support their efforts....

If we summarize, as reasons for our recent successes we have

1. The adoption of a true counterinsurgency strategy
2. Improved Iraqi security forces
3. The Iraqi people seeing the government as legitimate and worth fighting for

The first lead to the last. In the end, the last is vital to long-term success.

There were many good questions, and and I urge everyone to view the entire briefing, so I'll concentrate on the exchanges about the Iraqi security forces

Q General, Julian Barnes from the Los Angeles Times. You expressed some confidence that the Iraqi security forces are getting better. Are there specific areas of the country that you are ready to put U.S. forces into an overwatch role and give the day-to-day operations to the Iraqi forces? And where do you think that will happen first within the country?

GEN. AUSTIN: Well, there are no areas that we can -- that we would be willing to separate out right now to dedicate specifically to the Iraqi security forces.

We are working hand-in-hand with our coalition partners in all parts of the country. They have improved significantly, but we've been clear about saying that they're not there yet....

Q General, this is Dave Wood at The Baltimore Sun. Talk a little bit more about the Iraqi security forces' attempt to be more self-sustaining. We've been watching this and covering it for a number of years., It seems like they're always moving towards that goal and never quite getting there. What's your assessment of how long it will take to -- for them to become self-sustaining and all the things you mentioned? And is there anything that the United States could do to speed that up?

GEN. AUSTIN: Certainly we're doing everything that we can on a daily basis to enable them as quickly as we possibly can. But bear in mind that we're fighting at the same time that we're doing this. You know, the Iraqi security forces have grown significantly over the last year, and as they've grown, they've been equipping themselves and training and fighting all at the same time. And we've been helping them in that endeavor -- so very difficult to put a mark on the wall and say that we'll be fully trained and equipped by a certain time period, because, again, while we're doing that, we're fighting. I can just only guarantee you that we will do everything within our power to give them true capabilities as quickly as we can....

Q General, it's Ken Fireman from Bloomberg News. I'd like to go back to the question of the Iraqi security forces and their capabilities. What we've heard from a number of U.S. commanders over a period of time has been that the greatest limiting factor on the ISF is their weaknesses in logistics and supply, their inability to develop an infrastructure that can support their troops in the field, supply them and provide logistical support. Is that still a major problem? Is that getting better? Are they showing any evidence of curing those problems, or is that still a major limiting factor on them?

GEN. AUSTIN: That's a great question. And it's one that I certainly returned to the theater focused on -- an issue that I returned to focus on.

One of the things that we set out to do early on was to work to improve the Iraqi security force logistics system and help them improve their system. And I think we've been fairly successful since we came on board.

It was an area of emphasis for our entire command. I asked all of my commanders to partner with the Iraqi forces to help them make their system work. And it's important that we focus on making their system work versus making them adapt a system that we think is right for them. And that's been very successful for us.

What you've witnessed in recent days is that they deployed themselves to Basra, which was a significant movement. They resupplied themselves there and they actually learned from that, as well. And so when they deployed to Mosul, it was almost a seamless operation. They, again, learned from that they'd done in Basra and incorporated those lessons learned into what I consider to be a really successful movement. And again, as they moved forces into Amarah, they've done a pretty good job of supporting and sustaining themselves.

You know, the DOD IG was just here a while back, and on his way out, he was very complimentary about some of the improvements that he had seen in the logistics system.

It seems we are in a race against time. If Obama is elected, the clock runs out and either the Iraqi security forces are up to speed or we risk losing everything. If McCain wins, we'll have more time. Thing is, training an army is not something you can really shortcut.

"It is a persistently methodical approach and steady pressure which will gradually wear the insurgent down. The government must not allow itself to be diverted either by counter-moves on the part of the insurgent or by the critics on its own side who will be seeking a simpler and quicker solution. There are no short-cuts and no gimmicks - Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, 1966

6-29 Training HN (host nation) security forces is a slow and painstaking process. It does not lend itself to a "quick fix".

Previous from Lt Gen Austin
Iraq Briefing - 23 May 2008 - Meet the New Commander of MNC-Iraq

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June 21, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 19 June 2008 - The Last Surge Brigade Reports

This briefing is by U.S. Army Colonel Terry Ferrell, Commander of 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, and John Smith, Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader. Via telecommunications link they are linked to the Pentagon from Operating Base Kalsu in southeast Baghdad.

The 3rd ID is part of Multi-National Division Central, otherwise known as Task Force Marne. Their area of responsibility extends to the southern edge of Baghdad to the border with Saudi Arabia, and then to the border of Iran.

Col Ferrell reports to the commander of the 3rd ID, Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch. Lynch reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin, in turn, reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until last March. Until Petraeus is confirmed by Congress for this position, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This video and others can be viewed at DODvClips. The transcript is at DefenseLink. More videos, briefings, and military news can be seen at The Pentagon Channel.

In case you're not aware, we had 15 brigades in Iraq until the start of the "surge" at the beginning of last year. We sent 5 more brigades, which arrived in the first half of 2007, hence the term "surge". Col Ferrell's 2nd Brigade Combat Team was the last of those brigades to arrive.

COL FERRELL:...The primary enemies that we were dealing with in our area of operations was al Qaeda and Sunni extremists who had been left alone for long enough to create a sanctuary in Arab Jabour.

Al Qaeda had used this sanctuary to control the population through fear and intimidation. They used homes, farms and places of business as bases of operation and bomb-making factories, devastating the region's economy. People lacked consistent access to basic necessities, like clean water and electricity, let alone a functioning health care or education system.

They had -- the area had no sustained security presence provided by either coalition or Iraqi security forces. We began operations on June 15th, when elements of the Spartan Brigade Combat Team attacked to seize a foothold in Arab Jabour against a well-entrenched al Qaeda threat. Organized defensive belts existed throughout our area of operations, and deep-buried IEDs were common as the enemy was confident they would be able to keep coalition forces out and the local population controlled. They were wrong.
...

When we first arrived, we were experiencing on average of 30-plus attacks a week. Now we're seeing less than one per week.
...

The security environment that was created by these operations and increased the Iraqi army role in the area set the conditions for the local citizens to step up and begin to take control of their future. Over this past year, we've helped create city councils in each of our population areas. Neighborhood councils now give our communities a direct voice to the government.

All this is straight out of Gen. Petraeus' U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. The objective in fighting any insurgency is that the counterinsurgents must achieve security first. Only then can political progress at any level take place. From FM 3-24:

1-4 Long term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule. Achieving this goal requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as possible.

1-113 LEGITIMACY IS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE. The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government.

1-131 SECURITY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW IS ESSENTIAL The cornerstone of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads.

The first question hits on the all important topic of whether our gains are sustainable, but what's important is how Col Ferrell gives his answer

Q Sir, it's Kristin Roberts with Reuters.

In terms of the security situation, are there any events on the horizon that might threaten the security gains or raise specific security challenges? And can you talk a bit about the sustainability of the security gains you've seen, as the country moves toward provincial elections?

COL. FERRELL: I think, in our specific area of operations, that the security gains are sustainable. We have forces that will be staying there, coalition forces that will be staying in the battlespace.

The progress of the Iraqi army battalions, that are working with us, has made great strides. The people of the communities are making tremendous strides. They are working hand-in-hand to prevent the threats from coming back.

There's always a threat. We know that. But the communities work. We work. The Iraqi security forces work. They do not want it. They've experienced now fighting for so many years. They see the changes that they've worked so hard over the last year-plus to gain; that they will move this forward. That's the key.

Ferrell points more to the attitude of the people rather than the military strength of the Iraqi Army as being key. They must believe that the counterinsurgents will win, and that it is in their interests that they win. They must get off the fence and into our side. The question, then, is how to get the people from apathy to action.

Part of the way this is being done was explained by Mr Smith as he answered a question by Tom Bowman of NPR about the Iraqi government not sending ministers down t examine essential services and see what needed to be done.

MR. SMITH:... And through developing relationships, which -- this society is built upon relationships, and then they take it very seriously -- we were able to bring these officials into an area that they would not have dreamed of going into.

And that -- and as they came into the area and you saw the Shi'a meeting the newly formed town council of Arab Jabour for the first time, and that -- so you have a Shi'a district chairman sitting down with a Sunni town council and seeing them embrace. And the thing that I can't project here in words in that is the excitement in their eyes and the reunion and the reconciliation that took place at that moment. And that was the start. That was at the very beginning of that. That was the first part of October in that, when we engaged.

And from there, you know, we followed that protocol in that, and we have gotten assistance in that from the Ministry of Health. We've gotten assistance from the Ministry of Energy. We've gotten assistance from the Ministry of Irrigation and their representatives in those areas in that. So just speaking from our area, you know, they have been cooperative to the best of their ability, and funds are starting to break free in assistance.

In other words, the people are taking action at the local level in cooperation with officials at the national level. "Political progress" is a term much bandied about, and it's true that it needs to occur if we are to truly win this war. But what's important to understand is that it's not just a top-down process. It must occur at the local level too, and then hopefully the two meet in the middle.

Then, as is so often at these briefings, Al Pessin asks the hard question. I'm impressed that he seems to know what is really going on.

Q Colonel, it's Al Pessin from Voice of America. I wanted to follow up on Kristin's first question.

As you know, the surge was accompanied by a change in doctrine, a change of approach. That change of approach, I'm told, couldn't have been done without sufficient security forces.

Now, with the surge brigades leaving, what makes you confident that this approach will continue to succeed without all these extra U.S. troops there?

COL. FERRELL: I will tell you that I think that we were at the right place at the right time. And I understand the surge and the mission set that we got as we came in, and we were able to get after it. And I think it was very classic in the counterinsurgency aspects. It's the clear, hold, build as we moved through and a very slow, very methodical approach as we came in. But now we've been able to build the Iraqi security forces to come in.

As we move elements of the brigade combat team out of the battlespace -- and our brigade is very unique as the last surge brigade -- all of 2nd Brigade, 3rd ID, the brigade that works for me, is not working specifically here in this battlespace. So I have task- organized units that belong to other organizations that will be staying. So there will be a reduction, given, but there will be a coalition presence.

But what has changed is a significant increase in our area of operation of Iraqi security forces. When we first started, there was one Iraqi battalion -- no Iraqi police and one Iraqi battalion that was on the periphery of the brigade's area of operations. Nowhere did they really want to venture into our specific area of operations. And it took several weeks to get that to change. And it's taken time now to get them to the point that they do independent operations, the one battalion.

We have since, just in the last two months, received a second battalion. And we will see that it will continue to expand Iraqi security force presence over the coming weeks and months with plans that are designed for our specific piece of terrain with a larger presence of Iraqi army.

And additionally, we have just recently opened an Iraqi police station. We will have a permanent police station in Arab Jabour about the first of September, but there's a temporary station that now is open. We have over 400 candidates that is going through the process to become policemen. And we will see that bring more security to the area.

So you have Iraqi police officers. You have Iraqi army, the increased volume of Iraqi army. And then you still have that coalition presence that will facilitate the sustainment.

And don't forget the population. Don't forget the Sons of Iraq that are still there. But more importantly, don't forget the population and what they've been through and the changes and the transformation that they've been through and what they see now, what they have as they move forward. They wanted normalcy in their life. They're starting to see that and they're moving forward. I think that is one of the biggest keys that we have a tendency to overlook, here.

An entire chapter in FM 3-24 is devoted to building up the host nation forces. A few excerpts

6-1 Success in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations requires establishing a legitimate government supported by the people and able to address the fundamental causes that insurgents use to gain support. Achieving these goals requires the host nation to defeat insurgents or render them irrelevant, upholding the rule of law, and provide a basic level os essential and security for the populace. Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.

6-29 Training HN (host nation) security forces is a slow and painstaking process. It does not lend itself to a "quick fix".

And from the much quoted "Zen-like" section

1-154 THE HOST NATION DOING SOMETHING TOLERABLY IS NORMALLY BETTER THAN US DOING IT WELL. It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as to assess how well it is done. Where the United States is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires establishing viable HN leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant US support....

Finally, in response to a question, Col Ferrell addresses the fighting spirit of the Iraqi Security Forces. While no doubt some Iraqi forces are sub-par, and even turn from the enemy, many or even most fight bravely, and get precious little credit for it in the American press. Ferrell has two Iraqi battalions in his battlespace.

COL FERRELL:...Over time, they will both improve. And as more forces come in and they get the strength and capabilities and build the capacity, we'll see independent operations across all of them. They have the desire. That's the one thing I want you to understand.

The soldiers I deal with, and I've got great, you know, great knowledge of working with them on the ground and being engaged with them in the fight firsthand. The company commanders, a couple of the battalion commanders, but the company commanders are the ones that I have personal knowledge of down there.

They are out leading soldiers. They want to take the fight. They want to rid their area just as much as any of our soldiers. They know what's right and they'll get after it.

Just as interesting as the questions the journalists ask are the ones they don't ask. They don't question the basic military progress or success we have achieved. They don't insinuate that the briefers are misleading them. To be sure, I didn't start to watch these briefings until early 2007, and I don't even know if they did this teleconference type earlier than that. But judging from how the war was reported, I have to think that reporters were more skeptical. Either way, I find these briefings a good source of information about what's happening, and in sum they tell me that as of now we are winning.

Posted by Tom at 8:30 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

June 12, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 09 June 2008 - Job Creation to Defeat the Insurgency

Maj.Gen. Mark Hertling, Commander of Multi-National Division-North ( also known as Task Force Iron) and the 1st Armored Division, spoke via satellite today to reporters at the Pentagon. MG Hertling.

Maj. Gen. Hertling reports to reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin, in turn, reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Forces - Iraq, who reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until April. Until Petraeus is confirmed by Congress for this position, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The PentagonChannel website also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink website.

While there is much of interest in this briefing, what struck me was Hertling's emphasis on job creation as a means to defeat the insurgency.

First from Hertling's opening remarks

GEN. HERTLING: The last time, as Gary said, that I spoke to (reporters at the Pentagon via satellite) was 11 February. On that particular day, we had been involved in an operation we were calling Iron Harvest down in Diyala, the southern part of our province, for about a month and a half. And it was just a few days after that press briefing that we thought we had secured the area enough to switch -- using a military term -- our main effort and start pushing enablers, like aviation, engineers, intelligence, up to the northern province of Nineveh, and specifically the city of Mosul. We did that in about mid-February, and we began to set the conditions for the operations which are ongoing there now, along with our Iraqi brothers in the 2nd and 3rd Iraqi army division.

You can see what's happening; Al-Qaeda in Iraq is slowing being squeezed into an area smaller and smaller. Here's more of Hertling's opening statement:

So while we continued to fight through the February-March-April time frame in the southern part of our area of operations -- which, just as a reminder, is about the size of the state of Pennsylvania -- we really shifted our effort primarily to Mosul and also some of the other areas where we thought the enemy was located, and that enemy being specifically al Qaeda.

With our Iraqi brothers in the four Iraqi army divisions which are part of the northern provinces, we've seen some significant gains over the last several months in the north, more so in Salahuddin, Diyala and Kirkuk province, but less so in Nineveh and specifically Mosul, although that's beginning to change as well.
...

Some of you have heard and some of you have reported that many key AQI leaders have escaped. That first report came out of Diyala province when we were in Muqdadiyah. I've seen reports of it since we started our operation in Mosul, and I would suggest to you that that's -- just isn't true.

I'd be interested in where those comments come from. We've captured or killed a significant number of al Qaeda fighters in both Diyala and Nineveh as well as the two of our other provinces. And those who did leave or attempt to leave, we're continuing to pursue those in some of the desert areas throughout our area of operations....

The first question from a reporter touched on troop levels going down and whether Hertling would have enough to complete operations in Mosul:

Q Hi, General. This is Courtney Kube from NBC News. Defense officials, military officials continue to call Mosul the last urban stronghold of al Qaeda in Iraq. I'm curious, as the numbers in the surge continue to move -- as the troops in the surge continue to redeploy, there's talk of additional redeployments -- the numbers of troops in Iraq going down -- are you concerned, as the commander of this area of Mosul, that you aren't going to have enough troops? Do you have enough now? Looking forward, I mean, where do you see your area standing?

GEN. HERTLING: Well, I think the comments about Mosul being the last urban stronghold stand true today. It certainly is an urban stronghold. But I think one of the things that's been interesting is the majority of efforts in Mosul itself have been conducted by Iraqi forces, not us. We were able to contribute in the build-up of the security measures. As an example, there were almost 30 combat outposts built between that February time frame I talked about and the start of operations on 10 May. Most of those were done primarily by U.S. engineers with some help from Iraqi engineers that are improving in capability.

We are continuing to provide air support. We just did a major air insertion of an entire Iraqi brigade using U.S. helicopters last week in a very successful operation the Iraqis called Lion's Hunt in the western desert.

So I mean, we're still contributing to this. But quite frankly my partner, General Riyadh, has been leading the charge in Mosul to improve the security conditions there. Right now, I think, it would probably be accurate to say it is the urban stronghold today.

But I'll never say anything is last with al Qaeda, because you never know what's going to happen to them next. We think that they have gone out into the desert areas. We are pursuing them out there.

So as is typical with commanders, Hertling is confident that we've got the upper hand, but cautious enough not to write AQI off. Maybe we learned our lesson from the early days of the war.

Although this next question was about foreign fighters, part of Hertling's answer illustrates the importance of creating jobs and improving the economy in defeating the insurgency

Q General, it's Tom Bowman with NPR. Could you offer a little more detail on the leadership that you're picking up, with al Qaeda, in Diyala and Ninawa? And also you mentioned the level three fighters, those who are just doing it for a buck. Give us a sense of the numbers you're rolling up. And finally any sense of foreign fighters here or evidence of foreign financing?

GEN. HERTLING: Yes, there's quite a bit of evidence and, in fact, some foreign fighters that we have detained, primarily in the north but also in northern Salahaddin province, if you know where that is, near the towns of Shirkat and some other areas.

We're seeing some foreign-fighter lines of operations coming in, from both the open Syrian desert to the west but also through the north, through the Syrian ports, that they're being smuggled in, in various ways.
...

The level three guys are the most interesting. We had some discussion when we started the operations in Mosul with the minister of the Interior, minister of Defense where one of the Iraqi generals, the intelligence individual for the Iraqi force that was up there, put a number on what he thought was the number of terrorists in the city of Mosul. We had a discussion right after that saying that about half of those could potentially be swung away from the organization if jobs were more available, because many of these guys are doing some of these criminal or terrorist actions just in order to get paid and to survive.

So the level three guys are the ones that, while we still sometimes have to either kill or capture them, hopefully the increase in the infrastructure and the ability to provide jobs may cause some additional tipping of this organization in the north, and everywhere else in Iraq, for that matter.

And then later on we had this exchange in which Maj. Gen. Hertling expanded on this theme

Q One of the keys, though, is finding them something to do, right, as they come out? And you mentioned jobs earlier. How are you addressing that effort to just kind of create something for them to do?

GEN. HERTLING: Yeah, that's linked to several things that we've got going on here in the north. It's not only the detainee-release that it's critical to find jobs -- the detainee-release -- those released from detention are critical to find jobs for, but we're also trying to transition the several thousand Sons of Iraq, the concerned local citizen program. We're trying to do that in the short term, before October of next year.

We have, right now, 32,000 Sons of Iraq in the north. We think we'll get, by the time it's over, between 6(,000) and 7,000 detainees released back into the area over the next year or so.

So that is a significant number to find jobs for.

But I think, quite frankly -- and that's one of the things I'm glad you pointed this out, because not only is the U.S. government helping in this program, with the State Department, trying to get -- (short audio break) -- infrastructure up and running again, but the Iraqi government's helping significantly as well, with the ICERP program, to get buildings up and operational; you buy contractors that way; they're getting new infrastructure repair teams going; some of the power lines are being repaired, and that takes manpower and labor.

So, as infrastructure continues to rise, that unemployment rate, which is somewhere, depending on which province you go to in our area of operations, anywhere from 50 to 80 percent, it is critical, and those detainees being released into that unemployment population is something that concerns us, we're watching very closely. Quite frankly, it is not only -- for us not only about fighting the insurgency, it's finding jobs and helping the Iraqi government and the Provincial Council find jobs for these young men and women.

So contrary to what Keith Olbermann and other crazed leftists think, no we're not just running around killing innocent Iraqis. We're trying to make Iraq a better place, which will enhance the security of the region, deal al Qaeda a huge blow, and thus enhance the security of the United States.

Posted by Tom at 9:25 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

June 3, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 02 June 2008 - "Attack, Attack, Attack"

This briefing is by Major General Jeffery Hammond, Commanding General of Multi-National Division-Baghdad and the 4th Infantry Division. The 4th ID relieved the First Cavalry Division in December of 2007. This is Maj Gen Hammond's first press briefing.

The 4th ID is part of Multi-National Division Baghdad, and are also known as Task Force Baghdad. Their major area of responsibility is the city of Baghdad. MND-Baghdad is headquartered by the 4th Infantry Division from Fort Hood, Texas.

Maj. Gen. Hammond reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin, in turn, reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Forces - Iraq, who reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until April. Until Petraeus is confirmed by Congress for this position, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

Please watch the whole video. Trust me, they're worth it.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The Pentagon Channel website also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink site.

Maj. Gen. Hammond is upbeat about the progress that his troops and those of his Iraqi counterparts have made.

From his opening statement

GEN. HAMMOND: ...Now, in Baghdad, our mission is unchanged. It's to protect the people. We accomplish this by defeating the enemies of Iraq, improving the Iraqi security force's capability through partnership, developing the Iraqi police capacity, supporting political and economic growth, ultimately transitioning the Iraqi security forces in their responsibility for overall security.

"Our mission is ... to protect the people." I know I sound like a broken record but this is straight out of U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. For the uninitiated that would be the manual written by then Lt. Gen Petraeus' team in 2006 and basically forms the basis for everything we've done as part of the "surge".

The point is that the first focus of counterinsurgents must be to protect the population. Only then can political and economic progress take place. It does NOT work the other way around.

Continuing with Maj. Gen. Hammond's introduction

Now, our operations against these criminals extend well outside Sadr City as well, to all of Baghdad. We're pursuing the enemy, and we're searching for weapons caches across Baghdad, focusing in known support areas. I remind my soldiers we attack, attack, attack, across all lines of operation.

Now, the areas -- we're focusing outside of Sadr City on both the east and west side of the Tigris River, which -- as you're aware, it bisects Baghdad. Now we're going to continue to hunt these criminals, to locate and destroy their weapons storage areas, through targeted intelligence-driven raids.

Now, what's interesting is many of the leaders of these criminal elements have fled. They left. Our message to those enemy leaders who have left: Don't come back. To the few who remain, it's going to be all about attack, attack, attack. Leave or be captured or killed.

The conditions in Baghdad are changing. There's no place for those terrorists and criminals. The people are fed up with them. They're tired of the violence and destruction. They vote to move on.
...

Now, in partnership with our Iraqi counterparts, we've hired and trained over 8,500 new police. It's important to note though that 3,250 of those recruits are former Sons of Iraq.

So we're really aggressively pushing to get our Sons of Iraq, a little over 30,000, transitioned to other employment, much of that with the Iraqi army, the national police or the Iraqi police.

Now, right now we have over 22,000 Iraqi police in Baghdad. And we're rapidly approaching our end goal of 25,000, which is at the end of what we call phase one expansion.

Phase two's expansion is going to take us up to 35,200 police in Baghdad. And I hope to get there no later than February '09. This expansion sets the conditions for the future of Baghdad under civil control with police providing the necessary security throughout the city. So what's next? I've got to tell you, I'm optimistic about the future of Baghdad. But there's still a heck of a lot of work to be done. We will build on our success in specific areas.

First, our mission of protecting the population: That will not change. Security is our number-one task. And in partnership with the Iraqi security forces, we will continue to pursue those who operate outside the rule of law.

We will continue to expand our ability to be among the people of Baghdad. We're going to follow the COIN strategy that we've grown into. And as it is today, we currently have 51 joint security stations, 23 combat outposts.

That's a significant increase. And we plan to increase this total number by probably 15 percent over the next six months. It's critical that we not spend our time in the FOBs, the conventional FOBs; that we get out with the people where we need to be.

This last part about getting out of the large Forward Operating Bases and living among the people has been a critical part of 2007 and what is popularly termed the "surge". One of our mistakes from the early years was concentrating our troops in these large FOBs and then sending them out on raids. As Field Manual 3-24 makes clear, this does not work.

To be fair to these commanders, such as Gen. George Casey, they did not have enough troops to do anything else. But the other side of the coin is that they did not ask for the additional troops. It was only when Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno took over as commander of Multi-National Corps Iraq in late 2006 (a position that made him #2 in Iraq) did anyone challenge the existing strategy. Odierno told Casey to his face that more troops were needed. Casey wouldn't listen, which is why he was replaced with Gen. Petraeus.

The other thing of note was the part about the Sons of Iraq, formerly called Concerned Citizens Councils. It's not so much "political progress" as it is winning over the people. it's all about winning the "Hearts and Minds" of the populace. NOTE: I can almost guarantee that you do not know the true meaning of "Hearts and Minds" since it is one of the most misunderstood terms in all of warfare (I didn't until recently) so please follow the link!

After Hammond's opening statement, it was time for the reporters to ask their questions. As is usual, they were smart and tough, yet polite. One thing I've noticed is that the quality of the press corps, at least in these briefings, has improved over the past few years. Of course, what their editors do with the stories is another matter entirely.

Q General, it's Tom Bowman with NPR. You mentioned that there are a thousand filed claims in Sadr City. You paid out about 70,000. Can you give us a breakdown on those claims; how many for property damage, how many for injured or killed civilians?

GEN. HAMMOND: Tom, I can't give you a specific -- I don't have the numbers in front of me. But I'd probably guess and say probably 85 percent is for property damage, much of that property damage coming at the hands of indirect fire that was shot from Sadr City. Much of that fell short. We had a few mortar rounds that fell short in Jamila market, which I think you know is the critical market that provides much to the rest of Baghdad, and about 25 percent to one-third burned down as a result of short rounds. But probably 85 percent is paid out for property damage as a result of that, and just the direct combat fighting.

I think as you know, that our soldiers are very careful in the way that we maneuver and place precise fire on targets. I would tell you quite clearly -- having been up there quite a bit -- that the folks that we're fighting against, these criminals, they didn't care much about collateral damage. But it's our responsibility -- we assume the responsibility for the ground we occupy with our partners, Iraqi security forces, and we work together in the CMOC in dealing with the people as they come in.

It's very encouraging when a thousand people step forward. In the past they wouldn't have done that, out of the fear of the militias. They wouldn't have stepped forward. But they came forward seeking the assistance, and we well support them.

Q Fifteen percent would be injured or killed civilians? Is that right? So you're talking dozens, at least, of injured or killed civilians, correct?

GEN. HAMMOND: I would say -- just an estimate -- probably about 15 percent of the citizens that I'm aware of could've -- injured. Injured or killed. I'm not -- I can't get precise there, but I will give you a more precise answer if you stay in touch with me. I'll help you out on that.

Q (Off mike ) -- when you talk about mortars and rockets falling short and creating damage -- I mean, clearly, if you're paying out compensation claims, it's your rockets, the MLRS, it's the Predators dropping Hellfire missiles and it's the tank rounds that are also causing damage. Isn't that right?

GEN. HAMMOND: Well, no. No and yes. Let me -- let me be more precise. No MLRS rockets have been fired anywhere near Sadr City. It was a limited number of rockets on a precision strike against a series of high-value targets. And I can tell you that the collateral damage from that was very, very limited, and I know that because I got in a helicopter; I flew right over the site and sat on top of it and looked at it personally and examined it.

As far as any short rounds, as I describe them, from mortars or rockets, we didn't fire any mortars or rockets anywhere into Sadr City. It was the militia that were firing these from different ranges within Sadr City off of sort of rigged-up rails that might or might not be accurate, and quite often -- not quite often, but at times -- would create conditions where a short round, in fact, would fall on the innocent people. So they not only -- they made a point of not only embarking -- terror at the range they were trying to shoot the rocket but also at short range where they made the mistakes, definitely.

As far as any tank rounds that we shot which -- we did fire some well-placed tank rounds in very limited numbers when it was necessary to defeat a threat that was being imposed upon the people or our soldiers, but we are very -- we've been very specific and careful in how we have fought up there. I've been very proud of our soldiers, the fact that we haven't made many mistakes because of the concern for the number one mission we had. The number one mission was not to defeat the militia; it was to protect the people, to protect the people.

Q Right, but you -- if you -- just one last thing. If you've been so careful, why do you have the thousand claims against you?

GEN. HAMMOND: Well, a lot of people came out of the -- because these people had a legitimate claim, they felt, that they wanted to process. A lot of these -- that sort of gives you some sort of indication, I think, for the amount of indiscriminate damage that was imposed upon the innocent people by a relentless, unforgiving -- lack of conscience -- enemy.

I have problem with these tough sorts of questions. Theya re fine, insofar as the objective is to make sure that we are trying to fight as cleanly as possible. This is in keeping with FM 3-24. The problem comes when the press use issues like collateral damage to simply bash the U.S., or to insinuate that we're the only ones causing damage, and that if only we weren't there Iraq would be a nice peaceful place. Tough questions are admirable if the objective is to help us win the war, disgraceful if they're used to encourage cut-and-run. The other consideration is whether the critic spends all of his or her time attacking the U.S., or whether they spend time exposing the horrors caused by the terrorist insurgents.

So we'll see what NPR does with this story. Ok, I'm not optimistic either.

The reality of warfare is that no matter how careful you are things will be destroyed that we didn't mean to hit, and people will be killed or hurt that we weren't aiming at. I know this sounds macabre, but what it comes down to is a calculation as to whether the gains are more than the losses. One thing that should be noted, especially by hawkish right-wingers, is that if you want to win a counterinsurgency you had better keep the use of force to just what is absolutely necessary and no more. If you don't believe me pick up a copy of Field Manual 3-24.

Later we had the "Nancy Pelosi" question

Q General, it's David Morgan from Reuters. In terms of the cease-fire agreement that brought the recent spate of violence in Sadr City to an end, can you tell us, to your knowledge, did Iran play a role in restraining the special groups that were involved in the attacks?

And to what extent did their influence bring an end to the violence?

GEN. HAMMOND: Well, I don't know. I think that, you know, any time -- we've seen the past the Muqtada al-Sadr's declaration of cease-fire have impact. In the particular case this time around, what we dealt with, I think there were really two groups. There were those that chose to honor the desire to decrease, to eliminate the violence, and there are those that chose otherwise. And the ones that otherwise -- the ones I'm talking about, all you can really label them as is criminals. You know, there's either those that follow the law or those that wish to break the law.

And we're at that point now where I think the real influence in all this, in my opinion, is the people. I think we're seeing -- and I've been here before in Baghdad, in MND-Baghdad, in a different role. I've seen a significant difference now, where more and more I'm seeing the people, the people are stepping forward, and the number of tips we're receiving now, it's unbelievable. They're stepping forward. They're sharing information. They're telling us in Sadr City, in Area Gold, they're very thankful to the Iraqi army. They don't want the Iraqi army to leave. They're thankful that the militias have backed away. These people want to get on with life. It's really a remarkable situation to see as it's developed here in the last -- really last month. Very positive. Very positive what I see out there ahead.

In other words, Madame Speaker, you don't know what you're talking about.

There is a lot more to the briefing, most all of which is encouraging. You know we're on the right track when Voice of America reporter Al Pessin voices optimism as to the state of the Iraqi Security Forces in a question. But for that and other exchanges you'll have to watch the video or read the transcript. I'll move on to Maj. Gen. Hammond's final remarks:

Thanks for your time. The only thing I'd ask -- the message I'd ask you to take back is something like this. These youngsters you have here, soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, they're your credentials.

They're the nation's credentials. They're less than 1 percent of the nation who volunteer to serve here. And they want -- they want this mission. They're doing one heck of a job. I think I'd ask you, as you go forth, to find an Army, Navy, Marine or Air Force family member somewhere, in a local mall, wherever you go about places, and thank them. Because those folks have lent -- they've lent to us their service member here to fight this battle for freedom and for the needs of these Iraqi people. And their service member's doing one heck of a job.

I think the glass is half-full. I think clearly that it's an encouraging situation we have right now. But we still got a lot of work we got to get done. And we're up for it, we're up to it, and I'm looking forward to tomorrow.

I have nothing further. Thanks for your time.

Posted by Tom at 9:40 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

June 1, 2008

Strategic Defeat for al Qaeda in Iraq...

It's too early to say for certain, but signs everywhere point to a strategic defeat for al Qaeda in Iraq. You know we're winning when The Washington Post admits it

THERE'S BEEN a relative lull in news coverage and debate about Iraq in recent weeks -- which is odd, because May could turn out to have been one of the most important months of the war. While Washington's attention has been fixed elsewhere, military analysts have watched with astonishment as the Iraqi government and army have gained control for the first time of the port city of Basra and the sprawling Baghdad neighborhood of Sadr City, routing the Shiite militias that have ruled them for years and sending key militants scurrying to Iran. At the same time, Iraqi and U.S. forces have pushed forward with a long-promised offensive in Mosul, the last urban refuge of al-Qaeda. So many of its leaders have now been captured or killed that U.S. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, renowned for his cautious assessments, said that the terrorists have "never been closer to defeat than they are now."

Iraq passed a turning point last fall when the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign launched in early 2007 produced a dramatic drop in violence and quelled the incipient sectarian war between Sunnis and Shiites. Now, another tipping point may be near, one that sees the Iraqi government and army restoring order in almost all of the country, dispersing both rival militias and the Iranian-trained "special groups" that have used them as cover to wage war against Americans. ...

If the positive trends continue, proponents of withdrawing most U.S. troops, such as Mr. Obama, might be able to responsibly carry out further pullouts next year. Still, the likely Democratic nominee needs a plan for Iraq based on sustaining an improving situation, rather than abandoning a failed enterprise. That will mean tying withdrawals to the evolution of the Iraqi army and government, rather than an arbitrary timetable; Iraq's 2009 elections will be crucial. It also should mean providing enough troops and air power to continue backing up Iraqi army operations such as those in Basra and Sadr City. When Mr. Obama floated his strategy for Iraq last year, the United States appeared doomed to defeat. Now he needs a plan for success.

Unfortunately for the nation, I wouldn't count on Senator Obama changing his tune

A Strategic Victory

In another Washington Post story ouCIA Director Michael V. Hayden outlines the larger implications

CIA Director Michael V. Hayden now portrays the terrorist movement as essentially defeated in Iraq and Saudi Arabia and on the defensive throughout much of the rest of the world, including in its presumed haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

In a strikingly upbeat assessment, the CIA chief cited major gains against al-Qaeda's allies in the Middle East and an increasingly successful campaign to destabilize the group's core leadership.

While cautioning that al-Qaeda remains a serious threat, Hayden said Osama bin Laden is losing the battle for hearts and minds in the Islamic world and has largely forfeited his ability to exploit the Iraq war to recruit adherents. Two years ago, a CIA study concluded that the U.S.-led war had become a propaganda and marketing bonanza for al-Qaeda, generating cash donations and legions of volunteers.

All that has changed, Hayden said in an interview with The Washington Post this week that coincided with the start of his third year at the helm of the CIA.

"On balance, we are doing pretty well," he said, ticking down a list of accomplishments: "Near strategic defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Near strategic defeat for al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Significant setbacks for al-Qaeda globally -- and here I'm going to use the word 'ideologically' -- as a lot of the Islamic world pushes back on their form of Islam," he said.

The sense of shifting tides in the terrorism fight is shared by a number of terrorism experts, though some caution that it is too early to tell whether the gains are permanent. Some credit Hayden and other U.S. intelligence leaders for going on the offensive against al-Qaeda in the area along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, where the tempo of Predator strikes has dramatically increased from previous years. But analysts say the United States has caught some breaks in the past year, benefiting from improved conditions in Iraq, as well as strategic blunders by al-Qaeda that have cut into its support base.

"benefited from improved conditions in Iraq" And how did that occur? Not, as Speaker Pelosi says, because of the good graces of Iraq, but because of the surge. It was the right thing to do and it worked.

The Domestic Political Implications

Obama is to wedded to the leftist mantra that we've lost in Iraq and that nothing can salvage the situation. Since the forced exit of the last hawkish Democrat, Senator Joe Lieberman, I don't think there are any members of his party left to whom Obama could turn to for support should he decide on a "plan for success." The entire Democrat party is too tied to the Movon.org and Daily Kos version of events.

The Republican Bush Administration may have screwed up the war in it's early stages, but Senator McCain can claim to have recognized this early on and called for changes. Obama opposed the war from the start, something he trumpets on the campaign trail. Now that the evidence of both military and political success are impossible to ignore, he is reduced to claiming that a trip to Iraq would be a "stunt". The truth, as everyone knows, is that Petraeus and his generals will present him with so much evidence of success that denial will make him look silly.

In short, if current trends continue, McCain will look better but Obama will have some 'splaining to do.

What it All Means

The Wall Street Journal summed it up nicely

Zawahiri himself last month repeated his claim that (Iraq) "is now the most important arena in which our Muslim nation is waging the battle against the forces of the Crusader-Zionist campaign." So it's all the more significant that on this crucial battleground, al Qaeda has been decimated by the surge of U.S. forces into Baghdad. The surge, in turn, gave confidence to the Sunni tribes that this was a fight they could win. For Zawahiri, losing the battles you say you need to win is not a way to collect new recruits.

General Hayden was careful to say the threat continues, and he warned specifically about those in Congress and the media who "[focus] less on the threat and more on the tactics the nation has chosen to deal with the threat." This refers to the political campaign to restrict wiretapping and aggressive interrogation, both of which the CIA director says have been crucial to gathering intelligence that has blocked further terrorist spectaculars that would have burnished al Qaeda's prestige.

One irony here is that Barack Obama is promising a rapid withdrawal from Iraq on grounds that we can't defeat al Qaeda unless we focus on Afghanistan. He opposed the Iraq surge on similar grounds. Yet it is the surge, and the destruction of al Qaeda in Iraq, that has helped to demoralize al Qaeda around the world. Nothing would more embolden Zawahiri now than a U.S. retreat from Iraq, which al Qaeda would see as the U.S. version of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan.

Those who claim that Iraq has nothing to do with the war on terror miss these last points entirely. Winning in Iraq helps defeat al Qaeda around the world, whereby a cut-and-run would embolden them around the world. This is why a victory in Iraq constitutes a strategic defeat for al Qaeda, and not just a tactical setback in one place. Likewise, it would be a strategic victory for us, and not just a tactical achievement in one place with no larger meaning.

Posted by Tom at 8:30 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack

May 15, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 14 May 2008 - "The enemy does fear us"

This briefing is by U.S. Army Colonel Wayne Grigsby, Commander of the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division.

The 3rd ID is part of Multi-National Division Central, otherwise known as Task Force Marne. Their area of responsibility extends to the southern edge of Baghdad to the border with Saudi Arabia, and then to the border of Iran.

Col Grigsby reports to the commander of the 3rd ID, Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch. Lynch reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin, in turn, reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Forces - Iraq, who reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until last month. Until Petraeus is confirmed by Congress for this position, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This video and others can be viewed at DODvClips. The transcript is here.

Grigsby's 3rd Brigade is a "surge brigade", which I think means it is not normally part of the 3rd ID, but came in as an "extra", when we bolstered our forces from 15 to 20 brigades the first half of 2007. They deployed in March of '07 to the Madain qadha just east of Baghdad as the third of five surge brigades. As such, they are nearing the end of their 15 month deployment, and are due a well-deserved rest back home.

This past February I featured Col Grisby in one of my "Iraq Reports", so you can go back and view that one and compare it with this one.

In his introduction, Col Grigsby gave a strong account of his unit's success, but avoided giving direct answers to the reporters questions.

The questions from the reporters were smart and good. The Col tended to fall back on talking points when answering, however. I'm not sure if this is because of instructions from above, concern on his part about saying something that gets him in trouble, or whether he doesn't want to give sensitive information to the enemy (who no doubt watches these broadcasts).

Anyway, here are the parts that I found to be the most informative:

COL. GRIGSBY: ...When we arrived, violent crime was out of control. Shop owners were extorted by criminal elements, and we were getting attacked about four to five times a day.

In our time here, murders have declined by greater than 50 percent, from 631 in '06 to 253 in '07. Shop owners are selling their goods in revitalized markets and we are now down to maybe one attack every other day.

We accomplished this by conducting doctrinally correct, sound, full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations on the fundamental base of conducting aggressive, intel-driven combat offensive operations. We wanted to bloody the nose of the enemy and make them fear us. We did bloody the nose of the enemy and the enemy does fear us, both coalition forces and Iraqi security forces.

We never forgot what a U.S. Army heavy brigade combat team is built to do: to close with and destroy the enemy. We killed 160 enemy combatants, detained more than 500 suspected criminals, 47 of which were division and brigade high-level individuals, or "most wanted." And we cleared every enemy sanctuary that existed prior to our arrival.
...

But beyond killing and capturing the enemy, we knew that we needed the good people of the Madain qadha to trust and respect us. While we were conducting 25 air assaults into enemy sanctuaries in the dead of the night, we were building relationships with the townspeople that we lived with as neighbors in the major population centers. Since we worked out of eight patrol bases and four joint security sites in the middle of population centers, we never commuted to work. We did not ride to work. When a combat patrol began each day, Sledgehammer Soldiers were already among their neighbors, living with them.

We built these relationships by trust, by treating local residents with dignity and respect and giving them their communities back. By taking extremists and criminals off the streets in Jisr Diyala, Wahida, Salman Pak, and Nahrawan, we emboldened the good people to step back into the traditional roles of leadership, leadership by the tribal leaders, leadership by local governmental officials rather than leadership by fear where individuals use murder, intimidation to control the masses.

The major population centers of the qadha all now have revitalized markets, health care facilities, water distribution systems, schools, and even some windmills.

These tactics are straight out of the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. If you're somehow not aware, this is the book written by a team led by then Lt. Gen. David Petraeus in 2006, and released in December of that year. It is the "bible" of U.S. troops in Iraq, and following its prescriptions is a major reason for our astounding success since then.

Continuing with Col. Grigsby's introduction

But with all positives in Iraq, our hold on this momentum and these gains is tenuous. To make these tenuous gains permanent, we will continue to hunt the enemy where he sleeps and we will continue to assist our Iraqi partners where they look to make improvements. We will continue to shake hands and build relationships during the daytime and kill or capture the extremists at night. We will never forget what a heavy brigade combat team is built to do. As I said earlier, we have been here for 15 months, so we are scheduled to soon redeploy. We have a lot of work to accomplish before we depart, however. We are integrating another combat-tested brigade, Colonel Pat White's 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, the Iron Brigade, into the Madain qadha, and they are iron-strong. ...

The Sledgehammer Brigade is the most deployed brigade in the Army, and our Sledgehammer Soldiers can be proud that we are leaving this country in a far better condition than we arrived. Just a couple days, a couple of the kids came up to me and said, "Sir, you know the difference between last time and this time is no kidding. We see the difference. We see the transformation from 15 months ago today. We see the gains that we've made."

I mentioned earlier that Col. Grigsby tended to evade directly answering many of the reporters questions, and that is true. But what is also interesting is that none of the reporters directly challenged his assessment of the situation.

The first exchange is representative:

Q Colonel, it's Andrew Gray from Reuters. Could you tell us something about the strength of Iraqi forces in your area? What kind of size of Iraqi security presence do you have and how capable are they? The fact that a new brigade is coming in to replace you, does that indicate they're not yet ready to take over security in that area?

COL. GRIGSBY: Well, that's a great question. We have some great Iraqi security forces in the Madain qadha. I was here in OIF 2, where we were just starting with the Iraqi security forces, and I can tell you over the last 15 months I see some great gains, the best I've seen in 37 months of combat.

We have an Iraqi National Police brigade that we focus a lot of effort on, the 3-1 National Police commanded by Brigadier General Emad. And they are the center focus of that Marne Dauntless operation. And they're conducting independent operations. He has an intel network and he goes out and he kills or captures extremists along with the 3-1 Cav and now 1-35 Armor.

We also have a great Iraqi army brigade that came into the southern portion of our battlespace which is a known brigade, the 35th, out of Baghdad. They came out to the Madain qadha -- saw the great gains. And they're keeping the southern portion of our battlespace free of the Sunni extremists. They're doing a great job.

And we continue to work with the Iraqi police. We will continue to partner with them. We'll continue to help them with their community policing within the towns so that when the common Iraqi comes out of their house, they will see that guy on the beat.

And we can't forget about the Sons of Iraq, the 7,000 Sons of Iraq, that has helped us with security, and their support in assisting the Iraqi security forces within the Madain.

And we are one of the surge brigades, but we're the only brigade that is being back-filled. And 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division will come out here and support and assist the Iraqi security forces within the Madain and take it to the next level.

Hope that answers your question.

Q Sure. Just to follow up, though, Colonel, does the fact that you need to be back-filled by another brigade indicate that they still have some way to go? What do they still need to do before they can take over security for their own area?

COL. GRIGSBY: I think it indicates that people see that the Madain qadha's a key piece of terrain. Before we came here there was maybe one or two companies coming across on the east side of the river -- Sunni extremists, Shi'a extremists and Persian influence were doing what they wanted to.

They no longer can do that. The Madain qadha has a government that's standing up. The Madain qadha has 70 percent agriculture, which was shown by a farmers' co-op we've done just two weekends ago, where over 1,500 farmers came and worked.

There's a lot of ways to go out here, not only with security, but also with the capacity build, with governance and economics. And the Baghdad government is starting to see, and they're bringing $86.1 million out here to help us out. I think we were backfilled because we see this as a key piece of terrain and we see that this also is a door into Baghdad and we can continue to interdict the accelerants, if they are out there, that may try to threaten Baghdad.

He didn't really answer Andrew's question, which means that although the Iraqis are making progress they're not ready yet to fully take over.

As for the gains being fragile (read "reversible"), this has been stated by commanders at all levels for months. I suppose you can compare it to WWII in late 1944. Things looked good for the allies, but as we discovered the enemy still had surprises for us; the Germans with what was termed the "Battle of the Bulge", and the Japanese with the kamikaze.

Lastly, this important information about R 'n R for the troops when they get home

Q Colonel, Nathan Hodge with Jane's Defence Weekly.

You mentioned, in your opening statement, a brigade had been deployed 41 months since 2002. You also mentioned the utility of a heavy brigade combat team in these kinds of operations.

When brigade returns back to home station, will you see the need for any kind of focus on things like the traditional operations that you would have -- high-end warfighting? What kinds of things does the brigade need to focus on when it returns to home station?

COL. GRIGSBY: We always need to remember that we're a heavy brigade combat team. But I tell you what, these boys have been fighting for 15 months. And as we go home, we're going to go home. We're going to give them a 48-hour pass.

We're going to go through 10 half-days deliberate training, dictated by Major General Rick Lynch, on 10 half-days of reintegration training. As we get all the soldiers back into the Fort Benning, back into Fort Benning and their family members, and make sure that's straight.

And then we'll give them 30 days of leave or more, and they'll come back off of leave rested.

We'll do some leadership changes, and then we'll start conducting some individual training.

But during that first six months, these soldiers won't train at night. These soldiers will have Thursday afternoons off, called Marne family time, and these soldiers won't train on the weekends. So we get these guys back with their families. That's the most important thing.

And then as the leadership changes over in the December-January time frame, we'll start it again, but we'll start off like a heavy brigade always starts off. We'll focus on marksmanship, killing what we shoot at. We'll focus on maneuver. All this stuff, we'll focus on synchronized and indirect fire and attack aviation. Everything that built a fundamental base of this heavy brigade combat team.

And just as a side note, as we go back, this brigade on 17 February made its reenlistment objectives on 17 February, five months into the fiscal year. We made that along with the great 3rd ID. So we have soldiers not only that want to stay in the Army, they want to stay at Kelly Hill and continue to get after it. And I couldn't be more proud of them.

That's time off well deserved.

Bottom line, nothing in this briefing leads me away from my oft-stated conclusion that our gains are real and if current trends continue we will win, which means a stable, at least somewhat democratic Iraq that is an American ally.

Note: I've received a report about getting an error message when leaving comments. If you do get an error message (not "pending") please do me a favor and send email to me at redhunter43@yahoo.com Thank you.

Posted by Tom at 9:00 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

April 26, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 23 May 2008 - Meet the New Commander of MNC-Iraq

This briefing is by the new commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq, Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin III. Austin replaced Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno in February 2008, who at the time had been appointed Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army. This Wednesday Odierno was appointed commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq, the position now held by Gen. David Petraeus. Petraeus, in turn, has been appointed the next commander of CENTCOM. Both of these changes require Senate confirmation and so even if approved they will not take their new jobs until later this summer.

As the second-highest commander in Iraq, Austin reports directly to Gen. Petraeus. Petraeus reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until last month. Until Petraeus is confirmed, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This is Lt. Gen. Austin's first press briefing as commander of MNC-Iraq.

This video and others can be viewed at DODvClips. For some reason the transcript is not on the Defenselink site. I am trying to get one from Federal News Service, and if I do will post it or excerpts here.

Until then, please watch the video in its entirely. These briefings are good sources of information about what is happening in Iraq(which are also at The Pentagon Channel). The should be used to complement what we get from mainstream media and independent journalist-bloggers. Each source counter-checks and counter-balances the other.

Posted by Tom at 12:26 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack

April 23, 2008

Petraeus to CENTCOM, Odierno to MNF-Iraq

Today we have excellent news coming from the Pentagon. From CNN

Army Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, has been chosen to become chief of U.S. Central Command, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Wednesday

Petraeus would replace Adm. William Fallon, who said last month that he was resigning. Fallon said widespread, but false, reports that he was at odds with the Bush administration over Iran had made his job impossible.

In addition, Gates said, Army Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of the Multinational Corps-Iraq -- the No. 2 position in Iraq -- is being nominated to fill Petraeus' post. Odierno has been home from Iraq for only a couple of months but has agreed to return, Gates said.

The plan is for Petraeus to leave Iraq in late summer or early fall, Gates said, to ensure a smooth transition and plenty of time for Odierno to prepare.

Lt. Gen Odierno was slated to become the next Vice-Chief of Staff, but that is obviously now off.

Anyone who has followed the war in Iraq knows that these two men were the architects of our success in 2007. Along with a few others like Frederick Kagan and Jack Keane, they designed and implemented what is popularly known as the "surge".

Everyone is familiar with Gen. Petraeus. Odierno less so. Here's the short version for the uninitiated; Odierno was to Petraeus what Patton was to Eisenhower. Odierno is, in fact, known as the "Patton of Counterinsurgency".

I've blogged quite a bit about Petraeus and Odierno, and have covered most of their press briefings and/or appearances before Congress. Go to the sidebar under "Categories" and choose "Iraq" and "Iraq II 2007 - 2008".

Both commanders will have their work cut out for them. Adm. Fallon failed at CENTCOM in what was arguably his most important task; stopping Iranian interference in Iraq. His successor, Gen Abizaid, failed in this as well (Contrary to what the leftist blogosphere said, no Fallon was not the lone sane guy preventing the Bush Administration from bombing Iran). Petraeus succeeded in Iraq where his predecessors Sanchez and Casey failed, so he certainly has experience in saving losing situations.

As for Odierno, he is well suited to taking over command of MNF-Iraq. As he said during a press conference (I forget which, so sorry no link), he "got the memo" regarding the need to adopt true counterinsurgency warfare. He did a masterful job as commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, coordinating action between the divisional commanders, setting policy, implementing the "surge", and allocating resources.

I will have much more to say about this in the months to come. Both will have to be confirmed by Congress, and so will appear in testimony.

Richard Fernandez ("Wretchard") had this to say

Gen Petraeus has been nominated to head CENTCOM, according to the Washington Post. And Gen Odierno, his deputy, will take over command of ground forces in Iraq. I think this news will be received with great alarm and trepidation in Teheran.

As I've written in the past, I don't think an invasion or bombing campaign of Iran is in the works. What I think will happen (and it's just my own opinion) is that Petraeus plans take a hammer to all the places where Iran has poked its finger; turn its own allies against it with a combination of targeted force and politics.

More important than his battlefield successes in Iraq may be the implied victory in Pentagon politics that his nomination to CENTCOM chief suggests. It's important to remember that before the Surge, Petraeus' ideas were on the margin. Now they are in the mainstream.

Now it's the Democrats who need to "get the memo" about what's now mainstream.

There's also a great roundup of opinion over at Small Wars Journal. Read the whole thing, but here are two quotes:

Max Boot: Odierno spent the year from early 2007 to early 2008 working closely with Petraeus to supervise the implementation of the surge. They were by far the most successful team of commanders we have had in Iraq-potentially the Grant/Sherman or Eisenhower/Patton of this long conflict.

William Kristol: The allegedly lame duck Bush administration has--if this report is correct--hit a home run. CENTCOM is the central theater of the war on terror, and the president is putting our best commander in charge of it. What Odierno achieved as day-to-day commander in Iraq was amazing.

Thursday Update

The Wall Street Journal approves

This means that both men will be able to build on the Iraq success of the last year, without losing time as new commanders learn the ropes. It also means that General Petraeus won't face a superior at Centcom agitating that he withdraw troops before Iraqis are ready to handle their own security. That was the case with former Centcom chief, Admiral William Fallon, who recently resigned with a well-deserved White House push. As a theater commander with a direct line to the Defense Secretary and President, General Petraeus also won't have to answer to service chiefs jealous of his success and resources....

If confirmed by the Senate, the pair will lead their commands into 2009 and the next Presidency. This means the next President will get the candid advice of Generals who will not want to jeopardize hard-won progress with a too-hasty withdrawal. As patriots, they will of course follow civilian orders. But knowing first-hand the sacrifice of their soldiers, they well appreciate the consequences for Army morale if the U.S. fails in Iraq. Who knows: Barack Obama might even listen if General Petraeus explains why retreat in Iraq would make victory in Afghanistan harder, not easier.

Now compare Sen. Harry Reid's statement on these promotions with that of Sen. Joe Lieberman. Here's Lieberman (via The Weekly Standard)

"I applaud Secretary Gates' recommendation to nominate General David Petraeus to become the next Commander of U.S. Central Command, and General Raymond Odierno to become the Commander of Multi-National Forces - Iraq. There is no doubt in my mind that General Petraeus and General Odierno are the absolute best men to take on these two critically important assignments.

"General Petraeus has won the admiration and respect of the entire country over the past fifteen months. As commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, he has overseen one of the most dramatic turnarounds in American military history, quite literally seizing victory out of the jaws of defeat in Iraq. There is no one better qualified or more capable to lead America's brave men and women in uniform in the Middle East, which remains one of the most strategically vital regions of the world for America's national security.

"I also strongly support the nomination of General Odierno. As commander of Multi-National Corps Iraq, General Odierno brilliantly adapted General Petraeus' overarching counterinsurgency strategy into operational art. As much as anyone else, he deserves credit for the extraordinary transformation in security conditions in Iraq over the past year.

"In addition, General Odierno's willingness to accept another tour in Iraq -- having only just returned to his family in the United States after fifteen months there -- is a testament to his extraordinary patriotism and inspiring dedication to duty. There is no one better qualified to succeed General Petraeus in Baghdad than General Odierno.

And here's Reid

The next CENTCOM commander and field commander in Iraq will have to help the next President with a number of critically important challenges: making America more secure, restoring America's power and influence in the world, fixing our costly strategy in Iraq, and articulating a more effective strategy for winning in Afghanistan and defeating Al Qaeda in Pakistan....Our ground forces' readiness and the battles in Afghanistan and against al Qaeda in Pakistan have suffered as a result of the current costly Iraq strategy. These challenges will require fresh, independent and creative thinking and, if directed to by a new President, a commitment to implementing major changes in strategy...The Senate will carefully examine these nominations and I will be looking for credible assurances of a strong commitment to implementing a more effective national security strategy.

As Michael Goldfarb points out, the statement is so political that Reid can't manage "a word of thanks or praise for the remarkable job Petraeus has done in Iraq."

Tuesday Update

This article in the LA Times (h/t SWJ blog) describes perfectly why Odierno is the right general to succeed Petraeus

When Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno began his second tour of duty in Iraq late in 2006 as the war's No. 2 commander, he was handed a battle plan that he and his staff quickly determined was out of touch with reality -- a set of precise timetables for handing over whole provinces to Iraqi security forces, regardless of their readiness.

"This race to victory based on a timeline did not pass the common-sense test," said a top Odierno aide, citing the threat of widespread violence.

So Odierno made a fateful move: He challenged his boss, Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr., to change the strategy. It was an opening salvo in the behind-the-scenes battle over what became known as the "surge."

And Odierno's challenge, though initially spurned, goes a long way toward explaining why he was nominated last week to succeed Army Gen. David H. Petraeus as the overall commander in Iraq.

The tall, intimidating artilleryman with a shaved head and a grave bearing was an early believer in what is now basic U.S. policy in Iraq. And he has proved he will stand up for it under fire.

Odierno's commitment to the new approach is all the stronger because he embraces it with the fervor of a convert. During his first tour in Iraq, in 2003 and 2004, critics charged that his dedication to overwhelming force and firepower was the antithesis of counterinsurgency doctrine.

As a result, although Petraeus has become the face of the war, it is Odierno who more truly mirrors the American military's experience in Iraq.

Read the whole thing

Posted by Tom at 9:26 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

April 15, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 14 April 2008 - "From Clear to Hold and Build"

This briefing is by Marine Colonel Pat Malay, commander of Regimental Combat Team 5, and Mr. Robert Carrington, who is the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team leader.

They are part of Multinational Force West, and began their current tour in January of this year. MNF-W is headquartered by the U.S. II Marine Expeditionary Force. Their area of operations include the cities of Ar Ramadi and Fallujah. Maj. Gen. John F. Kelly serves as commanding general for II Marine Expeditionary Force.

Maj. Gen. Kelly reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin, in turn, reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Forces - Iraq. Petraeus reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until last month. Until a permanent replacement is found, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This video and others can be viewed at DODvClips. The transcript is here.

Here are what I found to be the most interesting parts of the briefing

Q Sir, it's Kristin Roberts with Reuters. I'm hoping you can give us a little detail about your efforts to incorporate the CLCs or the Sons of Iraq, the local folks there, into the Iraqi security forces or other government jobs, specifically how many want to be transitioned into the ISF and how many have been already.

COL. MALAY: All right. Well, I need to point out to you right off the bat that the Sons of Iraq are common to the Ramadi-Fallujah area. In Al Anbar, we progressed way past that months ago, and we have Iraqi policemen, we have provincial security forces, we have Iraqi highway patrol and the Iraqi army. That constitutes the security forces that we work with out here.

Getting the population involved in it's own defense is a primary goal of counterinsurgency. Because of the difficulties and time involved in getting Iraqi Police (IP) and Iraqi Army (IA) units up and running, one of the things Petraeus did was start a "Concerned Local Citizen" groups throughout Iraq. These were essentially neighborhood watch programs on steroids. A few months ago the Iraqis renamed them Sons of Iraq. The original CLCs grew out of the Anbar Awakening movement.

The idea was to get something for neighborhood defense up and running asap, and then later recruit from the CLCs to build IP or IA units. What Col Malay is saying is that they have gone through the CLC/Sons of Iraq stage and have already turned them into IP or IA units.

Q Hi, Colonel. This is Courtney Kube from NBC News. You spoke about the successes you're having in some of the bigger cities in your area of operations, but I'm wondering if you can talk a little bit about the more rural areas that your Marines have been moving into in recent weeks, specifically down in the southwestern part, near Rutbah. Can you talk about the economic situation there? And then, are you seeing foreign fighters continuing to flow into that area, and weapons? Can you update us on that situation?

COL. MALAY: Certainly, Courtney. You know, we're still very much working the clear, hold, build aspect of the counterinsurgency. We're well past clear in all of the areas, to include Rutbah, and now what we're concentrating on is hold and build. The hold is fulcrumed on how well the Iraqi security forces are able to integrate into the city areas and then extend out into those rural areas that you're talking about.
...

I wanted to comment quickly about the foreign fighters. Yes, they're still out there and we're still running into them, and we're finding them -- they're hard to find. They're hard to fix in place because they're running from us. But once we find them and we fix them, they're very easy to finish. We've had great success destroying them and a good portion of their network in the wadi systems, in particular around Rutbah.
...

Q Can you give us any -- sort of quantify the foreig