April 23, 2008
Petraeus to CENTCOM, Odierno to MNF-Iraq
Today we have excellent news coming from the Pentagon. From CNN
Army Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, has been chosen to become chief of U.S. Central Command, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Wednesday
Petraeus would replace Adm. William Fallon, who said last month that he was resigning. Fallon said widespread, but false, reports that he was at odds with the Bush administration over Iran had made his job impossible.In addition, Gates said, Army Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of the Multinational Corps-Iraq -- the No. 2 position in Iraq -- is being nominated to fill Petraeus' post. Odierno has been home from Iraq for only a couple of months but has agreed to return, Gates said.
The plan is for Petraeus to leave Iraq in late summer or early fall, Gates said, to ensure a smooth transition and plenty of time for Odierno to prepare.
Lt. Gen Odierno was slated to become the next Vice-Chief of Staff, but that is obviously now off.
Anyone who has followed the war in Iraq knows that these two men were the architects of our success in 2007. Along with a few others like Frederick Kagan and Jack Keane, they designed and implemented what is popularly known as the "surge".
Everyone is familiar with Gen. Petraeus. Odierno less so. Here's the short version for the uninitiated; Odierno was to Petraeus what Patton was to Eisenhower. Odierno is, in fact, known as the "Patton of Counterinsurgency".
I've blogged quite a bit about Petraeus and Odierno, and have covered most of their press briefings and/or appearances before Congress. Go to the sidebar under "Categories" and choose "Iraq" and "Iraq II 2007 - 2008".
Both commanders will have their work cut out for them. Adm. Fallon failed at CENTCOM in what was arguably his most important task; stopping Iranian interference in Iraq. His successor, Gen Abizaid, failed in this as well (Contrary to what the leftist blogosphere said, no Fallon was not the lone sane guy preventing the Bush Administration from bombing Iran). Petraeus succeeded in Iraq where his predecessors Sanchez and Casey failed, so he certainly has experience in saving losing situations.
As for Odierno, he is well suited to taking over command of MNF-Iraq. As he said during a press conference (I forget which, so sorry no link), he "got the memo" regarding the need to adopt true counterinsurgency warfare. He did a masterful job as commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, coordinating action between the divisional commanders, setting policy, implementing the "surge", and allocating resources.
I will have much more to say about this in the months to come. Both will have to be confirmed by Congress, and so will appear in testimony.
Richard Fernandez ("Wretchard") had this to say
Gen Petraeus has been nominated to head CENTCOM, according to the Washington Post. And Gen Odierno, his deputy, will take over command of ground forces in Iraq. I think this news will be received with great alarm and trepidation in Teheran.As I've written in the past, I don't think an invasion or bombing campaign of Iran is in the works. What I think will happen (and it's just my own opinion) is that Petraeus plans take a hammer to all the places where Iran has poked its finger; turn its own allies against it with a combination of targeted force and politics.
More important than his battlefield successes in Iraq may be the implied victory in Pentagon politics that his nomination to CENTCOM chief suggests. It's important to remember that before the Surge, Petraeus' ideas were on the margin. Now they are in the mainstream.
Now it's the Democrats who need to "get the memo" about what's now mainstream.
There's also a great roundup of opinion over at Small Wars Journal. Read the whole thing, but here are two quotes:
Max Boot: Odierno spent the year from early 2007 to early 2008 working closely with Petraeus to supervise the implementation of the surge. They were by far the most successful team of commanders we have had in Iraq-potentially the Grant/Sherman or Eisenhower/Patton of this long conflict.William Kristol: The allegedly lame duck Bush administration has--if this report is correct--hit a home run. CENTCOM is the central theater of the war on terror, and the president is putting our best commander in charge of it. What Odierno achieved as day-to-day commander in Iraq was amazing.
Thursday Update
The Wall Street Journal approves
This means that both men will be able to build on the Iraq success of the last year, without losing time as new commanders learn the ropes. It also means that General Petraeus won't face a superior at Centcom agitating that he withdraw troops before Iraqis are ready to handle their own security. That was the case with former Centcom chief, Admiral William Fallon, who recently resigned with a well-deserved White House push. As a theater commander with a direct line to the Defense Secretary and President, General Petraeus also won't have to answer to service chiefs jealous of his success and resources....If confirmed by the Senate, the pair will lead their commands into 2009 and the next Presidency. This means the next President will get the candid advice of Generals who will not want to jeopardize hard-won progress with a too-hasty withdrawal. As patriots, they will of course follow civilian orders. But knowing first-hand the sacrifice of their soldiers, they well appreciate the consequences for Army morale if the U.S. fails in Iraq. Who knows: Barack Obama might even listen if General Petraeus explains why retreat in Iraq would make victory in Afghanistan harder, not easier.
Now compare Sen. Harry Reid's statement on these promotions with that of Sen. Joe Lieberman. Here's Lieberman (via The Weekly Standard)
"I applaud Secretary Gates' recommendation to nominate General David Petraeus to become the next Commander of U.S. Central Command, and General Raymond Odierno to become the Commander of Multi-National Forces - Iraq. There is no doubt in my mind that General Petraeus and General Odierno are the absolute best men to take on these two critically important assignments."General Petraeus has won the admiration and respect of the entire country over the past fifteen months. As commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, he has overseen one of the most dramatic turnarounds in American military history, quite literally seizing victory out of the jaws of defeat in Iraq. There is no one better qualified or more capable to lead America's brave men and women in uniform in the Middle East, which remains one of the most strategically vital regions of the world for America's national security.
"I also strongly support the nomination of General Odierno. As commander of Multi-National Corps Iraq, General Odierno brilliantly adapted General Petraeus' overarching counterinsurgency strategy into operational art. As much as anyone else, he deserves credit for the extraordinary transformation in security conditions in Iraq over the past year.
"In addition, General Odierno's willingness to accept another tour in Iraq -- having only just returned to his family in the United States after fifteen months there -- is a testament to his extraordinary patriotism and inspiring dedication to duty. There is no one better qualified to succeed General Petraeus in Baghdad than General Odierno.
And here's Reid
The next CENTCOM commander and field commander in Iraq will have to help the next President with a number of critically important challenges: making America more secure, restoring America's power and influence in the world, fixing our costly strategy in Iraq, and articulating a more effective strategy for winning in Afghanistan and defeating Al Qaeda in Pakistan....Our ground forces' readiness and the battles in Afghanistan and against al Qaeda in Pakistan have suffered as a result of the current costly Iraq strategy. These challenges will require fresh, independent and creative thinking and, if directed to by a new President, a commitment to implementing major changes in strategy...The Senate will carefully examine these nominations and I will be looking for credible assurances of a strong commitment to implementing a more effective national security strategy.
As Michael Goldfarb points out, the statement is so political that Reid can't manage "a word of thanks or praise for the remarkable job Petraeus has done in Iraq."
Tuesday Update
This article in the LA Times (h/t SWJ blog) describes perfectly why Odierno is the right general to succeed Petraeus
When Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno began his second tour of duty in Iraq late in 2006 as the war's No. 2 commander, he was handed a battle plan that he and his staff quickly determined was out of touch with reality -- a set of precise timetables for handing over whole provinces to Iraqi security forces, regardless of their readiness."This race to victory based on a timeline did not pass the common-sense test," said a top Odierno aide, citing the threat of widespread violence.
So Odierno made a fateful move: He challenged his boss, Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr., to change the strategy. It was an opening salvo in the behind-the-scenes battle over what became known as the "surge."
And Odierno's challenge, though initially spurned, goes a long way toward explaining why he was nominated last week to succeed Army Gen. David H. Petraeus as the overall commander in Iraq.
The tall, intimidating artilleryman with a shaved head and a grave bearing was an early believer in what is now basic U.S. policy in Iraq. And he has proved he will stand up for it under fire.
Odierno's commitment to the new approach is all the stronger because he embraces it with the fervor of a convert. During his first tour in Iraq, in 2003 and 2004, critics charged that his dedication to overwhelming force and firepower was the antithesis of counterinsurgency doctrine.
As a result, although Petraeus has become the face of the war, it is Odierno who more truly mirrors the American military's experience in Iraq.
Read the whole thing
Posted by Tom at 9:26 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
August 30, 2007
Defense Vision Indeed
An editorial today in the Washington Times I think provides an opportunity to review some aspects of our national defense policy. William D. Hartung, identified as the director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation, wrote a piece called "Defense Vision MIA?"
Hartung is well intentioned, and unlike those on the far left genuinely cares about defending our nation. He has obviously given serious thought to matters such as how the DOD should be organized, and what weapons we should purchase. However, his thinking seems rather confused, and from this article it's hard to know exactly what he wants us to do
Here are some representative parts from his piece
...Mrs. Clinton's insistence on keeping "all options on the table" in dealing with potential adversaries — presumably including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons — represents old thinking that should have no place in a post-September 11, 2001, foreign policy.
Ugh. I certainly hope it does not come down to it but if we are not able to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons it's not too difficult to imagine a scenario in which we have no choice but to use them in self-defense. Although it's less likely, one can also imagine scenarios involving nuclear weapons with North Korea or China.
He then criticizes both Obama and Clinton for recommending that we add 80,000 troops to our armed forces
Advocating more troops raises an obvious question. What would the additional troops be for? Since all Democratic candidates claim to favor a withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq in relatively short order, the increase could not be meant to reinforce the U.S. presence there, unless they plan to maintain the occupation far longer than advertised.Do Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Obama want to ensure that the U.S. military is ready to engage in future Iraq-style occupations? Do they contemplate multiple humanitarian interventions that would involve hundreds of thousands of troops? Or is the call for more troops simply a political insurance to insulate them from Republican claims they are "soft" on terrorism?
None of these rationales is persuasive. In fact, a case can be made that an increase in troop strength is just as likely to detract from U.S. security as improve it.
So then he thinks that we can deter our enemies through high-tech weaponry, right? Not exactly. He wants to cancel most of them too. His prescription?
Increasing Special Forces for use in antiterrorist actions is a reasonable mission but does not require 80,000 more troops. Some of these units can be developed by training personnel already in the armed forces, rather than using new recruits who would take several years to attain adequate readiness. Unless Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Obama can clearly articulate the mission or missions requiring additional forces, they would be better served sticking to the issue of how to rebuild forces at existing levels after the trauma of Iraq.
This works only in a world whereby all US military actions are limited to Chuck Norris style quick in-and-out hit and run raids. If all threats meet this need, great. Unfortuantely I rather think the world will have other ideas.
Here's his other big idea
One place to start would be canceling programs like the F-22 combat aircraft, the V-22 Osprey, and the Virginia class submarine. These systems were designed when the Soviet military was deemed the primary threat, rather than the current challenge posed by a loose network of terrorist groups waging unconventional warfare.Here Harting reverts to everything that is wrong with modern liberal thinking on defense; cancel everything and build nothing in it's place. Substitute organizational changes for actual weapons. Sounds like Jimmy Carter and the B-1 all over again. Surely cancelling the Crusader was the correct move. I'm less certain about the Comanche, but I'll buy it. But what about the F-22, V-22, and Virginia class submarines? I think that if you look around the world it would seem reasonable to conclude that we might face any one of a number of enemies, and each would present a completely different challenge
Iraq and Afghanistan: Unlike Hartung, I want to stay in Iraq. Low intensity counterinsurgency. The need is for heavy weapons but small units. Lots of Special Forces are needed.
Iran: Air and Naval campaign: The need is for strategic bombers, aerial refueling, naval air, destroyers and frigates.
China: Any number of scenaries are actually possible. Most involve a shoot-out on the high seas, in which we're going to need every piece of high-tech equipment we can get our hands on.
North Korea: Absolutely unpredictable. It could turn into anything from a nuclear shoot-out, to a limited bombing campaign, to repelling a full-scale assault by the North Korean Army. The DPRK doesn't have much in the way of high-tech, but they do have a lot.
Venezuela or Cuba: Hard to imagine ground forces going to the former, but Cuba after Fidel remains unpredictable, and it's not impossible to imagine a US invasion. Low-tech forces should carry the day in either case, however.
So as we can see each scenario requires a completely different approach. It is my contention that we therefore need a little of everything. A balanced force is better than one in which we put all of our eggs in one basket.
The Israelis put most of their eggs into the airpower basket after their success in the 1967 war. As a result, for example they neglected artillery, thinking that their new F-4 Phantoms could serve as "flying artillery". As a result they nearly lost the 1973 Yom Kippur war, a loss that would have meant the end of Israel itself.
Further, it is not as if we can predict our wars. I laid out some obvious scenarios above, but history shows that we are usually surprised by how things develop. The Korean War took us by surprise. In the 1950s we prepared for nuclear war with the Soviets, only to find us fighing in the jungles of Vietnam the next decade. Weapons like the F-105, which was built as a short-range tactical nuclear bomber, ended up being used as a conventionbl bomber in Vietnam. For that matter, the VSTOL Harrier was built as a survivable tactical bomber for Europe (it could hide in the woods and be wheeled out to take off in a field), yet served in a conventional role in the Falklands War (in fact without it the British could not even have sent the task force forth).
Not Sitting Still
I don't have the time to go through the aircraft, submarines, and ships that our enemies might use against us, but suffice it to say that they aren't standing still. Let's not also be overconfident or arrogant with regard to our own capabilities. This attitude got a lot of US pilots killed during the early days of the Vietnam War, when we discovered that the MiG-21 was the equivalent of our F-4 Phantom, and their pilots nearly as good.
Further, some of our weapons are getting very old. The F-15 first flew in 1972. The F-16 in 1979, and the F-18 1982. The first Los Angeles class sub was launched in 1976. The CH-53 first flew in 1981, and the H47 in 1962. You get the point.
Yes all of the above systems have undergone major upgrades. I know all this. But you can only do so much with an old airframe. Sure, we could build a new helicopter instead of the tilt-rotar V-22 and it would be better than what is in the inventory. But we are really at about the limit of what you can do with helicopter technology, so it would be an exercise in the point of dimishing returns.
Instead of the F-22 Raptor we could rely on the somewhat less expensive F-35 Lightning II. This, however, would have been the equivalent of cancelling the F-15 and relying on the F-16. Ask any pilot about the wisdom of that potential decision.
And In Conclusion
We need to do two things. The first is to ensure that we have a balanced force. We need Special Forces, and we need F-22s. We need Virginia Class submarines and we need the MRAP. We cannot predict with any certainly who we might have to fight in the forseeable future, and different wars will require a different set of weapons.
The second thing we need to do is to simply spend more. Critics have a point when they say that the Army is stretched thin. The solution, however, is not to pull out of Iraq or anywhere else, but to build up the force. As the editors of National Review reminded us a few months ago how much our forces have shrunk recently
From 1974 to 1989, the Army had 770,000 to 780,000 active troops (all of them volunteers). Today, we have around 508,000. The Navy had 568 ships in the late 1980s; today it has 276, and its manpower is so reduced that it often has to helicopter sailors from homebound ships to outbound ones in order to keep them staffed. The Air Force’s number of tactical air wings has shrunk from 37 to 20, and the average age of its aircraft is 24 years (as compared with nine years in 1973).There is disagreement about whether the armed forces should be restored to their Cold War size, but there is consensus among military analysts across the political spectrum that they are too small. Today’s strategic environment requires them to be able to engage in multiple regional wars and peacekeeping operations simultaneously, and still have enough resources left over to deter threats and respond to unforeseen dangers.
During the last part of the Cold War I think we spend about 8% of GDP on national defense. Today it's at about 3.7% or so. While we don't need to go back to Cold War levels, we do need to do more. The unfortunate fact of history is that there will always be another war.
Posted by Tom at 10:09 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
May 24, 2007
Edwards Shows His Colors
On the one hand this is really no big surprise, but it's interesting to hear him say so plainly that he doesn't believe that there's any jihadist or Islamist threat to the West (h/t NRO)
The war on terror is a slogan designed only for politics, not a strategy to make America safe. It's a bumper sticker, not a plan. It has damaged our alliances and weakened our standing in the world. As a political "frame," it's been used to justify everything from the Iraq War to Guantanamo to illegal spying on the American people. It's even been used by this White House as a partisan weapon to bludgeon their political opponents. Whether by manipulating threat levels leading up to elections, or by deeming opponents "weak on terror," they have shown no hesitation whatsoever about using fear to divide.But the worst thing about this slogan is that it hasn't worked. The so-called "war" has created even more terrorism—as we have seen so tragically in Iraq. The State Department itself recently released a study showing that worldwide terrorism has increased 25% in 2006, including a 40% surge in civilian fatalities.
By framing this as a "war," we have walked right into the trap that terrorists have set—that we are engaged in some kind of clash of civilizations and a war against Islam.
There are so many things wrong in this it's hard do know where to start.
First, there's the big lie that the Bush Administration is manipulating threat levels for political purposes. Where's the proof, John? None, of course, is offered, because there is none to be had. Just because a threat level is turned up before an election doesn't mean that it was done for political reasons. One of the most basic tenants of logic and statistics is that association is not causation.
One thing that amazes me about the anti-war left is that they tend to assume that all of our intelligence findings about the enemy must be made public, and that anyting that is not public doesn't exist. The have no understanding that so much happens behind the scenes, things that won't and shouldn't be made public for dozens of years. The public actions officials take are but the tip of the iceberg, and the public sees only a bit of what is going on.
Judith Coplon
One example should suffice.
In 1949 an employee at the Justice Department named Judith Coplon was arrested in the act of handing top-secret documents to a known KGB agent. FBI agents had been following her for some time, and as she was handing the documents to the Russian agent the FBI swooped in and arrested them both. Coplon was caught red handed, as it were.
Newspaper reporters asked FBI officials how it was that they suspected her. They told some story about how they watched everyone in the DOJ records department, and discovered that Coplon was pilfering documents.
Coplon was convicted in two separate trials, but each time an appeals court ruled that certain evidence the government presented was inadmissable, and nullified the convictions. Eventually the government gave up and she was let free.
Fast forward to 1994. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's (D-NY) Commission on Government Secrecy has the job of deciding which old covert programs can safely be made public. There is, after all, no reason to keep things classified forever, and the public should know about the successful efforts of our clandestine services.
One of the programs that Moynihan's commission decides to make public was project Venona. During project Venona, the Signals Intelligence Service (the precursor to today's NSA) intercepted and decrypted hundreds of cables sent from the Soviet embassy in Washington DC to Moscow during 1942-45. They were not able to decrypt all cables, and some were only partially decrypted, but the intelligence haul was monumental nonetheless.
In the cables some 349 American agents working for one or another Soviet intelligence service were identified by code name. Of these, American intelligence was able to identify by name 171, leaving 178 unidentified to this day.
Among those identified in the cables was Judith Coplon.
At Coplon's trial, government prosecutors had a problem. If they revealed the existance of project Venona, the KGB would be alerted to the fact that many of it's agents had been compromised, and the Soviets would redouble their efforts to secure their codes. On the other hand, by not revealing Venona, much of the government evidence that was presented might get thrown out (you'll have to read the details of the trials yourself if you want to know why, because the technicalities would time some time to explain and I'm not a lawyer anyway).
In the end, the prosecution took the only decision they could; they kept Venona secret. Partially as a result of this decision, Coplon's two convictions were overturned and she walked.
Back to Edwards
In case it's not blindingly obvious by the example above, project Venona also revealed that Alger Hiss and Julius Rosenberg were Soviet spys. Yet for decades the far left claimed that they were innocent victims of McCarthyism.
No I am not saying that we should blindly trust whatever the Bush Administration tells us. What I am saying is that people need to be aware that when they turn up the terrorist threat level and only issue vague justifications we need to understand that there is a lot going on that we don't know about, and won't for decades.
So when Edwards talks about the Bush Administration "manipulating threat levels leading up to elections" he sounds like a complete idiot.
War on Terror?
In a way, Edwards is right when he says that there is no War on Terror. Unfortunately, his reason is completely wrong.
The correct answer would have been to say that we're in a War on Terror makes about as much sense as describing World War II as a War on Blitzkreig. It wasn't about fighting a tactic, but rather about fighting an ideology.
As such, as I've said many times, we're really in a "War on Jihadism". Our enemies, in their videos, pamphlets, and communications, call themselves "men of jihad". We ought to do them the favor of taking seriously what they say.
But is it a war? Edwards thinks not. Like most liberals, he distrusts and dislikes military action, and any military action is usually characterized as "an over reliance" on it.
The jihadists have been saying for decades that they are in a war against us. When Osama bin Laden issued his famous 1998 Fatwa declaring war against the United States, neither Republicans nor Democrats took them seriously, to say nothing of the major media. Stunned by this non-reaction, bin Laden took it as a sign from Allah that the United States was ready to be attacked. We paid the deadly consequences on September 11.
Of course we're in a war. Using this term does not, as Edwards supposes, mean that military action is our predominant method of fighting it. For over 40 years we fought what was properly called the "Cold War" against the Soviet Union, yet employed many methods other than military action to win it. Does he want us to rename that time period also?
For that matter President Johnson and other liberals declared a "War on Poverty" in the 1960s. The plain fact is that applying the term "war" to something does not mean that those involved necessarily see military action as the prime or only method of fighting it.
Playing Defense
Much else that Edwards says in the speech is silly as well. Consider this passage
We must be clear about when it is appropriate for a commander-in-chief to use force. As president, I will only use offensive force after all other options including diplomacy have been exhausted, and after we have made efforts to bring as many countries as possible to our side. However, there are times when force is justified: to protect our vital national interests... to respond to acts of aggression by other nations and non-state actors... to protect treaty allies and alliance commitments... to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons... and to prevent or stop genocide.
Sorry, but no it isn't clear at all as to when you'd use military force. As Jim Geraghty comments, "Okay, but how would he, or any other President, know that all other options have been exhausted? How do you know with 100 percent certainty that no additional efforts, concessions, negotiations, requests, or efforts at persuasion will bring on additional allies? When is it considered enough?"
Recall that in 1991 a majority of Democrats in the House and Senate voted against the resolution authorizing President George H.W. Bush to eject Saddam from Kuwait. Yet the Bush Administration had garnered worldwide support, and had all of the necessary Security Council resolutions in place. If that wasn't enough, what was?
It would seem, therefore, that Edwards is setting up a series of conditions that he know cannot be met. No matter how much failed negotiation takes place, he can always say that we ought to give it "another chance".
This is nothing new from the Democrats. Some time ago I reflected on all of the little conditions they were setting up and drafted some new rules for going go war Democrat-style.
And Finally
One of two more points and I'll let this go. Edwards again
But I will also remove any civilian or military officer who stifles debate or simply tells me what I want to hear.
What does this even mean? That he's going to fire anyone who agrees with him? This is the sort of pap that gets applause from the crowd but doesn't really mean anything. I t sounds good in theory but would be hard to actually enforce.
These troops are exhausted and overworked, and we have been forced to dig deeper and deeper to find ground forces for Iraq and Afghanistan. This leaves us ill-prepared for the future. Today, every available combat active-duty Army combat brigade has been to Iraq or Afghanistan for at least one 12-month tour. We are sending some troops back to Iraq with less than a year's rest. To make matters worse, the Secretary of Defense just extended tours from 12 to 15 months, which is unconscionable.
The proper response, of course, would be to rebuild our armed forces, which have fallen disasterously in size since the end of the Cold War.
Last month the editors of National Review provided some facts that shows just how small our military has become compared to the force that ejected Saddam from Kuwait.
From 1974 to 1989, the Army had 770,000 to 780,000 active troops (all of them volunteers). Today, we have around 508,000. The Navy had 568 ships in the late 1980s; today it has 276, and its manpower is so reduced that it often has to helicopter sailors from homebound ships to outbound ones in order to keep them staffed. The Air Force’s number of tactical air wings has shrunk from 37 to 20, and the average age of its aircraft is 24 years (as compared with nine years in 1973).
In addition (sorry but I can't find the link just now to prove it) during most of the Cold War we spent about 8% of GDP on defense. Today it's under 4%. For a time we spent about 50% of the federal budget on defense, today I believe it's under 20%. One of the biggest failures of the Bush Administration has been to not increase the size of our armed forces.
Edwards gives a positively Clintonian response as to whether he'd increase the size of our military
The problem of our force structure is not best dealt with by a numbers game. It is tempting for politicians to try and "out-bid" each other on the number of troops they would add. Some politicians have fallen right in line behind President Bush's recent proposal to add 92,000 troops between now and 2012, with little rationale given for exactly why we need this many troops—particularly with a likely withdrawal from Iraq.The numbers game only gets us into the same problems as the president's approach. We must be more thoughtful about what the troops will actually be used for. Any troops we add today would take a number of years to recruit and train, and so will not help us today in Iraq.
We might need a substantial increase of troops in the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Forces for four reasons: to rebuild from Iraq; to bolster deterrence; to decrease our heavy reliance on Guard and Reserve members in military operations; and to deploy in Afghanistan and any other trouble spots that could develop.
So does this mean he would or wouldn't increase the size of the military? I can't tell. 5 1/2 years from 9/11 and 4 years after the start of OIF and the best he tell us is that he "might" substantially increase the size of the military?
What he's doing is trying to have it both ways. In the first paragraph of the quoted secrion he's playing to the Kos kids, and in the last to whatever hawks are left in the Democrat party. In coming months he'll point to whichever paragraph suits him depending on his audience.
In short, Edwards gives us no reason to think that he would be a competent commander in chief. He is clueless as to the threat our nation faces, and has no serious plans to defeat the jihadists.
Posted by Tom at 12:30 PM | Comments (5) | TrackBack
March 13, 2007
Soldiers Angels in Kansas City
My friend Kat, who normally blogs at The Middle Ground, has been working with some of her friends to do something special for the troops in her area.
They became involved in the Kansas City chapter of the Soldiers Angels, a 501 3(c) organization dedicated to sending care packages to our troops overseas. Their motto: "May No Soldier Go Unloved"
Among other things, Kat and her frields constructed a float and marched in the annual North Kansas City, Missouri Snake Saturday Parade. The Snake parade is a charity event and raises awareness for charities in the Kansas City area.
Videos are on the KC chapter website. Go and watch them.
Several times I have posted about Adopt-a-Platoon, an organization in which I participate to send letters and care packages to soldiers. Whether you choose to participate through one of these or another charity doesn't matter. Our troops need to know that we care about them and are willing to take action. Head over and sign up today.
Posted by Tom at 7:38 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
February 25, 2007
Adopt-a-Platoon
Our troops need your support more now than ever.
Adopt-a-Platoon is an organization that offers many ways you can support our troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. I've been sending weeky letters and/or packages to soldiers and Marines through them for a few years now so I know they're a good outfit.
Please go to their site and see if one of their programs fits the level of support that you can provide. You do not have to adopt an entire platoon of 50 troops. They have different levels of individual troop support, and have both recurring and one-time programs.
If you're already involved in one or more campaigns through this or any other organization, then God bless you for your efforts. If not, please go visit Adopt-a-Platoon and check out the ways you can support our troops.
Posted by Tom at 8:35 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
January 10, 2007
The President's Speech on a New Plan for Iraq
President Bush gave his much anticipated speech outlining a new strategy for victory in Iraq tonight, and here are my initial thoughts on the matter.
It was shorter than I thought it was going to be, only about 20 minutes by my count. President Clinton took that long just to warm up. Here is the transcript posted at Fox News.
First, if you don't already know, the President is apparently basing some of or much of his new strategy on the plan laid out by Frederick Kagan and Gen Jack Keane (Ret) of the American Enterprise Institute, called "Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq". If you haven't already done so, I strongly encourage you to follow the link and download the "Interim Report", which is a 56 slide powerpoint in the form of an Adobe file. At the very least, please read the Executive Summary.
On with the speech. Following are excerpts
But in 2006, the opposite happened. The violence in Iraq - particularly in Baghdad — overwhelmed the political gains the Iraqis had made. Al Qaeda terrorists and Sunni insurgents recognized the mortal danger that Iraq's elections posed for their cause. And they responded with outrageous acts of murder aimed at innocent Iraqis. They blew up one of the holiest shrines in Shia Islam — the Golden Mosque of Samarra — in a calculated effort to provoke Iraq's Shia population to retaliate. Their strategy worked. Radical Shia elements, some supported by Iran, formed death squads. And the result was a vicious cycle of sectarian violence that continues today.
Well that's pretty honest. Not that I think he'll win applause from the Kos crowd, but the admission that the enemy's strategy worked is more than I think most presidents in history have been willing to say.
We benefited from the thoughtful recommendations of the Iraq Study Group...
And later
In keeping with the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, we will increase the embedding of American advisers in Iraqi Army units — and partner a Coalition brigade with every Iraqi Army division.
Ha. The President dismissed it out of hand is what he did, as well he should. Yes the ISG had a few good ideas, but most of them were bad. What the President did here was just thow them a bone for show.
The consequences of failure are clear: Radical Islamic extremists would grow in strength and gain new recruits. They would be in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Our enemies would have a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks on the American people. On September the 11th, 2001, we saw what a refuge for extremists on the other side of the world could bring to the streets of our own cities.
Bingo. Look, if you want to criticize the President and the dreaded neocons for mistakes made in the past go ahead. We'll take our lumps. But those who call for immediate withdrawal without a single thought as to the consequences are irresponsible in the extreme. For an example of one of the most mindless rants of this sort, read Senator Kennedy's speech at the National Press Club of earlier today. Rapid withdrawal will likely lead to a collapse of the Iraqi government and mass slaughter, but Kennedy seems not to care at all.
Back to the President:
The most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security, especially in Baghdad. Eighty percent of Iraq's sectarian violence occurs within 30 miles of the capital. This violence is splitting Baghdad into sectarian enclaves, and shaking the confidence of all Iraqis. Only the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their people. And their government has put forward an aggressive plan to do it.
Slide 12 of the Keane-Kagan plan (I told you to download it ;-) points out that "Baghdad is now the center of gravity in this conflict", and as such "We must act at once to improve security there." Slides 15-16 are maps of the city showing where the violence is occuring, and slides 17 and 18 outline the Iraqi militias and terrorist groups causing it.
Our past efforts to secure Baghdad failed for two principal reasons: There were not enough Iraqi and American troops to secure neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents. And there were too many restrictions on the troops we did have. Our military commanders reviewed the new Iraqi plan to ensure that it addressed these mistakes. They report that it does. They also report that this plan can work.
In two posts last October (here and here) I discussed this effort, and that it failed partially due to a lack of American troops. We could clear, but we couldn't hold. It depended on the Iraqis to do the holding, and they just weren't up to it. Later in the speech the President admitted just his when he said that
In earlier operations, Iraqi and American forces cleared many neighborhoods of terrorists and insurgents — but when our forces moved on to other targets, the killers returned. This time, we will have the force levels we need to hold the areas that have been cleared.
I think that those who believe that we should stick to our "light footprint" strategy, which emphasizes training the Iraqis, are mistaken because Iraq is sliding into chaos faster than we can build up a viable Iraqi army.
The President then talked about deploying more Iraqi units to the fight. However, they can't do it on their own.
Our commanders say the Iraqis will need our help. So America will change our strategy to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian violence - and bring security to the people of Baghdad. This will require increasing American force levels. So I have committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. The vast majority of them — five brigades — will be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs.
ABC News is reporting that the "surge" has already begun.
The phrase "well defined mission" is critical, both for military and political reasons. Many questioned why we should send more troops to do the same thing. The President is trying to tell people that this will not be the case. The Executive Summary to the Keane-Kagan plan makes just this point
We must change our focus from training Iraqi soldiers to securing the Iraqi population and containing the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now it must become the first priority.
As we all know, the Iraqi government not exactly been holding up their end of the bargain. The months-long squabbling to form a government was an embarassment. Many suspect that Maliki would just as soon let the Shia militias kill as many Sunnis as possible.
I have made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people — and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people. Now is the time to act. The Prime Minister understands this.
Does he? We should know the answer in a few short months.
This new strategy will not yield an immediate end to suicide bombings, assassinations, or IED attacks. Our enemies in Iraq will make every effort to ensure that our television screens are filled with images of death and suffering.
Not exactly "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat", but close enough.
Kagan and Keane anticipate enemy reaction on slides 30, 31, and 32, and suggest how we should counter them.
A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and communities....To give every Iraqi citizen a stake in the country's economy, Iraq will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis. To show that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi government will spend 10 billion dollars of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs.
Slides 37-40 discuss such reconstruction. From what I understand, part of our problem with such past efforts is that A) we couldn't adequately secure the reconstruction efforts, leading to a loss of credibility when the terrorists blew something up, and B) We reconstructed everywhere, instead of only doing so in areas willing to cooperate with us. Now, hopefully, we will establish a real carrot-and-stick system; cooperate and you'll get reconstruction money, otherwise you're on your own.
We will double the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
I've heard that these have been working out very well in Afghanistan, and have heard some frustration that they had not been used to as good effect in Iraq. Hopefully that will now change.
Succeeding in Iraq also requires defending its territorial integrity — and stabilizing the region in the face of the extremist challenge. This begins with addressing Iran and Syria. These two regimes are allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops. We will disrupt the attacks on our forces. We will interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq.
When I first heard this, and even when I read it later, I thought "that's pretty vague". I wasn't expecting him to announce airstrikes, but was hoping for something more.
But Michael Ledeen points out the sentence "And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq." and asks what else can it mean other than we're going to go after the training and supply bases in Syria and Iran? It does sound like it, and I certainly hope we do it.
The challenge playing out across the broader Middle East is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of our time. On one side are those who believe in freedom and moderation. On the other side are extremists who kill the innocent, and have declared their intention to destroy our way of life. In the long run, the most realistic way to protect the American people is to provide a hopeful alternative to the hateful ideology of the enemy — by advancing liberty across a troubled region.
Pretty close. If you think that the war is about "getting bin Laden", put your dunce cap on. It's about defeating radical Islam, plain and simple. We're always told that it can't be done with bombs and bullets alone, so spreading liberty (a bit different than democracy) is the only long term plan that makes sense to me.
Acting on the good advice of Senator Joe Lieberman and other key members of Congress, we will form a new, bipartisan working group that will help us come together across party lines to win the war on terror.
I have to think that Lieberman is almost persona non grata among Democrats these days when it comes to the war, but it works for me.
Most of the rest of the speech is fluff. The above are the main points.
Final Thoughts
I doubt that the speech will change many minds, at least in the anti-war camp. What will be interesting is to see if they actually have any alternative other than cut-and-run.
Those who want to win are divided on strategy, but at least we have ideas, many of which I outlined in previous installments of this series.
Either way, the President is going to push ahead and let congress squabble. Most anti-war Democrats don't have the courage of their convictions to cut off funds, but they don't have an alternate strategy to win, either. They seem to vaguely hope that the situation will simmer and the president will slowly bring home the troops. Iraq will fall into chaos and they can blame him. It would seem that he's determined not to let that happen, and is going to give it the 'ol college try one more time.
I say we support him on it. I'm going to write my Senators, Warner and Webb, as well as my Congressman Frank Wolf and let them know that I want them to support this effort. Yes I know that Webb will probably come out against it but he's going to hear from me anyway.
Previous
New Plan for Iraq V
New Plan for Iraq IV
New Plan for Iraq III
New Plan for Iraq II
Here's the New Plan for Iraq
Update
I wrote Rep Wolf and Sen Warner, but cannot find any email or web form contact information for newly elected Sen Webb, either on his new Senate web page or his campaign site. If you can find an email contact for him please leave one in comments. Until he gets around to setting this up I'll have to send him snail mail.
Posted by Tom at 10:50 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
May 20, 2006
Air Show at Andrews Air Force Base
Today I went to the annual air show at Andrews Air Force Base. The official name of the event is Joint Service Open House 2006, which is technically more accurate because all of the services are represented, including the Coast Guard. The aircraft, of course, are the main attraction.
Andrews AFB is in Maryland, just outside of Washington DC.
This year, the weather was perfect. Not too hot, not too cold. A bit of clouds but nothing major.
Modern military aircraft are truly amazing. We saw lots of aircraft demonstrations; F-15, F-16, AV-8, a World War II era P-15 Mustang, a Korean War F-86, even the new F-22. The Canadian Snowbirds and U.S. Navy Blue Angels put on tremendous shows. Paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne jumped out of C-130s. As I got there, the US Army Golden Knights parachute team was finishing their landings.
All day, the pilots put their aircraft through their paces today, twisting, turning, and climbing, mostly in afterburner. The thrust ratios of modern jet fighter aircraft is so high that they can accelerate going straight up, assuming one doesn't mind burning a lot of fuel quickly. The result is an aircraft that doesn't seem bound by the laws of gravity. They just go where they want when they want.
And they made it look easy.
So without further ado, here are some of the resulting photos
They let you climb up for a quick look at the crew cabin of this B-1b Lancer. Times have certainly changed, because in the 80s even that would have been classified. Interestingly the pilot was a woman. I spoke with her a bit while in line, as I try to do with all of them. I've been to maybe a dozen airshows over the years, and have always found that the pilots and aircrew love talking to the public and answering their questions.
The pilot of this B-52 Stratofortress said that his longest mission was 37 hours. For such a large aircraft, the crew area, like that of the B-1, is amazingly small and cramped. The crews call it the BUFF, which stands for Big Ugly Fat F..... I'll let you figure out the last word.
Here's an AV-8 Harrier making a vertical landing while an F-15 taxies by.
Several World War II era aircraft were there, including this Navy/Marine Corps F4U Corsiar. The Corsair was one of the fastest fighters of the war, although it was mostly useful as ground attack during our many amphibious invasions. It flew one of the demos.
In the foreground is a Mig-17 (basically a Korean War era Mig-15 with an afterburner), and in the background an F-86 Sabre. The F-86 and Mig-15 squared off in Korea, while the Mig-17 was one of our main adversaries in Vietnam
The Canadian Snowbirds taxi out in front of the Blue Angels. The Snowbirds are the Canadian military's precision flight demonstration team. They do everything our Blue Angels and Thunderbirds do, only slower. Only a superpower can afford to spare front-line jets for this type of duty.
The Snowbirds gave a pretty good account of themselves.
Here are the next generation of aircraft; the F-35 JSF and F-22 Raptor. First up, the F-35. "JSF" stands for Joint Strike Fighter, because it will be used by all services. It is not in production yet. It will also have VSTOL (Vertical and Short Take Off and Landing) capability, so it will also replace the Marine Corps AV-8 Harrier, in addition to the Air Force F-16 and some of the Navy F-18s. The UK's RAF and Royal Navy are also scheduled to purchase this aircraft.
The F-22 Raptor, pictured below, will soon dominate the skies. A huge C-5 Galaxy transport is in the background. The Raptor is now in production and I believe a squadron has been formed. I've read where they've put the F-22 up against F-15s and it shoots them down like it's swatting flies. The F-15s don't stand a chance. Expensive? Terribly. Worth it? Every penny. The Russians and Europeans are fielding some very good new fighters, and the F-15 is getting old (it first flew in 1972).
Here's a view of the F-22's tail, which shows it's unique thrust vectoring nozzles, which give it such great maneuverability. The black tail at left is the vertical stabilizer of an F-117 Nighthawk ("stealth fighter")
The pilots and aircrew love telling people about their aircraft. The aircraft below is the EA-6B Prowler, the Navy's electronic warfare aircraft.
This is what they call a "Heritage" flight, which has become popular of late. Aircraft of different eras fly together in a precision flying demonstration. Here we have a WWII P-51 Mustang, a Vietnam War F-4 Phantom II, a Gulf War/WOT F-15 Eagle, and the new F-22 Raptor.
The U.S. Navy Blue Angels
The stars of the show were the last demonstration of the day, taking off at around 3:30. As with the others, their flying is amazing and they make it look easy.
This, I think, was my best photograph of the day.
The Army and Marines
The Army and Marine Corps had their major helicopters and ground vehicles on display. Here is our main battle tank, the M1 Abrams. In the background is a self-propelled artillery piece. I didn't get the type.
Not Pictured
Around and inside the aircraft hangers behind the static displays, the Army, Marines, and Coast Guard had more displays. Units such as the Rangers and 101st Airborne have displays of what seems to be most of their equipment. I didn't really get a chance to speak with many of them, but I'm sure there were some veterans of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Also, many aircraft flew that I took pictures of but didn't publish here. My cheap digital camera only has a 3x optical zoom, and in most of the photos you only see a barely recognizable shape which, due to some weird rule of physics, seems farther away in the photo than it did live. The F-15, F-16 and F-22 did demonstrations which were absolutely amazing. This was the airshow at which I've seen an F-22 fly. Since they're all using their afterburners for the maneuvers, the sound is quite loud and impressive.
In addition to providing entertainment and information, airshows and military open houses are, of course, part sales pitch. They want to show the public first hand what their tax dollars are buying, and convince us that it's worth it to keep buying more such hardware. Yes I know that there's more to the story than what's shown here. But I've no problem with this type of government spending. Heck, I wish there was more of it.
Posted by Tom at 8:51 PM | Comments (5) | TrackBack
June 6, 2005
The Fallacy of the ABM Mentality
This past Sunday I was watchiing the 11:00am show on Fox News while at my part-time job at an electronic retail store. The guest was John Loftus. From his website, "As a former Justice Department prosecutor, John Loftus once held some of the highest security clearances in the world, with special access to NATO Cosmic, CIA codeword, and Top Secret Nuclear files."
He told of a new Russian supersonic cruise missile which would be a threat to the US Navy or indeed the continental United States.
Although I didn't get the name of the missile at the time, from subsequent research I believe it to be the PJ-10 BrahMos.
The weapon is the result of a joint venture between India's Defence Research and Development Organisation and Russia's NPO Mashinostroyenia. From Global Security:
The BrahMos missile is a two-stage vehicle that has a solid propellant booster and a liquid (propellant) ram jet system.The jointly developed Indo-Russian anti-ship cruise missile, which was successfully test-fired from Chandipur interim test range in Orissa, is a crucial step forward in India's defence efforts. This technological achievement places India among a small group of countries to acquire the capacity of producing cruise missiles. What, however, makes the jointly produced cruise missile distinguishable from others is that it travels at a supersonic speed i.e. more than twice the speed of sound. Almost all other contemporary anti-ship missiles fly at subsonic speed. Its other distinguishing feature is that the Indo-Russian cruise missile is a state-of-the-art product.
Its unmatchable speed is its high point, making it invincible. The supersonic speed imparts it a greater strike-power as well. Possessing stealth characteristics, the 6.9-meter cruise missile weighing three tons has a range of 280 km. Its another outstanding feature is that it is highly accurate and can be guided to its target mainly with the help of an onboard computer. This has been established by the test-flight. The computer and the guidance system have been designed by India whereas Russia has provided the propulsion system.
Loftus' point was that this and similar weapons invalidated our missile defense program, because they are an "end around". The idea is that countries can "simply" get around our missile defenses by developing our buying long-range cruize missiles.
Loftus wanted us to take from this that pulling out of the ABM was a huge mistake. Indeed, according to Loftus the "the Russians warned us" that they'd develop this weapon when we pulled out.
Even if I do not have the technical specifics correct as to what weapon Loftus was referring to, it doesn't really matter. We've all heard these arguments before.
The Fallacy of the ABM Mentality
There are a whole host of reasons why I believe Missile Defense is needed and why the opponents are wrong. Here we go, in no particular order:
First, let's get the Russians out of the way.
By this I mean an enemy who has the capability to fire serious amounts of nuclear weaponry our way. It was often said during the Cold War that missile defense was pointless because we couldn't stop every one they fired at us. Plenty would get though, and the devastation would be terrible. Better to rely on treaties and Mutual Assured Destruction.
There are several things wrong with these arguments. One, MAD is of dubious morality, especially when the targeting is countervalue (population centers) rather than counterforce (military targets). Second, treaties would never do much good anyway. Third, worst case, by reducing even a percentage of incoming missiles we would avoid at least some damage. I never did buy the "I'd rather be dead than live in a post-nuclear world" stuff. I'll take my chances alive, thank you. I at least want a chance to live. And you have no business telling Americans that they'd be better of dead anyway.
The Alternate Delivery Argument
Some say that if we build defenses against missiles "all our enemies have to do is to find another way to deliver them." Loftus was making just such an argument. If we build a defense against missiles, our enemy will build low-to-the-ground cruise missiles. Or they'll smuggle them into our cities. It's sort of an updated Maginot Line argument.
But by this logic we may as well not defend against anything. Airport security? They'll just hijack trains. Harbor security? They'll just come across the border. Firewalls on our computer systems? They'll just get work to get jobs with clearances and subvert systems from within. For that matter, why build defenses against anything?
But a Missile Attack is not Probable
This is another version of the argument made above. The problem with it is that all you have to do is look around the world and see the types and numbers of missiles our enemies have. All too many pose a serious threat to our country.
But it would be Suicide for them to Attack Us
Al-Qaeda crazies are one thing, this line of argument goes, but leaders of nation-states have too much to lose.
Sometimes this argument holds water. For example, once Breshnev came into power, the Soviet Union was not going to up and launch nuclear strikes on us. They were evil, but not crazy. Same with the Chinese in the post-Mao Tse-Tung era.
But even this starts to fall apart, and I haven't even gotten to the main part of my counter-argument. Note what I said above; "in the post...era" Khrushchev and Mao were dangerous and unpredictable, the former a ranting warmonger, and the latter completely uncaring about the possible deaths of millions of his countrymen in a nuclear war with the United States (Mao even scared the Russians, who came away shaken after conversations with him on this subject).
But the main problem with this anti-missile defense argument is that it assumes that foreign leaders will behave according to our definition of what is rational. It is "mirror image" thinking; "they would do such-and-such because if I were in their shoes it is what I would do." Now is not the time or place for a hundred examples from history, but a quick review of the Second World War should disbuse anyone of the notion that totalitarians act rationally.
It Won't Work
This argument is stated in various forms. Another version is "they'll always be one step ahead of us". No matter how it is stated, what it comes down to is a technical argument that our technology won't be up the task.
I don't have the time to do a full-scale dissertation, but suffice it to make a few points. One, development of an ABM system will take time. Because of constant opposition from Democrats, we are behind we should be. We lost much time during the 1990s. Second, we put a man on the moon thirty-five years ago, folks. Come on, of course we can do it if we set our minds (and money) to the task. Yes there will be failures along the way. Many, probably. But all test programs are full of failures (and if aircraft, crashes).
Ok, enough for now. Not a terribly topical post, I realize, but one I wanted to write about.
Posted by Tom at 10:21 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
March 22, 2005
Fake Statistics
Michelle Malkin has an excellent post on "The Myth of Black Soldier's Dying Disproportionately" in Vietnam, the Gulf War, and the Iraq War.
We've all heard the claim that black soldiers are frontline fodder in Iraq and are being killed disproportionately.I've heard this before, but it needs repeating every now and then. Kudo's to the New York Times for having the courage to take this issue on.In fact, as this New York Times op-chart makes clear, the truth is just the opposite. White and Hispanic soliders are overrepresented among military personnel killed in Iraq, whereas African American soldiers are underrepresented. (Blacks account for 18.6 percent of military personnel in Iraq, but account for only 10.9 percent of military personnel killed.)
The same was true in World War II, the Korean War, and the 1991 Gulf War. In Vietnam, sometimes referred to as "a war fought by black men against yellow men on behalf of white men," blacks accounted for 12.5 percent of all combat deaths versus 13.1 percent of the young male adult population of fighting age.
Check out the article on Vietnam stats, it's well worth reading. Among other things, you'll learn that
- The oft-cited "statistic" that one-in-three Vietnam vets suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is not even close to the truth (although PTSD is itself very much real)
- Suicide, homelessness, and drug abuse rates for Vietnam vets are about the same as for the rest of the population.
- The incarceration rate for Vietnam vets is lower than that for the general population.
- Two-third of those who served in Vietnam were volunteers.
Don't believe the crap you read in the liberal-left media about the number of civilians killed in Afghanistan or Iraq. The numbers they cite are mostly false. (hat tip USS Neverdock)
The Johns Hopkins study, published in the British medical journal Lancet, claimed that 100,000 civilians were killed as as result of U.S. and coalition actions in the invasion of Iraq. This is usually used in an attempt to discredit the invasion.
Slate completely debunked this study last October, and Instapundit has more last week. Both Slate and Instupundit get into details on statistical analysis that I am not qualified to comment on, but I can read plain English. And the story in Slate spells it out:
Readers who are accustomed to perusing statistical documents know what the set of numbers in the parentheses means. For the other 99.9 percent of you, I'll spell it out in plain English—which, disturbingly, the study never does. It means that the authors are 95 percent confident that the war-caused deaths totaled some number between 8,000 and 194,000. (The number cited in plain language—98,000—is roughly at the halfway point in this absurdly vast range.)Some reader comments posted on Instapundit:This isn't an estimate. It's a dart board.
andAre we honestly to believe that twice as many non-combatants have died as a result of the liberation of Iraq as were American combatants in 8 years of VietNam? In a war designed and fought to minimize civilian casualties with things like GPS guided bombs?
Please, you have the power to unleash the internet on this wholesale fabrication with a call to factual arms. This fraud cannot go unchallenged or in 30 days from now, it will simply be cited as irrefutable “fact” that “George Bush killed 100,000 Iraqis.”
There's no need to debunk the 100,000 civilian casualty figure being cited so often by war opponents. In progressive circles it's an article of faith that pre-war sanctions killed 5000 Iraqis per month. Cost of the war two years later? 20,000 Iraqi civilians saved! And counting...Surely civilians have been killed. And, as I said in my post on Discrimination in Just War Theory, we are required to try and protect the lives of civilians. But we don't have to put up with fake statistics.
Posted by Tom at 1:27 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
December 15, 2004
Humvee Armor and the Secretary
As it turns out, the Homespun Blogger's weekly symposium question is about Secretary Rumsfeld and the Humvee armor question. I addressed the issue in this post:
It's been pretty well established that the incident the other day when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld got some by tough questions from soldiers over Humvee armor was a setup. The reporter's behavior was completely out of line (and something of a braggart too). And Senators such as McCain and Biden, both of whom have been quite critical lately, are simply positioning themselves to run for president in '08. Further, we live in an age of style over substance, one in which the way a question is answered gets greater attention than the substance of the question at hand. But lapsing into despair over these things will not make them go away.
Ultimately, the question about the armor is valid. And it is inexcusable for Rumsfeld to have appeared startled by the question. After all, the issue of armor on Humvees and other vehicles has occupied the Pentagon for some time.
And unfortunately for Rumsfeld, it might get worse before it get's better. William Kristol, one of the most influential neoconservatives around, has declared in a Washington Post editorial that he no longer supports the Secretary. It seems to me that Kristol is entirely too hard on Rumsfeld, and seems unaware that the issue is actually fairly complicated.
And, before we write off our Defense Secretary over armor on Humvees, let's site back and take a deep breath. For the plain fact is that far from being the "arrogant, buck-passing" Secretary that Bill Kristol seems to think he is, Rummy is actually quite iconoclastic. He's trying to shake things up at the Pentagon far more than I think is generally realized.
Consequences
If there is any blame, it is in not anticipating that there would be an insurgency. We need to remember that we thought that what we were worried about was fighting a conventional battle against the Iraqi army. As such, our Army and Marine Corps was configured to fight just such a war. Armor on Humvees was simply not important in a traditional invasion, where armored vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank and Bradley M2/M3 fighting vehicle would lead the way.
But then, almost no one anticipated the insurgency. Recall that those who opposed the war warned of many dire consequences, but few if any mentioned a long insurgency. Most were focused on a conventional fight with the Iraqi army, or chemical attacks on our troops. Others told us that a civil war would almost certainly erupt, or that massive famine would ensue. Still others were certain that the "Arab street" thoughout the Middle East would erupt and chaos would ensue throughout the region, perhaps even toppling governments. But then if you're anti-war you are always forgiven.
That none of these things have happened seems not to matter to some of these critics. For the plain fact is that the requirements of an invading column and those of an anti-insurgent force are quite different. And it's not so simple to revamp overnight.
Armor on a Humvee has disadvantages, as has been pointed out elsewhere. One of them is slower speed, which can be a tactical disadvantage. Another is increased fuel consumption. In an insurgency, when you are operating from bases close to the scene of the action, this is not a big deal. But go back to the original invasion of Iraq (or of another country). This additional weight on the vehicles could very well have slowed down the invasion columns to the point where the Iraqis were able to put up a better defense. And this would have resulted in a longer conventional phase to the conflict. Which would have resulted in criticism from the usual suspects.
Some Marines in Fallujah have pointed out the pros and cons of armor to reporters who told them about the dustup with Rumsfeld
Asked whether he would prefer a closed Humvee with bulletproof windows, Munns said "it's a yes-and-no answer."
"An enclosed vehicle reduces your visibility and if you are not able to see an attack you might as well have no armor at all," he said. "It needs to be a fine balance between visibility and protection."
Munns said he prefers mobility over the weight of extra body armor.
The three Marines agree that the most exposed person is their gunner in the turret.
"He has to think about the bigger stuff, he is up there, more exposed than any of us," Munns noted.
History and More History
Here is where things get difficult. For me as a writer, that is. . Certainly it looks like up-armored Humvees are necessary in fighting the insurgency. Certainly also many soldiers are angry that they don't have enough armor. And maybe the Pentagon should have anticipated the need and got them out to the field faster. But, and I don't at all mean to sound callus here folks, but in the scheme of history this is not a huge screw-up. It is important and deserves our attention. Woe be the day when we shrug off what our troops tell us that they need.
And from most of what I read the Pentagon is and has been trying to get armor on the Humvees and trucks. Have their been mistakes, and should the job have been done faster and better? Perhaps so.
However, we need to put all this in the perspective of history. And if we take a little trip back through time, here are some things that we discover
- We entered World War II with 80% of our torpedoes being defective. That's right, folks, up to 80% of the torpedoes that we fired didn't work for one or more of three reasons: they dove too deep, they failed to explode on contact, or they detonated en route to the enemy ship, the magnetic detector being the culprit (ideally a torpedo goes under the enemy ship and detonates to achieve maximum damage, thus a magnetic detector is required to detect the steel of the ship).
- Not only did we enter the war with inferior and outright lousy tanks, we never did achieve parity with the Germanys. The reasons why we stuck with the venerable Sherman are many (and some quite valid), but that does not excuse the fact that we entered the war with inferior tanks. (Note to techies; yes I know this issue, like all others concerning military hardware, is very complex. See posts here, for example)
- The Shermans that we did finally build couldn't deal with the hedgerow country in Normandy in the days and weeks after the D-Day invasion. The tanks became stuck in the hedgerows that were all over the area and became bogged down. Finally a US sergeant came up with the idea of welding a fork-like scoop to the front of the tanks. When they came to a hedgerow they were able to plow the hedges up and keep moving. None of this was anticipated, as arguably it should have.
- However one comes down on the debate about US tanks, no one can dispute that our aircraft were almost universally inferior, especially to those the Japanese had. Our F4F Wildcat couldn't match the famous Mitsubishi Zero, the F2A Buffalo was a joke, the and TBD Devastator obsolete . At least theSBD Dauntless was a good aircraft.
- We went into Vietnam with F-4 Phantom fighter aircraft that didn't have guns. In our infinite wisdom we had thought that the days of gunbattles in the sky were over and everything would be decided by missiles. Wrong. Pilots quickly discovered that while missiles were preferred, there were many cases where only a gun would do. To rectify the situation we strapped a gun onto the center hard-point of the Phantoms (or some of them anyway), and only later reincorporated a gun into the aircraft.
Rumsfeld the Rebel
Take this story that appeared in the Wall Street Journal recently. The Army was quite convinced that it had discovered the way to winning future wars. Speed, overwhelming firepower, and ever-better C4I capabilities would surely devastate future enemies. What we found out was that yes, we could win this way - as long as the enemy cooperated. As Clausewitz reminded us
In war the will is directed at an animate object that reacts
Rumsfeld understands all this perfectly and it working to change how the Army fights.
"We're realizing strategic victory is about a lot more than annihilating the enemy," says one senior defense official in Mr. Rumsfeld's office. Victory also requires winning the support of locals and tracking down insurgents, who can easily elude advanced surveillance technology and precision strikes. In some cases, a slower, more methodical attack, one that allows U.S. troops to stabilize one area and hold it up as an example of what is possible for the rest of the country, could produce better results, according to emerging Army thinking.
Mr. Rumsfeld acknowledges that the military, which is still organized "to fight big armies, navies and air forces on a conventional basis," must change in order to deal with guerrilla fighters and terrorists. "The department simply has to be much more facile and agile," he says in an interview. "We have got to focus more on the post-combat phase."
and further
A recent directive, prepared by Mr. Rumsfeld's office and still in draft form, now yields to that view. It mandates that in the future, units' readiness for war should be judged not only by traditional standards, such as how well they fire their tanks, but by the number of foreign speakers in their ranks, their awareness of the local culture where they will fight, and their ability to train and equip local security forces. It orders the military's four-star regional commanders to "develop and maintain" new plans for battle, hoping to prevent the sort of postwar chaos that engulfed Iraq.But does it Matter?
Despite all of the good he has done in his position, Secretary Rumsfeld is under attack as never before. Regardless of what one thinks of Senators McCain and Hagel, when they call for his resignation we must pay attention. And when Bill Kristol adds his voice to the chorus, it's really time to sit up straight.
Perhaps the Humvee armor story is overblown. But if that is so it is more a case of the straw that broke the camel's back. Our inability thus far to put a lid on insurgency in Iraq has frustrated supporters of the war. That they should call for changes at the top should not surprise us.
Update
The editors of National Review, as usual, put some perspective on the issue of armor
Remember: When Rumsfeld showed up at the Pentagon for
his second stint as secretary of Defense, the army was hell-bent on building the Crusader, a "mobile" artillery system that couldn't even fit into a C-130 transport plane. It wanted to build the Comanche helicopter, an aircraft conceived in 1983 with our Soviet adversary in mind. The army was caught in a bad Cold War flashback. As the Wall Street Journal reported earlier this year, "Even as the armored Humvee proved itself in small conflicts around the globe, the Army failed to buy more because it was focused on preparing for major wars with other large armies — rather than low-end guerrilla conflicts."
It would be ironic if Rumsfeld lost his job over the issue of armor, when it was he who has been trying to revamp the military just so it could fight these "low-end guerrilla conflicts.
At this point, of course, everyone agrees on the need for more armored Humvees, which weren't originally conceived as combat vehicles. But in considering today's conventional wisdom, it is always useful to remember yesterday's. Before the roadside bombs really took hold as the Iraqi insurgents' weapon of choice, commentators were praising the British in Iraq for their unthreatening approach that emphasized soft vehicles and foot patrols. The Pentagon was criticized for its attachment to armor, not for having too little of it.
But hindsight is always 20/20 and if you're an anti-war commentator you are never held to account for what you said in the past.
Meanwhile, Republicans McCain and Hagel call for Rumsfeld's head. Once again, the editors of National Review
The get-Rumsfeld crowd — mostly Democrats, joined by the McCain-Hagel caucus and a few stray hawks — takes great umbrage at Rumsfeld's answer to a National Guardsman's question about an insufficient number of up-armored Humvees. Hagel intoned, “those men and women deserved a far better answer from their secretary of Defense than a flippant comment.” But Rumsfeld wasn't being flip. One wonders whether Hagel has even taken the time to read the full transcript of the secretary's remarks. The troops gave Rumsfeld a standing ovation at the end. Is it the position of the secretary’s critics that the troops were too stupid to realize they had just been belittled?
Further, Rumsfeld was certainly right when he said that you go to war with the army/military that you have. Long gone are the days when one had time to hold off the enemy with whatever was at hand while you built up your forces. Today we are almost required to see into the future. Unfortunately, noone has yet invented the necessary crystal ball.
Update IICourtesy of the Greg Pierce at the Washington Times
The truth is trickling out on the true state of affairs concerning the armoring of U.S. vehicles in Iraq, the Media Research Center reports.
" 'It now appears that the premise of the question that caused an uproar around Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was, so to speak, off base,' [Fox New Channel's] Brit Hume noted Tuesday night in reminding viewers how two weeks ago National Guardsman 'Thomas Wilson said to Rumsfeld, quote, "our vehicles are not armored, we do not have proper armament vehicles to carry with us north," into Iraq.'
"But, Hume relayed, 'according to senior Army officers, about 800 of the 830 vehicles in Wilson's Army regiment, the 278th Calvary, had already been up-armored' at the time of his widely publicized question.
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